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ABSTRACT 
 
ROSALIE GENOVA: Big Business, Democracy, and the American Way: 
Narratives of The Enron Scandal in 2000s Political Culture 
(Under the Direction of Dr. John Kasson) 
 
 
This study examines narratives of the Enron bankruptcy and their political, cultural and 
legal ramifications. People’s understandings and renderings of Enron have affected American 
politics and culture much more than have the company’s actual errors, blunders and lies. 
Accordingly, this analysis argues that narratives about Enron were, are, and will continue to be 
more important than any associated “facts.” Central themes of analysis include the legitimacy and 
accountability of leadership (both governmental and in business); contestation over who does or 
does not “understand” business, economics, or the law, and the implications thereof; and 
conceptions of the American way, the American dream, and American civic culture. The study 
also demonstrates how Enron narratives fit in to longer patterns of American commentary on big 
business. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Those who passed through Enron’s offices after the company declared bankruptcy on 
December 2, 2001, described an eerie scene reminiscent of the fabled ghost ship. It showed all 
signs of human occupancy; buzzing computer monitors, half-eaten snacks, and disarrayed 
papers all seemed to await the momentary return of people who had stepped out temporarily as if 
for a fire drill. Yet the 4,000 evacuees were gone forever—having been allowed only 30 minutes, 
on “Black Monday,” to clear the building. Now the surreal lifelessness at 1400 Smith Street in 
Houston was as startling and disturbing as the spectacular corporate collapse to which it 
testified.1  
This is one of several vivid images that have been strung together in an incoherent 
montage of the scandal: ominous trucks marked “Shred-It” and “Shredco;” the lowering of the 
“crooked E” logo from its perch above the Astros’ baseball field; President George W. Bush 
speaking in front of a banner reading “Corporate Responsibility;” the car in which an executive’s 
corpse was discovered; and those ordinary-looking Houstonians, crying and embracing, as they 
left their offices for the last time. In one sense, the Enron drama was over—yet on the national 
scene, its broader ramifications and meaning were still far from clear. Questions of business law 
and ethics and corporate influence on public policy were just as critical in American society before 
the Enron disaster as they are afterward. Such concepts may have been rather abstract, but the 
reality that thousands of employees and stockholders had lost their “nest eggs” now made them 
                                                 
1 Mimi Swartz with Sherron Watkins, Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron (New York: 
Doubleday, 2003); Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room, prod. Mark Cuban, Todd Wagner, and Joana 
Vicente, dir. Alex Gibney, 110 min., Magnolia Home Entertainment, 2005, DVD; Bethany McLean and Peter 
Elkind; The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron (New York: 
Portfolio, 2003); Loren Fox, Enron: The Rise and Fall (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2003); David Kaplan 
and L. M. Sixel, “Enron Lays off 4,000,” Houston Chronicle, 4 December 2001, 1A. 
 
 
 
all too concrete. If only for a moment, the Enron scandal won for these issues the level of public 
attention that they had deserved all along.  
From the company’s bankruptcy through the criminal trial of its chief executives in 2006, 
strikingly different narratives would compete in the public sphere, vying for primacy in laypeople’s 
understanding of “what went wrong at Enron.”2 Even the question, when posed this way, was rife 
with ambiguity. “Wrong” could have a moral meaning, making the inquiry an investigation into the 
greed, deceit and manipulation that caused or at least condoned the dramatic collapse. However, 
“wrong” could also be taken in its objective sense, referring to errors: human incompetence and 
misunderstanding. Like the notion of wrongness, so-called “fact” was critical in debates about 
Enron, but not always in the straightforward sense: “fact” was a hallowed concept, constantly 
invoked and just as constantly contested.  
If there was any consensus amid the rhetorical din of this moment, it was simply that 
something had happened that mattered. Were it not so, conceptualization of the story would have 
been neither urgent nor contentious. But the story was being told and re-told, in forums ranging 
from the State of the Union address to jokes exchanged among friends. This is a study of those 
stories—of narratives of the Enron bankruptcy and scandal. I seek not only to identify themes 
within Enron narratives and to establish those narratives’ significance, but also in summation to 
show how these stories about Enron fit in to much longer patterns of American commentary on 
big business. 
I began with a fascination with how people perceive, understand, and talk about large 
corporations in the contemporary United States.3 Yet as a research question, this interest was 
not only impossibly broad; it was also methodologically impractical. Most people do not generate 
a great deal of documents, under normal circumstances, about what they happen to think of this 
or that company, much less how they feel about anything as pervasive and yet as abstract as the 
                                                 
2 This is the title of a book purporting to be “Everyone’s Guide to the Largest Bankruptcy in U.S. History” 
(Peter C. Fusaro and Ross M. Miller, What Went Wrong at Enron: Everyone’s Guide to the Largest 
Bankruptcy in U.S. History (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2002).  
3 A “big business” is usually defined as one employing 10,000 people or more. Enron certainly qualified, but 
at any rate I am more interested in how big business is perceived than in this technical distinction. 
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current order of corporate capitalism. This is partly because today big business is ubiquitous and 
largely taken for granted—though this was not always the case.  
I realized that I needed to approach my question through some catalyzing event that 
brought ordinary people into the discussion about big business in American politics and society; 
something that inspired commentary from unexpected quarters and on which people were 
informed and impassioned enough actually to have opinions. Initially I thought Enron was too 
iconic, almost clichéd, but I came to see that as precisely the reason that it makes an apt case 
study. It was a scandal, yes, with all the inflated rhetoric and tawdry personal attacks that scandal 
usually breeds. But I find no anti-scandal that actually lasted: no nationally noted, protracted 
episode of trust, harmony and goodwill between US politicians, citizens, media and big business. 
Even if such an event did take place, it probably would be less interesting and less illuminating. A 
scandal, in how it is defined as well as how it is resolved, brings into relief a society’s standards 
for behavior and accountability.4 Because big business was at the center of this one, it prompted 
exactly the kind of reflection and debate that I sought. 
The more I read about Enron from the inside—from compensation policies to office 
nicknames—the more skeptical I became toward the popular assumption that something unique 
about its corporate culture condoned or even encouraged fraud. I do not offer any formal 
argument to the contrary, much less would I contend that Enron was a prudently managed 
company or even a comfortable place to work. But I do suggest that people’s reactions to Enron, 
as mounting facts and details about it became public, are more telling than we might think as to 
how they view big business as a whole. Many of Enron’s practices at which people balked were 
standard—suggesting systemic rather than episodic problems. If not for the rest, the company 
could have gone on with staggering profits and without any real scrutiny. In other words, it was 
only because Enron was in some ways an aberration that people had occasion to learn about and 
comment upon the norm. Thus the extraordinary, in this case study, gives way to the ordinary—
both in what goes on inside large corporations, and also in how people generally feel about it. 
                                                 
4 See Ari Adut, On Scandal: Moral Disturbances in Society, Politics and Art (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
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Despite all that was unexceptionable I quickly came to understand why Enron is so 
iconic; how it became (as its leaders so loudly complained) the singular “poster child” for the 
spate of dramatic business failures during the first few years of this century. Enron’s plummet into 
bankruptcy was outstanding, to be sure, in its speed, its complexity, and its ramifications. Widely 
lauded and wildly successful, this company also had further to fall than some of its peers—and 
given Enron’s well-known political connections, there was genuine suspense as it falteringly 
attempted to get back on its feet.  
But more important than any of these particular factors is the simple truth that Enron 
could make a good story. Its human interest intrigues included not only greed and deceit but also 
arrogance, grudges, cronyism, power struggles, sex, and suicide. It captivated me for many of the 
same reasons that it might captivate anyone else. Yet Enron’s appeal as a story did more than 
give it legs in the realm of journalism and punch in the political sphere. It also made Enron a 
ready case for the creation of narrative, which would in turn render this bankruptcy—dazzlingly 
complicated even to expert analysts—coherent and thereby contestable for just about anyone. It 
was the closest that the American public had come for decades to an inclusive, accessible 
national discussion on the practices and effects of large corporations and their top executives.  
Public Perceptions of Big Business  
 Among ordinary Americans—for my purposes, people without particular business 
expertise or affiliation—the word “corporation” almost always conveys blame or suspicion.5 Tack 
on “mega-” or “multinational” and it is even more certain, unless the context is technical, that we 
are hearing about something bad. It is as if the corporate form itself is tainted—and the larger the 
entity, the stronger presumption of guilt. Common journalistic substitutes like “giant,” “behemoth,” 
“juggernaut” and “Goliath” convey not only that the corporation is vast, but also that it should 
inspire fear. We stand in its long shadow and challenge it, if we dare, at our peril. Corporations 
themselves, due to these overwhelmingly negative connotations, apparently have learned not to 
call themselves such: formal statements and public relations communications much more often 
use terms like “company,” “group” or even “family”—if they even identify with a business entity at 
                                                 
5 Jack Beatty, Colossus: How the Corporation Changed America (New York: Broadway Books, 2001), xix. 
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all. One poll in 2000 showed that 82 percent of Americans believed “business has gained too 
much power over too many aspects of American life,” and that 74 percent agreed large 
corporations enjoyed too much influence in politics and public policy.6 
Nonetheless, historical scholarship on American attitudes toward big business shows a 
general progression toward acceptance of, or at least resignation to, large corporations. Not only 
will such companies exist, people have come to admit: they will usually dominate their industries, 
and often hold great economic and political sway. Studies of non-corporate trade journals, the 
popular press, politics and entertainment from the 1800s to the present suggest a majority of 
Americans tended toward relative complacency on the issue by the turn of the twentieth century. 
By 1929, writes business historian Louis Galambos, most Americans “accepted the giant 
corporation as a permanent feature of their society.”7 In 1932, A. A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means 
published The Modern Corporation and Private Property, which affirmed for a wide audience the 
ascendancy of big business and revealed how it penetrated every mundane event in the reader’s 
daily life.8 
How, then, to explain the frequent complaining about mega- and multinational 
corporations and their unscrupulous ways? The resentment today is both impossible to ignore 
and also clearly (and often self-consciously) connected to the shrill protestations of Americans 
past. The historical trajectory of acceptance of and reliance on large corporations, of course, 
could never have been measured were it not for a strong and persistent tradition of criticism and 
resistance. Since the rise of big business most Americans have focused on exploiting the benefits 
it offered while simultaneously warning of its potential ills, and trying to curb or pre-empt them.9  
To revisit old debates about big business in the United States is to hearken to 
constituencies and concerns that are sometimes grimly familiar, in context of current 
                                                 
6 Businessweek/Harris Poll, 2000, cited in Beatty, Colossus,xix.  
7 Louis Galambos, The Public Image of Big Business in America, 1880-1940: A Quantitative Study in Social 
Change (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 220. 
8 Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: 
Macmillan, 1932) quoted in Beatty, Colossus, 273-76. 
9 Jack Blicksilver, Defenders and Defense of Big Business in the United States, 1880-1900, American 
Economic History: A Garland Series, ed. Stuart Bruchey (New York: Garland, 1985), 398. 
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controversies, and at other times bewilderingly foreign. Small farmers of the Midwest and South, 
during the nineteenth century, feared that the trend of business combination threatened their way 
of life.10 Voters questioned the integrity of government leaders who seemed amenable to favors, 
contributions and even bribes from railroad executives.11 And most everyone recognized and 
resented that a dearth of competition in “natural monopoly” industries (such as oil, steel and rail 
transport) enabled large companies to manipulate markets and to charge unreasonable prices.12 
All of these complaints make as much sense now as they did then, and indeed some warnings of 
what might come to pass, if big business went unchecked, may now read remarkably prescient. 
“Under the American form of society, there is now no authority capable of effective resistance,” 
wrote Henry Adams in 1886. “The national government, in order to deal with the corporations, 
must assume powers refused to it by its fundamental law….”13  
Other strains of past discussions of big business are almost unrecognizable. Yet these 
too are instructive as to the contingency of American political economy: how people thought or 
sometimes feared that economy was developing during less stable times. Two patterns in 
commentary are perhaps counterintuitive, yet also consistent over many generations. First, there 
was a pervasive and firm linkage between big business and Christianity. In academia, the 
discipline of political economy first appeared, in the eighteenth century, within departments of 
Moral Philosophy. Many of the field’s first scholars were recruited from the ministry.14 From the 
church, clergy had much to say about large corporations, far beyond the pulpit of individual 
morals—and their comments were usually approving. “Captains of industry” such as George Baer 
and John D. Rockefeller, in turn, went out of their ways to discuss their careers and business 
strategies in a spiritual context.15 As we shall see, disgraced executives often do this today when 
                                                 
10 Galambos, Public Image of Big Business in America, 63. 
11 E.g. ibid., 69-71. 
12 Blicksilver, Defenders and Defense of Big Business, 74, 79-80. 
13 Charles F. Adams and Henry Adams, Chapters of Erie and Other Essays (New York: Henry Holt, 1886), 
134, quoted in Beatty, Colossus, 117-18. 
14 Irving S. Michelman, Business At Bay: Critics and Heretics of American Business (New York: A. M. Kelley, 
1969), 24. 
15 Ibid., 14. 
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they need political blessing or legal absolution, but most of these earlier cases were under 
entirely normal circumstances. It seems that in the infancy of big business, all parties considered 
commerce and church to be substantively similar, rather than awkwardly reconciled or 
strategically allied.  
Meanwhile, a second connection also persisted, in historical consciousness, between big 
business and, of all things, socialism.16 Most surprising about this theme is that it was advanced 
seriously both as a fear and as a hope. A detached analyst today might well understand the large 
corporation as a consummately capitalist entity—the product of private, competitive calculations 
in market penetration, distribution, economies of scale, and so on; one that would not have been 
possible under a more interventionist state. But many commentators, amid widespread fears of 
communism, have apparently seen its symbiosis with the federal government as a dangerous 
precursor to nationalized industry and a government-directed allocation of resources.17 Likewise, 
we might assume now that large corporations, with their flexible, decentralized operations and 
strategically-oriented top brass, can reliably maintain leverage over their employees, or at least 
adapt readily to any insubordination and emerge more or less unscathed. Some labor activists, 
however, argued by the 1920s that as companies grew larger they would become more 
susceptible to worker takeovers.18 The greater the concentration of means of production, they 
seemed to believe, the easier it would be to seize control from those who had done the 
concentrating.19    
Extinct lines of thinking, like extinct species, are useful in studying the evolution of their 
form. First, to acknowledge ideas about big business that have not survived is to identify which 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 166.  
17 As the New Deal’s National Recovery Administration illustrated, this was not an entirely unfounded 
suspicion. Here an effort to bolster the American corporate-capitalist order took the form of government-
sanctioned industrial cartels, encouraged—where they were not even supposed to be allowed—to cooperate 
in strategies of production, distribution, and price-setting (among others). The Supreme Court recognized 
the NRA as anathema and ruled it unconstitutional in 1935. Such a form of social organization was actually 
more in line with fascism than socialism. The fact that it was nonetheless more often associated with the 
latter may speak to Americans’ relative confidence in private organizations as partners to the state—or at 
least to paranoia about industrial nationalization. 
18 Blicksilver, Defenders and Defense of Big Business, 67, 71. 
19 Galambos, Public Image of Big Business in America, 220. 
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ones have, or at least to trace the mutations by which current notions have descended from prior 
incarnations. Second, I articulate patterns in historical commentary on big business even when 
they seem unfounded because my study of Enron narratives calls for the same treatment of 
sources. Like the remarks, complaints and connections just outlined, no doubt some recent 
arguments about large corporations will, in the future, sound wiser and more reasonable than 
others. But all are relevant in synthesizing the historical moment. Therefore I have striven to 
understand each text’s narrative or political angle before evaluating—if even I can—how plausible 
or justifiable it may be. 
 In the sum of historians’ reports on Americans’ resistance or acceptance toward big 
business over time, two factors emerge that have most often quelled public concerns and even 
fostered support. The first factor is good economic times.20 Periods of stability and growth, from 
the later nineteenth century to the present, may or may not have been directly attributed (or 
attributable) to large corporations. But regardless, prosperity has usually won them approval—if 
partly at the prompting of their leaders. In the twentieth century, big business has been credited 
for employing people, often with better security and wages; for increasing output to meet 
increased demand and thereby keeping downward pressure on prices; and for innovating new 
technologies and modes of organization that made life, from household chores to organizational 
administration, easier.  
The second factor most often driving public favor for big business—not unrelated to the 
first—is war. During and after World War I Americans tended to be complacent and even 
welcoming of big business, with the agitations of the Progressive era suddenly seeming passé.21 
Indeed this period’s integration of industry and government for purposes of organization and 
logistics may have eased the way for the US’ functioning as an “economic unit.” That 
development would be hailed, and even furthered (though to varying success) by the Hoover and 
                                                 
20 See ibid.,78, for one early example. 
21 Michelman, Business at Bay, 77-8; Galambos, Public Image of Big Business in America, 185.  
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Franklin D. Roosevelt administrations.22 Then in context of the Depression, the industrial upswing 
brought by World War II was more than welcome. It led the way to the consumer-driven postwar 
boom and the ascendance of American corporations on the scene of multinational commerce—
an important front, as it turned out, in the Cold War. As to direct symbiosis between business and 
national defense, despite Eisenhower’s foreboding the military-industrial complex survived and 
flourished, facing no serious political or economic threat through the Vietnam War and into 
current conflicts.  
These patterns point to another reason why the Enron scandal is illuminating as to public 
sentiment on big business: it happened at a time when circumstances should have discouraged a 
major hue and cry. This bankruptcy occurred on the heels of a fairly stable and prosperous 
decade for the American economy. For most of the 1990s, inflation was stable, unemployment 
was low, and productivity rose at an impressive rate. The bursting of the “dotcom bubble” in 2000 
portended problems, but that incident was understood more as a just comeuppance for one 
young and pompous industry (and its giddy speculators) than as a sign of widespread systemic 
failings. Despite a brief recession during that year and a major decline on the NASDAQ index 
since its 2000 peak, the economic climate—always measured at least as much by crude 
psychology as by anything else—was in 2001 still relatively healthy.  
Yet Enron, unlike so many doomed dotcoms, was neither a new nor an untested 
company. Moreover, after going down in disgrace it was followed by a number of other large and 
respected firms that were in completely different areas of business, such as Adelphia, Qwest, 
Tyco, and WorldCom. Thus from the Enron scandal’s economic context we can infer that at that 
time, compared to other historical junctures, people were not necessarily spoiling for a fight 
against large corporations. But from its relative gravity we can see how prepared American 
citizens and public officials were, despite a period of prosperity, to take seriously a corporate 
bankruptcy that involved foul play. People who defend and advocate for big business seem 
always to be jockeying against others who criticize and seek to contain it. This struggle is 
                                                 
22 Richard P. Adelstein, “‘The Nation As An Economic Unit:’ Keynes, Roosevelt, and the Managerial Ideal” 
The Journal of American History 78, no. 1 (June 1991): 160-87. 
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particularly evident among political leaders, and plays out both between and within the two major 
parties. Enron called attention once again to these ongoing negotiations—but also truncated them 
somewhat, as 2002 legislative reforms occasioned by the bankruptcy would demonstrate. 
The variable of war, too, probably favored big business more than it had for over fifty 
years: Enron bankrupted less than three months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
The global war on terror was at this time still new and widely supported, and the “rally effect” had 
brought exceptionally high approval ratings to both president and Congress even on domestic 
issues. If large corporations in the United States have often been informally equated with a 
patriotic front, and formally involved in war efforts, then it seems Americans recognize them with 
increased faith and loyalty during times of national strife. Insofar as people were angry about 
Enron, then, they were bucking a historic trend—and indeed the post-9/11 discourse of national 
pride sat awkwardly alongside the rage and embarrassment surrounding the bankruptcy. This 
equation would only grow more complicated as war policies became more controversial, 
particularly after the Iraq invasion. The US involvement in Vietnam would become a better 
historical analog than World War I or II in terms of attitudes toward big business in national 
defense, though still not a perfect one. 
The Enron scandal could have occurred during an economic slump when the United 
States had no foreign enemies to speak of. In that scenario, perhaps voices of protest and urges 
toward reform would have been a great deal stronger than they actually were. For every 
complaint aired and every reform enacted, after Enron, there were numerous arguments and 
proposals placed firmly outside the realm of consideration—for example, nationalizing the energy 
industry or forcing corporations to remain small and managerially simple. Here historical 
comparisons are again useful. Reactions to Enron’s collapse were more impassioned than we 
might expect, but they were still relatively muted compared to what, in the hands of populists and 
socialists through the Depression era, they could have been. The calming effects of economic 
prosperity and war morale may have been overridden, but the long-term acceptance of big 
business was not reversed.  
 xvii 
 
 
 
In reactions to corporate scandal specifically, Enron exemplified both continuity and 
change over time. After this disastrous bankruptcy many of the concerns that came to the fore 
were familiar from previous business scandals such as Teapot Dome in 1922-23, the electrical 
equipment price-fixing conspiracy of the 1950s, and the Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s. 
Laypeople and politicians voiced worries about the treatment and well-being of lower-ranked 
employees and other stakeholders who had had no fault in the fray. Speculation and allegation 
ran wild as to the competence and especially the character of top executives. General anxieties 
about companies’ size and sway, though sometimes only implicit, found their way into many 
complaints. Citizens questioned the integrity of political leaders, including legislators and the 
President, who appeared to have condoned, perhaps in self-interest, the practices leading to 
disaster. At the same time, they pushed these officials to implement reforms so as to avoid similar 
incidents in the future.  
Yet a number of novel conditions at the turn of the twenty-first century also informed 
reactions to this business scandal, making this an interesting test case in a new civic climate. 
First, more Americans owned stock than ever before; about 50 percent of the population. 
Although many of these shares were through institutional investments—as in mutual or pension 
funds—the figure still represented a far greater proportion of the country with some direct interest 
in the stock market.23 Meanwhile people could and did participate in financial exchanges without 
understanding their technicalities or even their fundamentals. While more and more Americans 
were investing in large firms and the markets on which they were traded, the internal structure of 
those firms and the regulations and models on which they worked had become more complicated 
than ever.  
If business was more arcane by numerous measures, Enron epitomized complexity and 
opacity in all its forms. Not only were its management and financial structures incomprehensible 
to most outsiders. By the time the company bankrupted there was real confusion and controversy 
even as to what business Enron had been in. Lack of comprehension would become not only a 
                                                 
23 Beatty, Colossus, xxii; David Skeel, Icarus in the Boardroom: The Fundamental Flaws in Corporate 
America and Where They Came From (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 210-11, 215. 
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problem in itself—as in the case of laypeople who struggled to understand what had happened—
but also an issue of charged debate. With so much potential for confusion and ignorance, claims 
about who did or did not know what was going on at Enron became crucial in establishing or 
undermining credibility.  
Norms and standards within large companies had changed as well, presenting not the 
first opportunities for fraud, but perhaps some new and different ones. Large modern corporations 
in the post-World War II era had initially thrived by legions of “organization men”—also called 
“sound men” and “yes men;” middle managers who faithfully submitted to the ideas of their 
superiors and the long-term interests of the company in exchange for career security. Here loyalty 
and a collective mentality were prized and rewarded.24 Yet toward the end of the twentieth 
century, a new ethic of skepticism, contrarianism and even irreverence came into vogue. The 
ideal manager was increasingly an innovator; someone who would readily challenge those above 
him or her in the event of untapped profit opportunities or inefficient working models.25 This is not 
to say that more conventional business structures and management cultures did not persist in the 
late twentieth century. It is, however, to say that they no longer represented the “cutting edge.” 
Again, Enron is an apt case in point. The company, whose slogan was “Ask Why,” took 
pride in experimenting with new business strategies and even creating markets where none had 
existed before. Indeed even as it grew ever larger and more established, Enron consciously 
identified itself with the entrepreneurial wave of small, new economy start-ups. Top executive Jeff 
Skilling, who gained great fame and then terrible infamy, personified such daring throughout his 
management career. It began with an admissions interview for Harvard Business School in which 
he salvaged an initially lackluster first impression by declaring “I’m fucking smart.” Skilling and his 
colleagues ultimately illustrated the dark side of exalted “innovation” in business culture at that 
time, and lay onlookers were quick to condemn their brash manners. The uncomfortable reality, 
however, was that this same audacity, translated into business strategy, had made millions. It had 
                                                 
24 William H. Whyte, The Organization Man (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1956; Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2002). 
25 See Skeel, Icarus in the Boardroom. 
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also been almost universally rewarded, including by those same investors who would later wrinkle 
their noses at these businessmen’s indelicacy.   
If Enron executives should have given people pause as to what the market valued in 
individuals, Enron itself should have cast doubt on the ways we have come to judge corporate 
performance. While familiar giants like Coca-Cola or IBM can generally attract and keep investors 
by maintaining a fairly stable value and paying reliable dividends, companies that espouse a 
growth model must ply their promise instead with a stock price consistently trending upward. 
Increasingly the latter scenario is normative, especially for younger companies. Thus partly by 
choice and partly by market pressure, these publicly traded firms face higher expectations over 
shorter increments of time. Meanwhile the growing emphasis on quarterly financial reports has 
forced management to make decisions on a closer horizon than ever, sometimes at the expense 
of longer-term care. These new standards, plus the premium on “innovation,” certainly do not 
force fraud onto executives, but they might facilitate or even at times seem to justify it. They may 
also blur the boundaries that supposedly delineate which behavior is ethical, legal, or even 
competitively advantageous. 
The direct connection between Enron and the White House was another distinguishing 
feature of this scandal as opposed to some preceding ones. The Bush family had longstanding 
ties to CEO Ken Lay and to his company, and those relationships flourished, to the benefit of all 
involved, after George W. Bush prevailed in the election of 2000. Past American presidents have 
treated big business as both friend and foe—and often cooperated with large corporations while 
pretending to condemn and chasten them.26 However, by this time several terms had passed 
since the nation’s highest officeholder had cultivated an image as corporate antagonist.27 Indeed 
the White House, regardless of which party occupied it, seemed increasingly friendly to big 
business. If Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush had pushed privatization and rolled back 
regulation, Bill Clinton had adopted many of their approaches—and he too played golf with Ken 
Lay. When George W. Bush took office as the first president to hold an MBA, it was in general a 
                                                 
26 Beatty, Colossus, 271; Michelman, Business at Bay,33.  
27 Jimmy Carter had cultivated this image somewhat, with his more obvious predecessor here being Franklin 
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culmination of business-government cooperation, and in particular a culmination of Enron-Bush 
synergy. For Americans who were uncomfortable with either one of these dynamics, the 
bankruptcy scandal may have helped to articulate why.  
Thus the context of business fraud had changed—both in what might give rise to errant 
behavior and also in how people were likely to react to it. There were also much different 
constituencies, in 2001, by which to categorize those doing the reacting. First, some groups had 
shrunken or fallen quiet. To historians of public perceptions of big business, clergy, unions, 
socialists, and farmers left rich and abundant materials through the first half of the twentieth 
century. Yet none of these collectivities had much to say about Enron. To the extent that a few 
individuals did, they were so narrowly heard as to be politically ineffectual.  
Meanwhile, other groups that had once deserved less study, being too small or too 
homogenous and rhetorically predictable, had grown far more capacious both in sheer numbers 
and also in variability of perspectives. The terms “investor” and “stockholder,” again, now applied 
to half the American population, and included millions of working people with a major stake but 
perhaps little understanding of big business or securities markets. Likewise as people identifying 
as farmers or union activists had dwindled in number, people who do some kind of office work in 
the ascendant “information economy” were more numerous than ever. This might have helped 
temper the reaction to Enron and other recent business scandals, for historical research has 
shown that the nearer someone’s own profession to the realm generally called “business,” the 
more moderate his attitudes toward it.28  
 But the most fundamental shift that made reactions to Enron unique to their own time 
involved no names, no numbers, nor even any single development in business or the economy. 
Rather, it was the reality that regarding big business, what was once new and noteworthy—
whether for good or bad—had become so familiar as to be taken for granted. During historical 
debates about large corporations, the most consistent, and usually the strongest, argument in 
their favor was that they provided goods and services to the American people that would 
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otherwise be far more expensive, or not available at all.29 Farmers of the 1880s appreciated the 
products on offer from large corporations, and praised the railroads for their competitive lowering 
of freight rates.30 Skilled workers of the same period welcomed large companies’ products and 
services, and even found that their wage scales and labor policies, in some cases, pushed 
change for the better.31 Such sentiments led the way toward a modern consensus: that the costs 
and threats of big business were outweighed by its benefits. The benefits emphasized were not 
for the government, nor for the nation on the global economic scene, but rather for “ordinary” men 
and women as they went about their daily lives. As we saw, this view largely prevailed by the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 Such an argument was viable for generations who could recall, or at least envision, a life 
without the conveniences wrought by big business. Roughly one hundred years later, in the 
aftermath of the Enron bankruptcy, a few of the company’s leaders and champions attempted to 
defend it along similar lines, saying it had brought new amenities (usually energy sources) to 
people and regions who would otherwise have gone without. But overall, there was no 
groundswell of popular support for Enron or any companies like it on the basis of their gifts to 
humanity. Indeed, it seems that only for those large corporations whose core business is 
conducted directly with consumers—for example, Wal-Mart—do we still hear unaffiliated 
individuals arguing that big business has made them better off than before. Such an argument, 
rather than departing from populism, sometimes sounds more like a new rendition on it; one 
positing that big business can actually favor and empower the common people. But this debate is 
hardly resolved. Indeed, what few corporate defenders there are among the lay public, make 
these claims precisely because so many others disagree.  
In most US industries, the presence and indeed the dominance of big business is a 
given. Huge, integrated companies control the markets for telecommunications, information 
technology, transportation, entertainment, and most other products and services used in daily 
                                                 
29 Blicksilver, Defenders and Defense of Big Business, 229, 241; see also Galambos, Public Image of Big 
Business in America. 
30 Galambos, Public Image of Big Business in America, 68-9. 
31 Ibid., 72. 
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life—and people simply do not remember, and cannot imagine, what life would be like without 
them. For large corporations this signifies unprecedented acceptance but also, in another sense, 
new vulnerability: people are no longer thankful to big business because they no longer recognize 
what it provides. Especially for a company like Enron, which had little to do with consumers and 
by its peak dealt primarily in finance and information rather than anything tangible, the most 
reliable safeguard against public resentment was now unreliable at best. To the extent, then, that 
people’s reactions to Enron were less radical than they might have been, it was partly because 
they no longer really questioned the right of large corporations to exist. But to the extent that the 
scandal did cause outrage and protest, it was partly because Americans had forgotten what was 
good about big business—and found themselves starkly confronted with a fairly thorough case 
study in all that was now wrong with it.  
Methodology 
There are numerous ways to study attitudes toward an entity or phenomenon (here, big 
business), or impressions of events and people (here, the Enron bankruptcy and characters 
implicated in it). Many of my secondary sources rely on opinion polls, letters and articles 
categorized either “favorable” or “unfavorable,” and quantitative measures of the use of certain 
terms. My own analytic unit, built in to sources of all kinds but hardly lending itself to objective 
sorting, is narrative.  
Nearly all public commentary about Enron, as with other events in news and politics, 
offered a story. I find stories more interesting and more instructive than self-evident means of 
analysis because they can be textured, engrossing, and poignant; they can also be inane, self-
contradictory, and patently unconvincing. That is to say, they seem more representative of how 
people actually think and argue with one another. They contain more allowance for the kind of 
ambiguity and subtlety that, when not conveniently eliminated from historical evidence, often 
provide its most illuminating core. Narrative is also a very democratic form: almost anyone can 
understand a story or construct her own. This wider opening for participation and reaction is all 
the more valuable when the topic—accounting practices and political maneuvering around a huge 
“new economy” corporation—is so arcane. 
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Yet another advantage to the study of storytelling is simply that it comes so naturally to 
people. Human beings crave and revere narrative. We use stories to make sense of our world 
and of our place in it. We tell stories to explain who we are, and look to stories to understand the 
other. Narrative asserts or insinuates itself in every mode of communication; it may even affect 
the way we think. Indeed, narrative is so ubiquitous that in trying to define it, we would probably 
do better to establish what is not narrative, than what is.  
Looking for a specimen of that strange creature, the non-narrative representation of 
events, Hayden White ended up in medieval Gaul. He described a document that listed 
consecutively the years 709-34, with roughly half of the annual entries followed by a terse caption 
such as “flood everywhere” or “Blessed Bede, the presbyter, died.” When White observed that 
this text had no “central subject;” no beginning, middle, or end; no sense of connection between 
its events; and no embedded judgment as to the significance, or even the relevance, of its various 
points; he was in effect defining narrative. It is that which has all of these things.32 The account 
that lacks them is at best unsatisfying, and at worst, incomprehensible. 
White made the important distinction between “narrating” and “narrativizing.” When we 
narrate, we tell a story from a particular point of view without feigning detachment or objectivity. 
When we narrativize, on the other hand, we construct the story without acknowledging its 
constructedness. We pretend that the narrative came into being naturally; that life “speaks itself 
as a story.”33 In other words, the narrator admits that we don’t have to take his word for it, but the 
narrativizer by definition presumes this kind of trust. White was interested in narrativization 
because of its especial manipulative potency. When a speaker acknowledges his own position in 
his story, it is less threatening than when he claims to be the conduit for an organic reality 
seeking to communicate itself. I would classify most public dialogue surrounding politically salient 
events as narrativization. Here I explore the ways people narrativized Enron’s bankruptcy and the 
attendant scandal, from various angles and toward various goals. I identify distinct narratives and 
                                                 
32 Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 6-8. 
33 Ibid., 2.  
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discuss how and why they competed with one another. Finally, I attempt to explain the 
implications and legacies of the stories people told about Enron.   
These “people” include journalists; former Enron executives, employees, and investors; 
legislators and other civic leaders, and vocal members of the lay public. For the first three sets of 
subjects I draw heavily on print and internet news sources, and on congressional testimony and 
debate as well as the text of legislation itself. The source base for the last group is somewhat 
more limited given my lack of access to diaries or personal communications, less than ten years 
old, of private citizens who are still alive. Yet I have not relied solely on the self-selecting 
populations of opinion poll respondents and on those letters to the editor that enterprising and 
opinionated individuals, who had the time and inclination, elected to send in. There is also a lively 
(if anonymous) chorus of lay Enron commentators whose jokes, slogans, cartoons, and brazenly 
doctored photos provided me not only with a rare researcher’s out-loud laughter, but also with a 
crucial perspective on what sentiment was out there beside the better-publicized rage and 
posturing. In every source—from federal documents to web detritus—I looked for the underlying 
narrative, seeking to identify its motives, its assumptions, its assertions, its ramifications, and its 
holes.  
Before I begin examining each party in the narrative struggle over how Enron should be 
understood, however, I must also acknowledge myself as a creator of narrative: this one. Like any 
other storyteller, I have emphasized some events at the expense of others. I have designated 
certain central characters and left others obscure. I have paired particular causes with particular 
effects. I have decided where to begin and where to finish. And most importantly, my narrative 
presents events via its own subjective interpretation; one that has potential implications as to how 
the reader should proceed. I contend that narratives about Enron were, are, and will continue to 
be more important than any associated “facts.” The distinction, here, is between interpretations of 
the bankruptcy as opposed to the numbers and information that, even when expertly compiled, 
fell short of a holistic explanation. Accordingly, people’s understandings and renderings of the 
Enron story have affected American politics and culture much more than have the company’s 
actual blunders and lies. This argument represents a road generally not taken, thus far, by 
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business scholars, for in their emphasis on what actually happens in the commercial sphere they 
usually overlook what people think is going on. Both are worth our study, but the latter can have 
much further-reaching implications. 
While historians differ as to whether or how much they should consider their writings 
works of narrative, I begin with the assumption that we are all narrators (narrativizers, per White) 
and that we should be free to embrace that role, responsibly. I have relished the task of crafting a 
good story; I think this makes history more engaging and more accessible. Yet I have attempted 
to exploit the benefits of the narrative form without compromising academic standards for 
questions, evidence, or conclusions. As a historian who studies something that happened in very 
recent memory, I am sometimes asked what distinguishes my work from journalism. With great 
respect to that field, to which almost all historians are indebted and whose mandate is simply 
different from our own, these standards constitute my answer.   
Analytic Themes 
 Narratives of the Enron bankruptcy and scandal are remarkably varied. Yet from sobbing 
news testimonials, to indignant speeches in the halls of Congress, to irreverent amateur cartoons, 
to legalistic sentence-splicing, three consistent themes emerge as the points of most intense 
disagreement. These are also the three elements of this scandal—common to many others like 
it—that speak most directly to Enron’s historical significance. All interrelated, they should be 
taken as an ensemble rather than in any prescribed order. 
 The legitimacy and accountability of leadership, within both business and government, 
fell into question immediately when the Enron scandal broke. In the case of business leadership, 
people debated (and most condemned) the role of the company’s leaders in the bankruptcy and 
its fallout. How had the company failed, and why? What were the obligations of its top executives 
to employees, shareholders, and the public? Who had sufficient authority either to have fixed 
Enron’s problems or to deserve blame for not doing so? Even beyond the company’s internal 
operations and external communications, further arguments about business leadership were less 
explicit, but even more urgent. What kinds of people become celebrity tycoon power-brokers in 
the United States? What can the public expect of them? What happens when they fall short? 
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 One area of discomfort, when the topic is businessmen of great influence, is the fact that 
they are not elected, nor are they public servants of any kind. They advocate in nobody’s interest, 
reliably, other than their own, and (in theory at least) that of their shareholders. More self-evident, 
then, were the arguments over civic leadership in the Enron scandal; namely that of public 
officials. Controversy abounded as to the types and degrees of responsibility first of legislators 
and the Bush administration, who had allegedly coddled the company in exchange for campaign 
contributions, and also of regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, that may have allowed Enron to 
break rules. Were these leaders and regulators doing their jobs? Moreover, had they come into 
those jobs, in part, because money and favors from companies like Enron can circumvent the 
democratic process?  
 Though almost never articulated directly, there was also frequent contestation as to who 
did or did not “understand” business, economics, or the law. Even before its problems were 
exposed, Enron’s business models, financing, daily functioning, and even its organizational 
structure were highly complex. To grasp what went awry could be more difficult still. The 
bankruptcy and its fallout witnessed a fascinating scramble over who was knowledgeable enough 
to make pronouncements on what had happened. When non-experts, from employees and 
investors to legislators, made judgments on Enron executives, they asserted that they understood 
enough to assign blame. For their part, these executives—once so revered for their expertise and 
ingenuity—alternately insisted that the people most angry with them did not understand relevant 
issues, and claimed (on strategically chosen occasions) that they themselves were unaware of 
key elements of their own company’s business and accounting.  
Meanwhile, there was no consensus that this kind of knowledge or understanding was 
even helpful, much less necessary, when interpreting and responding to Enron’s collapse. 
Recognizing that exclusive standards of expertise are often used to silence unwelcome questions 
and opinions, some of the people most outraged by the bankruptcy (or who had reason to pose 
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as such) framed narratives of it in moral rather than technical terms.34 All that one needed to 
understand Enron, they claimed, was a sense of right and wrong. Yet another party of narrative 
makers—satirists—also rejected the premium on business arcana by contending that neither 
technicalities nor moral reasoning were particularly relevant here. Pragmatic common sense 
enabled anybody to get their jokes, and, in some cases, to envision change.    
Finally, in making sense of the Enron scandal, people revisited and perhaps reconsidered 
conceptions of the “American way” and US civic culture. Here the issues under debate were most 
abstract, and invocations of them least direct. Part of the reason was that, if only on this set of 
questions, people had to think in terms of systems and processes rather than, as comes more 
easily, individuals and incidents. How much influence did large corporations enjoy over American 
government, society, and livelihood? Was this level of influence fairly earned and deserved? Was 
it for the best? Did it comport with the values of the nation’s imagined community? What happens 
when traditional admiration for businessmen’s ambition, innovation, and self-made success 
collides with traditional disdain for businessmen’s greed, manipulation, and sense of entitlement?  
Large Corporations in America: Reverence, Rebuke, and Something In Between 
This last conflict in cultural beliefs leads me to the most general premise of this analysis. 
For my studies of business and attitudes toward it, from the era before independence through to 
the present, have consistently demonstrated this tension: On one hand, Americans respect—
even sometimes idolize—individuals who achieve dramatic success and fabulous wealth through 
business enterprise. They have demonstrated time and again that the vast socioeconomic gulf 
between “average” citizens (such as, perhaps, themselves) and these celebrity executives is 
tolerable as long as the doctrine of the American dream lives on alongside it. Yet on the other 
hand, Americans have been suspicious of business from the very beginning—indeed, wary of the 
corporate form itself, from the earliest days of charter-granting in the American colonies.35 With 
every development in business has come a wave of resentment and resistance, much of it 
                                                 
34 For one approach to classifying explanations in technical terms as opposed to using “codes,” 
“conventions” or “stories,” see Charles Tilly, Why? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
35 Pauline Maier, “The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 
Third Series, 50, no. 1, Law and Society in Early America (January 1993): 51-84. 
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relating to the same mechanisms of concentrated money and influence that at the very same time 
earned admiration and applause. 
The American colonies, as we know, were conceived as a profit-making project. The first 
Europeans who committed to settling here did so, at some risk, in hopes of making money—far 
more than the Old World offered to non-nobles. It should not be surprising that these people and 
their descendants would admire the spirit of enterprise. With the market revolution, again, 
Americans of all regions and stations routinely praised growing corporations for the amenities 
they offered, and at such prices, as well as for many of their provisions as employers. By the late 
nineteenth century it was also suggested—by business’ biggest names, predictably, but by 
laypeople too—that corporate leaders served cultural betterment as well. By the logic that 
“material well-being must proceed (sic: precede) social and cultural progress,” Morgan, Carnegie 
et al. might be more valuable than the nation’s most esteemed thinkers and artists.36  
The more people identified as consumers and as wage-earners, the more immediate 
their recognition of how big business affected their livelihood. Renowned for his innovations in 
manufacturing and labor policy, Henry Ford ranked slightly below Jesus and Napoleon in 1920s 
public polls concerning “the greatest men in history.”37 Philanthropic giving by famous executives 
has also been a constant, by which business leaders salve conscience and/or public image. 
Whichever it is, the recipients have been grateful for funding that was unlikely to come from 
anywhere else. 
Even today, when the “question” of big business has obviously been settled in the 
affirmative, some scholars will be satisfied only with approval—as opposed to mere acceptance—
of the role of large corporations in establishing the United States economy and society. For 
example, in “The Prospering Fathers” (1999), Paul Johnson argued that the same titans of 
industry and finance so often called “robber barons” were actually patriots—economic pillars and 
civic exemplars—to which Americans past and present owe a considerable debt.38 Most 
                                                 
36 Blicksilver, Defenders and Defense of Big Business, 248. Here I am quoting the author. 
37 Beatty, Colossus, 256. 
38 Quoted in ibid., 159. 
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“household names” of the new economy, likewise, are recognized not only in association with 
their companies’ successes, but also in connection with their (often massive) philanthropic efforts, 
the readiest example being Microsoft founder Bill Gates. Enron’s best-known executives, Ken Lay 
and Jeff Skilling, were outright celebrities during the company’s heyday, considered geniuses of 
trading and management, and consulted constantly on matters of business and policy. Lay’s 
philanthropy would come to public attention primarily after his criminal indictment (and then again 
after his death), but it reflected the same tradition of noblesse oblige—and public appreciation 
thereof.  
Yet beginning no later than Americans’ zeal for commerce and the fruits it would bear 
was an intense skepticism toward the capitalist ethos and, as it developed, big business and its 
sometimes reckless ways. The Puritans’ Calvinist doctrine admonished both idleness and over-
commercialism, leaving in between a narrow strait of industrious piety that, as Perry Miller noted, 
ultimately proved too difficult for a bourgeoning (capitalist) society to navigate.39 Anxieties ran 
rampant in the early national period about the Bank of the United States’ consolidation of capital 
and power.40 Mark Twain’s 1873 novel The Gilded Age showed businessmen buying off 
legislators with nonchalance. Where they had appeared as “folk heroes” in many films of the 
1920s, Hollywood during the ‘30s portrayed them much more often as villains.41 Recent films 
such as “The Insider” (1999), “Erin Brockovich” (2000) and “Michael Clayton” (2007) carry on this 
tradition, presenting large corporations as unscrupulous, even violent, in their constant efforts to 
protect and enrich themselves. 
This longstanding duality in American thinking about business and large corporations—
admiration alongside suspicion—would be rich enough to sustain a study on its own, but I find 
there is also a third tradition in treatments of big business. I was not looking for it, but in my 
investigations of Enron narratives it became absolutely impossible to ignore. I determined over 
time that it was not only highly influential in this particular case study, but also that it too had a 
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long history. Yet while business historians often acknowledge it anecdotally, they seem not to find 
it worthy of synthesis or even comment. When more academically inclined, I call it satire. At times 
it would be more accurate simply to say mockery. The overall pattern is the use of humor, with 
business itself unmistakably and invariably the butt of the joke. Americans who make fun of 
business and business people engage directly neither in admiration nor in derision. Indeed, satire 
seems simultaneously to reject both attitudes and also to sample selectively from each.  
First comes mockery of the capitalist endeavor and its promises of wild success. In the 
1605 play Eastward Hoe!, a tavern patron bragged that, thanks to profit-making ventures in 
“VIRGINIA, Earth’s only Paradise,” its denizens had “chamber-potts” of “pure gould.”42 A folk 
song from the early twentieth century had Jay Gould’s daughter begging, before she died, to try 
the last two beverages in the world that she had never tasted: water and tea. There is also grim 
acknowledgment of the dehumanization (figurative and sometimes literal) that business logics 
could beget. Charlie Chaplin’s 1936 opus “Modern Times,” for example, satirized factory 
mechanization, featuring a boss who decided not to feed his employees via machine because its 
tendency to clobber them made it “impractical.”  
Moving toward more accusatory fun, Will Rogers said, around the same time, “A holding 
company is a thing where you hand an accomplice the goods while the policeman searches 
you.”43 Likewise on February 2, 1960, somebody bought advertising space in the New York 
Times, under fake sponsorship, to sneer at a recent price-fixing scandal that had germinated at 
the Barclay Hotel. “Antitrust corporation secrets are best discussed in the privacy of an executive 
suite at the Barclay,” the “ad” said. “It is convenient, attractive and financially practical.”44 Finally, 
the effects of office work at a large corporation on social relations and personal values presented 
ample opportunity to make fun of people who seemed to take themselves excruciatingly 
seriously. Impersonating a high-powered manager in a large company, author Joseph Heller in 
1974 described the ridiculous company politics that would become fodder for many later send-
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ups, including films like “Office Space” (1999) and TV series like “Arrested Development” (2003-
06) and “The Office” (2005-Present, US). Heller also lampooned businessmen’s notorious self-
importance. “I enjoy my work,” he wrote, “when the assignments are large and urgent and 
somewhat frightening and will come to the attention of many people.”45  
Many Enron jokes, cartoons and satires are to follow, and on my premise of taking humor 
seriously each deserves independent examination in context of specific debates. However, solely 
to illustrate how Enron jokes carried on the traditions described, I will share one now. Jeff Skilling, 
so it goes, was propositioned by a sexy blonde while the two were alone in an elevator. His 
response: “What’s in it for me?” This scenario in some ways suggests admiration for Skilling—not 
only has he received quite the offer; he is prepared to decline what many of his counterparts 
might entertain as an impossible fantasy because it does not make rational sense. The joke might 
also be understood, however, to cast doubt on Skilling’s humanity. His hesitation is not due to any 
standards of public decency or morality (Skilling was attached, as everyone knew), but instead 
shows a split-second calculation. If it didn’t involve money, he was not interested.  
If this joke sounds like it originated in a roomful of rowdy young men, that is probably 
because it did. Current among Enron employees long before the company’s troubles began, it 
smacks of the culture of Enron’s trading floor, which was almost unanimously described as a high 
school boy’s locker room with computers. (Accordingly it fostered banter much dirtier than this). 
Both the pride and the shame of the company, it would not be surprising if Enron’s traders were 
also its comic vanguard. However, like the historical gibes and satires described before, this joke 
is accessible—and, probably, funny—to anyone because it re-articulates longstanding 
ambivalence about corporate logics. It simultaneously congratulates the success and praises the 
discipline of a big businessman, while also sneering at his values and cynically insinuating that 
profit motives can blind a person to all other means of making decisions. The humor would 
become darker as Enron faltered and fell. 
To mock someone who occupies a privileged place in society is to impugn, in one way or 
another, his or her right to be there. The grounds for doing so can be as superficial as poor looks 
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or as serious as criminal allegations. But while satire, obviously, departs from praise when it 
describes high-profile executives and their world, it also avoids the tone of fear that characterizes 
straight polemic. To decry some public harm from commercial practices, or warn of its threat, one 
has to believe that people in business wield great power. It is only through the perception that 
“ordinary” people, by default, are at the mercy of corporate maneuverings that any complaint or 
resistive activism even appears logical, much less necessary.  
Thus expressions of suspicion and anger toward big business actually share one 
important element with expressions of admiration: a sense of wonder. Both earnestly positive and 
urgently negative characterizations of big business attribute to its prominent characters special 
prowess and also a certain mystique. Successful businessmen may be exceptionally driven and 
brilliant, or exceptionally greedy and conniving, but both traditions in commentary agree that they 
are exceptional. Not so the concomitant procession of satire and mockery.  
With humor, the world of business collapses into our own. It has no distinct or 
impenetrable language, logics and potencies. It contains neither heroes nor villains. There may 
be some action worth taking at a given juncture, but either way the first order of business is 
perspective. The subjects of these jokes are certainly not so lofty as to deserve our reverence. 
But neither are they imposing enough to disturb us—or even to be taken seriously, at least for 
now. I will attempt to demonstrate and validate each of these three views of big business, in the 
case of Enron: admiration for business success, outrage at business fraud, and amusement that 
encompassed both. But for their narrative ingenuity and for their resolution of the struggle 
between technicality and morality, I often endorse humorous accounts over the alternatives.  
I find, perhaps ironically, that by my own standards of narrative the most snide 
interpretations of Enron were also the most capacious. They took into account myriad factors, 
insisting that business decisions and moral judgments were equally relevant; neither one all-
encompassing. They offered a platform for a more inclusive discussion rather than excluding any 
amateurs. And moreover they approached the most powerful figures in the United States—in both 
the private and public sectors—as people rather than titans. One may notice that correctness or 
completeness did not figure in to these criteria. I am not sure either is possible—at any rate, I 
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certainly have yet to see a perfect Enron narrative. For jurors and legislators, deciding who was at 
fault and determining what reforms to initiate certainly represented worthy reasons to organize 
this scandal into a coherent story. But for the rest of us, Enron narratives serve a more abstract 
function. My basis for judgment, then, is more on what a story does than on what it says. I am 
more concerned with what a narrative makes possible, than with what it claims has happened. 
Accordingly, I will suggest that making fun of Enron was in many cases the most serious, the 
most conscientious, and the most deeply considered response. 
Chapter Overview  
1) Laughter and Tears in the First Narratives of Enron 
 This chapter briefly describes Enron’s business model and means of success before 
recounting the company’s plummet into bankruptcy in late 2001. Drawing on media coverage, 
“insider” testimonials, congressional hearings, and informal documentation of jokes, songs and 
protest slogans, Part I identifies literary models in narratives of the Enron scandal; namely tragic, 
melodramatic, and satiric. Part II is an examination of the many invocations of September 11, 
2001 in various Enron narratives. The political implications of each narrative are analyzed with an 
eye to the motivations of respective story-tellers—from radical anti-corporate activists to 
conservative legislators and the Bush administration.  
2) “Never Again:” Post-Enron Legislative Reforms 
 Two major pieces of legislation were enacted in 2002 purportedly in response to the 
Enron scandal: the McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Corporate Accountability. With the former, legislators awkwardly sought 
to address their own conflict of interest in regulating the same corporations that (indirectly) fund 
congressional campaigns. With the latter, Congress assigned blame and issued threats to vilified 
executives. This chapter analyzes how certain interpretations of the Enron scandal led to 
conclusions that BCRA and Sarbanes-Oxley would preclude a “repeat performance.” It also 
establishes the historical precedent, in both campaign finance rules and accounting and 
securities regulation, for scandal provoking legislative reform. Finally, it discusses the new laws’ 
practical impact, as well as their significance (or lack thereof) in the public sphere. 
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3) Enron Remembered 
 The years immediately following the Enron bankruptcy saw it referenced and recounted 
in myriad formats. From slapstick comedy to “talking-head” documentary, films offered distinctly 
different—but all to some extent misleading—accounts of the scandal. Meanwhile memoirs from 
former Enronians, vendors of Enron souvenirs, and various spoof artists all offered up their own 
stories. These retrospective narratives reflected not just distortions and omissions at the level of 
discrete facts but also much broader, and deliberate, compromised arcs of story. In this chapter I 
use the source base of Enron “memorials” to engage the concept and field of Memory Studies, 
arguing that we need new means of understanding collective memory to accommodate 
upheavals in business and the economy.   
4) A Trial, a Death, and a Class-Action Lawsuit 
 In 2006, former Enron CEOs Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling finally went on trial. Media 
coverage was comprehensive, but the proceedings—which lasted several months—lacked the 
drama and moral cohesiveness that could have provided public “closure.” This chapter recounts 
the legal fallout of the Enron scandal and public responses thereto, focusing on the trial but also 
including civil litigation, plea bargaining with the government, and some executives’ apparent 
evasion of punishment. The chapter also analyzes how Enron narratives changed between the 
time when the bankruptcy was “news,” and the eventuality, which perhaps came awkwardly late, 
of Lay and Skilling’s formal reckoning. It concludes with responses to Ken Lay’s unexpected 
death, and an analysis of fraudulent practices in shareholders’ civil claims against Enron.  
5) Epilogue: The Financial Crisis of 2008 
 Historians in generations to come who are interested in the business and economics of 
this era will likely not focus on the Enron bankruptcy or even the wave of corporate accounting 
scandals that crested in 2001 and 2002. These events will probably be eclipsed, in hindsight, by 
the mortgage and credit crises of 2008, which led to numerous Wall Street bankruptcies and 
controversial government bailouts. This epilogue compares accounts of corporate meltdown, 
portrayals of high-level executives, and debate about the role of the federal government between 
the Enron bankruptcy and today, placing both in context of a longer history of such narratives in 
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the US. It also examines the recurrent strains of reverence, resentment, and cynicism, in 
Americans’ responses to this latest episode of infamy in the business world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Laughter and Tears in the First Narratives of Enron 
 
 
 
“I'd like to take just a moment to read you, if I may, the final page of Hans Christian 
Andersen's story. I don't believe he's any relation to Arthur Andersen.” The speaker paused to 
encourage the audience response he anticipated. After the brief laugh, he began reading aloud. 
“’The emperor shivered, for it seemed they were right. But what could he do? After all, he was the 
emperor, and people expected him to be dignified….so the emperor…stood up, just as tall, and 
his servants went on carrying the train that wasn't there.’”1 
It was story-time in the US Congress. Sharing this fairy tale was Rep. Bart Stupak (D-WI); 
gathered around to listen, a sub-set of the House Energy and Commerce Committee dedicated to 
“oversight and investigations.” The purpose for this day’s hearing fell under the latter category, for 
by February 2002, the opportunity for “oversight” of Enron Corp. had long since passed. 
Legislators now sought to understand—or, more importantly, to explain—what had happened 
during the preceding six months as one of the nation’s largest and most admired companies had 
hurtled into bankruptcy. Stupak’s joke about Andersen provided some welcome comic relief, 
hinting at a potential conflict of interest between the Danish author of his nineteenth century 
children’s story, and Enron’s accounting firm Arthur Andersen LLP. Amid a scandal that had 
implicated so many individuals and groups, in both the private and the public sectors, this 
exaggeration plainly referred to that which, unfortunately, was not an overstatement. Around 
Enron even the most unlikely possibilities of illicit dealing, the joke grimly suggested, could not 
necessarily be ruled out.    
                                                 
1 Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Financial 
Collapse of Enron: Hearing before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 14 February 2002. 
 The function of Stupak’s speech as a whole, however, was not humor. It was an attempt 
to translate an overwhelmingly complicated phenomenon of business, finance, and commercial 
regulation, into an accessible story, even one that his audience already knew. By alluding to this 
well-known parable Stupak compared Enron’s wild success to the emperor’s exquisite robe: 
onlookers who did not appreciate its splendor—or indeed who saw nothing material at all—had 
been told, and had usually believed, that this was due to their own lack of sophistication. Of 
course, there was no robe, and eventually someone dared say so. The mass charade had come 
to an embarrassing end: the emperor was naked; the company insolvent.  
Yet the issues at hand in the aftermath of Enron were even less tangible than the 
emperor’s invisible clothes. Common knowledge was fuzzy: something had happened, causing 
thousands of people to lose their pensions, their savings, and their jobs. The money seemed to 
have been stolen, but some claimed it had never existed. Shareholders were suing; employees 
were sobbing. One former executive had committed suicide; another was building a lavish new 
house. While Bart Stupak was the only person who saw fit to read aloud from a children’s book 
on national television, nearly everyone who was talking about Enron at the time was trying to tell 
some kind of story. They were trying, for themselves and for others, to organize a mess; to make 
sense of gibberish. Enron needed a narrative. 
Here were the first attempts to make sense of what was already clearly a socio-historic 
event. Legends and memories tend to carry greater impact than the actual events they claim to 
represent,2 and this can only be more true in a case such as Enron’s, which involved so many 
obscure technicalities of law, securities and accounting, unfamiliar to the lay majority. Yet “what 
happened at Enron”—as if everyone understood perfectly—was still constantly cited, in many 
contexts, as a reference point. The real reference point, of course, was simply one Enron 
narrative or another, not the agglomeration of numbers that alone represents the true story 
(insofar as there is one). Some narratives reflected literary forms reminiscent of nineteenth 
                                                 
2 Two events, for example, about which scholars have made this assertion are that of the John Scopes trial 
(Edward J. Larson, Summer for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America’s Continuing Debate Over Science 
and Religion [New York: Basic Books, 1997], 244-45) and the Watergate scandal (Michael Schudson, 
Watergate in American Memory: How We Remember, Forget, and Reconstruct the Past [New York: Basic 
Books, 1992], 104, 124-25). 
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 century theatre or even ancient drama. Other stories reflected the bankruptcy’s unique timing by 
imbuing it with words and images from the events of September 11, 2001. In every case the 
creators of Enron narrative colored it with their own biases and shaped it toward their own 
purposes.3 Thus if the Enron scandal mattered, its stories dictate why it mattered and what it 
meant.4 
Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Enron (But Were Afraid to Ask) 
When scandal first brought Enron’s name into general news reports, many people were 
confused even about what kind of business the company had been in, and understandably so. 
Founded by Ken Lay in 1985, Enron began as a natural gas and oil supplier. By the late eighties, 
the company’s business strategy was more complex; it now facilitated natural gas and oil trading, 
customizing contracts to minimize loss and, of course, maximize profit. It worked. Enron went on 
to launch many foreign projects and, in the nineties, expanded its business to include (among 
others) electricity, water utilities, and internet broadband services. Though still an “energy 
company,” Enron was no longer defined by the “what” so much as the “how.” The company used 
the trading model that it had developed for its original products, to enter (or even sometimes to 
create) markets that had nothing to do with energy.5 The strategy was widely admired; Fortune 
magazine named Enron “The Most Innovative Company in America” every year from 1995 to 
2000,6 and its top executives became business celebrities. Only after the company’s collapse 
was there much inquiry into the details of what exactly Enron had been doing. 
This study will not attempt a comprehensive account of the circumstances surrounding 
Enron’s bankruptcy; many such accounts, in the scope and detail that the event deserves, are 
                                                 
3 Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), ix. 
4 In Watergate in American Memory, Michael Schudson wrote, “I am not interested in the ‘discourse’ for its 
own sake, as if there were nothing but discourse, but for the sake of its role in social action, present and 
future” (4). Though referring to a different American scandal, Schudson’s justification as stated here is 
essentially the same as my own. 
5 Peter C. Fusaro and Ross M. Miller, What Went Wrong at Enron: Everyone’s Guide to the Largest 
Bankruptcy in U.S. History (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2002), 164-69. 
6 Ibid., 172. 
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 available elsewhere.7 Rather, it will provide an overview of what is known in terms of, and, when 
necessary, in opposition to, the interpretations that most often found their way into Enron 
narratives of all kinds. It will summarize some of the most commonly cited of Enron’s practices, 
with particular attention to aspects in which they were typical or aberrant for a company of its 
function and stature. As will be shown, “what happened at Enron” does not, or should not, refer to 
any one specific faulty practice; the company’s problems stemmed from a variety of them.  
Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) and financial hedging came to ignominy through Enron, 
but the fine distinction between accounting sleight of hand that is, for better or worse, legal, and 
illicit trickery, is sometimes overlooked. Large corporations routinely form SPEs, and Enron 
already had scores of them before creating the infamous ones known as LJM. SPEs can serve a 
variety of functions and, although obviously intended to benefit the company, they are required to 
have a certain degree of independence and investment risk. Hedging is another increasingly 
common business and financial strategy. Hedges consist in contracts or investments designed to 
offset potential losses within a single market—for example, that of a particular commodity or 
financial asset. Like SPEs, hedging is perfectly legal.8 For years, however—beginning with 
commodities trading and then increasingly applied to investments as well—top executive Jeff 
Skilling treated this device as a panacea, summarily ordering his staff to hedge away all risks and 
losses, as if that were possible.  
The hedging SPEs known as the Raptors, made famous by whistleblower Sherron 
Watkins’ memo of warning to Ken Lay, were problematic by virtue of their peculiar characteristics, 
not simply because they existed. The Raptors were invested in a number of stocks that by 2001 
were flagging. Yet under the “mark-to-market” financial statement policy, Enron had been allowed 
years before to report gains based on expected investment returns—long before these gains 
                                                 
7 See Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind; The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and 
Scandalous Fall of Enron (New York: Portfolio, 2003); Kurt Eichenwald, Conspiracy of Fools: A True Story 
(New York: Broadway, 2005); Loren Fox, Enron: The Rise and Fall (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2003). 
8 In the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, An Overview of the Enron Collapse: 
Hearing before the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 18 December 
2001, Chairman Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND) asserted in his opening statement that “This is not your average 
business failure…This is about an energy company that morphed itself into a trading company involved in 
hedge funds and derivatives.” Dorgan suggested that Enron’s “involvement” therewith, regardless of any 
details, was inherently unusual or suspicious. 
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 actually materialized. As the Raptors failed to perform with the success that Enron’s statements 
had already assumed, it became increasingly difficult to reconcile those statements with reality. 
Moreover, the majority of the stock that capitalized the Raptors was Enron’s own. Few unbiased 
accountants would consider this strategy sound. As Enron went, so went the Raptors; yet as 
hedges, the latter should have been protecting Enron from losses. Instead, on the contrary, Enron 
was actually losing money through the funds.9 
Enron managers are often imprecisely portrayed as having “stolen money.” However, 
among the factors that caused the company to unravel, literal, direct theft from Enron by 
executives was comparatively minor. The singularly blatant, sustained instance was that of Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) Andy Fastow, who designed and then directed the LJM private equity 
funds. These funds transacted only with Enron, and included the bare minimum of outside 
investment (three per cent) to be considered independent entities. The LJMs, Fastow claimed, 
because they required no negotiation, would streamline and expedite vital deal-closing 
processes.10 The problem was that in such deals, he would be on both sides of the table—as 
CFO of Enron and director of the LJMs. A stark conflict of interest, this arrangement was 
specifically forbidden under the company’s ethics rules, but the board of directors in a special 
resolution exempted Fastow.11  
It might now be taken as a foreboding but ignored clue that the funds’ acronymic names 
were the first initials of Fastow’s wife and two sons.12 At any rate, over a period of two years, he 
took home $60.6 million through work with the LJMs—work that he had insisted would only 
                                                 
9 Testimony of Sherron Watkins in Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Financial Collapse of Enron; 
Eichenwald, Conspiracy of Fools, 54-60; Watkins to Kenneth Lay, memorandum, 15 August 2001, Arthur L. 
Berkowitz, Enron: A Professional’s Guide to the Events, Ethical Issues, and Proposed Reforms (Chicago: 
CCH, 2002), 137-40. 
10 The ostensible convenience of such a plan points to one of the central ironies of Enron particularly as 
related to the company’s strategic use of SPEs. While any corporation that falls so far, so fast, can be said 
to have taken on too much risk, it was actually the absence of risk that in this area pushed Enron into 
danger. Real, quantifiable business transactions involve more than one interested party and by definition 
contain potential both for gain and for loss. Thinking it had found a way to deal with itself via SPEs, Enron 
was in one sense sidestepping risk but in the final analysis taking on unsupportable liability.  
11 McLean and Elkind, Smartest Guys in the Room, 189, 193.   
12 Fastow’s wife was Lea, and his sons were Jeffrey (named after Jeff Skilling) and Matthew. Ibid., 189. 
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 require a few hours out of his schedule each week.13 Alternate Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) 
Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling both deny having known of any mischief involving the LJMs; however, 
both supported Fastow’s exemption from ethics rules, and Skilling thereafter appears to have 
either summarily approved LJM transactions or to have waived the requirement that he do so.14 
(Although the name of Skilling, and especially that of Lay, are most often associated with 
“stealing” at Enron, neither of them received any of the appropriated LJM money).15 Fastow’s 
siphoning of funds through the LJMs surely hurt Enron financially, but the worst long-term 
consequence may have been in terms of corporate image. After Fastow’s activities came to light, 
many outside trading partners refused to do business with Enron. Fastow then had to be 
dismissed as CFO and on the day he was fired, Enron’s stock price—which at its height scarcely 
over a year before had exceeded $90.00—fell from an already dismal $19.00 to $16.41.16 
Perhaps the most palpable of Enron’s publicized wrongdoings involved the California 
energy crisis of summer 2000. One popular understanding is that Enron caused the state’s rolling 
blackouts, in which selected regions lost electricity, in order to spike energy prices in this recently 
deregulated market. There is some fairly compelling evidence to this effect.17 However, some of 
Enron’s other practices in California energy dealing, though they became notorious in part thanks 
to names like “Get Shorty” and “Death Star,” appear to have been legally (if not ethically) 
defensible. Such strategies took advantage of inefficiencies and regulatory loopholes in the 
state’s energy market, and in most cases, other trading entities would likely have used similar 
                                                 
13 McLean and Elkind, Smartest Guys in the Room, 376; Eichenwald, Conspiracy of Fools, 554. These facts 
are uncontested; Fastow pled guilty on January 14, 2004 to conspiracy counts of wire and securities fraud, 
to reduce his forfeiture of assets and prison sentence in exchange for cooperation as a witness in the 
prosecution of other executives (Eichenwald, Conspiracy of Fools, 672).  
14 McLean and Elkind, Smartest Guys in the Room, 193, 310-11.  
15 This is not to say, however, that Fastow was the only executive who did. A number of others, most notably 
Michael Kopper and Ben Glisan, collaborated in the LJM schemes and profited from doing so (Eichenwald, 
Conspiracy of Fools, 667-68, 586). Glisan, at the time of this writing, is among the few former Enron 
executives who are actually behind bars (“Ex-Enron Executive Going to Prison,” Houston Chronicle 10 
September 2003). 
16 The date was October 24, 2001. Robert Bryce, Pipe Dreams: Greed, Ego and the Death of Enron (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2002), x; Bryan Cruver, Anatomy of Greed: The Unshredded Truth from an Enron 
Insider (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2002), 138; McLean and Elkind, Smartest Guys in the Room, 377.  
17 McLean and Elkind, Smartest Guys in the Room, 277-78.  
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 strategies had Enron not beaten them to it.18 Whatever Enron’s role in the energy crisis, the 
incident points to the blurry line between capitalistic opportunism and illegal exploitation. The 
outcry over Enron’s trading practices in California may be grounded more in moral conviction—
however justified—than in technical certainty.19 
It was only as the company began its precipitous decline that a few specific, pervasive 
practices made Enron distinctive; here the executives’ crowning offenses came in the form of self-
serving damage control measures. First, it is undeniable (for anyone other than the two men 
themselves) that Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling lied about the financial condition of the company in 
order to maintain investor confidence. Enron employees, whose pension funds were typically 
invested mostly if not completely in Enron stock, were not encouraged to diversify their holdings 
and may even have been deliberately “locked out” from selling during the critical time of October-
November 2001. Meanwhile, many top-level executives were selling their own Enron stocks with 
the franticness that any informed shareholder would. As the financial community and regulatory 
agencies began formal inquiries into Enron, a massive destruction of documents (shredding of 
hard copies and deletion of electronic materials) appears to have been ordered at Arthur 
Andersen, the firm serving most of Enron’s audit and account consulting needs. Finally, around 
the time of the bankruptcy many executives pillaged Enron’s coffers for enormous “retention 
bonuses,” while the same rank-and-file employees whose pensions had been decimated received 
roughly $4,500 each in severance pay.20 Whatever factors brought about the Enron collapse, the 
manner in which it was supervised represents the indubitable scandal. 
The scandal’s crowning feature was the company’s relationship to George W. Bush’s 
presidential administration. Enron and the Lay family had been among Bush’s biggest campaign 
supporters. Ken Lay was friendly with Dick Cheney when the latter was CEO of another Texas 
energy company, Halliburton. Lay was especially close to George H. W. Bush, but during the 
                                                 
18 McLean and Elkind, Smartest Guys in the Room 275; Jonathan Falk, “Substituting Outrage for Thought: 
The Enron ‘Smoking Gun’ Memos,” The Electricity Journal (August/September 2002): 20-21. 
19 Falk, Substituting Outrage for Thought, 13-14; Fusaro and Miller, What Went Wrong at Enron, 93-94. 
20 David Kaplan and L. M. Sixel, “Enron Lays off 4,000,” Houston Chronicle, 4 December 2001, 1A; 
Testimony of Sherron Watkins in Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Financial Collapse of Enron. 
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 son’s first term still received White House correspondence addressed to “Kenny Boy.” 21 When as 
Vice President Cheney served as chair of Bush’s Energy Task Force, he invited Lay to a closed-
door meeting to solicit Lay’s “ideas” for the new administration’s national energy policy.22 After 
the scandal broke, President George W. Bush would emphatically deny any recent contact with 
Enron executives.23 His position on the larger issues at hand was unclear, however, because 
even in the months following the company’s bankruptcy he fought against initiatives to increase 
“corporate accountability.” 
The outrage and desperation that punctuated Enron’s bankruptcy were surely 
understandable. And in one sense, the drama of the moment had productive potential: it rendered 
a number of complex issues immediate and compelling in a way that everyday Wall Street news 
never could. Once alerted, the public might have been moved to new levels of political 
involvement—and some individuals and groups did seize the opportunity. However, by the same 
token the Enron story became prime fodder for manipulative narrativization by people who had 
power and wanted to keep it. More concerned with the contestation of stories that took place after 
Enron than with offering any single authoritative account, this chapter tells and re-tells Enron just 
as these struggling interests did.  
PART I: POLITICAL THEATRICS IN THE AFTERMATH OF ENRON 
This section will develop a taxonomy of Enron narratives based on literary frameworks, 
which can help to describe the stories’ patterns and purposes. It identifies narrative veins that 
evoked tragedy, melodrama, and two forms of satire. To be sure, there were some that combined 
these literary elements or departed from them completely; no attempt is made to force neat 
classifications upon a debate that was chaotic and convoluted. Still, these four recurrent narrative 
                                                 
21 McLean and Elkind, Smartest Guys in the Room, 87. 
22 Cheney would later refuse to produce documents he had kept relating to this and other meetings with 
industry executives. (Eichenwald, Conspiracy of Fools, 441-42.) 
23 A reporter began, “Have you had any contact with Kenneth Lay or other Enron officials in the last six 
weeks—” and Bush interrupted by responding “No.” The President then interrupted a second question to 
reiterate, “I have had no contact with Enron officials in the last six weeks.” President, Address, “Remarks 
Welcoming General Tommy R. Franks and an Exchange with Reporters in Crawford, Texas,” Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents (GPO Access: frwais.access.gpo.gov) (week ending 28 December 
2001): 1825-44. 
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 structures are worth understanding insofar as they did pervade so much of the public discussion 
about Enron. The survey of narrative styles from various constituencies on the Enron scene will 
begin with the tragic perspective of former “Enronians.”24 They, after all, were supposed to be the 
primary focus of the national debate. 
Enron as Tragedy 
…I had all of my savings, everything in Enron stock. I lost $1.3 million and I hope and 
pray that it can be recovered …it's just very touching…to be in a predicament like this, 
because a lot of people have asked me, "Charlie, why in the world didn't you get out 
beforehand?" I go back to that one simple word of loyalty: loyalty to a corporation, loyalty 
to something that I helped build, that I strived and worked a lifetime to build.25 
 
 When Charles Prestwood and several other former Enron employees testified before the 
Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee just weeks after Black Monday, the 
story of the company’s collapse was a tragedy. The workers spoke of Enron with reverence, 
emphasizing its business innovation, technological prowess, and financial prosperity. As proud 
and loyal parties to this flourishing enterprise, they had trusted its leaders. It would have been 
impossible, they suggested, to predict Enron’s bankruptcy—but it also would have been ignoble. 
This hearing, held December 18, 2001, was the first of many. Billed “An Overview of the Enron 
Collapse,” it opened with testimony from four rank and file technical employees; a 70-year-old 
self-described “little bitty shareholder” also addressed the committee. In his opening statement, 
chairman Byron Dorgan (D-ND) posed a number of questions about federal regulation, 
accounting practices, and Enron’s board of directors, but these witnesses had obviously not been 
called to provide insight into any such topics.26 Rather, the “overview” offered here was of the 
human hardship that Enron’s bankruptcy had wrought.27  
                                                 
24 In Houston, “Enronian” has long been both a noun and an adjective.   
25 Senate Committee, Overview of the Enron Collapse 
26 Other witnesses who testified later in the hearing, including an Arthur Andersen executive and experts in 
stock analysis and business law, were in more of a position to do so. 
27 Those former employees who testified in Congress or even talked to reporters cannot be assumed 
representative spokespeople of this constituency. Nevertheless, because they did choose to speak publicly, 
their narrative was and will continue to be taken as the articulation of Enronians’ experiences. 
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 Tragedy depicts sympathetic characters brought to ruin by some cruel and unpredictable 
twist of fate. The tragic disaster must relate, however ironically, to the same values and traits that 
had promised good fortune; it interrupts a seemingly logical course of events that should 
intuitively have brought to the characters the success and happiness that their integrity or talents 
deserved. At its most poignant, tragedy suggests that the great achievements of its central 
characters had possessed an ominous underside all along. However, the devastating ultimate 
outcome never is, nor could it have been, foreseen—at least not by the characters themselves. 28  
A distinctly American tragedy shows that values of integrity, hard work and ambition, if 
misguided or corrupted, can, despite all good intentions, lead to misery. Much of Enronians’ 
testimony and public statements to journalists might be interpreted as narrative in this tradition. 
They presented themselves with humility as ordinary honest and industrious Americans; “just 
working people” who “had no idea that our company was on the verge of collapse” because “the 
bookkeeping and the accountants and the way they done things was [sic] way over our heads.” 
When challenged as to why they never questioned the statements of top executives, or sold off 
any of their Enron stocks before it was too late, employees cited loyalty to the company and 
thereby claimed the moral high ground. Though they usually presented themselves as helpless 
and desperate, they maintained that they wanted no “handout.” Even in the face of tragic 
misfortune, these Americans were independent and self-sufficient.29  
In an appropriately folksy encapsulation of this narrative as American tragedy, Charles 
Prestwood told the senators “it was from rags to riches back to rags” and that he intended his 
testimony to convey “the actual truth of what's actually is [sic] happening to us in this good old 
USA.” These statements pointed to the broadest implications of the tragic narrative of Enron’s 
collapse. Prestwood referred directly to the American dream, invoking its giddy cliché—“rags to 
riches”—but presenting his experience at Enron as an inversion of it. He had indeed, as he 
testified, been earning a comfortable living after nearly thirty years with the company; yet in just a 
                                                 
28 Max Scheler, “On the Tragic,” in Laurence Michel and Richard B. Sewall, ed., Tragedy: Modern Essays in 
Criticism, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1963), 33-34, 38. 
29 David Kaplan and L. M. Sixel, “Enron Lays off 4,000,” Houston Chronicle, 4 December 2001; Senate 
Committee, Overview of the Enron Collapse.   
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 few months he’d “lost everything [he] had” and become “a very broke person.” As if to ensure that 
his audience recognized his story as a challenge to one of the most vital of cultural axioms, 
Prestwood’s conclusion, that this was the “actual truth” about “this good old USA,” bluntly 
rounded out his indictment of the promise of upward mobility. 30 For him as for many other 
Enronians, the tragedy demonstrated that one could live and work faithfully by the tenets of the 
American “bootstraps” ideal and yet suffer for it instead of being rewarded. 
It might be inappropriate to refer to top executives as Enron “employees,” thereby 
grouping them together with the workers who, like Prestwood, could honestly say they were 
unaware of the company’s impending doom, and had “lost everything” as a result. Needless to 
say, those at the company’s helm experienced its fall differently: they suffered less financially, 
and it is difficult to argue that they were not, at least in part, to blame. Yet however the 
executives’ renderings of the Enron story differed from those of their subordinates, their 
narratives possessed the same sense of tragedy, as well as, in some cases, an emotional 
authenticity that should not be dismissed or ignored.   
High-profile Enron executives were at this time, in public, choosing their words very 
carefully (and with advice from a cadre of elite lawyers). Many feared, or knew, that they would 
face litigation, criminal charges, or both, and in such a position silence often seems the wisest 
statement of any. All of the big names of the Enron scandal received congressional subpoenas; 
all but one of them invoked the Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself, and refused to 
testify. Here they followed the example of many previous generations of American executives, 
having scoffed at government authority during their (alleged) offenses and then reprising the 
same attitude when facing questions afterward. Not surprisingly, this tradition was entrenched 
during the Gilded Age. In 1889, for example, leaders of the nation’s “Big Four” meat packing 
companies ignored congressional subpoenas regarding standards violations in their plants.31 
When finally induced to testify, the Secretary of the Chicago Union-Stock-Yards Company 
refused to produce crucial documents or to disclose key names—almost defeating the purpose of 
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 his appearance. The most significant players in Standard Oil, likewise, were notoriously 
enamored of the Fifth Amendment.32 More recent in strategic silence were electrical company 
executives, subpoenaed for Congress’ investigations into price-fixing scandals of the 1950s. 
Those who had nothing to lose—General Electric executives who had been fired and, in many 
cases, done jail time—agreed to testify, where those from Westinghouse, who had suffered no 
professional consequences, declined.33  
Enron executives probably could not be blamed if they expected that appearing in 
Congress would be at best a waste of time and at worst a belabored public shaming. But their 
refusals further suggest they recognized the one function a series of showy Enron congressional 
hearings, “optics” aside, actually could perform: creating a permanent public record, however 
imperfect, of what had happened and who was involved. Again, history has borne this out. 
Despite witness’ inconsistent cooperation, for example, the electrical price-fixing hearings are the 
singular means by which those events could be understood at the time and have been studied 
ever since. The same applies in the case of Credit Mobilier, in which bribery of congressmen by 
Union Pacific Railroad speculators came to light largely through congressional investigations in 
1872.34 In these business scandals, as in any, internal documents and hearsay were unreliable 
and inconsistent, if even available. Enron executives appreciated that a historical narrative was in 
the works, and also that its vital raw materials consisted in first-person statements. The facts on 
Enron, already obscure, would most likely become both less accessible and less coveted with the 
passing of time. The primary people whom those facts could implicate had no interest in hindering 
that process. 
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 The one exception to this logic—the sole Enron chief executive who accepted Congress’ 
high-handed invitation—was Jeff Skilling.35 In a characteristically bold and risky move, Skilling, 
reasoning that he had nothing to hide, actually testified twice. Apparently he had determined that 
rather than attempt to keep himself out of a burgeoning Enron narrative, he should propound his 
own; and, as he stated many times, he was confident history would prove him right. For the most 
part Skilling’s own narrative was, like those of his former subordinates, tragic. But this tragic 
narrative, necessarily, differed from that of the rank and file employees in significant ways. 
Because he was painfully aware that many people blamed him and his colleagues for the Enron 
disaster, Skilling had to go on the defensive. Yet he also expressed bewilderment and grief—in 
part so as to appear allied with publicly untarnished lower-ranked workers.  
Skilling repeatedly called Enron a “great company,” and affirmed that it was with 
dedication and pride that he had worked there ten years, with six months as chief executive. His 
abrupt and ill-explained resignation from the CEO post in August 2001 had raised eyebrows, and 
in retrospect appears a key turning point at which the financial and business communities began 
seriously to question Enron’s solvency. Skilling insisted he had resigned purely for personal 
reasons, and that he was fully confident, at the time, that Enron was as strong as ever. With an 
oft-repeated mantra, “I am not an accountant,” he claimed to have been completely unaware that 
anything was awry—with the LJMs, the Raptors, or any of Enron’s financial disclosures. The 
company’s collapse, he said, was due to a “classic run on the bank;” a spontaneous and irrational 
investor panic brought on by uninformed and reckless journalists.  
Skilling’s tragic narrative of Enron’s collapse differed most notably from those of his 
subordinates in its emphasis on technicality. Of course, there were all too many questions that, 
he maintained, he could not answer, but on subjects with which he was comfortable he implored 
his audience to rise above the sensationalism of the moment, to understand and assess the 
                                                 
35 Skilling’s testimony is not necessarily representative of Enron executives’ narratives overall—and this has 
only become more obvious with time, as some of his peers, such as Fastow, have admitted guilt and 
professed remorse. However, Skilling’s testimony is illuminating for the same reason that he alone chose to 
testify. He is perennially self-assured, and willing to “gamble” even, apparently, with his own livelihood. As 
such, Skilling personifies Enron more than any other individual—hardly a coincidence given his vital role at 
the company.  
 49 
 “facts” of the story. “The entire management and board of Enron,” he said in his opening 
statement before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, “has been 
labeled everything from hucksters to criminals, with a complete disregard for the facts and 
evidence assembled. These untruths shatter lives, and they do nothing to advance the public 
understanding of what happened at Enron.” He discussed the history of the “run on the bank” 
phenomenon, the technical complexity of the Raptor funds, and the recent trend in accounting 
that had produced “so many rules” that one “has to be a specialist to understand the mechanics 
of what’s going on.” He stated that his sales of his own Enron stock were routine and standard 
per the dictum of the diversified portfolio—and admitted that he didn’t “know what to say to the 
employees” whose entire savings were invested in the company when it collapsed.  
Skilling acknowledged that “others [had] suffered far, far worse,” but testified to his own 
personal and financial difficulties in the wake of the bankruptcy. He felt that he had been unfairly 
smeared in the media frenzy of a scandal that was largely imagined. Most gravely, he spoke of 
losing his “best friend,” former executive vice president Cliff Baxter, who had been driven to 
suicide by the same feeling. Executives like Baxter and himself, Skilling suggested, were even 
more devastated by the tragic fall of Enron, because the company reflected their innovations and 
effort more than those of any other employees. Though much of Skilling’s testimony met with 
suspicion, and with good reason, in this last point he was probably sincere. In a moment of 
intoxication from boom times and booze, Skilling had once exclaimed, “I am Enron!”36 A handful 
of executives, and none more than Skilling, had indeed won for Enron the awe and adoration it 
had enjoyed, and regardless of the circumstances of the company’s collapse, they still “were” 
Enron when it crumbled. The note that Baxter wrote to his wife before shooting himself on 
January 24, 2002, read in part, “Where there was once great pride now it is gone.”37 All evidence 
verifies that Skilling had spent a great deal of time with Baxter both in and out of the office, and 
he is said to have cried through the entirety of Baxter’s funeral. 
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 Like the rank and file employees, Skilling played up the pathos of tragedy, but unlike 
them he found himself under an uncomfortable spotlight. He attempted to turn this to his 
advantage by presenting himself and his colleagues as tragic heroes; honorable people whose 
greatest strengths had ironically brought them to shame.38 Skilling constructed a story in which, 
despite all of the executives’ hard work and best intentions, Enron fell from glory to ruin. While the 
general employee narrative had emphasized unavoidable doom, Skilling’s focus in stead was on 
a virtuous leader’s defeat. It would be too simple to label this narrative true or untrue, but it is 
worth noting that even some of Skilling’s most outspoken critics in some senses endorsed it. 
Since Enron’s bankruptcy, even Bethany McLean, the Fortune Magazine journalist whose 
skepticism about the company once provoked Skilling to hang up on her, has called him “a tragic 
hero in the classic sense.”39 As she recognized, Skilling’s exceptional talent was intimately 
connected to his downfall.  
Although he is usually characterized as arrogant, presumptuous, and brash, it also 
appears that everyone who dealt with Skilling, in any capacity and at any point, thought him a 
genius. McLean said he was “luminescently brilliant,” and she clearly referred to Skilling with a 
mix of sarcasm and admiration when she entitled her investigative book about Enron “The 
Smartest Guys in the Room.” Skilling’s onetime subordinate Sherron Watkins, even after publicly 
blaming him for the collapse and essentially calling him a liar, wrote that he was “the smartest 
man she had ever known.”40 Former energy trader Brian Cruver labeled Skilling “the smartest 
human being on the planet.”41 Anonymously, a former Enron executive and close colleague to 
Skilling called him “the smartest son of a bitch I’ve ever met.”42 
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 Skilling himself was always as ready as anyone else to exalt his own intellect. In his 
admissions interview for Harvard Business School, where he earned his MBA, he pronounced 
that he was “fucking smart;”43 and around Enron’s headquarters it was understood that he 
thought himself literally one of the most intelligent people alive. Tongue-in-cheek Enron 
employees had in the company’s heyday nicknamed it the “Death Star” after the battle station of 
the evil army in the “Star Wars” series. Ken Lay was the “emperor,” but Jeff Skilling was “Darth 
Vader;” this was to say, Lay was the official head of the imposing front, but it was Skilling who 
actually led its conquests.44 Though he only served briefly as nominal CEO, it was widely 
acknowledged that Skilling had been “running Enron” for years before that promotion.45 Thus to 
the extent that credit was due to any one individual during Enron’s stint as a Wall Street darling, it 
was most likely due to Skilling. If he was a genius, however, it was his arrogant over-confidence 
in his intelligence, as well as the unscrupulous ways in which he used it, that ultimately 
jeopardized his career, his reputation, and his well-being. For in many ways, it was much more 
difficult for Skilling to present himself as a tragic hero than it was for others to cast him as a 
melodramatic villain. 
Enron as Melodrama 
In the aftermath of Enron’s collapse, corporate executives were not the only people 
subjected to exceptional levels of public scrutiny and criticism. Elected officials as well came 
under attack due to increasing awareness of the campaign contributions that the company had 
made to members of both parties. As the scandal unfolded, politicians realized that they needed 
at least to distance themselves, in the public’s view, from the company; many legislators who had 
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 received moneys from Enron hastened now to return them.46 But better yet, some saw in this 
moment an opportunity more generally to denounce big business, rich executives, or other 
bogeymen, if it suited their purposes. It is perhaps toward this end that so many executives were 
subpoenaed; that Skilling was copiously if sloppily questioned; and perhaps even that some of 
the Enron hearings, in all their sound and fury, were held at all. They provided a forum for the 
construction of a different narrative of Enron’s collapse: Enron as melodrama. This story, as 
rendered by politicians, featured few technicalities, but plenty of moralizing. 
While tragedy provokes sympathetic reflection on disaster in terms of human failings and 
predestination, melodrama presents depthless conflicts for which specific (evil) characters are 
always clearly and directly responsible. In legislators’ melodramatic narratives, the Enron disaster 
was wholly the fault of the company’s chief executives, scheming villains who had ruined 
thousands of lives through theft and deceit. Melodrama’s virtuous characters often use “tirade;” a 
“protracted, desperate and vituperative speech;” to establish a “moral distance” between 
themselves and the villains being addressed.47 A similar strategy seemed to serve political 
purposes at the Enron hearings. In scathing fire and brimstone opening statements the legislators 
were able to berate even—or perhaps especially—the witnesses who refused to testify. Those 
who had caught the “Fifth Amendment flu;”48 former CFO Andy Fastow (of LJM notoriety) and 
several of his now-known accomplices; appeared as silent subjects of fulmination. “I hope you, in 
the dark night of your own souls, think about some of the people who…literally lost their entire life 
savings, and whose lives effectively in many ways is [sic] destroyed because of your actions,” 
Rep. Peter Deutsch (D-FL) told them.49 Rep. Bobby Rush (D-IL) implored, “For those of you who 
refuse to testify and know your guilt, I ask you, Was it worth it? Was the selling of your morals 
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 worth it? Was the selling of your souls worth it?”50  
 Skilling, the one top executive who took a speaking role, proved as formidable a villain as 
any melodrama deserves. When theater critic and historian Jeffrey D. Mason described the 
classic villain as “a sophisticated man shamelessly manipulating his text to gull the onstage 
listener,”51 he could have been writing about Skilling’s congressional testimony. Skilling dodged 
questions and twisted the words of others. He alternately claimed ignorance of technicalities, and 
expected legislators to defer to the set of arcane “facts” that he presented. He claimed to have 
been coincidentally out of the room during a crucial meeting—whose minutes reflected his 
presence—at the very moment when LJM issues came under discussion. Further, Skilling 
exhibited a remarkable amount of gall, when he testified, for someone in his position. “The 
framers of the Bill of Rights are watching,” he warned the senators as they prepared to question 
him. He stated that the “politicized process” of his interrogation “should be cause for concern of 
every American.” He criticized legislators whose questions vexed him, and smirked or balked at 
their accusations.52 Like his former colleagues who had refused to testify, Skilling was following a 
long line of executive predecessors, who when they did appear in Congress were barely 
cooperative and often quite strident. Standard Oil’s magnates, in the rare instances in which they 
testified, were known for their selectively foggy memories, and William H. Vanderbilt was similarly 
dodgy when speaking against increased railroad regulation in 1879. Vanderbilt even warned his 
congressional questioners that their project was destined to fail. Perhaps anticipating Skilling, he 
stated simply that the biggest businessmen of his time were “too smart” to be thwarted by 
government intervention.53  
Skilling’s detractors seem to bring out the worst in him, both by calling attention to his 
most regrettable words and deeds, and by inspiring him to new heights of audacity. Sen. Barbara 
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 Boxer (D-CA) appeared determined to avenge her constituents for the California energy crisis of 
summer 2000 when she said, 
We were worried, Mr. Skilling, in the summer that elderly people in the inland parts of 
[California] might lose their air conditioning and face, literally, death. The agriculture 
industry in my state was fearful that loss of refrigeration would cause economic 
devastation. Silicon Valley put solving the energy crisis as its number one priority in order 
to keep the information economy flowing. In the winter months, then…we feared that 
freezing temperatures would harm our people, particularly the elderly and the frail…Mr. 
Skilling, you helped caused these anxieties while you laughed about it. The people of 
California were not laughing. They're not laughing now. Our state wants justice.  
 
While California was suffering the conditions Boxer described, Skilling had rollicked a large Enron 
audience with, Q: “What’s the difference between the state of California and the Titanic?” A: “At 
least when the Titanic went down, the lights were on.” Though it would have been much wiser, 
politically, to apologize at the Senate hearing, Skilling defended this joke.   
Perhaps most importantly, on the fundamental issue of money made and money lost, 
Skilling’s testimony corroborated his image as a greedy and amoral robber baron. After admitting 
that he had lost little of his own $66 million when Enron bankrupted, he said that he could not 
donate anything to the employees’ relief fund because he faced so many lawsuits and had so 
many legal expenses that he “[didn’t] know whether [he would] have anything” within five to ten 
years. If Skilling was the smartest human being on the planet, he showed he was not the most 
intuitive. The hard-heartedness and effrontery that he displayed in his testimony made him the 
kind of character an audience loves to hate.54 
However, at some of the same moments in his testimony when Skilling may have 
appeared the embodiment of mendacity, he was actually presenting a valid point, if gracelessly. 
He explained his rude rebuffing of Bethany McLean, the Fortune reporter who was one of the first 
to voice doubts about Enron, by saying that the questions she was asking him would have been 
more appropriately directed to the company’s “accounting people,” “risk management people” or 
“finance people.”55 He said that his ignorance of LJM transactions was reasonable given that two 
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 other executives who worked on them had a “process in place” that involved “organizations of 
several hundred people, probably in aggregate, several thousand controls people.”56 In other 
words, in both of these instances, he didn’t know what he didn’t know because knowing it was the 
job of small armies of his subordinates. Skilling’s citing the complex compartmentalization of 
Enron should in no way have been, in and of itself, suspicious. He was describing the labyrinthine 
structure common to all firms of comparable size. The resulting lack of accountability was 
disturbing to many who heard Skilling, and perhaps rightly so. But the problem here was not with 
Enron; it was with the norms of contemporary big business. Overall, today’s “household name” 
corporations are so large and so compartmentalized that in some ways it is impractical even to 
conceive of them as unitary.  
Cultural and business historian Roland Marchand showed that during the twentieth 
century, Americans began to feel increasing anxiety about the big-ness of big business. Public 
relations campaigns have striven ever since to shrink the corporation, in the public eye, back 
down to a comprehensible size.57 If such manipulation of perception has worked, Americans may 
harbor some notion of the corporation as a group of individuals, limited in number, who more or 
less know and communicate with each other. Skilling’s references to legions of anonymous 
“people” with whose work he was unfamiliar gave the lie to this conception. This is not to say that 
Skilling behaved responsibly at Enron, or even that he testified honestly in Congress. It is, 
however, to say that some of his defenses backfired, in part, because he was expecting the same 
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 public that had long been fed the myth of the unimposing, cohesive corporation, to suddenly 
accept the fact of its enormity and diffusion.58  
To present Skilling as a melodramatic villain, the legislators needed to monumentalize his 
wickedness. The more outrageous the misdeeds they could establish, the better. Melodrama 
embraces the fantastical; the world it creates is one in which “anything good—or bad—might 
happen.”59 The characterization of a scheming Skilling at times reflected melodrama in its 
disregard for logic or common parameters of reason, and the far-fetched accusations leveled at 
him ranged from the laughable to the histrionic. For example, Sen. Dorgan mentioned a news 
report that claimed Skilling and Ken Lay had created a fake trading room to impress visiting 
analysts, complete with phones painted black “to make it look like a slick operation” (supposedly 
Skilling’s own words). When specifically asked about such a covert operation in phone cosmetics, 
Skilling said, “I don't know how you paint phones black. I mean, we have standard telephones in 
the company. I'd imagine they're the same phones that we have everywhere else. If someone 
painted a phone black, I certainly didn't know about it.” This response may sound ridiculous, but it 
only suits the question. The possibility of the fake trading floor was worth investigating—at least 
one former Enron trader has said that it did exist60 —but Dorgan’s pursuit, here, was misguided. 
The senator probably presented the image of painted phones to make Enron’s deception vivid 
even for people with no background or interest in business. However, it was too easily brushed 
off. Skilling could dodge the substantive allegation behind Dorgan’s question, which had very little 
to do with phones. 
Most grave among the evils of which Skilling was accused was the murder of his friend, 
former executive vice president Cliff Baxter. Because whistleblower Sherron Watkins wrote to 
Ken Lay that Baxter had “complained mightily” about the LJM transactions “to Skilling and all who 
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 would listen,”61 the discovery of Baxter’s dead body after Enron’s collapse triggered wild 
speculation about a corporate hit. Skilling had commissioned the killing, the tale went, because 
Baxter knew too much. Though some of the deeds that came to light in the Enron scandal could 
indeed shake one’s faith in humanity, they did not include murder. All evidence confirmed that 
Baxter’s death was, as ruled by the Houston police, a suicide.62  
Melodramatic villainy must always be contrasted with virtue. The Enron congressional 
hearings were organized as if with this precept in mind. Skilling and a number of other Enron 
executives were called before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House 
Energy and Commerce Committee on February 7, 2002, and this was the scene of the most 
damning of legislators’ tirades. One week later Sherron Watkins, the Enron former vice president 
and accountant whose memo of concern to Ken Lay became famous, testified to the same body. 
She was cast as a melodramatic heroine; an innocent, virtuous woman who had discovered a 
villainous plot and confronted evil.63 “You were the conscience of this corporation,” Rep. Edward 
Markey (D-MA) told her. Rep. Billy Tauzin (R-LA) was comforted in knowing that there were 
“people like [Watkins] in this world.” Rep. John Dingell called her “an extraordinary, courageous 
woman, who has been a bright spot in an otherwise sorry and outrageous saga.” Rep. Richard 
Burr (R-NC) took the adulation biblical when he told Watkins: 
In the New Testament, when Peter stepped out of the boat and walked on water, the 
miracle wasn't the fact that he walked on water. No, the miracle was that he chose to put 
his faith in God and step out of the boat, a boat which was his protection but was bound 
to sink in troubled water. Thank you for choosing to step out of the boat today. 64 
 
As we saw, legislators sometimes cast themselves as melodramatic heroes through 
diatribes aimed at the so-styled villains. With the heroine on stage, who was supposed to be 
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 brave but defenseless, they were able to go further by vowing to protect her against evil. By the 
same line of hyperbole that had suggested Cliff Baxter had been silenced by murder,65 
congressmen (and men they all were) insinuated that Watkins might be in danger because of her 
noble deed—but assured her that she would meet no harm. Rep. Markey told Watkins,  
I just want you to know…if actions that you feel are unwarranted are being taken against 
you because of what you're doing here, that you should let us know. They did the same 
thing to the Morton Thiokol whistleblowers that spoke of the O-ring, they demoted them, 
they punished them. But once Congress intervened, that was rectified within a day. So 
you should let us know that. 
 
“Congress” was apparently a fierce and unfailing defender of virtue, and should Watkins ever find 
herself in distress, she had only to “let them know.” Such pretense rang particularly false given 
the weakness of whistleblower protection laws at the time.66 Rep. Greg Ganske (R-IA) assured 
Watkins that he understood she might fear for her “personal safety” because she was “dealing 
with a really powerful problem…and a really powerful company.” 67 Such phrasing might be 
appropriate if addressed to a child, but not to a veteran accountant whose comprehension of the 
Enron situation was clearly more sophisticated than that of any of the legislators. The concerns 
for Watkins that the congressmen described were justified, but their bravado and condescension 
in promising to protect her were not.  
In context of Watkins’ personality, her characterization as helpless and innocent was 
especially absurd. At Enron she was nicknamed “the buzz saw,” known for her foul language and 
the intemperate style of self-expression that she used even at formal meetings.68 Further, an 
                                                 
65 At one point a questioner appeared to be pushing Watkins to say that Baxter’s death may not have been a 
suicide. Watkins finally changed the subject by saying, “it’s just a sensitive topic that I’d rather not comment 
on.” (Ibid.) 
66 John B. Chiara and Michael D. Orenstein, “Whistler’s Nocturne in Black and Gold—The Falling Rocket: 
Why the Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Provision Falls Short of the Mark,” Hofstra Labor and Employment 
Law Journal 23 (Fall 2005): 235-67. 265. 
67 House Committee, Financial Collapse of Enron. 
68 For example, years before Watkins wrote her memo, at the end of one presentation made by executives 
her response was, “What the fuck is this? This thing looks like a circle jerk to me.” When someone tried to 
defend the proposals, she cut in: “Let’s not sit around blowing each other, okay?” Her language in this 
instance clarifies in a literal sense why some at Enron said she “tried too hard to be one of the boys” 
(Eichenwald, Conspiracy of Fools, 95.) Watkins should not be too quickly judged, however. This kind of 
behavior, albeit inappropriate, may have been Watkins’ preference over the other unappealing options 
available to women at Enron.  
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 objective look at the actions she took as a so-called “whistleblower” quickly reveals a story far 
more complicated than that of moral purity versus wicked deceit. First, Watkins’ memo was 
addressed only to Ken Lay;69 she did not bring her concerns to the government, any regulatory 
agency, or the media. Here as elsewhere, “loyalty” is the explanation70—but in the case of 
Watkins, who was aware of malfeasance within the company, loyalty may have been less 
admirable. The memo makes plain that her objective was to alert Lay to a potential “wave of 
accounting scandals” so that he could clean up or hide the worst of Enron’s problems, particularly 
those of the Raptors;71 not so that he could honestly announce the company’s true financial 
condition and begin the fundamental overhaul that might actually have improved it.  
There has been speculation that Watkins’ motives were even less laudable than the 
whitewashing of Enron’s corporate image. In her memo she was extremely critical of her direct 
supervisor, Andy Fastow, and his management of the LJMs. She had never liked Fastow and 
may have felt insecure in her job. Writing such a memo, because firing a “whistleblower” was 
impolitic if not illegal, was one way to ensure that he could not dismiss her. (Even if he hadn’t 
wanted to do so before, he certainly did after reading it.) There was also a long-standing and well-
known rivalry between Fastow and corporate treasurer Jeff McMahon, which was serious enough 
to have informally created two opposing camps among Enron’s financial staff. Watkins had to 
know that, should Fastow be fired as a result of her memo, McMahon would likely take his place 
as CFO. (This is exactly what happened in the end.) Because she had always sided with 
McMahon, it might appear Watkins was doing her friend a favor—as well as replacing her boss 
with someone she liked better, and with whom she would be ingratiated. Finally, Watkins may 
have predicted the magnitude of the Enron scandal and intended the memo to serve precisely the 
purpose that it did: to appear a good deed in a naughty world and to win her the celebrity of a 
virtuous heroine. (Watkins has since become a nationally known writer, speaker and consultant 
                                                 
69 Watkins also provided a copy of the memo to corporate treasurer Jeff McMahon. Swartz with Watkins, 
Power Failure, 276.  
70 Swartz with Watkins, Power Failure, 274. 
71 Fox, Enron: The Rise and Fall, 250. 
 60 
 on corporate ethics.72 Her prior position as an internal accountant was handsomely paid though 
surely less glamorous.) But whatever Watkins’ motives—and she probably had more than one—
the statements of her memo were right. And like the child who blurted out that the emperor had 
no clothes, she showed courage when she told Enron’s CEO that the company’s dazzling 
success was illusory. 
As if concerned that the respective hearings in which Skilling and Watkins first appeared 
were not dramatic enough, the Senate found it necessary to bring the two face to face in a third 
hearing. Perhaps then more than ever, it was clear that the hearings were more for exhibitionary 
than investigational purposes, for there was nothing new to be learned simply by having Skilling 
and Watkins in the same congressional chamber.73 By all reports, they avoided eye contact, and 
as much as the senators encouraged direct confrontation between villain and heroine, they were 
disappointed.74 Reckless as Skilling was, at times, he was probably smart enough to know that to 
attack Watkins under these circumstances would have been stupid indeed. Watkins’ possible 
reasons for not berating Skilling, on the other hand, may be more complicated. 
Even at this point, having thoroughly denounced him, Watkins still considered Skilling 
“the smartest man she had ever known.”75 This may be but a clue as to the magnitude of her 
reverence. In the memoir she published after the hearings, she recalled several encounters with 
Skilling during her pre-memo years at Enron, and these anecdotes suggest she was in these 
moments acutely self-conscious and eager to win his approval. This appears to have applied 
especially to personal appearance. Watkins described being uncomfortably aware, upon one 
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 unexpected run-in with Skilling, that she was not wearing makeup.76 She also remembered 
specifically the “short purple skirt” that she felt was appropriate for meeting with him.77  
Yet such curious anecdotes were but a part of Watkins’ textured disposition toward 
Skilling. She concluded her memoir, “she had put her faith in the hands of important men [Skilling 
is among those named], and they had disappointed her.” The choice of the word “disappointed”—
rather than “disgusted,” for example—as well as the profession of her “faith” in “important men” 
such as Skilling, may indicate a persistent deference to he who had long been, after all, her 
professional superior. On the other hand, Watkins could have sought, with this tone, to cultivate 
her image as an innocent, idealistic heroine—and to contrast herself all the more starkly with 
Skilling and the others she had helped to disgrace. Again, her motives were probably complex. 
But at any rate, Watkins’ comportment throughout the Enron chronology of events, as well as 
during the hearings, made her even less suited to a depthless role than was her villain 
counterpart. 
From the condescension of male legislators, to the veneer of moral purity, to firsthand 
evidence of what might be interpreted as a reluctant crush on Jeff Skilling, Sherron Watkins’ role 
in the Enron story was not only that of a whistle-blower, but also, distinctly, that of a woman. This 
is but one case study among many in which these two categories, in narratives a business failure 
or financial crisis, have intersected and complemented one another. Aided by common 
melodramatic conceptions of gender reminiscent of the Victorian era, the script most often 
features on one hand reckless men whose competitive drive for money and status—often 
attributed in most unscientific terms to “testosterone”—begat macho business cultures that 
normalized and even rewarded rash decisions; and on the other hand temperate, beneficent 
women who intervened in the public interest (usually by reporting the wrongdoing to male 
authorities). Indeed, a vastly disproportionate number of corporate whistleblowers are female, 
and again, Enron makes a worthy “poster child” because the company’s two most prominent 
                                                 
76 Swartz with Watkins, Power Failure, 2.  
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 critics were Watkins and, at Fortune, Bethany McLean. However, just as Watkins’ dramatic 
casting points up the gendered nature of such moral narratives, so too does it reveal their glaring 
inconsistencies. 
First, the conceit that women are, by nature, morally “right” in times of crisis is an 
expedient reversal of the usual assurance that at most other times, by nature, they are empirically 
“wrong.” As long as people in power (predominantly men) are benefiting from a certain 
arrangement in business or politics, protestations against questionable practices, often articulated 
by lower-ranked women, are almost invariably written off as uninformed and overly emotional. 
This applies within private companies as well as to the apparatus of government. Even when men 
express dissent, complaints are often dismissed on the grounds that they are irrationally worked 
up and, essentially, don’t know what they are talking about.78 Such characterization, when it 
sticks, can feminize anyone beyond credibility.  
Yet once a consensus builds around the idea that a given status quo is unacceptable, 
this order can be upset. Particularly when scandal turns an issue moral, facts and technicalities, 
typically considered part of men’s natural domain, fall by the wayside. Women’s role as arbiters of 
the greater good suddenly becomes legitimate, and they may take center stage as serious 
players even with arguments that are entirely unchanged. Thus even as essentialist notions of 
gender remain, amid scandal, the values assigned to men’s and women’s supposedly innate 
traits can be switched. Such an abrupt shift begs the question of whether a greater variety of 
perspectives, regardless of gender, might have been useful all along—or might even obviate the 
need for such a damaging and embarrassing rupture, in the first place, to break down normal 
boundaries of legitimized participation.  
Second, and more concretely, the casting of men as corporate miscreants and women as 
their virtuous chaperones is grossly reductive in terms of individuals’ motives and even of 
individuals’ behavior. Some of Enron’s lesser-known episodes provide instructive examples. To 
begin, we have women acting out. For example, the only person at Enron ever to be called rival 
                                                 
78 To name a few examples, business leaders and political elites use such a line to dismiss complaints 
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 to Jeff Skilling was Rebecca Mark, CEO of the Enron International division. In business tactics 
she was just as ambitious, and in personal attitude just as heedless, as he. Mark, however, knew 
when and how to turn on the charm, a valuable aptitude that by all evidence Skilling lacked. 
Appreciated for her high heels and short skirts, she also enjoyed another advantage over Skilling 
that she never hesitated to exploit.79 During the late ‘90s Mark flew around the world in Enron 
corporate jets, negotiating the details of those “innovative” energy contracts for which Enron 
became famous, and even launched the company’s water trading operation, which she initially 
proposed to name after herself. She welcomed the gaping jaws of her dealing partners as a 
legitimate bargaining chip, as no doubt a female Skilling would have too, but like him she could 
also be intimidating and relentless when advocating new business models and promoting 
alternative methods of reporting assets’ valuation. Her office nicknames included “Hell on High 
Heels” and “Mark the Shark.” 
Despite (or more likely because of) their many similarities, Mark and Skilling competed 
bitterly, for years, over professional promotions, recognition, and project funding.80 Both evidently 
recognized that they had met their match, for the attacks were personal and the language 
profane. Company rumor had it that although at each other’s throats in meetings, these two were 
in each other’s beds after hours,81 but that probably says more about generic corporate 
mythology than it does about this particular relationship.82 At any rate, Mark was said to have had 
a number of strategic liaisons with Enron men, thus explaining her position as the only prominent 
woman of the company’s heyday. More important than the merit of such rumors, which is 
unknown, is the fact that they did not seem to bother Mark in the least; indeed she may have 
found it useful to let them proliferate.83  
                                                 
79 McLean and Elkind, Smartest Guys in the Room, 71-72. 
80 Eichenwald, Conspiracy of Fools, 71, 127, 131; McLean and Elkind, Smartest Guys in the Room, 71, 101. 
81 McLean and Elkind, Smartest Guys in the Room, 112. 
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83 Mark’s one confirmed intra-office relationship was with John Wing, her predecessor as CEO of Enron 
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there. (McLean and Elkind, Smartest Guys in the Room, 44-45). 
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 Furthermore, among the key accomplices to Andy Fastow’s money-shuffling was 
corporate counsel Kristina Mordaunt. By her own account, Mordaunt knew exactly what she was 
doing, in all its illegality, when she not only signed off on numerous conflicts of interest among 
Enron’s SPEs, but also personally invested (with formidable returns) in insider dealings via 
LJM.84 Eventually she worked directly for Fastow; promoted, essentially, for her ethical 
pliability.85 When Sherron Watkins shared her concerns, pre-memo, with Mordaunt as a company 
lawyer, the latter responded with “annoyance and skepticism.” Asking “why are you doing this? 
Are you trying to bring down the company?” Mordaunt apparently tried to strong-arm Watkins out 
of pursuing her questions any further.86 Even if the lawyer was not trying to protect Enron, she 
may well have been hoping to protect herself. Later, with an SEC investigation looming, it was 
Nancy Temple of Arthur Andersen’s legal department who ordered that the accounting firm 
destroy all emails and non-essential records related to Enron.87 
Ultimately even the good woman of the Enron story might have been, in some ways, bad: 
Watkins’ heroic whistle-blowing act appeared to have had self-interested parameters—goals 
typically associated with machismo: recognition, self-promotion, and even winning the right to 
sneer at a longtime tormentor (namely Fastow). It is worth noting, however, that whatever the 
faults of Mark, Mordaunt or Watkins, incompetence was not among them.88 Indeed, in each of 
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 these three cases it is the woman’s incisive understanding of Enron’s business, her own work, 
her place in the company, and her prospects for personal gain—by means that were sanctioned, 
illicit, or somewhere in between—that demand to be taken seriously and also to be scrutinized, 
just like those of the men around her.  
In a more comprehensive picture of Enron, we also see men disrupting the conventional 
gender order by taking a moral stance—in the interest of others and at grave potential expense to 
themselves. Long before the scandal went public, Watkins and McLean were preceded by three 
would-be Enron whistleblowers, two of whom were men.89 John Olson, a securities analyst on 
Enron with Merrill Lynch, cut his rating of the company as early as July 1998. Merrill suffered for 
this when Enron—at Andy Fastow’s command, at this time on this issue—redirected some of its 
investment banking business elsewhere. Fastow made it clear he meant to “send a message” 
conveying “visceral” objection to Olson’s research conclusions—namely, that Enron could not 
have as high a net worth as it claimed (and as everyone else believed).90 Likewise Carl Bass, a 
partner at Arthur Andersen’s Houston offices, was alarmed when he heard of LJM’s conflicts of 
interest. After extensive independent research, Bass complained strenuously to Andersen’s 
Professional Standards Group that Enron was wildly out of line and that Andersen was essentially 
risking its own name by kowtowing to this unscrupulous client.91 
                                                                                                                                                 
should have included more pictures, and then made great show of attempting to take notes on her remarks 
before giving up, admitting “I don’t know shit about this.” The charming, pretty and soft-spoken McLean, for 
her part, tried to explain in manageable terms the role of offshore accounting and the complicity of securities 
analysts, but Stewart simply exclaimed that everything she was describing was illegal (or should be), and 
that the entire financial system was impossible to understand—by design. Laughing, McLean cautioned that 
his interpretation of events was overly “sinister” and patiently sought to distinguish certain illicit practices in 
accounting and stock trading as the exception, rather than the rule. Unwilling or unable to grasp any such 
nuance, an unmoved Stewart concluded their conversation, “I am putting all my faith in you.” Stewart, as 
always, was putting on a show, and in this particular segment may also have been flirting. Even by the latter 
reading, however, per traditional roles he was playing the woman to McLean’s man. The Daily Show, 
“Bethany McLean,” http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/wed-february-20-2002/bethany-mclean. Accessed 4 
January 2010.  
89 The woman was Margaret Ceconi, who joined Enron Energy Services in November 2000. Ceconi 
anonymously emailed a hypothetical “question” to the SEC in late July 2001—weeks before Watkins sent 
her memo—that intimated huge losses were going unreported by her (unnamed) employer. An SEC officer 
called Ceconi to answer her question, but never pressed her to disclose why she had asked. (McLean and 
Elkind, Smartest Guys in the Room, 303). 
90 Eichenwald, Conspiracy of Fools, 182-83. 
91 Ibid., 252-53, 427-28. 
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 Although neither worked directly for the company, these men both risked wrath and 
retaliation by pronouncing, and then standing by their pronouncements, that something was 
wrong at Enron. Olson, in fact, was “reined in” by Merrill Lynch, and ultimately fired (with 
generous severance, that he might “leave quietly”). Again, the reason, explicitly given, was his 
skepticism toward Enron—and his replacement upgraded Enron’s rating with haste.92 Bass, for 
his part, was taken off all Enron consulting jobs at the insistence of Enron’s Rick Causey, who 
said Bass’ questions and demands showed he had “no creativity.”93 Olson or Bass may have 
acted on the same kind of mixed motives as did Watkins or, for that matter, McLean—though 
neither man sought or received much publicity at the time of his bold move. The point is that they 
did a similar thing to Watkins, with similar stakes. That neither man became famous may have 
been a matter of timing, but it also may have been a matter of gender. Watkins, even if a “buzz 
saw” in her everyday life, was better suited—partly by her own design—as moral champion in an 
Enron melodrama. By the time it appeared as national theatre, the varying meanings of men and 
women being “right” or “wrong” were, like Rebecca Mark, Kristina Mordaunt, Nancy Temple, John 
Olson, and Carl Bass, excluded from the program.   
Melodrama concludes with the overarching message that good must always defeat evil.94 
It presents an “ideal” or “normal” state of affairs; the plot’s driving conflict begins when that stasis 
is threatened, and resolves when order is restored.95 Melodrama serves to “reassure the virtuous 
that though their fears be valid, their optimism is justified.”96 The “virtuous,” presumably, are in 
the audience, booing the villain and cheering the hero. The Enron hearings as melodrama 
assumed an audience of virtuous Americans, and it is here that the stakes were highest in 
legislators’ efforts to establish their own heroism. Peace and prosperity in the capitalist free 
market, per this melodrama, had been threatened by Skilling and his executive cronies. An 
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 innocent but morally determined heroine—Watkins was even blonde—had discovered their plot 
and confronted it, but on her own she would not be able to save the day. Just when she risked 
harm at the hands of the villains, Congress valiantly took the stage by subpoenaing everyone. 
Legislators wooed their audience by praising the “American people,” and repeatedly professed 
that it was they who were being represented, and like Watkins protected, in the congressional 
response to Enron. 
From that moment on, there could be no doubt that the villains would be vanquished, and 
their threat to the norm eliminated. The overall “good”-ness of the modern corporate order could 
be affirmed, and the audience’s anxieties about it assuaged. The history of American melodrama 
includes a number of influential works that addressed bitter controversies of their times, such as 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin on slavery and The Wizard of Oz on monetary policy. Such stories could 
make statements challenging the status quo, and some did inspire sympathy for specific political 
causes. The Enron melodrama, however, like its predecessors offered a political vision that was 
deliberately contained: all things would be set right without change—or, at most, through bounded 
change. More radical narratives of the Enron scandal would draw on melodramatic tropes as well, 
but for legislators who worked in close symbiosis with big business, there were two critical goals: 
to define themselves in opposition to corporate fraud, and to affirm that such fraud was the 
exception, and not the rule. If they were able to achieve these objectives, politicians could 
emerge from the Enron melodrama personally untainted, and without having to consider any 
drastic economic or regulatory reform. Thus they steered Enron melodrama firmly away from the 
genre’s most potent possible messages: that no public official was fit to play the hero, for 
example, or that capitalism itself was the villain.  
Like tragedy, melodrama leaves the audience with a strong sense of closure, and usually 
a “lesson learned” that can make for a brighter future. Both the tragic and melodramatic 
narratives—by former employees and politicians, respectively—emphasized the need to learn 
from the Enron disaster so that nothing of its kind would happen again. As if a hero speaking the 
final lines of his big scene, Rep. Billy Tauzin (R-LA) said at Watkins’ hearing, 
If there is any good news in all this, it's that we're finding out what went wrong. We're 
really getting to the bottom of it, and we're learning how we might turn the corner…to help 
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 make sure that no other company experiences this again…And there's one other good 
news…There may be other problems in other companies in America—this is incredibly 
an aberration. I have never in all of the years of watching companies succeed and fail 
and bankruptcies—and there have been some might[y] big bankruptcies in this country—
seen anything like this. When we are through examining it and responding to it, I think the 
American public will be well-served by the process of learning from this experience and 
the changes we are going to make.97 
 
The Enron disaster was unlike anything that had come before, and, it was promised, there would 
be no “repeat performance in corporate America.”98 Such definitive closure evaded any concerns 
that the scandal indicated systemic problems in government or business. Indeed the “changes” to 
be made in Congress, on the issues at hand, primarily consisted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
which though conceived in melodrama was hardly radical. Another narrative form, however, was 
able to give voice a much wider range of political possibilities, because it dispensed with moral 
absolutes and denied its audience consolatory closure. The next set of narratives to be 
considered are the satiric. 
Enron as Cynical Satire 
At the same time as the Enron collapse was being lamented, it was also being 
lampooned. If there is a constant cultural reflex to make fun of those in power, the arrogant and 
spectacularly rich Enron executives who now squirmed under the media microscope made 
especially tempting targets. Rep. Bart Stupak’s depiction of Enron as the naked emperor, and his 
joke about Andersen, were about as far as someone in his position dared go in making light of 
this disastrous bankruptcy. Beyond the halls of Congress and the pressures of electoral politics, 
however, professional and guerilla satirists, whose only job was to entertain and to please, could 
join in the Enron frenzy in an entirely different way. They had an opening—perhaps even a duty—
to satirize a situation that was in many ways acutely unfunny.  
Obviously, laughter could never bring back lost jobs or vanished pensions, but it could 
serve as a comfort, or perhaps as a kind of psychological revenge, both to people who suffered 
directly from Enron’s bankruptcy and also to people far removed from it who were nevertheless 
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 appalled. Whether told to one person or to many thousands, jokes offered a less draining 
alternative to constant fury at the executives; one that may have given the laughers a feeling of 
empowerment. Satire not only assures audience members that they are right to see through the 
emperor’s robe, but moreover sees to it that the emperor is duly embarrassed and ashamed 
when “exposed” in public. Some Enron humor was handed down from on high—if the likes of Jay 
Leno and David Letterman can be considered American institutions—but most often it surfaced in 
anonymous, anything-goes forums, particularly on the internet, if it was ever committed to text at 
all. Fortunately many jokes that circulated in conversation were also set down in memoirs or 
haphazardly compiled for publication. While congressional hearings were by definition exclusive, 
most Enron satire was by medium inclusive. And with this vast diffusion of participation came a 
gleeful eschewing of responsibility: anybody could enjoy a laugh, but nobody had to offer a 
solution.  
In time-honored tradition, many jokes suggested that the businesspeople in question 
were simply rotten characters; thoroughly dishonest and immoral. Similar complaints surface 
often in anti-corporate polemics, but here, rather than conveying fear of the target, denigration 
happens by means of poking fun. “Why do they bury senior Enron executives at least 20 feet 
under ground?” One joke asked. The punch line: “Because deep down they are really good 
people.”99 Jon Stewart reported that an Enron “spokesperson” expressed regret for not firing 
thousands of employees closer to Christmastime, explaining that “their Department of Pure Evil” 
was in shambles along with the rest of the company.100 Jay Leno said on The Tonight Show, 
“The wife of Enron CEO Kenneth Lay, Linda Lay, was on the ‘Today’ show yesterday. She said 
her husband is an honest, moral man who has done nothing wrong…She went on to say that 
they’ve lost all their money. Luckily, they’ve still got plenty of everybody else’s.”101  
Many spoofs referred specifically to statements in Congress, and since Skilling was the 
only top-level executive who testified, they might as well have been mocking him by name. “How 
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 can you tell when an Enron executive has started lying during his Congressional testimony?” One 
joke went. The answer: “When his lips have started moving.”102 Among the “10 Things Enron 
Executives Should Probably Not Say In Response To Senate Committee Questions:” number 
eight, “Please rephrase your question in the form of an answer…;” number seven, “I’m sorry, 
Senator, I didn’t say ‘Simon says ask questions.’ You’re out;” number five, “You think that excuse 
was bad? Let me read this list of worse things I could have said…”103  
Tellingly, the number one item on the above list—the ultimate punch line in this 
countdown—was “Excuse me Senator, don’t I remember you from the last fundraiser?” The point, 
of course, was well taken. Satire, unlike tragedy and melodrama as performed in congressional 
hearings, could attack politicians who were implicated in the Enron scandal. Because it did not 
have to strive for gravity or a moral conclusion, satire could create an Enron narrative in which the 
heroes and villains of the political melodrama were all part of the same despicable charade. 
Accordingly, in addition to government, the judiciary and law enforcement were fair game as well. 
To the proposition that corporate criminals would now be sent to the “tough” prisons, Jay Leno 
said, “you know, the ones that have only nine golf holes and not the full eighteen.” To the promise 
that the punishment for such crimes would be “doubled,” he said, “That means they will slap you 
on both wrists apparently.”  
Composed to the evocatively American tune of Simon and Garfunkel’s “Mrs. Robinson,” 
one song went in part: 
Hide it in a Cayman bank where no one ever goes. 
Pay it to the Congress for your projects… 
 
Coo coo ca choo, Enron managers, Cheney loves you more than you will know. 
Whoa whoa whoa… 
 
Sitting on a slush fund full of cash and other perks 
Paying it to candidates in crates. 
Democrats, Republicans, there’s no need to choose. 
When the votes take place you never lose. 
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 The ditty suggested Enron-style fraud and the corruption of public officials were familiar, if not 
entirely wholesome, pastimes—perhaps like having a mindless affair with someone twice your 
age. Regardless, the tone was cheerful enough for singing. Amid all the gibes even putative 
heroine Sherron Watkins was not safe. One compilation of statements by Enronians that 
compared “what they said” with “what they meant” asserted that when Watkins wrote, in her 
memo to Ken Lay, “I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting 
scandals;” she actually meant, “you should be incredibly nervous that I will distribute this memo to 
reporters after Enron implodes in a wave of accounting scandals.” In satiric Enron narratives, no 
motive was pure. 
As with melodrama, Enron satire sometimes expressed disdain for practices and 
conventions that were part and parcel of contemporary corporate capitalism. The same vastness 
and compartmentalization of the corporation that Skilling had described, to his audience’s 
incredulity, were spoofed in the following report on an imaginary addition to the Periodic Table, 
“Enronium:” 
This amazing element…has a nucleus composed of one enron…two executive vice-
enrons, ten senior vice-enrons, 18 vice-enrons, and 36 assistant vice-enrons…Enronium 
is highly inert and does not decay. Instead, it institutes a continuing series of reviews and 
reorganizations, which continuously shuffle the positions of all particles. This guarantees 
that none of the particles really know what is going on throughout the rest of the atom. 
Atoms of Enronium spontaneously form into molecules known as “Business Units” by 
exchanging packets of “memos”…with each other.104 
 
The ignorance excuse was certainly suspicious in the Enron case, but the kind of complexity and 
lack of internal cohesion being mocked above is simply a trait of the modern corporation. Save for 
the convenience of Enron’s name in evoking particle terms (like “neutron” and “electron”) this 
fictitious “element” could as easily represent the structure of any other large company. 
Similarly misconceived, though undeniably elegant, was the following Enron haiku: 
Our profits are made 
at the consumer’s expense. 
Pass the caviar.105 
 
                                                 
104 Barry, Enron Joke Book, 41. 
105 Ibid., 18.  
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 In a capitalist market, profits must be made. Often they are made by charging the consumer 
more, sometimes far more, than the product or service cost to provide. The California energy 
crisis represented an exaggeration of this system, and may have involved illegal activity—but the 
general principle summarized in the haiku’s first two lines is accepted and practiced far and wide. 
As for the indulgence in caviar: again, it is laissez-faire capitalism that is being lampooned here, 
not just Enron. To allow the accumulation of wealth and to deny any radical re-distributive 
intervention is to guarantee that a few will eat caviar while the majority will not.  
The reality of Enron employees’ and investors’ betrayal and devastating financial loss 
made the grimmest but perhaps most necessary humor. One Bill Shein uploaded to the internet a 
recording of what was supposedly Enron’s new voicemail greeting: 
Thank you for calling Enron. Please listen closely to the following options, as our menu 
has changed. 
If you wish to serve a subpoena on a current or former Enron executive, press “one.” 
If you are an Enron shareholder and would like to learn how to turn your Enron stock 
certificates into decorative origami, press “two.” 
If your Enron 401(k) plan is worthless and you would like tips on how to survive your 
retirement eating nothing but Mac ‘n’ Cheese, press “three.” 
If you are an Enron executive and would like to find out which prison inmate will be 
making you his bitch, press “four.” 
If you would like to invoke your constitutional right against self-incrimination, press “five.” 
If you are Dick Cheney, press “six”…and thanks for nothing, Dick! 
If your company is looking to hire someone to record your voicemail message, press 
“seven,” or stay on the line and an operator will assist you. 
Thank you for calling Enron, The World’s Greatest Company.106  
 
Satire like this was cathartic, but otherwise unproductive. At best, it articulated fantasies of 
revenge. “Remember,” wrote Leslie Woolf Hedley in a disclaimer for contemporary American 
satirists, “it’s not the duty of satire to solve the problems we portray.”107 Enron satires such as 
those quoted above condemned business and government alike, but although sometimes quite 
eloquent in stating the issues involved in the company’s collapse, they never advanced any 
proposals for change or offered hope for the prevention of “another Enron.” The cynical satirist 
                                                 
106 “The Enron Voice Mail System,” http://politicalhumor.about.com/library/blenronvoicemail.htm. Accessed 5 
March, 2010; Swartz with Watkins, Power Failure, 351. 
107 Leslie Woolf Hedley, introduction to Contemporary American Satire II (Sonoma, CA: Exile Press, 1992), 
9. 
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 can encourage a kind of lighthearted despair.108 An activist satire, however, can offer a similarly 
biting critique while raising the possibility that a better world is possible. 
Enron as Activist Satire 
At its best, satire exposes the follies of its society and offers a rational standard against 
which to judge them.109 Ideally, it attacks certain behaviors, institutions, or groups because its 
authors believe they could be “otherwise than they are.”110 Some people who satirized the Enron 
disaster did so with sufficient factual grounding and political conviction to make an intelligent (if 
underappreciated) contribution to the public dialogue of the moment.  
One might not expect to find poetry in the pages of a journal called Critical Perspectives 
on Accounting. However, at least one contributor was inspired to summarize “The Lessons of 
Enron” in verse. Michael Grayson’s composition reads in part: 
…It is not enough simply to tell the truth; 
Otherwise you might end up in that witness booth. 
 
Preparers and auditors must tell everything needed 
So the financial statements can be properly heeded 
By people who are willing to put in the time 
To understand and interpret before they lend a dime. 
 
Grayson here sought to rally his colleagues around the professional standards of thoroughness 
that he felt Arthur Andersen Accounting had abandoned. He also commented on securities 
trading, which is one of the arenas of American business with the dubious arrangement in which 
litigation has in effect been substituted for regulation: 
The holders who paid real money to buy their stock 
Do not get a refund. They just think, “Flock! 
We are being sheared like any old sheep 
And the only ones who will even make a peep 
 
Are the class-action lawyers who earn their pay 
By suing the bastards day after day.” 
Maybe we would all be better off if 
The SEC got involved in many a tiff.111 
                                                 
108 Alvin B. Kernan, “A Theory of Satire,” in Modern Satire, ed. Alvin B. Kernan (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
& World, 1962), 172.  
109 Ibid., 153. 
110 Gregory Fitz Gerald, Modern Satiric Stories: The Impropriety Principle (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 
1971), 46. 
111 Michael Grayson, “The Lessons of Enron,” Critical Perspectives in Accounting 15 (2004), 1003-4. 
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Granted, the artistic merit of this poem is probably not its greatest strength. (Just as Jeff Skilling 
absolved himself by repeating time and again, “I am not an accountant,” perhaps this accountant 
would plead that he is not a poet.) But Grayson succeeds in presenting proposals for change 
through a medium of amusement, and thereby exemplifies activist satire. 
Meanwhile other Enron activist satire was being performed in person. The Billionaires for 
Bush, a network of activists against big business and its influence on the current administration, 
sarcastically took to the streets in tuxedoes and evening gowns. They used aliases like Monet 
Oliver DePlace and Meg A. Buck, and carried signs and shouted slogans such as “Corporations 
Are People Too!”, “Make Social Security Neither!”, and “Four More Years! Four More Wars!” 
Maintaining a more consistent stance toward Enron than did their namesake, in 2002 the 
Billionaires for Bush heeded the call to “Free the Enron Seven” and founded the (fake) Enron 
Legal Defense Fund. Their affiliate choral group, the Wall Street Singers, performed the following 
song (to the tune of "Mandy" by Scott David English & Richard Buchanan Kerr), “We’re Enron:” 
We used to pump the natural gas.  
Then we started kicking ass. 
They states made us roar—they deregulated. 
So we devoured more—our stock was inflated.  
 
Then we started losing dough.  
But no one was supposed to know. 
How we cooked the books! And nobody caught it 
When our accounting crooks were shredding the audit. 
 
Just before our stock did tank, 
We sold and took it to the bank. 
The workers still got screwed—it was our intention 
To bilk the working dude right out of his pension! 
 
We're Enron 
When Dick Cheney needs power solutions 
We are there to discuss. 
Yeah Enron 
We gave Bush lots of big contributions 
He's been working for us! 
Oh Enron.112 
 
                                                 
112 “Felonius Ax” [Clifford J. Tasner], “We’re Enron,” http://billionairesforbush.com/cds.php#enron. Accessed 
5 March 2010. 
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 Taken alone, this satire is more cynical than activist. In context, however, it was part of a 
shrewd political strategy in which the Billionaires for Bush could attract attention and elicit 
laughter from people who otherwise might not have been inclined to listen to their grievances. 
Over the course of George W. Bush’s two terms the group became a burgeoning national 
phenomenon, with new “chapters” springing up constantly—probably because its street antics 
looked like so much fun.113 But an official online “Do-It-Yourself Manual” advised protestors 
anywhere on how best to exploit an audience’s amusement, once won: 
Let’s have fun AND be effective messengers…Corporate takeover arguments resonate 
across the political spectrum…Leave social and ideological issues behind. Corruption is a 
winning issue, corporate cronyism is the best cross-cutting critique of this administration. 
Hence we don’t do much on gay marriage, reproductive rights, the moral issues behind 
Iraq war etc.  
…It’s not enough to say corporations have too much influence in government. We need 
figures…Enron’s Ken Lay is George Bush’s biggest lifetime contributor, and gave him 
more money than all 16 years of Kerry’s special interest money combined. EVERY 
American should know that. Vague generalities preach to the choir, swing voters are 
concerned with facts…114 
 
Thus the Billionaires’ agenda transcended humor, and indeed transcended Enron and even Bush. 
They used laughter as a sort of Trojan horse, presenting it as a gift to their (hopefully) 
impressionable audiences before revealing that it was only a front for their real mission: to 
mobilize voters against what they called the “corporate takeover” of the United States 
government.  
 When demonstrating, the Billionaires for Bush may have had just as unique an effect on 
themselves as they did on their audiences. It seemed they had found a refreshing mode of social 
protest; one that relieved (if temporarily) the burdens of rage, despair, and polemic, and instead 
allowed someone quite unhappy with the government under which he lived to affect a carefree 
persona and a luxuriant life. Rather than articulating the harm that certain policies did the less 
fortunate, the Billionaires articulated the boon that those same policies gave the more fortunate—
                                                 
113 Full disclosure: when the President was re-elected in 2004 the Billionaires for Bush held a “Re-
Coronation Ball” in Washington. The author attended as corporate counsel Sue Pina Yurass, along with 
financial advisor husband Rob Yurass and client Texas oil heiress Cookie D’Books. The Wall Street Singers 
performed, Monopoly money rained from the rafters, and the celebratory mood inspired many lucrative new 
conspiracies among the guests.  
114 “Billionaires For Bush Do-It-Yourself Manual, Version 2.000.000.000,” 
http://billionairesforbush.com/diy_v2_contents.php. Accessed 5 March 2010. 
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 which they found equally worthy of attention and concern. Such an alternative political manifesto 
was funny, the Billionaires suggested, without being any less true.  
If the use of humor and the adoption of cavalier attitudes toward political problems, even 
the most serious ones, has ascended in popularity over more traditional methods of dissent and 
protest, it might be due to the widely observed disillusionment that set in after the Vietnam War 
and Watergate.115 A certain scandal fatigue appears to have rendered anger and sorrow, 
whenever occasioned by the news, too exhausting for most Americans. By this time—the early 
2000s—televised political satire was fast gaining favor, not only as entertainment, but also as 
information and de facto analysis. The left-liberal viewpoints of the likes of Jon Stewart and, later, 
Stephen Colbert, may not be diluted at all, but their cynical and mocking approach to the news is 
evidently palatable, even welcome, to a huge mainstream audience whose majority is neither 
activist nor radical.   
Gregory Fitz Gerald has gone so far as to call the satirist a metaphorical “keeper of the 
tablets during a period in which the orthodox ministry seems in chaos and confusion.”116 Such 
praise may be grandiose. In the moment of the Enron scandal, however, the American “orthodox 
ministry” of official authority—President Bush’s administration and Congress—did certainly 
appear to have been caught in a rather unorthodox position. The moral “tablets” might have been 
as safe with a gaggle of leftists playing dress-up as they would with anyone else. The wisdom in 
activist satire was that it combined amusing wit with knowledge and conviction. Perhaps 
surprisingly, while Enron satire was probably more enjoyable than Enron tragedy or Enron 
melodrama, it also had the capacity to articulate the issues at hand with compassion and 
complexity in ways these other narrative styles did not. It went beyond individual scapegoats and 
easy answers about right and wrong; it challenged audiences to think beyond the sensation of 
scandal and to conceive of Enron as the symptom rather than the disease.  
                                                 
115 Julian Zelizer, “Seeds of Cynicism: The Struggle Over Campaign Finance, 1956-1974,” The Journal of 
Policy History 14, no. 1 (2002): 73-111. 88.  
116 Fitz Gerald, Modern Satiric Stories, 46-47. 
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 Finally, activist satire offered hope for change, and substantive ideas about how change 
could be achieved. More than any other Enron narrative, this one took advantage of the 
opportunity that the scandal presented: to tap into newly aroused awareness and anger about 
corporate fraud and the government-big business alliance. Enron as tragedy or even as 
melodrama could have included a pointed critique and a vision for change, but as has been 
shown, this potential was quashed by the political interests that such narratives might have 
threatened. The unfortunate thing about activist Enron satire, then, was that there was not more 
of it. The majority of Enron stories, whether they provoked laughter or tears, ultimately 
encouraged either resignation to, or a restoration of faith in, a relatively unchanged status quo. 
Perhaps this was the reason that despite all the bluster in Congress, not many substantive 
reforms were seriously considered—and even fewer were adopted—in the aftermath of Enron’s 
dramatic collapse. 
PART II: HOW ENRON COLLAPSED AT GROUND ZERO 
Having taken a literary sampling of Enron theatrics, we must now acknowledge that 
throughout this variegated performance of Enron narratives and legislative showmanship, the 
audience was watching more than one program. Despite the appeal of drama and the comfort of 
laughter, at the time of Enron’s bankruptcy there was a distinct pall of trauma hanging over US 
political discourse, and it shadowed Enron narratives of all kinds—even some of the funny ones. 
Enron, all along, was more distraction than main event. Coming in December 2001, the 
bankruptcy followed closely on the heels of a much more palpable event: the attacks of 
September 11.  
This recent trauma—a real one—offered an even more immediate, timely way to make 
Enron stories coherent and meaningful. To be sure, there were still many unanswered questions 
about September 11 in the months that followed, but compared to the arcane technicalities of 
Enron’s bankruptcy, the series of disasters known in shorthand as “9/11” could be grasped 
instantly. The attacks were all too physically real, and their effects all too obvious. 9/11 became 
all the more accessible, as a concept, as the collapse of the World Trade Center became its 
primary referent, with stories of the other hijacked flights—and their passengers—often played 
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 down in favor of the scene and the victims in Manhattan. The idea of a great and terrible collapse, 
then, was universally intelligible at the time of Enron’s demise. Through the “borrowing” of 9/11 
imagery to describe what had happened at Enron, just about anybody could impose a familiar 
story on the mess of numbers and business terminology that had left even experts baffled.  
Moreover, an intense awareness of the attacks, though they were understood in different 
ways, permeated American life to a degree that would be difficult to overstate. Whether or not it 
was actually the case, many people felt that their lives, the country, or the world had 
fundamentally changed on September 11.117 Especially so shortly thereafter, and especially on a 
political issue, discourse needed constantly to acknowledge this ferment. In other words, both for 
speakers and their (intended) audiences, if Enron was to make sense, it had to make sense 
alongside September 11. How was this accomplished? Or at least, how was it attempted, and 
with what political implications? Talking about Enron, a few people mentioned 9/11 explicitly. But 
more often, they invoked the attacks without acknowledging (indeed, sometimes without even 
being aware) that they were doing so. The result was a distinct narrative pattern that drew upon 
tragedy, melodrama, and even sometimes satire. It claimed a much more particularized (if 
artificially imposed) setting in space, time, and circumstances. And as always, the stories that 
took shape showed fingerprints from their creators, belying proclivities and partialities. 
Narratives are never created in a vacuum. Their construction and reception take place in 
a wider context, which includes other goings-on and thus other narratives. Marita Sturken 
illustrated this brilliantly in Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the 
Politics of Remembering.118 Sturken studied narrativization in the United States during the 
second half of the twentieth century, in relation to the two events mentioned in its title as well as 
others. One of her book’s many valuable contributions is the metaphor of the “tangle.” By my 
reading this term refers to the ways in which various narrative “threads” cross each other and 
become interconnected in such complex ways—some of which we cannot see—that they are 
impossible to isolate. On this premise Sturken showed, for example, how people understood the 
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118 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 
 79 
 AIDS virus, biologically, through loaded analogies invoking the Cold War.119 This concept holds 
immense promise in the study of narrative, and indeed it is surprising that it has not been more 
widely embraced. Not only does it make sense to study narratives in associational context; 
arguably it makes no sense not to. Why describe the thread as if it lay neatly on its own when it 
never has and never will? Thus as a study of Enron narrative, this must also be a study of the 
other major national narrative with which it was entangled from the very start.  
Devastating Implosion 
Houston, Texas, is far removed from New York City in the spatial sense, but for many at 
Enron, identification and connection with the “Big Apple” belied this distance. Never was this 
clearer than on September 11: At 1400 Smith Street, the toppling World Trade Center was 
associated with Enron almost immediately. Like everyone else receiving live news on that 
morning, Enron employees were shocked and bewildered. Yet some of them felt an additional 
anxiety. They imagined that as an American Fortune 10 company Enron was a plausible target 
for those whom, it was assumed, had directed the attacks: fundamentalist Islamic terrorists 
protesting capitalist greed and exploitation. Former Enron trader Brian Cruver recalled that when 
the speaker system in Enron Center North announced, “We have no reason to believe Enron is in 
any danger,” it seemed only to heighten this fear. It was the kind of statement that, if true, should 
have been unnecessary. As the company headquarters were frantically evacuated, one of his 
coworkers bluntly summed it up: “A lot of people hate Enron, so we’re leaving.”120  
Of course, with the passage of time Enron employees were reassured that they were well 
out of (direct) harm’s way. Like many large corporate and financial organizations, Enron had 
representatives in the World Trade Center who were conducting routine business when the 
planes struck. But as a company Enron was no more affected by the attacks than any other; 
indeed, headquartered in Houston it was relatively well-situated compared to some of its 
counterparts back east. In the following weeks, nonetheless, darkness hovered over the 
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 company. The stock price, which had been flagging, stabilized when the market reopened on 
September 17, yet Cruver remarked that this “great news” went practically unnoticed. Even some 
of the traders, typically rowdy young men whose devil-may-care tactics made Enron millions, 
paused to reflect on the state of the world, and even on the place of capitalism in its future.121 
Some Enronians seemed to recognize that the company epitomized American corporate 
capitalism in its current cutting-edge form, and thus felt doubly attacked. 
Just a few months later, as bankruptcy loomed, most of these people found they had little 
work to do—and knew that soon they would have none. When someone posted a handmade sign 
next to a high-story window that read, “This is not an exit,”122 the already dark humor was yet 
more chilling in context: live television broadcasts had shown people leaping out of the World 
Trade Towers as they collapsed. This joke could convey the anxiety that many Enron employees 
felt simultaneously for their company and for their country. For some, the two disasters; Enron’s 
folding and the September 11 attacks; were proximate not only in time, but also perhaps in 
meaning.  
The official date for Enron’s collapse was December 2, 2001. Supervisors infamously 
waited until the last minute—almost literally—to inform the casualties of “Black Monday” that they 
were being laid off. Employees were rounded up for floor meetings, where “management” 
delivered the news, accepting no questions, and commanded them to clear the building 
completely within 30 minutes. This time, the evacuation of 1400 Smith Street was due to a 
disaster that had struck home.  
The conceptual link to September 11 was much more openly articulated after Enron’s 
“collapse” was complete. Former employees may naturally have made the analogy because it 
was rooted in their emotional experience: imploding buildings could symbolize the abrupt 
demolition of “structures” once thought sturdy, such as that of the corporation itself, which was 
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 supposed to reward loyal workers by guaranteeing professional and financial stability.123 
Pragmatically, the 9/11 analogy was also useful when former Enronians sought public validation 
and support. In the immediate wake of Enron’s bankruptcy, their concrete goals included securing 
passable severance pay, maintaining benefits such as health insurance, and finding new jobs in a 
tight market and at an inopportune time of year. Thus while the employees may have wanted 
empathy for its own sake, they also hoped that it might win for them tangible consolations. Many 
of the people in their newfound audience knew little about Enron, and nothing about its descent 
into bankruptcy. But, again, everyone knew September 11th; thus the devastating fall was a 
convenient metaphor. 
Former Enron employees described the “chaos and confusion” of “the final crash,” which 
in “the sheer speed of the collapse” had “sabotaged” their lives. Common to many of their stories 
was a pathos of profound loss. When so many Enronians said that they, or others, had “lost 
everything,” they were speaking not only in financial or professional terms, but also in terms of 
personal relationships. No one died on the day of the bankruptcy, but the phrases that former 
Enron employees used almost suggested otherwise. “Mourning” was a frequent phrase that they 
used to express their feelings. “I made some good friends at Enron,” one wrote to the Houston 
Chronicle, “but I know I won’t see many of them again.” Specifically, employees described 
poignant farewells in context of the urgent and forced evacuation of the building, recalling stories 
from the World Trade Center. “I saw co-workers and friends hugging one another for comfort,” a 
former employee said, “I saw tears in people’s eyes as they bid ‛goodbye and good luck.’” 
Another professed getting “choked up” when he thought about “the team that [he] was part of” 
being “scattered in the streets.” A third remembered searching in vain for “friends and colleagues 
in the building.” Elaborating the analogy between layoff and death, he went on to state that 
because he had been able to keep his job he had “survivor’s guilt.” He referred to dismissed 
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 former co-workers as “missing,” but in his choice of words, “we mourn for those who are gone!,” 
he metaphorically consigned the “missing” to the same grimly ambiguous status as the “missing” 
of September 11.124  
When confronted with the Enron bankruptcy, Congress was already quite busy with 
another matter: namely, responding to the first foreign attack on “American soil” since Pearl 
Harbor in 1941. These men and women may have been preoccupied; but then, in a sense, so 
were their constituents—and legislators knew it. With piles of rubble still to be cleared, the attacks 
on the World Trade Center loomed too large on the political scene to be compartmentalized or 
isolated, even briefly, while public officials addressed a different issue. Thus in dealing with the 
Enron scandal, a domestic affair seemingly unrelated to 9/11, congresspeople forged connections 
between the two events both out of their own predisposition and as a means of presenting 
themselves to the electorate in a flattering light. The latter was particularly critical because these 
legislators stood at the intersection of the two crises. As leaders and guardians of the homeland, 
they faced potential blame for allowing such an effective attack against it. And because so many 
in Congress routinely exchanged political favors for financial contributions—with large 
corporations generally and with Enron specifically—legislators appeared to have turned a blind 
eye on corporate misbehavior, leaving the American public now to bear its brunt. 
 Legislators’ speeches in the Enron hearings were rife with imagery invoking the 
September 11 attacks. Most glaring were the dramatic renderings of the company’s fall, from a 
great height, claiming thousands of innocent victims. First “tremors” had been felt in the buildings 
of 1400 Smith Street. Then came Enron’s “tumble;” “free fall;” “implosion;” “frighteningly swift 
collapse;” it had “cascaded downwards rapidly;” “precipitously dropping” or “crashing down” in “a 
state of complete collapse;” it was “carnage;” a “disaster of epic proportions by any measure;” the 
“impact of Enron’s collapse” was “the downfall of thousands,” whose plans and dreams had “gone 
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 up in smoke,” leaving them “devastated.” People’s faith in the company or in corporate America 
generally, had been “shaken” or “shattered.” Byron Dorgan remarked on “the height from which 
[Enron] fell, the speed by which it unraveled and the pain it inflicted.” Rep. Peter Deutsch (D-FL) 
spoke of “thousands of real people” who were “suffering;” Wyden spoke of families in grief 
counseling. We have seen how time and again, legislators dubbed the Enron story a tragedy. 
When accompanying evocative descriptions like these, the concept moved from abstraction to 
application: the “tragedy” of September 11.  
In her famous internal memo of warning to then-CEO Ken Lay, Enron “whistleblower” 
Sherron Watkins had chosen fortuitous phrasing: “I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in 
a wave of accounting scandals.”125 Of course, Watkins could not have been invoking September 
11, even unconsciously, when she wrote this memo in August 2001. It is significant, however, that 
this single line was to echo back and forth in the congressional hearings, as well as in many 
mainstream media stories. It is possible that all of the same language would have been used 
even if the events of September 11 had not occurred. However, because they had, these 
relentless descriptions of a devastating fall had special resonance. Again, both for those who 
spoke and for those who listened, there had been a substantial and irreversible change of 
context.  
Legislators wanted testimony from people who had been “[close] to the fire” at Enron; by 
this they meant top level executives. When former executives appeared at the hearings, the 
September 11 imagery persisted, but the tone changed from amazement at the “fall,” to 
condemnation of those responsible. In its less severe form, the allegation was that of negligence. 
Rep. Richard Burr (R-NC), for example, said the executives had been careless and selfish, 
showing “no regard for human lives.”  
Jeff Skilling’s resignation as CEO was a favorite case in point here, particularly in light of 
its timing: August 2001, which in retrospect was clearly, for Enron, the beginning of the end. 
Skilling claimed he left for strictly personal reasons;126 repeatedly insisting that he had sincerely 
                                                 
125 Watkins to Kenneth Lay, 15 August 2001, in Berkowitz, Enron: A Professional’s Guide, 137. 
126 McLean & Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room, 347.  
 84 
 believed the company was in excellent financial condition. But Rep. James Greenwood (R-PA) 
was unconvinced, and used the imagery of devastating implosion to accuse Skilling of negligence 
amid disaster: 
…People in far inferior positions to you could see cracks in the walls, feel the tremors, 
feel the windows rattling, and you want us to believe that you sat there in your 
office…and had no clue that this place was about to collapse.  
 
In Greenwood’s metaphor, Skilling must have known that the “building” of Enron was “about to 
collapse.”127 Out of cowardice and inhumanity, Greenwood suggested, Skilling decided to run for 
the door even as his subordinates stayed and worked on in spite of their (justified) worries.128 
Many depictions of the “heroes” of September 11 had featured people who risked or met death by 
remaining in the crumbling World Trade Towers, or even by rushing in, in order to help others in 
danger. This description of Skilling’s actions, then, alluded to a potent moral distinction at the 
time: between people who, in moments of crisis, acted merely on self-preserving instinct, and 
people who placed others’ needs over their own. 
The worst analogies were reserved for executives who refused to cooperate with 
Congress. If Skilling’s crime had been to allow Enron’s implosion, or to pretend he hadn’t seen it 
coming, some of his colleagues were said to have actively caused it. In one of a few explicit 
references to September 11, Rep. Mike Bilirakis (R-FL) compared them with the hijackers:  
…With the apparent type of mindsets that many of you must possess to have done what 
you have, maybe you really don't realize what you have done. You know, it took terrorists 
from other countries to tear this country and really the world asunder, and yet we have 
fellow Americans who have accomplished something that's almost as bad… 
 
 
Bilirakis thereby suggested that the executives who declined to testify, like suicide bombers, were 
so irrational or immoral that he could not so much as guess at how they understood their own 
actions. In a vow that echoed those of President George W. Bush and other officials in response 
                                                 
127 Greenwood’s prior imagery around this section of the transcript had evoked an earthquake; the 
implications of this analogy were less damning of Skilling than that of the September 11 collapse of the 
World Trade Center. Nonetheless, Greenwood’s description of a building about to crumble resonated with 
images and stories of 9/11. 
128 Another analogy used for Skilling’s carefully-timed exit from the Enron disaster was that of a sinking 
ship—for dramatic effect, the Titanic—with Skilling its selfish captain, who fled in a lifeboat but left his crew 
and passengers to drown. See House Subcommittee, Finding of Enron’s Special Investigative Committee. 
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 to September 11, Rep. Burr said to the same group of silent men, “Let me assure you, the anger 
will not die, we will not go away, and America will not forget what has happened.” Such allusions 
and admonishments were subtle compared to the remarks of Rep. Bobby Rush (D-IL): 
 Just as the World Trade Center bombers have shaken the sense of personal security for 
millions of Americans, the Enron catastrophe has left our public without a sense of 
economic security. At the center of this economic meltdown, we find a handful of 
economic terrorists. But unlike most terrorists who base their actions on twisted and 
perverse ideals of justice and righteousness, the economic terrorists at Enron had one 
cause: selfishness and greed.129 
Legislators did have to share the stage, at the Enron hearings, with those who had “been 
there.” By offering effusive praise for former Enron employees, Members of Congress attempted 
to turn this potential threat into an advantage, and to position themselves as champions and 
avengers of the economically dispossessed. However, the ex-Enronian rank and file had 
representation, and an agenda, of its own. These employees emphasized that they wanted “no 
handout,” but under this tough veneer were some urgent concerns.  
Recall as an example Charles Prestwood, who was one of the most eager spokespeople 
for the “victims” or “survivors” of Enron’s collapse. In the first “general overview” hearing, held just 
weeks after the company bankrupted, Prestwood testified that he had worked 33 years for Enron 
and invested in it all of his savings. Having been unable to sell company stock after its value 
began to drop, he stated that all that he and other Enron employees could do was “just sit there 
and watch [the company; their savings] melt down.” This devastating implosion, then, was a 
spectacle even for those directly involved. They were horrified but apparently transfixed. After 
losing $1.3 million, Prestwood now had to come out of retirement just to stay afloat.130  
Outside of Congress, furious former Enron employees had publicly condemned specific 
top executives, occasionally comparing them to “terrorists” or “the Taliban,”131 but those who 
                                                 
129 Ibid. 
130 Senate Committee, Overview of the Enron Collapse. 
131 Letter to the Editor: Mark Lindquist, former employee. Houston Chronicle 7 December 2001; Greg 
Hassell, “The Fall of Enron: The Culture: Pressure Cooker Finally Exploded.” Houston Chronicle 9 
December 2001. 
 86 
 testified preferred a more measured tone.132 Janice Farmer stated that she had been “lied to” and 
“cheated.” Prestwood went no further than to declare “something stinks here.”133 And generally, 
employee witnesses did not name names in their testimonies. Rather than emphasizing feelings 
of anger or longings for revenge, they echoed the resolute and optimistic statements popular 
among post-9/11 morale-boosters. They called for justice and for affirmation that such a disaster 
would not be allowed to happen again, but they emphasized the redemptive potential in this 
collapse, insisting that the nation would emerge stronger from this—yet another—trying episode. 
The difference here between legislators and employees was the moral high ground. The former 
were potentially implicated in the scandal, and “at the end of the day” had suffered little. The 
latter, on the other hand, were in the opposite position: undeniably hurt, but safe from blame.  
Charles Prestwood’s forceful opening statement is worth revisiting for its echoes of 
September 11: 
…You know, it's just very touching…to be in a predicament like this, because a lot of 
people have asked me, "Charlie, why in the world didn't you get out beforehand?" I go 
back to that one simple word of loyalty: loyalty to a corporation, loyalty to something that I 
helped build, that I strived and worked a lifetime to build.134 
 
The language of “getting out” anticipated Rep. Greenwood’s later insinuation that the disloyal Jeff 
Skilling had fled Enron to save his own hide, leaving his faithful subordinates to be crushed in the 
collapse. Prestwood emphasized his own decision to stay at the company; thereby distinguishing 
himself from “a lot of people” whom he suggests would have made the more self-interested 
choice. Also, implicitly, Prestwood joined in condemning others who did “get out beforehand”—
most obviously, executives like Skilling who knew what was coming and fled. Finally, it is worth 
noting that the imagery he used to describe his dedication and “loyalty,” was that of building. The 
verb form of the word was there; the references to “getting out” suggested the noun as well: a 
physical structure within which one could not safely stay. Like that overnight icon, the gruff New 
                                                 
132 Before their congressional cheering squad, Prestwood and his counterparts certainly could have gotten 
away with such an indulgent analogy. However, they did not need it. Again, former Enron employees stood 
(rightly or not) on the highest moral ground that was available on the post-Enron scene. Most likely they 
simply recognized the numerous and obvious differences between despicable corporate leadership and 
suicide hijackings, and decided not to affect an equation where there was none. 
133 Senate Committee, Overview of the Enron Collapse. 
134 Ibid. 
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 York City firefighter, Prestwood had pressed on at his own risk. He and other virtuous Enronians 
thereby embodied American bravery and valor.  
The cognitive conception of the World Trade Center’s collapse was inextricable from its 
emotional resonance; one could not speak of September 11’s “devastation” in strictly material 
terms. Here lay the special opportunity, in their Enron narrative, for congresspeople to present 
themselves positively. For if the disaster they were confronting was a collapse that had harmed 
thousands of innocents, then implicitly, like New York firefighters and police, President Bush, or 
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, these legislators were there to comfort the afflicted, capture the 
perpetrators, and restore the peace. (This was a modification of, but by no means a departure 
from, legislators’ self-promotion as melodramatic heroes.) Echoing the speeches that sought to 
console and rally the populace in the wake of September 11, congresspeople, while 
acknowledging the devastation wrought by this new, metaphoric collapse of Enron, insisted that 
Americans’ pride and morale would never falter. Indeed, that which did not kill (corporate) 
America, would make it stronger. Rep. Billy Tauzin (R-LA) said: 
We are learning from these hearings….And I truly believe…when we complete them, we 
will, together…be able to propose a set of reforms…that is going to build better, clearer, 
more responsible lines of communication and information and disclosure and investor 
confidence in this country. If that's a result of this mess, then perhaps our country will be 
much better for it in the end.135 
 
If imagery of September 11 pervaded discussions about Enron, the narrative about 9/11’s 
ramifications likewise informed people’s statements—not only as to the meaning of Enron’s 
collapse, but also as to how the nation might begin to recover.  
Sifting Through the Wreckage 
Almost from the very moment the first plane struck the World Trade Center on September 
11, a story was born. Such a disaster, in its shocking devastation, certainly needed some account 
to least approach coherence—first, simply to convey urgent and terrible news, and later as a 
means more generally to understand.136 Any narrative of a far-reaching event gives rise to 
                                                 
135 House Committee, Financial Collapse of Enron. 
136 In his extensive historical studies of American responses to crisis, both natural and man-made, Kevin 
Rozario finds enough continuity to conclude that storytelling has always been crucial both conceptually and 
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 counter-narratives, and the 9/11 case, with all of its political, cultural, racial and religious fetters, 
was certainly no exception. Nonetheless, the mass media and elected officials did present an 
“official” narrative of the attacks, and thanks to what has been called the rally effect137 there was 
a fair degree of consensus around this narrative. It went something like this: Out of the (literal and 
figurative) clear blue sky, a group of terrorists descended upon the homeland to strike at its heart. 
Motivated by hatred of the United States and all it stands for—including democracy, material 
progress, enterprise, and individual liberties—these Muslim fundamentalists murdered thousands 
of innocent Americans. They hoped to instill fear and, ultimately, to pressure the US into bowing 
to their global political agenda. Though devastated, the intrepid American people would remain 
faithful to their nation and its values. Osama bin Laden and other associated terrorists would be 
“brought to justice” (whether the judge be earthly or divine), and “America” would return to peace 
stronger than ever.138  
Though the events of September 11 were constantly described as “tragic,” this narrative 
actually failed to qualify as tragedy in the classical sense. Its woeful climax was not due to the 
human failings of sympathetic characters. Indeed, because those characters would likely have 
included the President and intelligence officials, such a premise might have provoked more anger 
(directed at the wrong targets) than pathos. Instead, 9/11 here represented a momentary victory 
for forces of plain evil. Likewise this narrative’s resolution was too optimistic to befit a tragedy, for 
it promised not only restoration but indeed some kind of holistic social betterment. The scale of 
                                                                                                                                                 
emotionally. He further argues, however, that just as disasters need narratives, narratives in a sense need 
disasters, which operate in their middle segments as “principles of transformation.” Kevin Rozario, “Making 
Progress: Disaster Narratives and the Art of Optimism in Modern America,” in Lawrence J. Vale and Thomas 
J. Campanella, ed., The Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 32-34. See also Kevin Rozario, The Culture of Calamity: Disaster and the Making of 
Modern America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
137 Michael A. Genovese, “The Transformations of the Bush Presidency: 9/11 and Beyond,” in Richard S. 
Conley, ed., Transforming the American Polity: The Presidency of George W. Bush and the War on 
Terrorism (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2005), 16-17; Roger H. Davidson, “Americans’ 
Beliefs About Themselves, The World, and War: Before and After 9/11,” in Conley, ed., Transforming the 
American Polity, 30; Maggie Wykes, “Reporting, Remembering and Reconstructing September 11, 2001,” in 
Steven Chermak, Frankie Y. Bailey, and Michelle Brown, ed., Media Representations of September 11 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 133. 
138 Kelly R. Damphousse, Kristen S. Hefley, and Brent L. Smith, “Creating Memories: Exploring How 
Narratives Help Define the Memorialization of Tragedy,” in Chermak, Bailey, and Brown, ed., Media 
Representations of September 11, 139. 
 89 
 9/11’s destruction notwithstanding, the state-sanctioned account of these so-called tragic events 
was actually more similar to melodrama.  
One of the first and most critical elements of the 9/11 narrative was that of surprise. The 
attacks were presented as a shocking rupture, incomparable with any other event in the history of 
the world and “at the origin of [a] causal chain” rather than having any of their own. This 
foundational premise of the 9/11 narrative allowed no acknowledgment, much less analysis, of 
the terrorists’ possible grievances. It also preempted any suggestion that a more vigilant or 
responsive state apparatus might have been able to prevent the crisis. It cast the United States 
as the pure and innocent victim of a fateful but completely arbitrary attack.139 Thus when they 
invoked 9/11 with reference to Enron, certain crafters of the Enron narrative were borrowing the 
tenet of surprise and with it a mandate for self-absolution.  
Legislators insisted Enron’s collapse was unlike any other business scandal in American 
history, implying that they never could have been expected to see it coming. Furthermore, by 
harping constantly on executives’ deceit, congress people as well as President George W. Bush 
glossed over two important and embarrassing facts. First, as mentioned before, some of Enron’s 
most problematic practices had been entirely legal. Second, those activities that were illicit could 
have been caught much sooner—not only by private auditors and analysts, but also by the 
government, as represented by regulatory agencies and the SEC.140 In other words, had certain 
responsible parties, including agents of the government, performed the very functions for which 
they had been designed, then the Enron bankruptcy might not have been a surprise. Indeed, 
under such circumstances it may even never have happened at all, or at least not with such grim 
consequences for so many people. For their own distinct reasons, Enron employees too played 
                                                 
139 Angelica Nuzzo, “Reasons for Conflict: Political Implications of a Definition of Terrorism,” in Tom 
Rockmore, ed., The Philosophical Challenge of September 11 (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 131-36. 
140 Agencies regulating the energy industry, on the federal level as well as specifically in California, 
conspicuously failed to identify or address problems with Enron earlier on. Likewise, the SEC had granted 
Enron special approval to use “mark to market” accounting; this was the official veneer for Enron’s infamous 
practice of reporting anticipated revenues before they actually materialized. As one would assume, or at 
least hope, mark to market accounting carries many caveats, and stringent rules with which financial 
statements using this method must comply. Had the SEC monitored Enron’s use of mark to market 
accounting, it might never have been allowed to turn into abuse. For a brilliant discussion of Enron’s 
financial shenanigans as fully visible for years prior to the bankruptcy, see Malcom Gladwell, “Open Secrets: 
Enron, Intelligence, and the Perils of Too Much Information,” The New Yorker 82 (8 January 2007), 44-53.  
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 up the element of surprise in their accounts of the company’s bankruptcy. Though employees 
were in many ways unsuspecting and innocent victims, those who did so should have known 
better than to invest their entire savings or pensions in Enron stock.141  
Also central to the 9/11 narrative was the concept of the “American way” under attack.142 
President Bush’s speeches in the days following September 11 described the hijackers as 
“enemies of freedom,” declaring that the liberties Americans enjoy, such as freedom of speech 
and of religion, were the main reason for Islamic fundamentalists’ hatred. A worldlier component 
of the American way, however, was at least as relevant as these. It seemed the terrorists had 
targeted the World Trade Center not only for its height but also for its significance as a symbol of 
American commercial capitalism—appropriately located within its urban epicenter, New York City. 
As cultural historian Max Page has shown, the demolition of New York—as imagined in popular 
culture before 9/11 and as broadcast in news afterward—fascinates and captivates due to 
American’s longstanding ambivalence toward all that the city represents. In Page’s words, New 
York has long been “the symbol of the best and worst of everything, the barometer of the nation’s 
health and sickness, poverty and wealth.”143 (The same might be said of the booming twenty-first 
business culture of which Enron went from crowning jewel to festering shame.) 
Beverly Gage’s account of the 1920 Wall Street bombing likewise illustrates that 
September 11 was not the first time terrorists, motivated at least partially by hostility toward 
American industrial capitalism, violently shook the confidence of even its fiercest proponents. 
Gage points out that by that time the United States already had a “legacy of anti-capitalist 
terrorism,” including the Haymarket riots of 1886 (though who actually provoked that violence 
                                                 
141 One employee who stayed on past Black Monday pointed this out in a frank open letter to his colleagues 
and former colleagues; the letter stated essentially that those who had invested disproportionately in Enron 
should have known better, and that everyone who had suffered in the company’s collapse should take 
responsibility for their own poor judgment. (Letter to the Editor: Anonymous, current employee. Houston 
Chronicle 13 December 2001.) Here we see another mythical ideal of capitalist markets impugned: that the 
consumer is reliably rational and informed. 
142 Thus implicitly, what was not the provocation of attack was any action or policy that the United States had 
undertaken. This logic fits in with the broader conception that the masterminds of 9/11 could not have had 
any rational or even comprehensible complaints about the US government (Davidson, “Americans’ Beliefs 
About Themselves, The World, and War” in Conley, ed., Transforming the American Polity, 34-37). 
143 Max Page, “The City’s End: Past and Present Narratives of New York’s Destruction,” in article in Vale 
and Campanella, ed., Resilient City, 79, 84-86.  
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 remains controversial), and nationwide dynamite attacks in 1919. Yet in retrospect she suggests 
that Americans can no longer imagine this time, when financial and corporate institutions were 
regularly attacked by means both rhetorical and physical.144 If Gage is right, this may be one 
reason why Americans experienced September 11 as such a shock, even if they shouldn’t have. 
Thus another aspect of the “American way,” the spirit of enterprise that had earned the 
nation’s economic hegemony, had been assaulted, primarily in New York, on September 11.145 It 
is also significant but rarely remarked that, for all the longstanding patriotic symbolism attached to 
the “homeland,” and for all the piety surrounding hearth and family, most everyone who died on 
that day died at work. From high financiers to maintenance staff, those American martyrs at the 
World Trade Center did not spend their last moments at home, nor, in most cases, in the 
company of loved ones. They were making or exchanging money—a national tradition no less 
hallowed. As the 9/11 narrative intertwined with stories of Enron, the notion of an embattled 
American way pervaded both, with commerce undeniably, if sometimes awkwardly, at its core. 
Each narrative held that a peaceful and flourishing status quo—either a generalized “America” as 
it bustled on September 10, or the US stock market and corporate capitalism—had suddenly 
been forced onto the defensive.  
The situation called for a reaffirmation of unity and collective ethos. President Bush urged 
all those who were grieving after September 11 to continue living proudly by their American 
values. Likewise in the one speech that he devoted specifically to the issue of “corporate 
responsibility”—delivered amid the series of scandals that followed Enron in summer 2002—he 
expounded on the “American way” that would endure both the “war on terror” and the economic 
fallout of several large corporate collapses. First, he made much of his location, which he called 
“the financial capital of the world:” 
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 New York City is a unique symbol of America's creativity and character and resilience.146 
In the last 10 months, New Yorkers have shown…a spirit that honors the loss, 
remembers its heroes, and goes forward with determination and with confidence…all 
Americans are proud of New York.147 
 
Bush had come to Wall Street to call for “a new era of integrity in corporate America.” He 
advocated, among other things, longer prison terms for financial fraud, greater transparency in 
accounting, and stock analysis untainted by conflicts of interest.  
However, he said, “The ethics of American business depend on the conscience of 
America's business leaders.” Here Bush cited the same “character and resilience” shown after 
September 11. Having cited the American spirit from one narrative, he applied it to another:  
We will show that markets can be both dynamic and honest, that lasting wealth and 
prosperity are built on a foundation of integrity. By reasserting the best values of our 
country, we will reclaim the promise of our economy. [Business] leaders in this room help 
give the free enterprise system an ethical compass, and the nation respects you for that. 
We need that influence now more than ever. I want to thank you for helping to restore the 
people's trust in American business. I want to thank you for your love of the country. 
 
Bush thus affirmed that executives, the “vast majority” of whom were “honest,” like the heroes of 
New York were allies of “the people” in the struggle against threats to the American way.148 
A third defining component of many 9/11 narratives was their emphasis on the attacks’ 
perpetrators. It was not that Osama bin Laden or even Al Qaeda were assumed isolated actors. 
On the contrary, the “war on terror” was predicated on the idea that plots like that of September 
11 came out of cooperative global networks. Nonetheless, the mystique surrounding bin Laden 
                                                 
146 Max Page points out that in the wake of disaster, “resilience” can mean “renewed vitality”—real 
progress—but it can also refer to “elasticity” and a return to the prior state of things. After September 11, he 
recounts, some more radical thinkers in New York offered proposals for renewal by means of urban reform. 
Yet it is the latter definition of “resilience” that largely applies to post-9/11 New York; the consequences of a 
political process similar to Congress’ response to Enron, in which the dominant melodramatic narrative left 
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91.  
147 This last statement, “all Americans are proud of New York,” might sound now like generic jingoism, but 
prior to September 11 it would have been most unlike Bush to make such a remark. Politicians of both 
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Americans do not admire the metropolis of the northeast, nor its stereotypically liberal and effete inhabitants. 
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traditional populist ideals. To observe him in 2002 not only professing his own reverence for the city but also 
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148 President, Address. “Remarks on Corporate Responsibility in New York City.” Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents (GPO Access: frwais.access.gpo.gov) 9 July 2002.  
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 and a few of his close associates implied that there was something unique about them, perhaps 
in motives or psyche. Their individuality was part of 9/11 as we know it—suggesting that the 
event and its consequences would have been different had other people been responsible.  The 
analogy between the hijackers of September 11—or at least an amorphous enemy of the 
American way—and Enron executives, yielded the same deceptively comforting conclusion to the 
narrative of corporate scandal.149 With all manner of scathing epithets, from “pinstriped crooks” 
and “robber barons,” to “con men” and of course “economic terrorists,” Enron’s former leaders 
were so closely identified with the scandal as to be conceptually synonymous with it. And like the 
9/11 attacks, the Enron bankruptcy, such narratives suggested, would have happened differently 
or not at all if not for these particular bad men. 
Here again we see strains of melodrama, whose basis is always a (villain-perpetrated) 
conflict that can be resolved by individual punishment and the restoration of order. There were no 
fundamental problems or unjust systems underlying the Enron collapse. Therefore this threat 
would be gone once the authorities disposed of the bad guys. Thus the 9/11 and Enron 
narratives, entangled, each attempted a presumptively triumphant tie-off, affirming the righteous 
strength of the American government, and the enduring faith of the American people.  
A Moment of Silence 
Numerous narrative crossovers between September 11 and Enron have been identified 
thus far. But for all the eagerness with which people borrowed images and assumptions from the 
9/11 narrative to describe and explain the Enron bankruptcy, these analogies failed at least as 
often as they succeeded. There is, therefore, much to learn through examination of which 9/11 
invocations “worked” in the Enron narrative, and which did not. “Failure” and “success,” here, 
refer to the extent to which an analogy caught on and proliferated. For example, the image of 
“implosion,” which Sherron Watkins happened to use in her prescient memo to Ken Lay, echoed 
back and forth in Congress, the media, and employee accounts. It seems people judged it an 
appropriate and helpful way of thinking about Enron. By contrast, Bobby Rush’s term “economic 
                                                 
149 Some commentators correctly pointed out the complicity of many investment banks, auditors and 
analysts, but in the official Enron narrative, blame never spread any further than that. 
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 terrorists” appears to have been too much of a stretch. Explicit comparisons between Enron 
executives and the 9/11 hijackers were rare; the specific phrase “economic terrorists” never 
showed up anywhere again.  
Despite the ubiquity of words like “implosion” and “collapse,” the conflation of Enron’s 
“fall” with that of the World Trade Center had its limits. Part of the appeal of the imagery of a 
devastating collapse was in its accessibility: the concept of a crumbling building was not difficult 
to grasp. The immediacy of the September 11 disasters, however, was not transferable. In other 
words, Enron narratives could invoke them conceptually, but not experientially. 9/11—as 
witnessed and recorded in Times Square at least—was visual, visceral, and traumatic. One only 
had to see footage or a picture—both of which were everywhere—to understand immediately 
what had happened (plane crashes) and what it meant (many deaths). Indeed such value as 
spectacle is probably one reason why “September 11” so often denotes only the attacks on the 
World Trade Center, to the exclusion of the crashes at the Pentagon and in Pennsylvania, which 
offered less to see and were not thoroughly recorded. 9/11 was also firmly bound by space and 
time, known ever after by the date of its events and also converting the phrase “Ground Zero” 
from a general means of referring to a bomb site to a term assigned only to the area where the 
World Trade Center had stood. 150 The metaphor became more common after September 11—
but its referent was now unique. 
The Enron disaster, on the other hand, had no iconic representation. The closest that the 
mass media could get were photos of distraught employees outside the company headquarters 
on Black Monday. As horrible and as “tragic” as Enron’s collapse had been for many people, the 
trauma was not physical, nor, generally, was it even visible. Moreover, the “implosion” had 
actually taken place over a period of several months, with no particular punctuating moment; 
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 indeed by the time the company officially declared bankruptcy it was already old news to anyone 
who had been paying attention.  
The sense of discrete place in the September 11 narrative was particularly difficult to 
match with application to Enron. Obviously, certain key conversations occurred, and people 
raised some of the first warning signs, at the base of the company’s headquarters: 1400 Smith 
Street in Houston. It was a sleek, blue-toned tower of sixty floors, shaped like an oblong cylinder. 
It had a series of circular crowns that, lit up, were visible as part of the Houston night skyline. The 
tower’s external walls reflected the images of other buildings around it, which included two other 
cylinders—smaller but still avant-garde—also part of the corporate property.  Employee 
anecdotes described the bankruptcy with abundant reference to these buildings, and through 
metaphor Enron was often equated with its headquarters, with the bankruptcy posited as 
something enacted physically upon them. Years later, representations of the Enron campus 
would appear in visual media recalling the scandal. Often, photographs and video featured most 
prominently two of Enron’s tallest and narrowest buildings, standing side by side, in what might 
be read as yet another subtle analogy to September 11. 
All of this granted, the events of September 11 were not as physically defined as 
narratives typically assumed. “9/11” came to refer, more often than not, to the collapse of two 
buildings in New York—again, playing down the similar attack on the Pentagon and the other 
hijacked flights. The most obvious reason would be that the World Trade Center disaster was the 
most theatrical and the most deadly. But there are other possible factors at work here as well; 
ones that relate to narrative and its political parameters. For example, to emphasize damage 
done to the Pentagon would be to admit its vulnerability, and moreover to draw attention (and 
journalists) to an institution famous for its meticulous standards of secrecy and supposedly 
airtight security. Thus the firm association of September 11 with one distinct place was in this 
sense false, or at least overly simplistic. To tie the Enron scandal to a specific location, however, 
was more specious by far. The company’s “collapse” itself really happened on the stock market, 
which does not physically exist. The market is either “located” diffusely in the financial centers of 
New York, Tokyo, London and the like, or it is not located anywhere.  
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 In sum, 9/11 became the kind of psychologically acute conception, fixed in space and 
time, that prompted people to ask each other, “Where were you?”151 (One year later, 95 percent 
of Americans claimed to “remember exactly.”)152 Trying to similarly commemorate the Enron 
collapse, one would have to ask, “Where were you when the Raptor funds started losing money?” 
or “Where were you when the Dynegy merger fell through?” Even if the person somehow had an 
answer, it wouldn’t have the same affective value.  
The “official” narrative of September 11 was based on something cultural critics have 
called the “war framework” or “war narrative.” Essentially, through choices of terms and images, 
the 9/11 story posited the attacks as an act of war (as opposed to, for example, a crime); and 
constructed a logic by which the United States’ appropriate response was military, rather than 
legal or diplomatic.153 In some ways, particularly in a time when September 11 and its 
consequences are still so salient, this framework may not be obvious. It might be said, ironically, 
that the war framework in the 9/11 narrative could elude conscious recognition precisely because 
its influence was so overwhelming. Even those most critical of the Bush administration and the 
“war on terror” tended to frame their protests using much the same language. It is a sure sign of a 
narrative’s power when people are unable to think or at least to speak of its events in any other 
way. The only surer sign, perhaps, is when a narrative proves to be self-fulfilling; in this case, by 
the pronouncement that 9/11 had begun a “war.” Robert Fulford defined the “master narrative” as 
one that “swallows us.”154 The 9/11 master narrative, then, may have been more prescriptive than 
descriptive: even if “war” was not the most appropriate term for the attacks of September 11, it 
certainly applies to the actions that the United States then took (ostensibly) in response.  
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 The foundational framework of the “official” Enron narrative might be called “outrage and 
reform.” The bankruptcy was presented as an “outrage,” unprecedented and inconceivable; 
“outrage” also describes the dramatic fury that often pervaded the narrative. “Reform” refers both 
to the call for moral correction of the offenders, by way of seized assets and jail time; and to 
proposals for new legislation to preempt “another Enron.” If the 9/11 war narrative can be called, 
albeit dubiously, a success, Enron’s parallel did not fare as well. The problem with the outrage 
and reform narrative was that people saw through it too easily.  
For one, many of the same legislators who were so incensed by the Enron scandal had 
for years been accepting campaign donations from the company; this is to say nothing of the 
longstanding friendship and political-monetary symbiosis between Enron and the Bush family. 
After the bankruptcy most politicians returned Enron moneys or contributed them to the former 
employees’ relief fund, and President Bush visibly distanced himself from Ken Lay. Politically 
speaking, however, this was too little, too late. The overarching and enduring issue was the 
position of Enron and other large corporations in the American halls of power. The depiction of 
this (or any) company as an outrageous bunch of rogues answerable to a stern federal policeman 
was unconvincing. Thus where the 9/11 war narrative featured an alien “enemy” that many 
people recognized as such, the Enron narrative was unable even to distinguish its heroes from its 
villains in any clear or consistent way.  
A particular strength of the 9/11 war narrative was in its perpetuation of a longstanding 
American myth Roger Davidson has dubbed that of the “optimistic tinkerers.” This cultural 
touchstone is the idea that Americans always learn from struggle and adversity, and will not only 
right that which is wrong but will actually somehow benefit from all difficulties in the end.155 
Cultural historian Kevin Rozario observes that this line of thinking fits well into a “(business) 
culture” positing crisis and destruction as cues to eliminate obsolete products and outmoded 
methods in the name of streamlining, innovation, and growth.156 Chester Destler pointed out that 
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 Andrew Carnegie believed mankind was innately disposed toward linear progress, and felt that 
principle applied equally well to the evolution of the species and to his own steel business.157 In 
this mode of thinking as in others Carnegie has many successors in more recent generations—
not all of them tycoons or even businesspeople of any stature.  
Like the 9/11 war framework, the myth of the optimistic tinkerers may be so pervasive 
that we cannot readily recognize it. In a previous incarnation, as part of Calvinist doctrine, it was 
popularized centuries ago with the first settlements in New England. The Puritans did believe 
some experiences were pure suffering, but they also attempted to make theological meaning of 
every hardship that God wreaked. To this day the same basic notion, if secularized and 
brightened, is at work every time someone ends a complaint of struggle with “But…” and an 
affirmation that she will emerge stronger and wiser. The myth’s appeal is in its denial that 
anything categorically bad can ever happen. And this idea of betterment through adversity was as 
useful after September 11 as it ever had been before, for it led Americans firmly away from the 
thought, perhaps unbearable, that there was absolutely no consolation. Leaders of all kinds, as 
well as survivors, the bereaved, and “ordinary” citizens, constantly averred that the nation would 
learn and grow stronger from this trauma. President Bush even called it “the greatest chapter in 
our nation’s history.”158 There is at least some indication that this idea was widely embraced: in 
the weeks after September 11 nearly 80 percent of Americans in a Newsweek poll said that as a 
result the country would “change for the better.”159 
The Enron narrative’s “war” corollary, “outrage and reform,” was less convincing in 
defining the threat and promising victory. Americans also had less emotional inclination and little 
logical rationale for adopting the betterment through adversity idea with reference to the Enron 
scandal. First, for most Americans the Enron disaster was not sufficiently somber to prompt a 
search for a deeper meaning and redemption. Second, legislators and President Bush vowed that 
the nation would learn and benefit from the scandal, but due to the same problem of ambiguity as 
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 to which “side” the government was on, Americans probably doubted (and with reason) that much 
real change would be made—at least, of a kind that would actually benefit them. Moreover, if 
September 11 encouraged Americans to close ranks, rally around the government, and affirm a 
positive collective identity in the face of attack, Enron reminded Americans how deeply divided 
their society was, by disparities in money and power. It may have led people to question the very 
same “American way” that they were supposed to be defending.160 
In addition to establishing emotional immediacy and a sense of moral coherence, the 
violence and trauma of September 11 allowed its narrative to take on philosophical and spiritual 
dimensions. In the face of death many people turn to certain precepts for comfort—affirmations of 
transcendence between this world and the next. This might mean that the bereaved will ultimately 
be reunited with the dead, or that the souls of loved ones stay with us even after their bodies 
expire. The catastrophic quality of 9/11, by which so many lives were lost so quickly and by such 
surreal means, evoked another axiom of spiritual faith in times of grief: that even the most horrible 
trials are part of an order beyond human understanding. Somewhere between vengeance and 
forgiveness,161 such an attitude may allow people to accept tragedy and go on with their lives 
without denying their own suffering or excusing those who caused it. Compared to hysteria, which 
was certainly one understandable reaction to September 11, these kinds of affirmations were 
productive. Perhaps more than any other element in the 9/11 narrative, its philosophical-religious 
component served a genuine and urgent emotional need.  
Of course, everyone could be grateful that Enron’s collapse did not directly claim any 
lives. For the purposes of the official narrative, however, this disaster’s relative lack of impact, in 
essential terms, posed a challenge: this deathless “tragedy” was difficult to dignify. As we saw, 
some Enron employees adopted language that suggested death, seeking to do justice to the 
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 emotional intensity with which they had experienced the bankruptcy. Additionally, however, the 
invocation of death might work to vindicate the Enron “survivor.” To state that he was “mourning” 
a profound “loss” in the wake of a “devastating tragedy” sounded nobler than simply to say that 
his employer company had folded, leaving him to deal with the unsavory consequences—some of 
which he might have been able to avoid. Images of death in the Enron narrative worked to 
politicians’ advantage as well. The associated spiritual gravity as a unifying tone for the Enron 
story was preferable over themes of embarrassment or shame which, were it not for political 
posturing, would have come more naturally. This was hardly the first time that religious precepts 
of life, death and disaster had been applied to fluctuations in the American economy. By the turn 
of the twentieth century nearly all academics still applied the Bible to economic theory with what 
business historian Irving Michelman has deemed “unbelievable smugness and certitude.” 
Financial busts and depressions were likened to lean years in the Pharoah’s time and thereby 
rendered natural as the wilderness.162 
However, when the Enron narrative tried to parlay imagery of death into the same 
philosophical and spiritual discourse of 9/11, again the analogy was stretched too thin. Rep. 
Greenwood called the corporate collapse “biblical in scope;” Rep. Deutsch appealed to the 
executives’ “souls.” A few legislators referred to the scriptures at length during the Enron 
hearings, but the sermons fell flat. In stead of life and death, this disaster was prodigious only in 
the banal terms of solvency and bankruptcy. And because the Enron narrative was hard pressed 
to take on a spiritual cast, it could not provide the kind of solace that some were able to find after 
September 11. Lost savings and pensions were not still present “in spirit,” nor would they ever be 
reunited with those who missed them. Likewise God must have been indifferent to Enron, for it 
was difficult to argue that any higher wisdom governed how corporations rose and fell.  
President Bush joined many other civic and religious leaders in encouraging Americans 
to pray in the wake of September 11, for the families of the dead and for their own strength to 
endure. It seemed a reasonable response to tragedy and chaos. The prospect of prayer after 
Enron, however, was more ambiguous. The stock market may have moved in mysterious ways, 
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 but it was not supposed to. The wills and actions of powerful people in business and politics may 
have transcended mortal understanding, but they shouldn’t have. In other words, it is not 
necessarily intuitive to pray to an omnipotent higher power when the struggle one faces so 
obviously resulted, arbitrarily, from the carelessness of fallible humans and the injustices of their 
society.  
The most profound prayers are sometimes unspoken. At many ceremonies honoring the 
dead, it is acknowledged that some grief defies words; that some mourning is completely private. 
In a collective “moment of silence,” those assembled are encouraged to pause and reflect, alone, 
before sharing their own thoughts or hearing more from others. While tranquility for many was 
difficult to find in the wake of September 11, what moments of silence there were could be put to 
their traditional spiritual purpose. This experience of death, like any other, indeed had dimensions 
beyond verbal expression. In Enron’s postmortem, however, some solemn officiators were at a 
loss for words for reasons more mundane. In stead of being too awed by tragedy or too 
emotionally unsettled to speak, they fell silent when at last their pretenses failed them.  
Jeff Skilling, for example, for all his verbose equivocation finally had to admit that he 
didn’t “know what to say” to the employees devastated by Enron’s collapse.163 President Bush in 
public said remarkably little about the scandal, only discussing Enron in response to specific 
questions and only speaking about “corporate responsibility” in response to intense political 
pressure. In an unexpectedly revealing exchange, Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA), one of the most 
relentlessly scathing legislators to participate in the Enron hearings, appeared to have much to 
say, but was ultimately forced to acknowledge the limitations of speech:  
SEN. BOXER: …Let me say that this is an incredible [witness] panel. I would like to take 
Ms. [Mary Bain] Pearson home with me, because she— 
MS. PEARSON: Well, that could be arranged. 
(Laughter.) 
SEN. BOXER: Well, good. 
MS. PEARSON: You can take us all home with you. Do you have any Enron stock? 
(Laughter.) 
SEN. BOXER: That's another story, maybe for another day, but we'll talk. 
Here's the point. These people have been deeply, deeply, deeply hurt, their dreams 
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 shattered and they're here helping us and it's kind of the American spirit and I want to 
thank you so much.164 
 
Pearson, an elderly widowed Latin teacher, had invested in Enron stock as her “long-term health 
care” plan, and frankly told this Senate committee that she didn’t know how to proceed now that 
the stock was worthless. When Boxer “wished” out loud that she could bring Pearson home (as a 
souvenir of American civic virtue?), Pearson used humor to point out the Senator’s insincerity and 
condescension without stepping out of line. Sen. Boxer attempted a benevolent evasion—“we’ll 
talk”—and faltered.  
Ultimately Boxer redoubled her lip service to the Enron “survivors” with the clumsy 
affirmation that their appearance in Congress embodied “kind of the American spirit.” The 
transcript shows that the Senator had the last word here, but in effect Pearson had revealed the 
emptiness of her statements. Boxer’s and other politicians’ expressions of rage at the Enron 
executives, and empathy for former employees, meant little in the context of chronic systemic 
inequality. Thus if the “moment of silence” after September 11 was for reflection, affirmation, and 
prayer, the “moment of silence” after Enron’s collapse was one of awkward and embarrassed 
confusion. Underneath all the superficial blustering, nobody knew what to say. 
Let’s Roll 
If the official Enron narrative had serious weaknesses from the start, the 9/11 narrative 
began over time to show significant problems as well. Its promise of triumph in the newly minted 
“war on terror” fell into doubt as, in the months that turned into years following the attacks, the 
United States failed to capture or even locate Osama bin Laden. Moreover it was clear that the 
threat of terrorism was not traceable to any identifiable individuals in particular. The 9/11 
narrative’s simplistic (sometimes melodramatic) presentation of a “war” between good and evil, or 
between “freedom” and “fear,” was also complicated by controversial domestic policies that 
abridged Americans’ civil liberties and, in 2003, by a questionable invasion of Iraq that alienated 
many of the nation’s usual allies. The political “rallying effect” of September 11 by that point had 
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 clearly begun to wear off.165 Legislators and vocal citizens in increasing numbers raised the 
possibility that the federal government or the Bush administration could have done more to 
prevent such a tragedy. Skeptics also impugned the justifications for many of the United States’ 
post-9/11 foreign and domestic policies. 
Over time the already flimsy official Enron narrative only continued to droop further. Its 
most despicable villains, including Ken Lay, Jeff Skilling and outright thief Andy Fastow, had 
forfeited their careers and reputations but otherwise faced little immediate punishment. These 
three executives were expected to become cautionary tales in the tough new regime of corporate 
accountability, but instead, they would enjoy free and opulent lives until their trials in 2004 
(Fastow) and 2006 (Lay and Skilling). Meanwhile disastrous corporate frauds and collapses 
continued, with the consequences for culpable executives being no less ambiguous.  
Like the 9/11 war narrative, Enron’s “outrage and reform” framework denied the 
possibility of underlying systemic problems. “Victory,” in the Enron narrative, should only have 
required some stiff prison sentences and a few prudent regulatory adjustments. As we have seen, 
politicians in particular had emphasized the renewed strength of the American market after the 
Enron lesson was learned—yet even years later it is still far from clear that this battle has been 
won. Thus if anyone was ever convinced in its aftermath that Enron’s spectacular collapse 
provided an effective “wake up call” to federal regulation, that belief probably fell into doubt fairly 
quickly. One opinion poll indicated that nearly three fourths of Americans thought the Enron 
scandal was indicative of “broader problems” in how companies reported their earnings, as 
opposed to being an “isolated incident.”166 Because it was conducted in January 2002—after 
Enron’s collapse but before Tyco, WorldCom, and other such sequels—the poll revealed in effect 
that most Americans actually expected those additional bankruptcies. Thus even if the 
perpetrators were to be caught, and legislation was to be passed, to prevent a “repeat 
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 performance” after Enron, the greater part of the population still did not accept this as a proper 
end to the story.    
The entanglement of the 9/11 and Enron narratives took an especially bizarre twist on the 
issue of personal values: namely, the selfish and material versus the altruistic and moral. In 
President Bush’s State of the Union Address in January 2002 he had reiterated a version of the 
“betterment through adversity” idea, stating that the nation would benefit from the September 11 
attacks by renewing its guiding principles:  
None of us would ever wish the evil that was done on September the 11th. Yet after 
America was attacked, it was as if our entire country looked into a mirror and saw our 
better selves. We were reminded that we are citizens, with obligations to each other, to 
our country, and to history. We began to think less of the goods we can accumulate, and 
more about the good we can do. 
 
For too long our culture has said, "If it feels good, do it." Now America is embracing a 
new ethic and a new creed: "Let's roll." (Applause.) In the sacrifice of soldiers, the fierce 
brotherhood of firefighters, and the bravery and generosity of ordinary citizens, we have 
glimpsed what a new culture of responsibility could look like. We want to be a nation that 
serves goals larger than self. We've been offered a unique opportunity, and we must not 
let this moment pass. (Applause.)167 
“Let’s roll” were the last known words of Todd Beamer on the hijacked United Airlines Flight 93, 
as he apparently directed fellow passengers in foiling one part of the September 11 plan. The 
plane may have been intended to strike the White House or the Capitol, but instead Beamer and 
his seatmates forced it down in an unpopulated area in Somerset County, Pennsylvania—certain 
of their own deaths but trying to keep others to a minimum.168 Thus Bush in his new “creed” was 
referring to the kind of “ordinary” self-sacrifice that Beamer exemplified.  While the victims of the 
World Trade Center bombings did include a disproportionate percentage of corporate capitalists, 
those 9/11 narratives also stressed that they met their fates as equals to the maintenance 
workers, vendors, and cleaning staff with whom they shared the buildings. Depictions of heroism 
focused on more modest types—especially police officers and firefighters. No doubt some men in 
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 suits ran out of the World Trade Center without even looking back, but that would not make an 
inspiring story. 
In the months that followed, however, Bush began calling on Americans to spend more 
money. The Ad Council, which in Sandra Silberstein’s words is “as close as the US comes to 
having a national propaganda organ,” moved from urging racial and religious tolerance in the 
wake of September 11 to encouraging shopping and tourism.169 Though officially rationalized to 
stimulate a reeling economy, this multi-level campaign also recalled cold war-era exaltations of 
capitalism that were used in ideological attacks on the Soviet Union—the most recent in a long 
succession of political attempts to equate commerce and consumption with patriotism.170 
Consumer advertising specifically played on the 9/11 narrative by suggesting the nation could 
recover from the attacks, in part, by shopping. More than one car promotion, for example, played 
on Beamer’s words with the slogan “Keep America Rolling.” This reversed the original, sacrificial 
spirit of the “let’s roll” doctrine, for people were now apparently expected to serve the country by 
indulging themselves. It also sat uneasily with the grief and reflection that for many Americans 
lasted more than a few months after September 11. The tragedy, at least for some, really had 
prompted a shift away from selfish and material priorities; thus when the master 9/11 narrative 
took its curious turn toward consumerism it was in some senses going against the collective 
emotional grain. 171  
At the same time Americans encountered these exhortations to patriotic spending, the 
ugliest details of the Enron scandal were coming to light. Mobilization for the war on terror, like 
many US war efforts prior, may have encouraged more support or at least acceptance of big 
business as an integral part of the nation’s battle front—but the bankruptcy was ill-timed to 
contribute to any public goodwill. Matched only by deceit, the overwhelming theme in people’s 
disgust toward Enron executives was greed. After all, the men who had designed these nefarious 
schemes for self-enrichment had already been wealthy beyond most people’s imaginations. 
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 These “most people” included Enron employees, who as front pages across the country 
demonstrated were now suddenly and severely impoverished, probably forever. The implicated 
Enron executives epitomized the kind of careless and self-serving behavior that seemed most 
unforgivable in a time of crisis; images of Jeff Skilling dashing out of the figurative collapsing 
building were one illustration.   
The Enron narrative absolutely needed to maintain a consistent stance on the vice of 
greed—namely, against it—and if nowhere else it did manage coherence on this point. Here 
Enron actually exposed a problem with the 9/11 narrative, for while the story of corporate scandal 
condemned self-indulgence the September 11 story was trying awkwardly to promote it. People 
may have been inclined to judge Enron executives especially harshly in the wake of September 
11. If so, the same conviction against greed upon which they were operating probably did not 
mesh well with the “keep America rolling” ad blitz and the assertion that purchasing was patriotic. 
Here was yet another inconvenient and impromptu confrontation with capitalism in some of its 
less savory components. The despicable “selfishness and greed” that Rep. Bobby Rush had 
attributed to Enron executives, as well as the metaphorical caviar that some satirist complained 
they enjoyed “at the consumer’s expense,” are both constant, even indispensable elements in a 
market of competition and private ownership.  
Here economic actors need to be motivated by self-interest and a (preferably infinite) 
desire for gain, and the tastiest rewards of success can only go to a fortunate few. Likewise, a 
drastic drop-off in consumer spending after September 11, even if due to some mass shift in 
personal values, would indeed have compounded the damage of the attacks in economic terms. 
The government’s bald efforts to avoid such an outcome may have struck a dissonant chord with 
Americans at the time, but given the nation’s commitment to commercial prosperity, which dates 
back to its inception, such campaigns should be expected.  
All of this is to say that ultimately, both the 9/11 and Enron narratives were undermined 
by internal contradictions and ongoing challenges. Both had attempted to impose order on chaos, 
coherence on ambiguity, and closure on unresolved problems. But over time, details of both 
“collapses” and their fallouts cast the federal government in an unflattering light. It increasingly 
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 appeared that longstanding fundamental issues were involved in Enron’s bankruptcy and the 
September 11 attacks. And on the most concrete point, upon which there could be no debate, 
both bin Laden and Ken Lay were still at large, walking free and unrepentant, years after their 
respective assaults on the “American way.” It seemed that transnational terror networks and 
multinational corporations, which were both faceless, diffuse, and unaccountable, were 
presenting new challenges to the American government apparatus. It was ill-equipped to deal 
with them. Two of the nation’s first twenty-first century political narratives, inter-tangled, had thus 
eroded beyond credibility. Their affirmations of national strength, unity and purpose consequently 
began to ring hollow. America was still “rolling,” but it was not necessarily clear where to. 
Conclusion: Reflections on Narrative in the Age of Enron      
Some scholars and theorists have declared that the postmodern era sounds the death 
knell of narrative. They argue that contemporary technologies, particularly the internet, with their 
compression of space and time and their infinitely fragmented frames and perspectives, will 
render storytelling impractical, irrelevant, or obsolete.172 Though we are certainly witnessing 
changes in the modes and media of narrative, it would be naïve to conclude that the form itself 
will soon (or indeed ever) disappear. Moreover, as has more than once been pointed out, the 
argument for the end of narrative actually proves itself untrue; it is a kind of rhetorical 
contradiction in terms. For one of the essential elements of narrative is a coherent sense of 
developments in chronology, concluding in a definitive “ending.” These commentators have 
created a narrative about narrative, complete with its final episode. Obviously, the human impulse 
to narrate/narrativize is alive and well—and those who have tried to deny this provide an excellent 
case in point.173 
In historiography, the narrative form has of late come under intense fire. Such attacks are 
warranted. The historian as story-teller risks presenting the past as a neat chronology of events 
progressing logically toward a predetermined outcome, and for too long this paradigm has 
prevailed by virtue of the false comfort it affords to writer and reader alike. Far from being a 
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 strictly academic problem, the larger construction of “History” as a set of authoritative narratives 
has been invoked in the service of many shameful political agendas seeking to rationalize and 
legitimate forms of oppression. In response, the first step of deconstruction was to impugn the 
story’s content. The second step was to impugn the story’s form. 
We now know that reductive narrative does great injustice (in both senses of the phrase) 
to the past. But if history is not a story, what is it then? Discouraged and nonplussed, we might be 
tempted to conclude simply that it is a senseless mess. Some postmodern theory seems to offer 
few other possibilities! But while such resignation is understandable, it should not be allowed to 
stand. I would argue that the idea of history as mess is not only analytically paralyzing; it is 
moreover innately wrongheaded in the same way as the conceit of history as grand narrative. The 
grand narrative model forces too much order upon the world, but the mess model, if it can be so 
called, ignores what order there is. 
To be sure, the struggle over how to understand Enron was messy. This narrative 
contestation also illustrated order, however, in the surprising predictability of its literary styles: 
tragic, melodramatic and satiric storytelling. As to the frequent invocations of September 11, 
fraught though they were, here still order can be found, for a tangle is different from a mess—it is 
made up of discrete strands. Though we cannot really isolate any of these, we can identify places 
where they cross and encircle one another, and by carefully loosening here, prodding there, we 
can imagine how such knots might have formed. An event such as Enron lacked the obvious 
narrative ingredients of a discrete time, place, or cohesive succession of events easily 
understood. It carried little of its own emotional meaning without borrowing from cultural tropes or 
another more immediately affecting incident. Nonetheless, from tragedy, to comedy, and back to 
trauma in a much more immediate context, we have seen the myriad ways that people found to 
translate and interpret the Enron bankruptcy through story. Thus Enron may illustrate well, as a 
case study, the persistent impulse—mental, political, emotional, even spiritual—to make a 
narrative of everything, even in the dazzlingly fast-paced and complex society in which the 
ancient storytelling tradition now finds itself.  
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Chapter 2: “Never Again:” Post-Enron Legislative Reforms 
 
 
 
 “The more we learn, the more nauseating the whole story becomes,” said Rep. Charles 
Bass (D-NH). Such proclamations of visceral disgust, particularly with selected Enron executives 
present and forced to listen, were easy and near universal in congressional chambers directly 
following the company’s bankruptcy. Sometimes, however, they came attached to affirmative and 
forward-looking statements that held more substance. It had seemed that the first order of 
business, in Congress’ treatment of Enron, had been polemic, but lawmakers also conceded that 
they had another job to do. Even now, at the opening of one of their first investigative hearings, 
congresspeople were beginning to posit Enron’s collapse as a call to legislative reform.  
Bass went on: “I hope that after we get beyond the question of who wrote what memo to 
who, who put whose signature on a memo, [and] the complexity of all the transactions …we really 
ask…what we can do…to make sure that this tragedy perpetrated by these business cowboys 
never happens again.”1 By coining yet another creative epithet for Enron executives, Bass 
signified that he certainly bore them no sympathy. At the same time, however, his ambition to “get 
beyond” the intricacies of their nauseating misdeeds suggested that ultimately, the task before 
him and his colleagues was not to analyze technicalities in this particular “corporate disaster,” as 
he referred to Enron. Rather, they were to prevent something similar from happening again. The 
phrase, in various permutations, appears scores of times in these congressional transcripts. 
Soon after it concluded hearings on Enron’s demise, Congress began considering 
reforms to prevent what one of Bass’ colleagues called a “repeat performance.” By establishing 
the primary factors in such a disaster, Congress would identify where and how to implement 
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the House Energy and Commerce Committee, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 7 February 2002.  
  
legislation to pre-empt those ominous circumstances that first enabled Enron’s deceptive 
success, and then made its bankruptcy so damaging for so many. The objective was no longer 
simply to understand what had happened at Enron; now legislators were to extract principles from 
it. Overall, two major conclusions emerged: that big business enjoyed too much political 
influence, and that publicly traded corporations could issue fraudulent financial statements with 
relative ease and impunity. Congress’ dual conceptualization of what kind of a problem Enron 
was begat two major reforms, both enacted in 2002: the McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act, or BCRA (March), and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Corporate Accountability (July).  
However, the main principles that legislators came up with to explain Enron were not so 
much developed through analysis of its collapse, as they were revived by using it as an excuse. 
The exigencies for reform, both in campaign finance and in corporate accounting, hardly arose 
out of nowhere as answers to the Enron failure. Rather, they represented longstanding initiatives 
in search of a catalyzing event. This claim need not be abstract: both the BCRA and Sarbanes-
Oxley bills had been written years before Enron went bankrupt. That the debates surrounding 
these reforms (and indeed in Sarbanes-Oxley’s case the very text of the bill) mentioned the 
company by name, was therefore misleading. These laws could be, and were, framed as a 
response to Enron specifically, but the “response” preceded that which it responded to. This was 
but one of many instances in legislative history when a publicized incident exposing weaknesses 
in one system or another—here, campaign finance or corporate financial disclosure—seemed to 
vindicate a pre-existing movement for reform.  
At this point, then, Enron had become less salient as a bankruptcy and more salient as a 
scandal. This shift partly signified Enron’s translation from a business phenomenon—understood 
and discussed from a business perspective—to a political one, which was supposed to make 
sense to any American voter. “Making sense,” now that reforms were being proposed and 
debated, required a much more widely accessible narrative that was not just about how 
corporations do business, but indeed about their position in civil society. The concept of scandal 
did much to facilitate this translation—and had already proved useful even prior to BCRA or 
Sarbanes-Oxley debates. As we saw, even some of the earliest narratives of Enron invoked 
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scandal by decrying not only Enron’s fraud, but also the complicity of regulators, public officials, 
and even the law.  
But as the federal government itself took up Enron as a problem to solve, designating it a 
scandal, even implicitly, also suggested some more specific changes in how this story would be 
told. First, although vilification and blame of executives certainly continued, legislators could not 
always speak so personally about individuals. To accept that reform was needed was to admit 
that Enron’s fraud, ultimately, was not necessarily particular to the people involved—otherwise, 
with these few “bad apples” out of their corner offices, no legislation would have been in order. 
But furthermore, viewing Enron as a scandal re-cast the significance of those individuals, and 
even the company, that remained at the center of the story.  
In On Scandal, Ari Adut argues that a scandal has to involve prominent figures not only 
because they command attention, but also because they stand for “groups, institutions and 
values.” This symbolism applies with even more weight to people in whom trust has been 
invested.2 No matter how outrageous the behavior of a low-status unknown, then, it cannot 
readily be called scandalous. This is because he stands for nobody but himself, and has no public 
expectations staked on his integrity. Enron, however, did fulfill Adut’s scandal criteria. Its 
executives certainly personified “groups, institutions and values,” beginning with their own 
company but also, given Enron’s size and status, they stood for the modern energy industry, 
trading in the “new economy,” and even big business as we knew it in the early 2000s. Adut 
further shows that the less the public knows about the milieu in which a scandal has occurred, the 
more likely they are to assume the misbehavior is typical, and that a broader set of people are 
therefore guilty as well.3 At the time and in the context of Enron, such a blanket conviction in the 
court of public opinion had happened fairly easily.  
Furthermore, notwithstanding the widespread and perennial suspicion toward big 
businessmen, Enron’s leaders had also enjoyed a crucial degree of “trust” by employees, 
                                                 
2 Ari Adut, On Scandal: Moral Disturbances in Society, Politics and Art (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 24. 
3 Ibid., 27-28. 
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investors, the media, and even regulators and the government. Even all of the cynicism and 
embarrassment that came after the bankruptcy could not obscure the unpleasant fact: Enron 
could only have climbed so high with the cooperation and endorsement of millions of believers. 
Therefore Enron executives, who stood for important but often ill-understood realms of business 
activity, and who had once been highly regarded, now had to become more than individual actors 
or even character types. In legislator’s narratives of problem and solution, they had to become 
representative—not only of a broader category of people, but indeed of conceptual threats.  
 Two threats in particular; namely, government’s “corruption” by big money, and fraudulent 
accounting; became the rationales for post-Enron legislation. A pair of scandals, thus conceived, 
facilitated a pair of reforms. Yet while BCRA and Sarbanes-Oxley each had its own justification, in 
the form of a problem exposed by Enron, each also had its own narrative. And the two stories, 
though both fundamentally “about” the same thing, were strikingly different. In the political 
narrative that logically led to BCRA as a resolution, lawmakers themselves were implicated in the 
conflict. Appearing beholden, for money, to large corporations like Enron, they had lost the faith of 
their constituents. The latter believed Congress, in exchange for campaign donations, had 
condoned Enron’s wrongdoing. Meanwhile the story offering Sarbanes-Oxley as finale was a 
much more familiar tale of greedy and reckless businessmen—and far less nuanced on the 
question of blame. There was no doubt but that chastening was the answer. The government 
needed only to stand firm, both in its rules and in its punishment for breaking them.  
If BCRA debates forced Congress into an uncomfortable exercise in self-scrutiny in early 
2002, Sarbanes-Oxley offered relief by mid-year. The first legislative analysis of Enron required 
congresspeople to speak critically—if circuitously—about their own modus operandi. But in the 
end, they would return to a melodramatic conceptualization of Enron in which they themselves 
were pure; even heroic. The most important commonalities between these two narratives, and 
how each pushed for reform, were the factors of rushing and, related, of oversimplification. Given 
that the advocates of BCRA and Sarbanes-Oxley knew they had greater sway, but only for a 
limited time, their arguments invoking Enron were hasty and haphazard. And not surprisingly, in 
 113 
  
these two cases as in many past reforms suddenly enabled by scandal, the resulting legislation 
was rife with loopholes and fatal compromises.  
PART I: 
APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION: THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT 
 
“You need to change your opinion.” So said Enron’s Jeff Skilling in an individual meeting 
with the chairman of the House Energy and Power subcommittee in 1999. Skilling proceeded to 
lecture the congressman, in his own office, on the obvious wisdom of forcing states to deregulate 
their energy markets. As a celebrity top executive of a Fortune 10 company, Skilling felt entitled to 
give orders in Washington—perhaps especially when, as in this case, he was speaking with a 
Texas Republican. One high-ranking member of Enron’s government staff later said “Jeff thought 
you could throw money and buy people and they did what you told them to do.”4 As a general 
matter Skilling regarded public officials as “idiots,” and in conversations like this one he made little 
effort to hide it. 
That year Enron was approaching the peak of its glory. It was entering more and more 
markets, its price per share was close to $100, and it was soon to be named Fortune magazine’s 
“Most Innovative Company in America” for the fifth year in a row. Yet in retrospect all of this 
appears dramatic prelude to the infamous bankruptcy of 2001. The mainstream news media 
would then register disgust with Enron’s leadership; particularly founder and CEO Ken Lay, 
former CEO Jeff Skilling, and CFO Andy Fastow, who had personally pocketed $60.6 million over 
years of accounting trickery.5 
After the initial shock and condemnation of these executives, some observers began to 
fume that only a government bowing to corporate prerogative could have allowed such a disaster. 
Perhaps, the allegation ran, federal regulations had condoned this egregious fraud because of 
the documented campaign contributions that Enron had given to both parties. This complaint 
                                                 
4 Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous 
Fall of Enron (New York: Portfolio, 2003), 173.  
5 McLean & Elkind, Smartest Guys in the Room, 376; Kurt Eichenwald, Conspiracy of Fools: A True Story 
(New York: Broadway, 2005), 554. These facts are uncontested; Fastow pled guilty on January 14, 2004 to 
conspiracy counts of wire and securities fraud, to reduce his forfeiture of assets and prison sentence in 
exchange for cooperation as a witness in the prosecution of other executives (Eichenwald, Conspiracy of 
Fools, 672). 
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soon broadened to refer to corporations more generally: that big business was buying favorable 
legislation, to the detriment of Americans’ interests as investors and as citizens. The 
circumstances surrounding Enron’s bankruptcy cast shame on company executives as well as 
Congress, the president, and energy regulators. But for those who felt that big business enjoyed 
too much influence on government—and that argument of course long pre-dated Enron—this 
scandal actually was not a particularly good case in point. Nonetheless, political narratives used 
Enron to symbolize corporations’ political power during the 2002 debates on campaign finance 
reform. This analysis will explore how and why.  
Between 1989 and 2001, Enron gave roughly $6 million in campaign donations, with 
about two thirds going to Republicans. Its foremost executives also gave generously on an 
individual basis. Enron was one of George W. Bush’s primary backers, and the Bush family had 
long been personally connected to Ken Lay.6 There is no doubt but that Enron won some 
influence in Washington: For example, Vice President Dick Cheney appears to have consulted 
Lay personally, in secret, as he crafted the Bush administration’s energy policy. Another Enron 
protégé, Sen. Phil Gramm (R-TX), co-sponsored a law that relaxed commodity futures trading—
vital to Enron’s business model—while his wife Wendy sat on Enron’s board of directors.  
But Enron had a grand political objective whose defeat far outweighed such victories. 
During its most successful years, the mid to late nineties, the company focused all of its 
Washington wherewithal, including lobbying, advertising, and millions of dollars, on the legislative 
effort to force nationwide energy deregulation. This would not only have been a financial boon, 
but also an ideological triumph, for Enron. Yet congresspeople, including many who had gladly 
taken Enron moneys, flatly rejected the proposal, as did Rep. Joe Barton in our opening scene. 
Even as its “government affairs” budget staggered, Enron could not even move the bill out of 
committee.  
When Barton ended the aforementioned meeting with a final rejection of Skilling’s 
proposal, it might have appeared that the Enron executive had made a grave political misstep. In 
truth, Skilling was fighting a losing battle—if sloppily. And at any rate, the company had many 
                                                 
6 McLean and Elkind, Smartest Guys in the Room, 87. 
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advocates in Washington who were more socially adept. (Indeed, given his attitude toward 
government and his typical manner of engagement, both well known, it is not clear why Skilling 
was allowed anywhere near the Capitol as a representative of Enron). Deregulation stalled mainly 
because local utilities—smaller businesses in the various states—had stronger connections to 
their congresspeople than Enron did. In other words, this flush multinational corporation faced 
opponents who had far less money to spend, and yet found with all its might it could not even 
mount a challenge.7 This legislative loss to smaller, regional utility companies hardly represented 
any populist victory, for here one set of business interests simply trumped another. However, it 
pointed up that “Business” is not a monolithic interest group; and indeed that even an Enron can 
be overridden in this fragmented constituency’s internal struggles. More to the point in BCRA 
debates, it demonstrated that Enron made a poor model for campaign finance reformers, who 
spoke of large corporations that could buy any national policy they pleased. 
Nonetheless, as the Enron scandal unfolded, politicians, including President George W. 
Bush, had to distance themselves from the company. Many legislators who had received moneys 
from Enron hastened to return them.8 And when campaign finance reform came up for debate 
just a few months after the bankruptcy, congresspeople were forced to contend with the 
proposition that they themselves were to blame, in part, as well. The story that developed, 
awkward as told by legislators, suggested that Congress’ “conflict of interest” was the problem; 
that lawmakers were declining to effectively regulate big business because they relied on 
corporations like Enron for campaign funding. As opposed to simple demonization of greedy 
tycoons, which underpinned the Sarbanes-Oxley accounting reforms of that same year, this 
explanation implied a need for institutional change that would address the business-government 
symbiosis. Since 1907 corporations had been barred from making direct campaign contributions, 
but they were known to funnel money through individual executives; to sponsor so-called issue 
ads that clearly supported one candidate over another; and to make generous soft money 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 173. 
8 Victoria A. Farrar-Myers and Diana Dwyre, Limits and Loopholes: The Quest for Money, Free Speech and 
Fair Elections. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), 82. 
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donations to parties (soft money being that which is unregulated by federal campaign finance 
law). Addressing such loopholes was the main stated rationale for the Mc-Cain Feingold and 
Shays-Meehan Bipartisan Campaign Reform bills, known together as the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act.  
Enron was thus not only conceived as a business scandal, but also—if reluctantly—
considered as a political scandal as well. Ari Adut has pointed out that political scandal is in some 
ways endemic to democratic systems, because it entails certain expectations for leaders’ 
behavior, and empowers voters (if informally) to arbitrate what is acceptable and what is not. 
Political scandals can also represent “democracy in action,” as when culprits are criticized, voted 
out of office, impeached, or even prosecuted as a result of their scandalous deeds.9 Legislators, 
naturally, wanted to contain the narrative of Enron as political scandal, and thereby contain its 
possible impact on them. Therefore the BCRA debates conveyed, at every turn, careful and 
calculated negotiations between admission and denial; humility and grandiosity. But this was not 
the first time that American leaders undertook a tentative self-examination on the issue of money 
in politics.  
A History of Big Business, Big Money, and Campaign Finance  
Campaign expenses, and how they were covered, were not always so controversial in 
the United States. To begin with, “electioneering in the founding era did not involve large sums of 
money.”10 Candidates ran (then, tellingly, the term was usually “stood”) for office, largely on their 
pre-existing reputations rather than by proactively engaging the public. What little money was 
required went largely to printing and distributing campaign literature. When George Washington 
campaigned for a seat in the Virginia House of Burgesses, his provision of free alcohol to the 391 
voters in his district (generously averaging more than one and a half quarts per head) 
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10 John Samples, The Fallacy of Campaign Finance Reform (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006), 
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represented an exceptionally large campaign expenditure. Furthermore, whether large or small, 
campaign expenses were paid by the gentleman candidate himself.11 
By the early nineteenth century, however, the scenario began to change. Increasingly, 
men of more modest means entered politics—and though this development in one sense a 
realized a democratic egalitarian ideal, it also signaled a new role for money in electioneering. 
The “professional politician” hereby emerged; a candidate who relied on others to fund his 
campaign. His entrance entailed not only requests for donations, but also gave rise to the spoils 
system, whereby a newly elected officeholder would grant government positions under his 
purview to those who had supported his run. Eventually beneficiaries of the spoils system were 
expected to pay for their jobs, as the national political parties took assessments on their 
salaries.12 Thus the primacy of money came not only to saturate the process of campaigning, but 
also the mechanisms of governing. 
As the nineteenth century wore on, big business gained its reputation—and rightly so—
for buying influence with public officials. Railroad executives in particular had a relatively easy 
time manipulating and paying off government officials at both the state and federal levels, and 
often thwarted unfriendly reform efforts with campaign contributions and outright bribery.13 By 
1874, railroad leaders felt comfortable announcing that they would “disregard” regulations that 
were enacted against their wishes, such as the Wisconsin “Potter” Law controlling freight rates 
and passenger fares. In 1890 the president of the St. Paul Railroad seemed to declare that the 
railroad industry was self-governing. Its executives, Robert E. Riegel wrote, were “practically 
independent sovereigns, exercising functions and prerogatives in defiance of the laws, and 
practically denying their amenability to the laws of the country.”14 The word “practically,” used 
twice here, probably does not mean “virtually” or “almost.” Rather, Riegel was describing who 
                                                 
11 Congressional Quarterly, Congressional Campaign Finances: History, Facts, and Controversy 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1992), 29. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Jack Blicksilver, Defenders and Defense of Big Business in the United States, 1880-1900, American 
Economic History: A Garland Series, ed. Stuart Bruchey (New York: Garland, 1985), 212, 222. 
14 Chester McArthur Destler, “The Opposition of American Businessmen to Social Control in the Gilded 
Age,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 39, no. 4 (March 1953): 641-72. 647. 
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made the railroads’ rules in practice, regardless of ostensible jurisdiction—and this came not as a 
complaint from some railroad discontent; but from someone highly ranked within the industry. The 
railroads would either buy the government that they wanted, or make a government of their own. 
The railroads were not the only business group perceived to be above, or in control over, 
the law. Joseph Keppler’s famous editorial cartoon of 1889, “Bosses of the Senate” would 
become an icon of the Gilded Age. Keppler depicted the “bosses” as a line of grimacing men with 
dollar signs on their chests. Their bodies were roughly ten times larger than those of the senators, 
mostly due to gigantic stomachs, on each of which was written a given industry “trust:” sugar, 
coal, iron, and so on. They had entered through a wide doorway designated just for them, and in 
the background was a small window—closed and locked—marked “PEOPLE’S ENTRANCE.” 
The trusts, then, were apparently gorged on profits and power. Not only did they give orders in 
the senate—the “people” who senators supposedly represented were not even allowed in.15 
If Congress appeared compromised, so too did the White House. William McKinley’s 
presidential victory over William Jennings Bryan in 1896 was partly due to the pioneering 
fundraising of campaign manager Mark Hanna, who developed a systematic means of soliciting 
donations from banks and corporations.16 If Bryan represented populism, then his defeat by 
McKinley and the Republicans’ big business allies was surely apt. It was the election of 1904, 
however, that decisively solidified the movement for national campaign finance reform. By this 
time the complaints of undue business influence in politics were strong enough to overwhelm 
opposition.17 Although some states had enacted campaign finance reforms during the late 
nineteenth century, the first major federal law on the subject was the Tillman Act of 1907. Tillman 
forbade corporations from contributing directly to federal campaigns—outlawing the type of 
funding that had helped bring McKinley and also Theodore Roosevelt to office.  
                                                 
15 The image first appeared in Puck on January 23, 1889. “Bosses of the Senate” has many ideological 
descendants among modern editorial cartoons—up to and including many artistic renderings of the 2010 
Supreme Court decision Citizens United v. FEC, which relaxed rules on corporate campaign spending. 
16 Congressional Quarterly, Congressional Campaign Finances, 30. 
17 Robert H. Sitkoff, “Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate 
Charters,” The University of Chicago Law Review 69, no. 3 (summer 2002): 1103-116. 1128; Congressional 
Quarterly, Congressional Campaign Finances, 30-31. 
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The next major episode in campaign finance and the controversial relationship between 
business and government came with Teapot Dome. In 1925 Congress learned that the Teapot 
Dome reserve in Wyoming had been secured through bribery of public officials, and with 
contributions to help retire Republican campaign debts incurred in 1920. The scandal 
corroborated then-President Warren Harding’s reputation for being on the take. Harding, who 
brought “cronies, poker, cigars, and bootlegged highballs” to the White House, indeed had had a 
hand in the operation. The head of the Department of the Interior, author of the secret leases, 
was an old friend of the President, and Harding granted him control of the reserves on dubious 
reasoning.18 Again, public outcry enabled reform; this time as the Corrupt Practices Act. The new 
law mandated more thorough and more frequent disclosure of campaign funding sources, thereby 
closing one loophole that had made the Teapot Dome scheme possible. It also tightened 
restrictions on contributions, electioneering, and campaign spending, and broadened the purview 
of campaign finance regulations to apply not only to money but also to “a gift, subscription, loan, 
advance…or anything of value.”19 
Nearly fifty years later, the Watergate scandal set off yet another impromptu referendum 
on the role of money in politics. On its face, the sordid story was of a president who 
commissioned an office break-in. Watergate, however, was also an embarrassment in campaign 
finance. Richard Nixon’s 1972 reelection campaign, it turned out, had been largely financed by 
unreported contributions that were illegal by virtue of source, size, or both. Furthermore, some of 
these very funds went the conspirators who carried out the break-in at the Watergate Hotel, both 
in advance of the operation and afterward.20 Yet again, scandal cleared the way for a reform 
initiative that long pre-dated it. In 1974, public opinion polls showed that Americans ranked 
“government corruption” among the most important national issues, and that support for 
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19 Congressional Quarterly. Congressional Campaign Finances, 31-32. 
20 Ibid., 41-42. 
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disclosure laws and public campaign funding had risen from previous levels.21 That year 
reformers accomplished a major set of campaign finance regulations as amendments to the 
Federal Election Campaigns Act of 1972. This legislation began the public funding system for 
presidential campaigns, further restricted donation amounts (and outlawed them entirely from 
some sources), mandated more disclosure of gifts and expenditures, and created the Federal 
Elections Commission to oversee federal campaign financing.  
Congress has been accused of enacting these new regulations essentially for show: so 
that they could appear to be taking action in response to Watergate. Indeed, nearly all of the 
campaign finance abuses associated with the scandal had already been illegal;22 thus any reform 
conceived strictly to close what loopholes remained, could have been minor. Instead, Congress 
propounded the most sweeping legislation on election funding to date. In The Fallacy of 
Campaign Finance Reform, John Samples argues that this was, in part, due to another form of 
opportunism—here pertaining not to a pre-existing reform crusade, but, more cynically, to 
legislators’ practical self-interest.23  
Thus the post-Watergate laws instantiated, perhaps most obviously, a perennial 
phenomenon in election reform. Here the uniqueness of campaign finance, as a topic of 
lawmaking, becomes particularly relevant. It is unlike most other realms of law that Congress 
considers and debates in that it pertains to the legislators themselves, carrying a much greater 
impact for them, overall, than it does for their constituents. People in Congress, when dealing with 
electioneering issues, are in the unusual position of making rules primarily for and about 
themselves. And because campaign finance so directly affects their own careers and lives, 
legislators can hardly ignore the prospect of either helping or harming in decisions about 
regulation.  
Specifically, immediately after Watergate and up to the present time, legislators have 
attempted to shape campaign finance according to their own desires as incumbents and as 
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partisans. First, limitations on campaign contributions or spending typically help incumbents by 
undermining challengers. In most cases, a challenger must raise and spend far higher amounts, 
compared to someone already in office, to mount a viable candidacy and thereby a real 
competition. It is not difficult to see how such a handicap on challengers might appeal to a 
Congress that is, by definition, composed entirely of incumbents—most of whom want to keep 
their seats. Second, different types of campaign finance reform are distinctly partisan because 
they can either encourage or hinder the kinds of donations that go to Republicans or to 
Democrats. For example, unions being banned, in 1943, from contributing directly to campaigns, 
was a strategic answer to the analogous ban on corporate donations; for unions tended to back 
Democrats where corporations more often supported Republicans.24 Likewise, caps on 
contribution amounts usually help Democrats, who receive smaller donations but in larger 
volume. As long as the limit is calculated to be lower than a critical mass of Republican gifts, but 
around the highest amount of Democratic ones, then it dampens Republican fundraising only.25 
The voting patterns of particular legislators—sorted by their electoral vulnerability and party 
affiliation—substantiate that many do support or oppose particular reform measures according to 
their interests in staying in office and bolstering their parties. 
Thus members of Congress, in passing the post-Watergate reforms, might have been 
serving themselves, performing for the public, or both. But at any rate, their purported goals of 
curbing the influence of money in politics, and maintaining the confidence of American voters, 
both went largely unfulfilled. Since the 1970s campaign costs have only continued to rise—and 
ever more sharply in recent elections. Meanwhile, constituents’ trust in their leaders, and 
particularly their faith that lawmakers serve public interests over special interests, have only 
declined since the era of the Vietnam War and Watergate. 26  By 1990, one opinion poll found that 
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25 Samples, Fallacy of Campaign Finance Reform, 200-203.  
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71 percent of respondents agreed “most members of Congress are more interested in serving 
special interest groups than the people they represent.”27 
Before Enron and BCRA, the final major episode in this series of campaign finance 
scandals was the Keating Five affair. Charles H. Keating, Jr., was a lawyer, businessman and 
financier known to give very generous campaign contributions. During the late 1980s he made or 
solicited $1.5 million in gifts to five senators: Alan Cranston (D-CA), Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ), 
John Glenn (D-OH), Donald W. Riegle (D-MI), and John McCain (R-AZ). Some of these moneys 
came from corporations but were channeled through non-profit organizations to which Sen. 
Cranston was connected. Keating also employed the campaign finance strategy of “bundling:” 
combining smaller donations from family members, associates and employees of a company, into 
a lump sum, so as to make a stronger impression on the recipient. These five senators in 
particular were accused of doing Keating favors in return for such contributions. As hearings and 
news reports built a story around how Keating had won influence in Washington, the “Keating 
Five” moniker tarnished them, and even further tarnished the image of the federal government as 
related to big money.28 
Keating Five was an apt precursor to Enron because both scandals connected a 
business structure that had failed disastrously, to shady political donations. Charles Keating’s 
political clout, seemingly “bought,” would have been scandal enough on its own. Yet the source of 
his wealth, and the potential motives for his generosity, made this story even more galling. 
Keating’s financial empire, during the relevant time period, was largely composed of thrift 
institutions: the Savings and Loan firms at the center of this period’s most infamous bankruptcies. 
The S&Ls’ irresponsible investment and reporting practices, like those of Enron, were extremely 
lucrative so long as they went unquestioned (and in many cases unregulated). Part of what 
Keating appeared to have been doing, with his political contributions, was shoring up Senate 
opposition to unfavorable regulatory decisions. Insofar, then, as people believed Keating 
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effectively paid to have legislators wink at S&Ls’ reckless dealings, this was a business scandal 
and a political scandal combined into one headline. The same would later become of Enron. 
Keating Five set the stage for BCRA not only in its concepts, but also in one of its main 
characters. John McCain emerged from the Keating Five scandal largely unscathed, as he was 
exonerated by the Senate Ethics Committee investigation (though the same cannot be said for all 
his four colleagues). Nonetheless, he has often stated that his commitment to campaign finance 
reform grew out of the disgrace of his association with Keating.29 The role of money in politics 
became a major issue during the presidential election of 2000 in part due to that cycle’s 
unprecedented volume in giving and spending by both parties. Campaign finance reform was 
also, however, a major plank in candidate McCain’s platform, and that prompted each of his 
opponents to address the issue, at least to some extent, as well.30 Still in the Senate two years 
later, McCain had the same enthusiasm, but different circumstances. He would play a lead part in 
pushing and passing BCRA when Enron came along as an expediting pretense. 
2002: Something Old, Something New 
The real intended purposes of BCRA were and remain subject to debate, but its basic 
provisions can be crudely summarized thus: It placed new rules on soft money fundraising and 
spending; it prohibited corporations, unions, or any unregistered group from funding “issue ads” 
within a certain timeframe before an election; it strengthened and standardized mandates for 
contribution disclosure; and it raised maximum legal amounts for individuals’ campaign 
contributions.31 The initiative had, in some form, been languishing in Congress for five years.32  
The Enron disaster won BCRA expedited congressional debate under special rules, the reluctant 
cooperation of President Bush, and most importantly, the public impulse toward reform that so 
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often follows a national embarrassment.33 Again, in the allegation that business always got its 
way in Washington, Enron had never been a good example. But the myth created political 
momentum just the same.  
When legislators arguing in favor of BCRA referred explicitly to Enron, they co-opted 
questioning of their own integrity by framing the scandal as an opportunity for affirmation. 
Carefully acknowledging the conception—implicitly, the misconception—that congresspeople 
were beholden to big business, they argued that campaign reform would restore Congress’ 
credibility in the public view by placing controls on corporate contributions. Perhaps no legislator 
had a greater interest in this effort than did John McCain. Such image management, draped in 
false piety, recalled Theodore Roosevelt’s championing the Tillman Act—for the scandal that 
most directly precipitated that reform implicated Roosevelt himself more than anyone else. His 
own 1904 presidential campaign, as Congress discovered, had been secretly financed in large 
part by several corporations. By the next year, Roosevelt was one of campaign reform’s most 
energetic supporters. The bill that was ultimately passed as the Tillman law had been written and 
introduced five years prior.34 Not only, then, did Roosevelt receive credit for legislation that was 
not his idea. He received credit for a set of reforms that passed in reaction to his own 
questionable activities. McCain’s role in BCRA, in light of the Keating Five affair, was 
comparable—though McCain at least had helped write the bill years before. 
Congresspeople advocated BCRA with rationale attempting a fine balance between 
citizens’ (putative) desires, and their own interests. Appealing simultaneously to two distinct 
audiences—constituents and congressional colleagues—these legislators’ remarks need to be 
parsed accordingly. For example, Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) described BCRA as a relief for 
legislators caught between conniving donors and a skeptical public—yet this relief would also 
bring a burden. Boxer sought to convince her peers that funding restrictions would benefit them, 
politically, enough to compensate for the material loss entailed: 
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No longer will federal candidates have to go and ask for unlimited sums of money for our 
parties and be put in a position where even if, of course, we are not going to give special 
privilege to the people giving it, it has that appearance of a conflict of interest. And the 
American people have every right to question what we do if they look and see the large 
sums of money we receive. I think the Enron scandal brought this home. I think people 
[Note: “people” here means legislators] felt terrible that they had taken these sums. That 
was the system. They may have done absolutely nothing to help a company that had 
gone astray, but it looks bad. 
 
Likewise, Sen. Chris Dodd’s (D-CT) rhetorical contortion hinged on distinguishing 
appearance from reality: 
The exploding use of soft money is…in the minds of many, a corrupting influence, 
suggesting that large contributions…to office holders, candidates, and political parties 
provide those donors with preferred access and influence…Whether or not that is the 
case is immaterial. I have never suggested, I have never known of a particular Member 
whom I thought cast a ballot because of a contribution…[But] that is what [most people] 
think happens. So it then becomes a fact to them.35    
 
Here the premise of an “appearance of corruption,” which became the legal grounds for BCRA, 
was most instrumental but also most specious: unable or unwilling to demonstrate actual 
corruption, even BCRA’s most fervent supporters had to keep the concept abstract.36 
Furthermore, the only form of corruption that would be undeniable, per descriptions like this one, 
would consist in a campaign contribution purchasing a legislator’s vote. Dodd and his colleagues, 
by averring that such deals did not go on, avoided addressing the possibility of more subtle forms 
of influence. 
John McCain, spearhead of BCRA political strategy, and his corps of fellow advocates, 
insisted that American citizens wanted to “take back” their government from moneyed “special 
interests,” and reasoned that the more media attention given to the legislation, the more likely 
constituent pressure would facilitate its passage.37 Yet despite the importance of this premise that 
the public no longer trusted its leaders, no one could specify at what prior time it had. And 
abundant evidence from before and during the Enron scandal suggested this bankruptcy was 
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hardly the tipping point. Moreover, polling that inquired specifically about campaign reform 
indicated that, perhaps due to precisely the kind of cynicism toward politics that the measure 
sought to combat, most citizens acknowledged a problem but did not expect it to be solved. 
People tended to agree that legislators were more responsive to large contributors than to other 
constituents, but they also ranked campaign finance near the bottom of their policy issue priority 
lists. At any rate, most citizens expressed doubt that campaign reform, in any of its components, 
would actually work to reduce the power of corporations or other special interests.38 
Arguments for campaign finance reform assume that the will of the people exists in some 
pure form outside of the political process.39 “Corruption” is only possible insofar as there is 
something to corrupt—here, lawmakers’ reflection of their constituents’ will; and something with 
which to corrupt it—here, money. Yet even if it were possible to distinguish what the American 
electorate wanted, distinct from all campaigning and moneyed influence, it might well turn out that 
on many legislative issues voters do not even have opinions. Many people will readily admit 
uncertainty, if not apathy, when asked about the same matters on which congresspeople are 
urgently supposed to do their bidding.40 This reticence does not necessarily mean that Americans 
are simply ignorant and politically uninformed—though many commentators are willing to 
pronounce such a judgment.  
A more generous and less fatalistic explanation is the “cognitive miser” theory. By this 
line of thinking, people simply have limited amounts of attention and energy with which to conduct 
their daily lives. Accordingly, they learn about political issues and developments only to the extent 
they deem worthwhile—whether for forming opinions, buttressing positions they already hold, or 
deciding how to vote.41 As we have seen, campaign finance reform is a good example of an issue 
on which most people hold a fairly consistent position, and yet has never provoked much public 
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clamoring. The more informed Americans are, the more likely they are to find fault with the 
current system of campaign finance.42 But an electorate composed of cognitive misers has rarely 
risen to engage the issue—even by voting for or against candidates based on their relevant 
positions or their funding profiles, much less to analyze reams of campaign money disclosures. If 
nothing else, it appears they find other concerns more pressing.43 
Thus we see a great disjuncture between the sentiments that BCRA supporters attributed 
to their constituents, and actual prevailing attitudes. This gap is hardly surprising, but it highlights 
the importance of narrative, in the most visionary sense, in this legislative debate. Some of the 
grandest language deployed in arguments for campaign reform altogether bypassed the issue of 
public sentiment per se and instead invoked loftier conceptions of democracy, civic culture, and 
the American way—all supposedly threatened in the aftermath not only of Enron’s collapse but 
also, just months before, of September 11. Here individuals and their opinions—perhaps because 
so unreliable—were no longer central, even no longer relevant.  
Rather, the nation’s political and cultural integrity were at stake in the question of money 
and elections. The following statements exemplify this premise:  
Diane Feinstein (D-CA): Campaign reform goes to the heart of our democracy. The way 
we currently finance and conduct our campaigns is a cancer metastasizing throughout 
the body politic.44  
 
Feinstein’s metaphor recalled that of Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-MN), who after Watergate called 
private money in elections “a cesspool,…a source of infection for the body politic.”45 House 
Minority Leader Dick Gephardt (D-MO) raised the stakes even higher: 
It doesn’t have to be this way. It was never meant to be this way. Our Founding Fathers 
never conceived of such a system. We have inherited a wonderful legacy of democratic 
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government which began as a bold and risky experiment. Despite more than 200 years of 
history, it continues to be an experiment and we cannot allow it to fail…46   
 
Gephardt might not have acknowledged his invocation of the Gettysburg Address, but here the 
house was divided between corruption and civic virtue—and needed to reunite around the right 
principles.   
Not surprisingly, a narrative of progress was also at work. An editorial in the New York 
Times, rather than gesturing to any noble tradition, reviewed the history of money in politics as a 
downward spiral leading ultimately to this moment of opportunity. But if Enron signified the 
darkest hour in campaign finance, then BCRA promised dawn: 
Today can be a historic moment in American politics. In the 19th century, Congress was 
basically up for sale. Lawmakers regarded it as a point of pride to pass special-interest 
legislation and harvest campaign money. The political establishment is back at that old 
game. The…endless special-interest legislation of recent years and the Enron abuses 
should jolt Congress to take stock. If lawmakers approach in that spirit, they will do the 
right thing.47 
 
The most glaring flaw in this rendition of campaign finance history is that it ignored BCRA’s 
extensive precedent. Generations of reform efforts, although not entirely pure in motive or means, 
indicated that 2002 was hardly the first time people questioned the influence of money in politics. 
Whether the past was glorious or gloomy, Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) focused instead on the 
future with a promise of redemption: 
…We will be taking the solicitation of big money by people in power…out of American 
politics and with it will go the appearances of favoritism and corruption. The political 
landscape will change when this bill takes effect. It will be filled with more people and less 
influence; more contributors and smaller contributions; more democracy and less elitism. 
 
In contrast to descriptions of corruption, or references to what the American people wanted or 
needed, quotations like these offered an argument much more difficult, empirically, to refute. It 
was as if the antidote to the “appearance of corruption” was the appearance of righteousness. 
The actions and attitudes of real legislators and real voters were less important than the 
nebulously construed “American way,” which warranted faith in systems, principles, and legacies, 
if not in people.  
                                                 
46 House Committee on House Administration, Campaign Finance Reform: Hearing before the House 
Committee on House Administration, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 1 May 2002.  
47 Editorial, “Congress In Search of Its Soul,” New York Times, 13 February 2002, Editorial Desk, 30.  
 129 
  
Congressional opposition to BCRA was just as spirited and just as high-minded. Led 
most vociferously by Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY), opponents—predominantly Republicans—
argued that the measure would abrogate constitutional guarantees of the most precious kind: the 
rights of citizens, in a democracy, to pursue their interests and voice their views. Campaign 
contributions from any entity, they insisted, were protected by the first amendment, and to forbid 
issue ads—particularly during the crucial pre-election period in question—would be to stifle 
political dissent.  
They claimed to be championing hypothetical grassroots citizen’s groups; ordinary 
Americans just seeking to have their political say. Indeed they studiously avoided reference to 
how corporations or business associations would be affected by BCRA, as in House Majority 
Whip Rep. Tom DeLay (R-TX)’s letter to the New York Times, warning that “groups of citizens 
would be forbidden from joining the debate” if the bill passed. DeLay, as an opponent of BCRA, 
said he wanted instead to “encourage political participation” whereby “citizens [can] join together” 
with “others who share their views” to “fight for their beliefs.”48 On the basis of evidence, however, 
claims that campaign finance reform threatened “citizens’” rights rang hollow and, particularly 
because they usually came from Republicans, also seemed disingenuous. Soft money donors 
and issue ad backers were statistically much more likely to be corporations, and GOP-favoring 
ones at that.  
McConnell and other Republican critics of BCRA also decried double standards in the 
“electioneering communications” provision, making much of the fact that television networks 
would face stricter regulation than would major newspapers—which were notoriously liberal. Only 
here did they refer to “corporations,” warning of the powers of newspaper firms such as The 
Washington Post and the New York Times Companies, whom they saw as political antagonists. 
Here “the media” became corporate bogeymen; Republicans’ answer to the specter of big 
business in politics. “The McCain-Feingold bill would give the media an even greater role in 
determining which candidates win elections,” Rep. DeLay wrote. Individual first amendment rights 
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would be curtailed, but “the media would have no restrictions.”49 Summing up the primary 
objections to BCRA, McConnell said the Senate’s passing it marked “a sad day for our 
constitution, a sad day for our democracy, and for our political parties. We are all now complicit in 
a dramatic transfer of power…to outside special interest groups, wealthy individuals, and 
corporations that own newspapers” (emphasis mine).50  
Most fundamentally, BCRA opponents argued that nobody had been able to prove 
money’s influence on legislators in the first place. Pointing to the same flaw in the “appearance of 
corruption” standard mentioned previously, they asked rhetorically for proof that they or any of 
their colleagues had ever introduced, supported or opposed particular policies because a 
corporation or other special interest had paid them in soft money to do so. Yet here lay the logical 
sleight of hand on the other side of the BCRA debate: such quid pro quo would be all but 
impossible to prove beyond doubt,51 and McConnell and his cohorts must have known that. The 
campaign funding and legislative systems were both far too complex—and most lawmakers far 
too savvy—to leave clear evidence even if such deals were being made. Business leaders, for 
their part, would have no interest either in exposing their own role. In sum, BCRA’s opponents 
complained that the measure was based on “anecdotal or circumstantial evidence” of corruption, 
but given the context this might be the best evidence, or indeed the only evidence, available.52  
For all their differences, which ranged from tactical to philosophical, McCain and his 
cadre of BCRA supporters, and McConnell and his (smaller) team of BCRA dissenters, shared 
one point of agreement, rarely acknowledged but telling. All believed that “corporations”—and the 
word choice was significant—posed a particular threat on the political scene because they 
controlled vast financial resources and owned key media outlets. Everybody wanted to come out 
against corporate power. Nobody would admit to defending corporate rights. And indeed, even as 
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some legislators did champion the political prerogatives of big business, they did so by obscuring 
it behind hypothetical groups of concerned citizens. 
On March 27, 2002, President Bush signed the McCain-Feingold Act into law. There was 
no signing ceremony and a marked lack of fanfare. Even John McCain issued only a one-line 
statement, indicating he was “pleased” that his political pet project of many years had finally come 
to fruition.53 Such subtlety and reserve stood in stark contrast to the accolades of Sarbanes-
Oxley’s enactment a few months later, when legislators and the president would hail a new era of 
corporate responsibility. It also signaled a difference in narrative framing between the two pieces 
of legislation. Where Sarbanes-Oxley would time and again be touted as a decisive means of 
correction and punishment—the Enron scandal’s just resolution—neither side of the BCRA 
debate positioned campaign reform as a narrative end-point. For its supporters, McCain-Feingold 
was but a “first step” in what they felt should be an ongoing process of monitoring and adjusting 
the rules of election funding. For those who had opposed BCRA, its enactment was a violation of 
the first amendment, marking the beginning of a new crusade.  
As he had promised, Mitch McConnell sued the Federal Election Commission on the very 
day BCRA passed, seeking an injunction from enforcement of the legislation based on the same 
objections he had mounted in Senate debates.54 Congresspeople testifying in favor of BCRA 
related, under oath, occasions when they had faced pressure to grant campaign contributors 
special “access and favors.” And after a trial that deserves its own narrative analysis, the 
Supreme Court upheld the new law in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003). This 
decision admittedly relied on circumstantial evidence and “common sense” 55—but, again, due to 
the factors of the case this may have been the strongest basis for judgment possible. The 
McConnell ruling would be revisited seven years later, when a 501(c)(4) non-profit group called 
Citizens United stood in for the same first amendment cause. The group sued the FEC for the 
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right to air a political exposé on Hillary Clinton shortly before the Democratic primary for the 2008 
presidential election, and its appeal reached the Supreme Court. 
Doubts about the fundamental premises of BCRA have carried over into assessments of 
its impact. For one, the basic assumption as to how money came to permeate politics may have 
been misconceived. Some critics charged that legislators, not corporations, were to blame for any 
questionable alliances between the two; that companies were being subjected to soft money 
“shakedowns” whereby lawmakers subtly threatened consequences for withholding campaign 
contributions. Yet this time, it was business leaders, rather than lawmakers, who could claim the 
status of victim in the equation of money and politics. Again this allegation, like the general 
complaint of “corruption,” would be difficult to prove because neither legislators nor corporations 
would benefit from publicizing such dynamics. 
Nonetheless, in actions if not in explicit statements, business leaders substantiated the 
premise that lawmakers had obligated them to become accomplices to corruption. Through think 
tanks and industry groups that allowed them to remain anonymous, executives from the nation’s 
largest and most successful firms intimated they supported BCRA’s soft money ban. Their 
primary practical reason was that it would curb the pressure that companies faced to make 
campaign donations or else risk legislative retaliation.56 Analogous reasoning was already loudly 
proclaimed during the late nineteenth century, as in the struggle over antitrust policy. Big 
business defender George Gunton, whose work was heavily subsidized by Standard Oil, 
conceded that large corporations had bought into the political fray, but he blamed the solicitors, 
rather than the donors, of campaign gifts. “Take from the boss the power to blackmail the 
corporation,” Gunton wrote in 1890, “and the corporation will gladly disappear from politics.”57 
(Significantly, the “boss” in this formulation was a politician, not an executive.) As Robert Sitkoff 
has shown, the Tillman Act of 1907 also came about with support from business, with similar 
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rationale. Corporations had complained of “systematic shakedowns” from lawmakers, and wanted 
legal protection.58 
It appears that the reality of the business-government relationship, regarding money, 
features neither entity as wholly innocent or wholly culpable. Rather, corporate leaders and 
legislators cast blame on each other while continuing to push for rules and norms that serve their 
own benefit. We have seen how legislators calculate limits and embed loopholes in campaign 
finance legislation to serve incumbent and even partisan interests. Likewise, business leaders 
have distinct preferences, and a certain amount of influence, in the particularities of campaign 
finance rules. Although most companies would prefer not to make soft money donations—and 
many even have official policies against it—to opt out of the system alone is politically equivalent 
to, as one manager put it, “unilateral disarmament.”59  
Indeed, since at least the early twentieth century politicians allegedly pressed for 
corporate contributions by citing the donations of the companies’ competitors.60 The implication, 
which hardly needs spelling out, is that rewards will be meted out commensurate with gifts. No 
company would want to find itself on the low end of that continuum. Thus large corporations, as 
diverse and conflicting as their objectives sometimes are, have long had incentive not only to act, 
but also to act together, in shaping campaign finance reform. To extend the weapons analogy, a 
regulation such as BCRA’s soft money ban is like mandatory, universal disarmament: offering 
safety to all as long as all participate. 
As Sitkoff put it, business leaders want relief from lawmakers’ extortion, and to have legal 
grounds for delaying or withholding contributions. They do not want, however, to deal themselves 
out of “the market for legislation”61—much less to eradicate that market. Legislators, for their part, 
also have reason to maintain it in some form. Political Action Committees (PACs) and 527 
organizations remained, after BCRA, legal and viable options for corporations who wished or 
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needed to spend large amounts in political campaigns.62 Even in the presidential election of 
2004—the first to take place after BCRA’s passage—527s were immensely influential.63 
Meanwhile, issue advocacy groups and trade associations were not required to disclose their 
funding, so we cannot know how much came from corporations.64 History suggests that 
loopholes in campaign finance regulation have always been more the rule than the exceptions to 
it. So it went with the Tillman Act, which, as everyone noted at the time, allowed companies to 
funnel money through their executives. Likewise, the post-Watergate reforms condoned and even 
effectively encouraged the rise of PACs.65  
The so-called “hydraulic theory” of election funding holds that corporate money, like 
water, despite any obstacle in its path ultimately flows where it will. It does appear, however, that 
at least some money from business readily dried up after BCRA was enacted; that corporations 
chose not to exploit all of the loopholes available under the new rules. This evidence suggests 
there was at least some truth to their complaints of being “shaken down,” for once soft money 
donations were illegal, so were legislators’ requests for them. For example, if determined to use 
soft money contributions to advance their political agendas, corporations could have re-routed 
roughly the same amounts that previously went to the parties, into 527 organizations, which were 
still allowed to accept it. Instead, in 2004 business gave far smaller soft money contributions to 
527s than in recent prior elections.66 In fact, some of the largest corporate soft money donors 
from the elections of 2000 and 2002 did not give at all during that cycle. Likewise, the hydraulic 
                                                 
62 Samples, Fallacy of Campaign Finance Reform, 262; Stephen R. Weissman and Ruth Hassan, “BCRA 
and the 527 Groups,” in Michael J. Malbin, ed. The Election After Reform: Money, Politics, and the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 97-98. 
63 Farrar-Myers and Dwyre, Limits and Loopholes, 133, 135, 137. 
64 Robert G. Boatright et al., “Interest Groups and Advocacy Organizations After BCRA,” in Malbin, ed., 
Election After Reform, 114. 
65 Zelizer, Seeds of Cynicism, 75, 79, 102.  
66 Farrar-Myers & Dwyre, Limits and Loopholes, 152; Boatright et al., “Interest Groups and Advocacy 
Organizations After BCRA,” in Malbin, ed. The Election After Reform, 119-20. 
 135 
  
theory might have corporations channeling soft money through executives to pass contributions 
off as “individual,” or increasing hard money contributions. In 2004 they did neither.67  
The 2004 campaign showed increased levels of citizens’ political engagement over the 
election of 2000.68 BCRA supporters may have taken that change as a vindication of the new 
rules, signifying that the chastening of money in elections led voters to re-invest time and effort in 
politics. However, it might also be attributed to other factors, such as the political polarization 
associated with George W. Bush, then running for reelection, and with the recently begun, 
controversial war in Iraq. Moreover, due to PACs, trade associations, and the like, there is no 
definitive evidence that the 2004 election really was any cleaner, in terms of finance, than 
previous ones. 
Aside from the central matter of soft money, BCRA’s effects also appeared ambiguous on 
other scores. The electioneering communications provisions, which regulated televised “issue 
ads,” seem to have affected the timing and sponsorship of advertisements, but not their volume 
or content.69 Thus from the perspective of the typical viewer, political advertisements were largely 
the same before and after BCRA. BCRA’s endorsement of sunshine as a disinfectant in 
elections—the provision that streamlined disclosure of campaign donations—may also have been 
misguided. Disclosure is only meaningful if some intermediary between campaign and voter—the 
news media, most likely—is able and willing to sort through and synthesize vast amounts of 
complex data. Furthermore, and crucially, it must do so proactively if citizens are to judge 
candidates by the origins of their money in time to vote accordingly. Absent a breaking scandal 
there is little incentive for journalists to undertake such a task.70  
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Behind all of the questions that dog BCRA lurks most persistently the potential 
embarrassment not of public outrage, but of public apathy. As mentioned before, most Americans 
never felt strongly about BCRA even as legislators strenuously debated it in their name. Likewise, 
there is little evidence that citizens cared or even noticed when McCain-Feingold changed the 
rules of their elections, nor that campaign finance has ever been a particularly salient issue when 
voters form opinions and make choices. This dubious development, too, is part of a legacy: the 
post-Watergate reforms, for example, only ever enjoyed “lukewarm” support from voters. Despite 
all complaints that money had corrupted politics, the electorate never really pressured legislators 
to enact new campaign regulations, nor did it punish the opponents of reform—even in the wake 
of such a scandal.71 
Thus rhetorical posturing and grandiose narratives about the public good and the future 
of American democracy belied the reality that citizen-voters were probably the constituency with 
the least interest—in more than one sense of the word—in campaign finance rules. The 
“appearance of corruption” standard glossed over both the (inevitable) dearth of hard evidence 
that legislators were on the take, and also the possibility that “appearances” may not be so 
important after all if the public rarely pays attention anyway. And here we return to the ultimate 
narrative irony in the story of BCRA as an outcome of the Enron scandal. As stated previously, 
Enron was never an apt example of a corporation buying its way through the legislative process. 
Thus even if corporate money had flooded American politics, and even if the public were 
dedicated to damming the deluge, the fact that Enron provoked the most lively discussion and the 
most significant reform since Watergate would have made little sense—were it not for the power 
of stories. General anxieties about corporate influence found traction in narratives of the Enron 
scandal. And in a story of plutocracy, executives like Lay and Skilling made very convincing 
plutocrats. 
Hypocrisy Incumbent: The Compromises and Confusions of BCRA 
As if the bill’s many loopholes were not enough, both political parties set about 
undermining BCRA almost immediately after it passed. President Bush, promptly after signing the 
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legislation, approved the efforts of McConnell et al. to challenge it in court. Meanwhile, a 
bipartisan coalition pushed for maximum flexibility in the law’s actual implementation; that is, in 
the practical rules that the FEC would enforce. This effort included some of the same Democrats 
who had claimed credit, for their party if not personally, for enacting the campaign finance 
reforms. The FEC, notoriously political, was accused of plotting to “eviscerate” BCRA—but if this 
was true, many politicians and party operatives were in on the conspiracy. 72 Here manifested yet 
another uniqueness in campaign finance as a legislative issue. The rules of implementation, on 
any new law, are typically left to regulatory agencies due to the latter’s special expertise. On the 
topic of election funding, however, everyone in politics and government has expertise, and most 
are loath to defer to as shaky an authority as the FEC.73  
Both parties also made a point of soliciting as much soft money as possible after BCRA 
passed but before it took effect. Democratic National Committee chairman Terry McAuliffe, who 
had welcomed the legislation, said in an interview “We’re trying to tell everybody, ‘Get your 
checks in before Nov. 5,’ because there’s no more soft money after that.”74 Both the Democratic 
and Republican National Committees even set up organizations in the states, in advance, to keep 
the soft money coming. The state groups could continue collecting and spending the kinds of 
large contributions that BCRA would soon make illegal in federal campaigns—and these funds 
could still be used, within the states, for federal electioneering.75 
Even if legislators themselves did not propose such means of sidestepping BCRA, there 
is no doubt that they stood to benefit. Moreover, had a majority in Congress really intended to 
exile special interest money from political campaigns, the bill could have been much stronger and 
more comprehensive. Loopholes such as those offered by PACs, 527s, and state party 
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organizations were hardly unforeseeable; and indeed in many cases were already quite obvious. 
Here, then, was yet another reminder of how legislators had passed BCRA in part with an eye to 
their own interests as perennial political candidates.  
The charge that BCRA was, in Sen. Rick Santorum (R-PA)’s words, an “incumbent 
protection plan,”76 should give any “little-D democrat” pause. Generally, it is in the public interest 
that any election be open and competitive, but limits on campaign spending and regulation of 
media communications do disproportionately hinder challengers, who face special obstacles even 
to make themselves known.77 (The same complaint surfaced about campaign rules at the time of 
the post-Watergate reforms.78) Indeed, most of the congressional Republicans who supported 
BCRA—the people whose votes allowed it to be called “bipartisan”—were the ones most 
vulnerable, in their own districts, to losing their seats to challengers.79 It might have been this 
personal threat, as much as an earnest commitment to campaign reform, that prompted these 
legislators to break with the party line.  
Related to the quandary of campaign finance rules that may return incumbents to 
Congress term after term, was the issue of free speech. For if BCRA made it more difficult to 
defeat someone currently in office, it also, via issue ad provisions, made it more difficult to 
publicly protest incumbents’ policies. As American courts have recognized (and enshrined), 
money, in electioneering, is speech. For this reason, even after Mitch McConnell lost his suit 
against the FEC, many McCain-Feingold dissenters remained faithful that the measure would 
ultimately be reversed as unconstitutional. The “concerned citizens” of McConnell’s and DeLay’s 
warnings, whose political engagement BCRA would supposedly thwart, do after all exist—
alongside the corporations and interest groups that these congressmen were really defending. 
However big or small, and however rich or poor, the “speaker” may be, a democratic system 
theoretically should thrive on the most communications possible, from the most corners, 
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regarding policy issues and elections. Any law that hinders people or groups, whatever their 
motivations, from publicly criticizing elected officials (also incumbent candidates), should face 
skepticism and scrutiny. No one denies that BCRA’s provisions affect the exercise of first 
amendment rights. The controversy is over the appropriate balance between such rights and the 
guarantee of democratic elections and responsible policymaking—and the answer is not obvious. 
In 2010 the Supreme Court did strike down part of BCRA in its ruling on Citizens United 
v. Federal Elections Commission. The decision overturned restrictions on electioneering 
communications (the funding of issue ads) by a narrow majority, effectively deregulating political 
ads such that any group may finance them, to any extent, at any time (though disclosure of 
sponsorship is still mandatory). While this ruling was bounded, reversing only part of existing 
campaign finance law, it was received as a major development both among those inclined to 
celebrate and those disposed to lament. The former group applauded the decision as a righteous 
vindication of free speech, while the latter warned of an “opening of floodgates,” in political 
contests, to special interest—especially corporate—money. Both views probably hold some truth. 
Rules regarding the amount of campaign contributions, and who can make them, remain in effect 
at present, but the Court appears potentially open to revisiting those restrictions as well. 
 The libertarian strain in American political philosophy urges us to think of government as 
a self-interested organization or entity, just like any other. Accordingly, it acts on concern for its 
own security and prosperity, even at the expense of the public. By such reasoning, 
congresspeople’s willingness to place hurdles in the way of political challengers, and to place 
conditions on political speech, is not surprising in the least. The theory is intriguing, however, as 
applied to a legislative struggle against “special interests.” It contends, essentially, that the federal 
government itself is a special interest, with its own distinct stake in policy. Moreover, it suggests 
that the government is more similar to a large corporation than to any ideological group—even 
the largest and best-funded—because like a company, it has no single issue or discrete set of 
concerns that it was created to address. Instead, it is a vast assembly of individuals who have 
very little in common except a shared desire to protect and bolster their organization. If the line 
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between the private sector and public service seems ever blurrier, perhaps in this one aspect the 
diminishing distinction is theoretically useful rather than just fiscally convenient.   
Private money has never been more important, in American politics, than it is now. At this 
point fundraising is a never-ending task, and an inevitable, major component of virtually any 
politician’s job. Amid all the niceties of regulating who can give, and how much, this general state 
of affairs should not go unacknowledged. We cannot scientifically measure the impact of money 
on politics, because we lack any other contemporary US electoral system with which to compare 
the one we have. (Comparing our system to those of other countries introduces too many 
variables—such as party formations, structures of governance, and the means and accessibility 
of communications—to examine campaign finance in isolation). But Kurt Hohenstein suggests 
that the continual imperative to court huge amounts of money symbolizes, “more than any other 
modern development,” the great gulf in experience between a political candidate and her 
constituents.80 Again, if in the end “common sense” is among the best evidence available on the 
relationship between money and politics, then this idea is convincing enough. If people do not find 
their leaders relatable, perhaps one logical explanation is that those leaders are constantly 
surrounded by amazingly rich people and organizations, and at all times thinking about and 
dealing in millions of dollars. Even if such activities are not innately wrong, they are certainly 
unfamiliar to most “ordinary” citizens. 
Yet another issue that modern campaign finance debates tend to gloss over is a practical 
one: how should candidates pay for their electioneering? Given how expensive it has become to 
run a serious campaign, where will the huge amounts required come from—if not from private 
entities that have impressive resources and, indeed, that have special interests motivating such 
generous donations?81 The only consistent answer that has been offered is public funding, along 
the lines of the presidential campaign fund created after Watergate. The premise here is that 
publicly funded campaigns will be fairer, and that publicly funded candidates will be less beholden 
to private backers. Yet this system of campaign finance has never been popular among 
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Americans, and their support for it continues to decline.82 Ari Adut found that the French 
electorate knew about and condoned illegal campaign financing for generations simply because 
they found the alternative—their own tax money used for electioneering—more objectionable.83 
Americans’ sentiments are probably similar, especially given the widespread distaste for 
politicking and their disillusionment with governmental leadership. It seems they feel public funds 
would not be well spent on campaigning. Meanwhile legislation such as BCRA signals that the 
public campaign finance system may effectively end before it ever effectively began—as does the 
emergent trend in candidates who forego public funding.  
At any rate, 2002 marked no particular turning point in how American voters assessed or 
related to their government. Indeed, just a few years later, more “circumstantial” or “anecdotal” 
evidence appeared to suggest BCRA fell far short of restoring lawmakers’ image—not to mention 
of purging any real corruption that may have taken hold among them. The congressional 
elections of 2006, which brought Democrats into control of both chambers in a dramatic reversal 
of partisan power, were distinctly characterized by continuing scandals of money and influence in 
Washington. Among the notable names associated with the Republican-controlled sitting 
Congress’ “culture of corruption” were lobbyist Jack Abramoff, Ohio congressmen Bob Ney, and 
Tom DeLay. The common factor in each of these scandals was the manipulation of democratic 
elections and governance through money, political influence, and lies. None was “another Enron,” 
but neither did Enron seem to have brought about any fundamental change.  
For roughly one hundred years, Americans demanding campaign finance reform have 
expressed essentially the same concerns. They worry that moneyed interest groups and 
individuals hold too much power in elections, and that challengers and candidates of modest 
means face an unfair disadvantage due to funding patterns.84 Yet both voters and lawmakers 
seem uncertain as to the root problem. Sometimes, protests and reforms focus on the origins of 
campaign contributions; and sometimes instead they emphasize size. There is no reason why 
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one factor must be more important than the other, and indeed most regulation has addressed 
both. But among laypeople, in non-technical discussions of campaign finance, statements of 
concern tend to invoke the sheer volume of money tied up in electioneering more often than 
anything else.  
It is as if the dollar amounts themselves pose the most serious threat to democracy.85 
Such is the attitude that predominates outside of Congress—and indeed, it would be quite 
discordant if voiced within the Capitol. Everyone there has accepted, and works within, the reality 
of modern campaigning. This pattern in lay perception, however, also echoes many narratives of 
Enron, in which incomprehensible hugeness—of the company, of executive salaries, of contracts’ 
valuation, of corporate assets—so alienated some observers that the details became irrelevant. 
Condemnations of bigness may not always be articulate, but they are perennial. Campaign 
finance reform debates in 2002 seemed to bring together fears about big business, big money, 
and a government corruptible by both. 
Lawmakers have found a way at least to try to co-opt this strain of popular sentiment. For 
just as “corruption” can be cited to discredit government, so to can it be cited to justify 
government. What to do about the threat of money’s infiltration? Create and maintain 
mechanisms of authority to identify and root it out, and in which the people have utmost faith. If 
legislators had first to establish, in debates about campaign finance, that they were not the 
problem, their overarching task was really to present themselves as the solution. They were not 
enabling special interests to influence the nation’s governance—they were guarding against that 
possibility. If not for their power, the implication went, then the story might play out differently. 
Campaign finance reform has always involved narratives of “sin and redemption.” 86 
Lawmakers tend to cast themselves as heroes, striving to serve and protect the American people. 
From the private sector come villains, seeking to derail the course of democracy, with money both 
their primary tool and their constant objective. As we saw in legislators’ dramatic speeches on 
BCRA, this tradition was still alive and well in the early 2000s. Yet, again, it was somewhat 
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uncomfortably applied to the issue of campaign finance, because here congresspeople had to 
acknowledge how they themselves featured in this narrative’s conflict. Legislation on “corporate 
accountability,” however, which was debated just a few months after BCRA, enabled a much 
neater hero-villain formulation.  
If BCRA had brought congresspeople dangerously close to blaming Enron on the least 
convenient party—themselves—Sarbanes-Oxley allowed them to blame the most convenient 
party: big business executives. With Sarbanes-Oxley legislators could return to a melodramatic 
narrative of Enron, and to the vilification of their favorite whipping-boys. Yet even here, problems 
of knowledge and understanding proved frustrating. The story was not quite as simple as these 
storytellers would have liked. 
PART II:  
ENRON MELODRAMA’S CURTAIN CALL: THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 
 
Where BCRA supporters had posited Enron as a symptom of sickness in government, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act located Enron’s problems squarely in the realm of business. The latter 
bill sought (among other things) to ensure the integrity of accounting audits; to hold CEOs and 
CFOs more strictly responsible for their companies’ financial statements; to prevent executives 
from trading company stocks during periods of “blackout” when their employees are unable to do 
so; and to strengthen the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In theory, each of these 
measures could have helped to prevent “what went wrong at Enron,” conceived as a set of ethical 
breaches in business and accounting.  
In specifics, many of the law’s provisions were quite narrowly tailored. This was the 
legislative consequence of construing Enron as “incredibly an aberration,” in the words of one 
congressman. If the scandal was unique, then the reform it necessitated could be finely targeted 
to prevent another aberration of this kind. Sarbanes-Oxley emphasized, for example, separating 
accounting firms’ auditing and consulting services, meaning that none could do both jobs for the 
same corporate client. This measure was intended to eliminate conflicts of interest such as the 
one Arthur Andersen appeared to have with Enron. Likewise Sarbanes-Oxley created a national 
review board for accounting services, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), 
which itself would also be regulated to prevent partiality among members. The rationale was that 
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better federal supervision would guarantee investors’ trust in the financial statements of 
companies in which they bought or held stock. Such a reform, in response to Enron, suggested 
the bankruptcy provoked a crisis in confidence as to securities’ value. This was not to happen 
again. 
A History of Fraud and the Regulation of Representation 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s legal premises can be traced back to the foundations of contract law 
and to prohibitions against fraud and forgery. Essentially, Sarbanes-Oxley was about 
representations of value in business dealings, and about who officially vouched for them—and 
could thereby be blamed if they were false. Business regulations have always struggled to keep 
abreast of new modes of swindling, though with its ever-quickening pace, innovation in 
commercial practices and in technology always seems slightly ahead. If Enron’s fraud instantiated 
this pattern, thus easing the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the last major regulatory overhaul in this 
vein had come about under similar circumstances.  
In assessing the worth of large, publicly traded corporations, and particularly their effect 
on stock markets, Sarbanes-Oxley’s most relevant precursor was the securities reforms of the 
New Deal era. It was then that the SEC was created, that public companies first had to release 
formal financial statements, and that many of the rules of stock trading first took effect. Most of 
these measures were intended to prevent another bubble, and subsequent burst, based on the 
harsh lesson beginning in October 1929. There was also a distinct business scandal, however, 
that helped provoke New Deal reforms. It anticipated Enron not only in that regard, but also 
because the scandal was predicated on changing energy markets as well as stock speculation. 
Samuel Insull made his name, and a great deal of money, buying electrical utilities. His 
large holding company garnered wide admiration and many investors, but from late 1931 through 
early 1932 it suddenly plummeted into bankruptcy. Over one million investors saw their savings 
devastated.87 One FTC lawyer, who had watched some of them attempt to recover their money, 
described “just the average run of people—clerks and school teachers there in Chicago, small 
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shopkeepers in Illinois, farmers from Wisconsin—and…they had lost every penny.”88 Insull had 
made one irresponsible investment decision after another, and in the absence of any 
consolidated, coherent disclosure of the assets of his holding company, nobody had known—and 
nobody chose to question—its real worth, or even whether it was solvent. For these reasons and 
many others more technical, Enron’s success and subsequent collapse were quite similar to 
Insull’s. 
The most important long-term consequences of Insull’s scheme were legislative. Here 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt was the opportunistic politician who seized upon scandal to 
accomplish his preordained objective. Campaigning for the presidency at the time, Roosevelt 
cited Insull as a baron of the “power trust” run amok. The candidate argued that concentrated 
private ownership of utilities was gouging consumers and threatening democracy. He also 
advocated securities law reform, which would protect investors from “the reckless promoter, the 
Ishmael or Insull” who inflated his own stock’s value by lying.89  
Roosevelt, of course, won, but Insull’s operation as a precipitating scandal also figured 
into that era’s political shift. First, Insull, like Enron, inspired a series of high-profile congressional 
hearings. Named later for the chief counsel of the relevant Senate subcommittee, Ferdinand 
Pecora, the hearings were part of an investigation into stock exchange practices. The timing—fall 
1932—was no coincidence. The Pecora hearings, in context of a crashed stock market, 
staggering deflation, and rising unemployment, helped catalyze support for greater regulation in 
securities trading.90 Insull’s story and the Pecora hearings facilitated reforms such as the 
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Act of 
1935, and the Federal Power Act of that same year. The premise overall was that big business, 
and the power industry, should not be left to state-level regulation. (Recall that Enron, in its time, 
was still lobbying the opposite position: that even the states should not regulate energy markets). 
Insull would come to symbolize the “corrupt old order;” the era before securities and utilities law, 
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at least in theory, made his kind of swindle impossible.91 Needless to say, fraud would continue 
both in stocks and in energy. But in a detailed comparison of Insull’s case with Enron’s, Judge 
Richard Cudahy and legal scholar William Henderson argue that some of the reforms that Insull 
inspired may actually have prevented Enron’s collapse from triggering a severe market downturn 
in 2001-2002.92  
For all their similarities, one notable difference between the Insull scandal and the Enron 
scandal is that only the former prompted new legislation regulating energy. Insull’s fraud was 
identified with his particular industry, whereas Enron—appropriately—was barely even 
considered an energy company in the postmortem. Enron’s only major, publicized misdeed that 
was actually industry-specific was its trading exploitation in California’s energy crisis. The 
company has always been much more closely associated with accounting fraud. Accordingly, 
2002 saw accounting reform. On the rare occasions when energy-related abuses did enter the 
congressional discussion, they were usually merely used as examples, among others, of Enron’s 
crookedness. 
2002: A Calling to Account 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been attributed by some to “Sudden Acute Regulatory 
Syndrome.” This recurring phenomenon in business regulation arises from a catalyzing event (in 
this case, Enron’s collapse) which leads to the quick adoption of new rules even over the 
objections of industry leaders and lobbyists. The latter are usually able to exert at least some 
influence over the regulatory policies that govern their own business.93 Larry Ribstein likens such 
political conditions to a “regulatory bubble;” an extreme but temporary inflation of lawmakers’ 
willingness to “invest” or “buy into” the movement to create more rules.94 Like the libertarian idea 
of government as a special interest group, the concept of a regulatory bubble is intriguing in its 
conflation of politics with markets. If speculative bubbles in the financial world often begin with 
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rash groupthink and end in disaster, it should not be surprising if regulatory bubbles arise out of 
somewhat similar contexts, and have consequences that may well be regrettable in hindsight.  
Yet almost immediately after the Enron bankruptcy, the voice of the free-market ideal was 
already back, loud and clear. Though a regulatory bubble was expanding at this time, in other 
words, not everyone was willing to speculate. Sen. Robert Bennett (R-UT), for example, was 
reluctant to support new reform measures, and offered an interpretation of the Enron collapse 
that signified little need for a Sarbanes-Oxley when he said “the market is the fastest, quickest 
punisher of stupidity. And that's what happened.” Other legislators emphasized the overwhelming 
strength of corporate America, and insisted that an aberration like the Enron scandal should not 
tarnish its image. Even bill co-sponsor Rep. Michael Oxley (R-OH) warned,  
The fact that the vast majority of American businessmen and women are enterprising, 
honest and hard-working is what has made America in its brief 200-plus years the most 
prosperous civilization the world has ever known…There is no law Congress can pass 
which would match the entrepreneurial talents of the American people. Indeed…we can 
run the risk of restraining those talents when we rush to legislate in times of crisis. In this 
area Congress must proceed with extreme caution, because there is a direct correlation 
between the amount of freedom in a society and its ultimate success or failure. 
 
From the “other side of the aisle,” Rep. Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) joined in:  
 
Nobody should assume that because there have been a very small number of people 
who had been irresponsible, that this represents the American free-enterprise system. 
Most accountants in this country are fundamentally honest and perform their work in the 
highest professional standards…Most corporate executives and board members of this 
country work very hard, very diligently and in the highest professional manner to perform 
their function.95  
If Congress at this time did more to maintain the corporate capitalist status quo than it did 
to pre-empt “another Enron,” such remarks may help explain why. For here we are reminded how 
bounded the melodramatic narrative had been all along. These legislators, though more than 
willing to vilify Enron executives, still maintained nobody should get too carried away in the effort 
to restore calm and order. A just resolution would require only limited reform. Indeed, to 
undertake any major overhaul in regulation would itself be an act of injustice; an arbitrary 
victimization of the “diligent,” “hard-working,” “professional” and “talented” majority in American 
business. Such comments echoed the growing chorus of praise for small business owners and 
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employees, often touted as the backbone of the American economy and the embodiment of 
entrepreneurial spirit and dedication. But they also drew upon a common strategy in arguing 
against increased business regulation: that it would hurt honest, hard-working people in small 
operations. Big business often manages, in defending itself from stricter supervision, to “hide 
behind” small business—and it has help, in doing so, from legislators. 
Initially, President Bush had been far from enthusiastic about the Sarbanes-Oxley Bill. In 
March 2002 he had announced a plan for reform that emphasized responsible self-governance in 
corporate America, as opposed to corrective legislation. Executives, he said, must answer to the 
“demands of conscience.” Over the following months, however, doubt only mounted as numerous 
public companies issued “revised” financial statements. By mid-July, the New York Stock 
Exchange was weaker than it had been for five years. It became clear that Bush should not 
appear to be standing in the way of corporate accountability reform. He gave a speech in New 
York City plugging “Corporate Responsibility,” but investors and financiers were clearly 
unconvinced; one could literally watch the stock market falling on the ticker tape as he spoke. On 
July 30, 2002, after it had been passed unanimously by the Senate, Bush signed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act into law.96 “We hope all of this will begin to calm the economic situation,” said primary 
sponsor Sen. Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) in a press conference in the White House driveway, “and 
provide a framework within which we can move forward and assure our investors…that they can 
count on the American capital markets to reflect fairness and integrity and transparency.”97  
In fact, Sarbanes and Oxley had written the bill before the Enron bankruptcy, but none of 
its proposals had yet even been studied by that time.98 By most accounts, the legislation was 
passed in a hurried and haphazard fashion, before much research had been done as to the 
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wisdom of its provisions.99 Jean Baudrillard wrote, “The denunciation of scandal is always an 
homage to the law.” A disturbance to a society’s moral structure, he argued, can be ritually 
alleviated by being labeled a deviation from the law in such a way as to affirm the power of the 
legal order, which supports “capital.” 100 President Bush and Congress, in the wake of Enron’s 
collapse, were clearly attempting something along these lines. For it is arguable that the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act brought little in the way of “reform;” either because this new legislation still 
fell short of practical efficacy, or because it simply reassembled and reiterated policies that had 
already been on the books.101 In any event, it has been subject to sustained criticism from a 
remarkable variety of angles. 
In business circles, the new Sarbanes-Oxley regulations are collectively nicknamed 
“SOX” out of familiarity and, usually, contempt. Primarily in terms of work hours, the cost of 
compliance provokes much grumbling. To avoid the expenses of SOX compliance, some 
companies have “gone private” (removed themselves from the stock market); or “gone dark” 
(reduced public ownership to below 300 shareholders, which is the maximum allowed for a firm 
that does not comply).102 Neither phenomenon is particularly promising for the American 
investment climate. More troubling, though, is the fact that smaller businesses as well as large 
are required to follow SOX policies. For them, the associated costs can be prohibitive,103 such 
that they may shut down, or that people may be deterred from launching modest startup ventures 
in the first place. The one business constituency distinctly unopposed to Sarbanes-Oxley is 
accountants. The law is a boon for external auditors, as it effectively grants them a captive market 
for a new set of services that only they can provide.104 “SOX Auditing” and also consulting on 
“SOX Compliance” are distinct services—almost a professional sub-field in their own right—and 
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quite lucrative. Thus if accounting firms seemed to have erred in the Enron scandal, Sarbanes-
Oxley in this respect ironically rewarded them. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also falls short in its purported goal to increase whistleblower 
protection. So far, very few claims for relief from retaliation have been filed under the 2002 law—
and the courts have ruled, in most cases, in favor of employers.105 Sarbanes-Oxley also imposed 
a statute of limitations that may serve ultimately to condone corporate offenses, because they are 
often so complex that they go undetected until years after the fact.106 In other words, if a 
corporate employee discovers “too late” some arcane evidence of fraud, he can only take action 
at his own risk. He has no legal protection as a whistleblower.  
Finally, some lesser-known components of Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower rules suggest 
that, far from being custom-designed for someone like Sherron Watkins, they actually would have 
excluded her. First, the terms of the law limit one’s options, upon discovery of whistle-worthy 
activity, as to whom it can safely be reported. An employee is only protected if she brings her 
information to a federal agency, which Watkins never did. Furthermore, a would-be 
whistleblower’s motives are subject to scrutiny. Only one who can prove she acted in “good faith” 
is guaranteed legal protection. For reasons outlined previously, Watkins may well have failed that 
test—especially with all the money and legal talent that Enron would have enlisted to discredit 
her. No one on either side of Sarbanes-Oxley debates, however, even acknowledged this fact. 
Thus even if Sarbanes-Oxley was intended to pre-empt another Enron, narrowly 
conceived, here it failed even to do that. Particularly in its whistleblower provisions it departed 
significantly from the circumstances of Enron’s case—delivering the real message, to anyone 
reading fine print, that Watkins as whistleblower-hero was to remain an exception, protected by 
incidental circumstance, rather than the norm. More substantively, in the broader goal of 
empowering corporate employees to report any transgressions they witness, these same 
loopholes in Sarbanes-Oxley are problematic even with Watkins entirely aside. For in her motives 
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and in her decisions, Watkins was probably typical: thinking and acting, for the most part, in her 
own interest. Indeed, what else could be expected? Whistleblowers who care only for the public 
good must certainly be admired, and protected, but there is no reason to believe they would be 
the majority. To legally discount someone who brings real crime to light, on the basis that she 
might have motives beyond simple “good faith,” is to ensure that most people in a position to blow 
the whistle probably will not. Instead they will weigh the potential evidence that might be brought 
against them, and likely decide that the safest course of action is to keep quiet—whether they 
continue working with the offending company or leave. 
As for big business executives who claimed to have been unaware of fallacies in their 
companies’ financial statements, SOX created no new loophole, but neither did it really close the 
existing one. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, CEOs and CFOs would now be required to review their 
companies’ quarterly SEC reports. Furthermore, they had to “design” and “review” the 
“effectiveness of internal controls to ensure that they receive material information…”107 They 
would affirm they had done all of this with personal signatures, now mandatory, on every SEC 
filing. Such specifications clearly referred to claims, like those of Jeff Skilling, that a high-ranking 
executive did not know, or even could not know, whether his company’s statements were honest 
or sound. A CEO now not only had to peruse these financial disclosures, but also was expected 
to make sure, himself, that he had all knowledge of precisely the kind Skilling had denied. To 
vouch for a corporation’s financial statement is essentially to vouch for all of its significant 
dealings.  
Nobody who was familiar with how business is done in a large firm, and who took any 
realistic approach to regulating it, should have approved such provisions. The size and 
complexity of companies like Enron might itself be problematic, but as long as it stands, there is 
no use in denial. Skilling’s statements to Congress that he had no idea, nor even any reason to 
suspect, that Andy Fastow was stealing from the company, were probably false. But on the 
scores of more complex transactions on which senators quizzed him, Skilling likely was more or 
less ignorant. Enron was simply too big for any executive, even one as allegedly brilliant or as 
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highly paid as Skilling, even to know, let alone vet, everything that it did. Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
requirement that CEOs and CFOs achieve corporate omniscience—even on financial profile 
alone—amounted to wishful thinking and impractical legislating. In the language of the law, 
congresspeople even appeared, quietly, to acknowledge this. The word “knowingly” always 
affixes to descriptions of what constitutes an offense in approving financial statements. Therefore 
executives can—and do—still insist they did not knowingly commit any fraud, even when signing 
their names to figures that later turned out to be false.  
Knowledge and Retribution in Sarbanes-Oxley 
Information and knowledge, in presence and absence, was problematic in determining 
how to prevent another Enron. But it was also pivotal in selling policy proposals that offered 
answers to that question. Those who pushed for accounting and securities reform in 2002 faced 
some unique challenges, along these lines, in their task of political persuasion. Campaign finance 
reform had been a dry enough topic, with plenty of technicalities that most Americans would find 
difficult to master—and even more difficult to care about. Yet the regulation of SEC filings and 
internal policies on company stock trading was even more arcane, tedious, and seemingly 
irrelevant to most people’s lives. In discussions of Sarbanes-Oxley, the people involved 
sometimes attempted to take advantage of their topic’s complexity and boringness. At other 
times, they combated it by speaking in reductive terms about wrongdoing and retribution. 
When Arthur Andersen CEO Joe Berardino testified in Congress about his company’s 
work with Enron, he emphasized how complicated professional accounting is. “I ask that you 
keep in mind,” he said in his opening statement, “that the relevant auditing and accounting issues 
are extraordinarily complex and part of a much bigger picture.” Further, in one of many similarities 
between his testimony and Jeff Skilling’s, Berardino also insinuated he would not be able to 
answer all of legislators’ questions—and that this was no fault of his own. He continued, “None of 
us here yet knows all the facts. Today’s hearing is an important step in enlightening all of us. I am 
certain that together we will get to the facts.”108 Like Skilling, Berardino in the same breath 
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insisted that the “relevant facts” were within his exclusive expertise, and also that he did not and 
could not know everything that was going on within his company from where he sat as CEO.  
Berardino could claim an even more specialized body of knowledge, as compared with 
his audience, than could Skilling. And by constantly reminding legislators how arcane the rules of 
accounting were, he suggested that public outcry targeting his company—for Andersen stood 
almost as thoroughly disgraced as Enron in the wake of the scandal—must be trumped up with 
misinformation, or just misunderstanding. One critique of Berardino’s maneuver bears quoting at 
length: 
This continues the hiving-off of the auditing and accounting issues into a separate, 
arcane domain, understandable only by the technically literate cognoscenti. It could be 
construed as a brave, yet audaciously patronising comment. But it serves notice that the 
vast majority of the audience (whether present at the hearings, or later readers) might as 
well fall asleep since it is a well-known truism of popular culture that accounting is 
profoundly boring…perhaps this is a cunning rhetorical ploy: cause the resolve of your 
inquisitors and accusers to wane through boredom and tedium.109 
 
This pointed rebuke comes not from some anti-corporate activist journal, nor from a literary 
academic turned loose on congressional transcripts. Rather, these are the views of two business 
scholars writing for an audience composed almost entirely of accountants.  
Not only do these commentators impugn Berardino’s “rhetorical ploy” to put off 
legislators’ interrogatives. They expect their readers—people in Berardino’s field, who have 
similar expertise—if not to agree with their analysis, then at least to know what they mean. Lest it 
be unclear, the authors announce: “Through the medium of accountants and managers, 
accounting has been remarkably successful in maintaining a luminescence of objectivity 
(emphasis in original).110 This is to say: accounting is not objective, nor is it “luminescent”—even 
in its dazzling technicality. People like Berardino just try, and often succeed, to make it appear 
that way. The readers of Critical Perspectives in Accounting were to confront this proposition and 
at least consider that it might be true. Thus Enron’s fallout may have prompted a few among the 
cognoscenti to question how opacity and boredom might be used strategically.  
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One scholar of accounting further suggested that Sarbanes-Oxley itself gave too much 
credit to accountants for their expert knowledge. Here it was not one CEO’s rhetoric, but instead 
the very foundations of new legislation, that seemed at best misleading or at worst to condone 
ongoing offenses. As mentioned before, Sarbanes-Oxley’s accounting provisions focused on 
eliminating accountants’ conflicts of interest by forbidding them to consult for the same client 
company that they audited. Yet scientific studies of instances when accountant-auditors failed to 
recognize problem transactions suggest that breakdowns are usually in “competence and 
diligence,” not in objectivity.111 In other words, auditors are more likely to lack the dedication, or 
even the competence, to do their jobs effectively, than they are to turn a blind eye to fraud due to 
partiality toward a client. It is a matter of incomplete knowledge rather than mal-intent. Yet by 
ignoring this evidence, the architects of Sarbanes-Oxley again addressed more what “looked bad” 
within Enron’s particular case, than what actually seems to need remedy.  
On issues of information and knowledge as well, the scandal of Samuel Insull had 
presaged Enron. For in understanding and responding to Insull’s fraud, the primary obstacle 
facing Congress as well as prosecutors was the complexity of his business model and the 
indecipherability of his accounting. Then-chairman of General Electric Owen Young, who had 
brokered deals for Insull, said under oath “I confess to a feeling of helplessness as I began to 
examine the complicated structure of that organization…[it was] impossible for any man, however 
able, really to grasp the real situation.”112 Young, like any executive associated with Enron, had 
reason to force this “confession” of ignorance, even if it was false. Claiming to have been 
confused is preferable, after a scandal, than appearing to have been complicit. The lead lawyer 
who investigated Insull, however, was more likely to have been in earnest—especially when he 
suggested that even the mastermind himself may not have known what he was doing. In 1939 
Ferdinand Pecora recalled: “It is said that only twelve men were qualified to understand the 
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Einstein theory of relativity; but the Insull structure was so complex that no one could fully grasp 
it, not even, probably, Mr. Insull himself.”113  
Insull might have been stopped earlier had he been required to make disclosures to the 
SEC. But if the problem underpinning his protracted fraud was a lack of information, then the 
problem underpinning Enron’s was overabundance. Enron, like any other publicly traded 
company since the early 1930s, had to file official financial statements every quarter. Plenty of 
information—including but not limited to these SEC filings—existed to suggest that Enron was 
insolvent, or at least engaging in risks not reflected by its market valuation. Yet for years, nobody 
inside or outside of the company was willing or able to discern the company’s 
misrepresentations.114 Thus Enron’s fraud might be interpreted, in one sense, as a successful 
“data dump:” an overwhelming of potential questioners with too much information. Berardino’s 
gestures to the “extraordinarily complex” accounting world and its “much bigger picture” seemed 
to attempt a similar cowing.  
After the Insull scandal, one of Congress’ motives in holding the Pecora hearings, and in 
taking up reform, was to demonstrate that something was being done. The process of legal 
prosecution is notoriously slow, especially in context of a sudden tide of public indignation. But if 
the courts had to take their time mulling over Insull’s case and deciding how justice would be 
served, Congress did not. As in the case of Enron—whose major criminal trials did not occur until 
nearly five years after the fact—the congressional hearings got underway much more quickly.115 
And if legislators intended their hearings and deliberations to compensate, somehow, for Insull’s 
lack of immediate punishment, then their concerns proved justified not only in the moment, but 
also in the long term. When Insull did eventually face trial, he was acquitted. Thus smearing his 
name was the closest the government would ever come to giving the public, and particularly 
Insull’s former investors, what they wanted: to see this swindler “pay.” 
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Congresspeople undertook an analogous show when they plugged the Sarbanes-Oxley 
bill. For all the technicalities of accounting regulation and securities law, legislators emphasized 
more than any other SOX provisions those that pertained to punishment. Not only were these the 
most accessible features of the reform; they also resonated with conceptions of “bad guys” 
responsible for the Enron fraud and, accordingly, fantasies of revenge. The melodramatic Enron 
narrative, which featured legislators as the heroes who would restore the disturbed moral order, 
was being rehearsed yet again. “While we can't stop greed,” said Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT), “We 
can stop greed from succeeding. And nothing is going to focus someone's moral compass more 
than knowing that if they don't do what is right and moral, they're going to be a guest of the state 
behind iron bars for a long, long time.”116 Such a vow conjures an image of Jeff Skilling, 
mustachioed and in handcuffs, screwing up his nose. “Rats! Foiled again!”  
President Bush, for his part, emphasized that his administration would investigate, arrest, 
and prosecute corporate leaders who failed to “uphold their responsibility” to shareholders and 
employees. At his most energetic, he even directed these vows to “you”—the executive 
miscreants—and used the harsh tone of one who stands in judgment of sin. As if to pronounce a 
final condemnation over villains who were cowering in defeat, Rep. Edward Royce (R-CA) exalted 
in the thwarting of these “pinstriped crooks.” Sen. Mike Enzi (R-WY) declared, “There is no 
punishment too great for a criminal who destroys dreams.”  
Sarbanes-Oxley did, in fact, spell out the punishment for “false certification of financial 
information.” A “knowing violation” can result in a $1,000,000 fine and/or up to ten years 
imprisonment, and a “willful violation,” $5,000,000 and/or up to 20 years. It also increased the 
maximum fines and sentences for existing securities-related crimes, directing the US Sentencing 
Commission to make federal sentencing guidelines to reflect the “serious nature of the 
offenses…, the growing incidence of serious fraud offenses…and the need to deter, prevent and 
punish such offenses.” Such instructions make clear the context of an urgent need for 
punishment—for each of these stated reasons, and probably a few others unmentioned. The 
                                                 
116 Conference Report on Corporate Responsibility Legislation. 
 157 
  
other major piece of legislation passed in response to Enron, BCRA, also included sentencing 
guidelines for people who broke the rules. It was the first campaign finance law ever to do so.117 
Retribution was also to come in tangible form. Money had been stolen; thus money had 
to be given back. Sarbanes-Oxley mandated that any CEO or CFO who received a bonus or 
other inventive-based compensation twelve months after a fraudulent financial statement, would 
have to return it in full. Here the premium on pat justice met overemphasis on Enron’s 
particularities. For in Enron’s case, the CEO(s) and CFO—Lay, Skilling, and Fastow, 
respectively—do seem appropriate candidates for returning bonus compensation. They had been 
rewarded for fraud, whether they designed or merely condoned it, and that was surely unfair. 
However, numerous other people at Enron, by this reasoning, should also have had to return their 
incentive-based pay. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, they never would. Moreover, in other instances of 
corporate fraud—ones that have already occurred as well as others likely in the future—the CEO 
and CFO would probably not be the best people to pay their bonuses back. Under Sarbanes-
Oxley, they would have to do so just the same, based purely on their job titles. Thus yet again, 
Enron’s specifics, and a superficial conception of what would appear just desserts, prevented 
what could have been a much more effective reform. 
At this juncture the import of Enron narratives becomes most clear. Sarbanes-Oxley, the 
primary official response to the scandal, was influenced by Congress’ melodramatic conception. 
This was the second, and the last, piece of legislation to be passed in response to Enron; 
Congress and the President were all too eager to consider the problem solved with the closure of 
a “lesson learned.” But any decisive closure that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provided was more 
symbolic than real. For this reason the enactment of its “reforms,” done hastily and without 
sufficient analysis of the complex problems they sought to address, makes an appropriate finale 
for the Enron melodrama, and for Enron legislation. If the conflict of the plot was conceived 
superficially, it is not surprising that its resolution should be superficial as well. The main objective 
of most of the actors, all along, was applause.  
                                                 
117 Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, “Campaign Reform’s Worst Enemy,” New York Times, 6 July 2002, 
Editorial Desk, 13. 
 158 
  
Conclusion: Narratives Toward Reform 
 
These two narratives of what kind of problem Enron was—the one pointing to BCRA, and 
the one pointing to Sarbanes-Oxley—were not mutually exclusive. Many legislators and 
commentators subscribed to both, arguing that the Enron scandal proved a need for campaign 
finance reform and also a need for new rules in accounting and stock trading. But not only could 
these two narratives coexist, rhetorically—they also in some ways needed each other, politically. 
The self-scrutiny that Congress had to negotiate, when it took up BCRA, might have been too 
dangerous were it not for the comforting blame of executives that Sarbanes-Oxley allowed. 
Likewise the railing against corporate crime in which legislators indulged, with Sarbanes-Oxley, 
might have seemed altogether too hollow and hypocritical were it not for the admission, which 
came with BCRA, that government played some role in the Enron disaster. 
The most important practical commonality, in the processes of passing BCRA and 
passing Sarbanes-Oxley, was the factor of rushing. Opponents complained, and supporters took 
faith—but all agreed on the significance of timing. Movements for reform in campaign finance and 
in accounting, thanks to Enron, came suddenly into season; hence the urgent dusting off of two 
bills written years before. But time was “of the essence,” as well, in the sense that it would run 
out. The shock and rage provoked by scandal both inevitably fade over time;118 thus so too does 
the support that they lend to reform movements. Legislators knew that if they wanted these bills 
to pass, they would have to work quickly—and not meticulously. Many of the weaknesses and 
compromises in BCRA and Sarbanes-Oxley can probably be attributed to haste. Yet if time in part 
undermined these reform efforts, timing had made them possible in the first place. For if there 
had been no Enron, there would have been no “post-Enron” reforms. Legislation similar to BCRA 
or Sarbanes-Oxley could eventually have passed, but not in 2002—and perhaps not at all. 
When Enron executives had realized in 2001 that their company was failing fast, they 
requested but were denied a federal bailout. Instead they soon found themselves scapegoats in 
the government’s new regime of “corporate responsibility.” Of course, politicians had to distance 
themselves from Enron post-bankruptcy, and some snubs certainly were calculated to that end. 
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But they also illustrate, again, how narrative trumps logic when people describe the American 
political system before them, and envision the one they would like in its place. Enron narrated as 
a Washington titan facilitated the McCain-Feingold laws; and Enron narrated as a band of 
“pinstriped crooks” facilitated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. But such superficiality does more harm 
than good in understanding and addressing the enduring problems of which Enron reminded us. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Enron Remembered 
 
 
 
On the website tlknet.com, you may order an Enron duffel bag, watch, mug, or pen, 
among many other accessories bearing the “Crooked E” logo. Also for sale are numerous shirts 
and hats celebrating Enron Field—the name of the Houston Astros’ home stadium while under 
previous sponsorship. Presenting these “Enron Collectibles,” tlknet promises: 
 
Directly from the folks that brought you the LARGEST corporate collapse in history! Once 
this stock is gone......there will never be anymore made!   
 
These items were purchased directly from the Enron Signature shop and are not knock-
offs they are all BRAND NEW selling direct to you!!  Most of the items we will have for 
sale are truly impossible to find anywhere! 
 
The claim of authenticity is essential here, and fundamentally connected to a sense of 
temporality. In this general pitch, as in many descriptions of individual products, tlknet 
emphasizes that these Enron artifacts, because real, are in finite supply. The company is gone, 
and all traces of it eventually will be too.  
Even as it advertises its own merchandise, tlknet appears ambivalent as to the consumer 
appeal of Enron collectibles. The website offers an odd mix of items that refer directly to the 
bankruptcy and scandal—for example, a framed stock certificate or the cover of Enron’s ethics 
handbook—alongside miscellaneous corporate paraphernalia that would be entirely 
unremarkable bearing any other logo. Most likely the latter items are simply left over handouts 
from promotions or staff retreats. Reflecting such a motley collection, tlknet cannot seem to infer 
how its customers would commemorate Enron. Is it simply a company that no longer exists, 
leaving behind rare relics like anything else that has vanished? Or is every Crooked E a badge of 
infamy? The website’s product captions cannot help but convey this unresolved question. A 
coffee mug with a cap for travel, for example, “would make a great conversational piece around 
 the office or workplace!”—but an online shopper is left to imagine what kind of conversation the 
mug would provoke. Especially in the professional setting that the vendor suggests, not all of the 
possibilities are appealing.  
As if to acknowledge that risk, along with the dubious sentimental value of Enron 
souvenirs, the website makes clear that if nothing else, to “get it while you can!” might make an 
Enron collector some money. “Enron memorabilia,” tlknet claims, with the imprimatur of the 
Smithsonian, are “appreciating in value!” But with this pitch, like all its others, subject to doubt, it 
seems even the primary purveyor of Enron’s remaining merchandise is ultimately uncertain as to 
why anybody would want it.1 If the Enron mementoes on tlknet.com signify attempts to remember 
Enron, the website’s awkward sales appeals begin to articulate the complexity of such a project. 
In the years following the company’s collapse, its name remained meaningful, but it was not 
always clear how or even why. One challenge was the absence of almost anything material that 
was related to Enron—but as we see from the products on tlknet, even “Signature” objects could 
not necessarily make it tangible. 
Enron proved difficult to remember for many of the same reasons it had been difficult to 
narrativize—and yet over time, these two tasks conflated. Narratives can make the past more 
coherent, and in Michael Schudson’s nonacademic but unassailable term, also more 
“interesting.”2 (Enron was never, for most people, innately interesting enough, and this would only 
be truer as it faded from the news.) Thus if one component of memory is story in retrospect, then 
to construct an Enron memory was to continue a process that was already underway when the 
company went bankrupt. Narratives of Enron remembered, however, were distinct from 
contemporaneous narratives in that they signified—both deliberately and accidentally—the 
passage of time. From the company’s bankruptcy in late 2001 to the eve of Ken Lay’s and Jeff 
Skilling’s trial in late 2005, numerous stories emerged about Enron—and they showed both the 
benefits and the weaknesses of hindsight. At the same time, understandings of the bankruptcy 
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 that were already vague, fragmented further into references that could not be called narratives in 
their own right, but which still gestured toward certain patterns in perception and political 
meaning. Here I identify what I contend to be expressions of collective memory of Enron, and use 
them to critique existing memory theories. 
Historiography has of late witnessed what Jay Winter calls a “memory boom;” a 
burgeoning field of scholarship dedicated to the study of memory in all its forms and 
manifestations.3 Various definitions of memory are on offer, but the one seemingly most 
capacious and versatile is the relationship between past and present.4 This conception of 
memory includes but does not end with the individual cognitive process of remembering. It can 
also encompass narratives and representations of past events, regardless of how or even if they 
are received and adapted as part of a particular memory. As numerous scholars have argued, 
that which can be called “collective memory” is not simply the aggregate of individual memories 
within a specified population. It “involves the integration of various different personal pasts into a 
single common past that all members of a particular community come to remember collectively.” 
The concept “implies a past that is not only commonly shared but is also jointly remembered.”5  
As aspect in which working theories of memory are lacking, however, is in their apparent 
bias toward the traumatic, the violent, the emotional, and the visual. These qualifications 
dominate discussions of memory per se, to the exclusion of certain events that, I will argue, do 
not fit this model but that nonetheless find expression in collective memory. My premise is that 
the Enron collapse was a noteworthy socio-historic event; and accordingly that in the years 
immediately following it was already being “remembered” in popular cultural forms even if by 
gross misrepresentation. Iwona Irwin-Zarecka has advanced the idea of multiple “frames of 
remembrance;” arguing that memory texts are “framed” according to the form in which they seek 
                                                 
3 Jay Winter, “The Memory Boom in Contemporary Historical Studies,” Raritan 21: 52-66. 52. 
4 John Nerone, “Professional History and Social Memory,” Communication 11 (1989): 89-104. 89. See also 
Allan Megill, “History, Memory, Identity,” History of the Human Sciences 11, No. 3 (1998): 37-62, on the 
influence of the present on conceptions of the past (51-52). 
5 (Emphasis in original). Eviatar Zerubavel, “Social Memories: Steps to a Sociology of the Past,” Qualitative 
Sociology 19, No. 3 (1996): 283-99. 294. A similar explanation of collective memory is in Barbie Zelizer, 
“Reading the Past Against the Grain: The Shape of Memory Studies,” Critical Studies in Mass 
Communication 12, No. 2 (June 1995): 214-39. 214. 
 163 
 to be received—as commemoration, entertainment, or “the truth,” to name a few examples.6 
Drawing on sources with a variety of different “frames,” I identify two related problems to which all 
attest. First, there appeared singular difficulty, for those who tried, in constructing and preserving 
a collective memory of Enron. Second, scholarly theories of memory seem generally inapplicable 
to an event of this kind.  
Both for people trying to publicly “remember” Enron, and for an analyst trying to 
understand this process using current frameworks of memory, the round hole is the convention 
that collective memories necessarily involve trauma, emotion, personal investment, visual 
representation, a sense of time and location, drama, and at least some degree of narrative 
coherence. The square peg is a scandal that was only viscerally upsetting to a very few 
individuals, that was arcane or even irrelevant to much of the American public, that is nearly 
impossible to depict visually, that is not defined by any particular date or time, that few people 
actually understood, and that had little entertainment value even as it was happening; making it 
likely to become even less compelling with the passage of time.7 Enron lacks the fundamental 
features of the remembered event as we know it—and yet it has not been forgotten. Through a 
variety of means, memory-makers sought to reconcile the square shape of this scandal with the 
round hole of conventions in collective memory. This analysis will conclude, from these strained 
reconciliations, that additional ways of understanding memory are needed to accommodate 
Enron and comparable events.   
Michael Schudson has argued that legislation is a form of memory text, stating in the 
case of the Watergate scandal that the reforms enacted in its wake were intended to 
“institutionalize collective memory.”8 The same might well be said for the McCain-Feingold 
campaign finance law and the Sarbanes-Oxley accounting regulations passed after the Enron 
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 bankruptcy. Their proponents explicitly stated that these new laws were intended to pre-empt 
“another Enron,” thereby positing the scandal as something to be learned from. Not even a 
person, much less a nation, can learn from any experience without remembering it. Yet these 
post-Enron regulatory initiatives also functioned as memory in additional, more subtle ways. 
Given all the hearings and debate that their passage entailed, they created a record that, if not 
always coherent or complete, was permanent. Moreover, most congressional proceedings related 
to Enron—beginning with those theatrical interrogations and testimonies examined in Chapter 
One—witnessed explanations of root problems, and attributions of credit and blame. This also 
represented an early attempt to commit Enron to official memory; supposedly one that could be 
put to good use.  
Such institutionalized commemoration, however, was only a small and fairly insignificant 
proportion of collective Enron memories emerging prior to the Lay-Skilling trial. In the realm of 
popular culture and mass media, numerous books, films and references were also remembering 
Enron. Because they targeted a much wider audience, these expressions of memory were both 
more accessible and—in cultural terms at least—more influential. Moreover, in nearly all of these 
popular commemorations of Enron, formal authority was conspicuously absent. That is to say, 
these narratives tended to exclude government, regulation, the judiciary, and even law 
enforcement. Such a pattern of omission was a statement in itself as to how people remembered 
Enron. For purposes of this study, it also suggests that the lay public was more likely to “keep” 
informal rather than formal memorializations of this bankruptcy. Evidently, they found such 
retrospective narratives more compelling, or even more accurate. 
Expository Memory: Insiders and Infiltrators Tell (Almost) All  
Many expressions of Enron memory were primarily expository; framed as “information,” 
“fact,” or “the truth.” The main principles on which such narratives traded were honesty, 
authenticity, and completeness. Several investigative journalists and business writers who had no 
direct connection to the Enron bankruptcy published books about it from 2002 through 2005, and 
some among them represented original and quite thorough work; in other words, a unique and 
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 valuable account.9 The highest sellers, however, in print media as well as in documentary film, 
came promising the inside scoop. Here former Enron employees, Houstonians associated 
indirectly with the company, and the reporters who effectively helped bring on the bankruptcy, 
claimed audiences’ trust as authoritative sources above all others. 
 Some insiders seemed to claim the mantle of the survivor, thereby becoming “primary 
figures of authenticity.”10 The concept of survivorship seems always at a premium in the wake of 
disaster stories, and although Enron was in the end no real implosion or mortal tragedy, those 
who lived to tell the story enjoyed some of the same cachet. Former employees like Charles 
Prestwood, and former shareholders like “little bitty” Mary Bain Pearson, had appeared as 
survivors to testify in Congress. They also surfaced from time to time thereafter as quoted 
authorities in news articles about later Enron developments. Two more concerted manifestations 
of Enron memory came from higher-ranked Enronians—accountant and whistleblower Sherron 
Watkins and Enron trader Brian Cruver—in the form of published memoirs.  
The memoirs of Watkins and Cruver carried both the authenticity of the survivor account 
and the assertion of professionally specialized knowledge. Their narratives were also 
confessional, if ambivalently so. The authors had to present themselves as credible people of 
integrity even as they capitalized on publicity surrounding a disgraced corporation and its 
scandalous downfall. Yet these memoirists were not the last veterans of errant enterprises to 
make names for themselves by reversing loyalties—nor, by far, were they the first. The reformed 
businessman who starts life anew, guided by purified values after rejecting greed and 
exploitation, should by now be familiar. He offers an exclusive inside perspective on his forsaken 
former world, and usually a vindication of outsiders’ suspicions about it. Having “seen the light,” 
the confessor can now be taken at his word. Such testimonials represent an important part of the 
“lost values” school of big business criticism, which holds that large systems and organizations in 
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 commerce have forced a departure from the traditional American mores of rugged 
independence.11 This line of thinking has been traced back to populism, but echoes even earlier 
the Jeffersonian advocacy of yeoman self-reliance over Hamiltonian ideas of centralized 
government and banking.  
One of the most prolific of twentieth century reformed businessmen, who applied “lost 
values” to the modern corporate order that he left behind, was Theodore “T. K.” Quinn, onetime 
top-ranking Vice President in General Electric’s New York office. In 1948, he wrote of his 
epiphany: 
…In the summer of 1935, I determined to resign. Being a symbol of so-called “success” 
was never going to satisfy me. My father had been a liberty-loving Irishman and a life-
long fighter for the underdog. There I was on the wrong side of the fence…I do not 
suppose that General Electric was much worse or much better than any other giant, 
impersonal corporation, but there was no satisfaction in that…I only knew that I 
wanted…to get into something—anything—else.12 
 
The controversy at hand, in Quinn’s memory of this moment, was the antitrust litigation constantly 
dogging his company. But these proceedings were, he averred in retrospect, merely a cue that 
life would be better once free of his “giant, impersonal” employer. He would join his father on the 
right side of the “fence” between rote, systematized profit-making and righteous independence. 
Though Quinn’s departure from the corporate world was actually gradual, and never really 
complete, he pretended later to have had an abrupt realization. He published a book called I Quit 
Monster Business (1948), and testified frequently against big business in general and against GE 
in particular.13  
 With every move, Quinn built his career like the savvy businessman that he was. He went 
on to make plenty more money as a Madison Avenue advertiser, but also as the author of books 
like this one. Watkins and Cruver, as Enron memoirists, made similar decisions, and probably for 
similar reasons. Cruver is still using his MBA—though apparently no longer in the fast-paced life 
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 of a commodities trader—and Watkins works nationally as a consultant, speaker and writer on 
corporate ethics. Thus their recollections of Enron should not be accepted simply as they are 
presented: “the unshredded truth” or “the inside story,” respectively. They were written in part to 
serve personal goals, and each deliberately and strategically sidesteps certain issues. 
Nonetheless, with the question of complete truth aside, it makes more sense to view these 
accounts as vehicles of collective memory than as personal reflections. Their decisions to 
publish—and so soon after the bankruptcy—suggested Watkins and Cruver consciously proffered 
their memoirs as authoritative, authentic Enron memory, to be received as widely as possible. 
 In 2003—the year after her star testimony in Congress and her appointment as Time 
Magazine’s Person of the Year—former internal accountant and Vice President Sherron Watkins 
published Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron. Watkins became famous for 
writing an anonymous memo to Ken Lay, urging him to take a critical look at some of Enron’s 
partnerships and accounts. This was in August 2001, which was probably the last point in time 
when something could have been done to avert disaster. Fatefully, Lay failed to act. But like 
Bethany McLean, whom Skilling had rebuked for impugning Enron’s business model, Watkins 
would ultimately be heard far and wide. She won recognition as a “folk hero” in the Enron drama, 
and the words she chose to describe her fears for the company; “I am very concerned that we will 
implode in a wave of accounting scandals;” were repeated often and by many, in retrospect, as 
something of a prophecy.  
As in her statements to senators, Watkins presented herself in this memoir as entirely 
innocent—even cowed—amid all the shady dealing that she witnessed at Enron. She played 
down any personal motivations she may have had in writing her famous memo of warning, such 
as getting Andy Fastow fired or gaining job security or national recognition for herself. At the 
same time, Watkins played up the risks that came with blowing the whistle. As Ari Adut has 
stated, “Acquiring prestige from a scandal requires the denouncer to communicate effectively the 
costs of his or her normative enterprise.”14 Here the “normative enterprise” was, ostensibly, 
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 integrity in accounting standards, and more broadly in corporate governance—although Watkins’ 
real enterprise may have been her own career. At any rate, per Adut’s rule, Watkins emphasized 
in Power Failure the fear and danger that she felt, first when directly challenging Ken Lay, and 
then when testifying against him, Jeff Skilling, and numerous other company superiors. She 
recalled, for example, gripping a Bible and crying as she first went public with her revelations.15  
In fact, Watkins actually eliminated a number of risks to her own well-being when she 
blew the whistle at Enron. By documenting her suspicions, and by bringing scrutiny to Andy 
Fastow, Watkins legally and interpersonally shored up her job. (At any rate, when she wrote her 
memo she had already started looking for another one, all her claims of “loyalty” notwithstanding.) 
Furthermore, by the time she testified in Congress, Watkins could only gain from such supposed 
feats of bravery. It should be noted that she requested her own subpoena—yet her memoir 
makes no mention of that fact and indeed seems to imply otherwise: “Finally, on Valentine’s Day, 
the cameras turned to Sherron Watkins…she looked wide-eyed and anxious. But soon enough, 
she gathered herself.”16 As to the head-to-head confrontation between her and Skilling, staged by 
the Senate, Watkins claimed Skilling “requested the showdown,” but provided no evidence for 
that, nor any hint as to how she would know.17 At any rate, from blowing the whistle, through her 
testimony, to the very writing of her memoir, Watkins had every reason to expect precisely the 
outcome that she got: accolade, security, and entrepreneurial success.  
Recalling her work at Enron, Watkins’ “confessions” were actually nothing of the kind. 
Neglecting to mention her impressive salary or the professional perks that she enjoyed as a high-
ranking executive, she placed herself at a cultural distance from the indulgence and waste for 
which Enron was known. Retrospectively, she assumed the persona of an innocent country girl 
naïve enough to have trusted her high-rolling bosses, but ultimately keen enough to see through 
their tricks. There is no guilt inherent in receiving generous pay, working and traveling in comfort, 
or living well—but as if in deference to an Enron-triggered backlash against such Fortune 10 
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 norms, Watkins evidently felt she had something to hide. As to real, active wrongdoing—rather 
than simply looking out for herself—it does appear Watkins was innocent, at least through the 
time she wrote her memo. The only admission of any possible fault that Watkins has ever made 
on record would not come until 2006, when Lay and Skilling went on trial. She was asked both in 
media interviews and in court why she was never indicted for insider trading, given her profuse 
dumping of Enron stocks at a strategically ideal time. She replied that she did not know—and 
even acknowledged that her stock sales had been “wrong.”18   
On a more personal note, Watkins’ recollections of wanting to look good for Jeff Skilling 
came too frequently to ignore. She described, without any explanation, her deliberately 
provocative choice of clothing on occasions when she knew she would see him, and cringingly 
regretted the times Skilling caught her sans makeup. Given that Watkins wanted to be taken 
seriously in this writing, and that she had publicly and permanently damaged this man’s career 
and life, such admissions are bizarre and defy obvious explanation. One can only imagine what 
Skilling himself made of them, for undoubtedly he read Watkins’ book. Indeed, she likely knew 
that he would, for everyone close to Skilling acknowledged that he perused all coverage of 
Enron’s collapse with an almost obsessive, yet perhaps masochistic thoroughness.  
Yet Skilling, regardless of Watkins’ actual regard for him, was not her target audience. 
Suggesting that she had long wanted to impress him, in ways that were not strictly professional, 
may have been part of Watkins’ calculated self-presentation within this memoir. First, it could be 
taken a sign of extreme deference toward a man in a supervising role, which would enhance 
Watkins’ image as well-meaning and loyal, far beyond the (official) call of duty. Second, this 
admission fit in well with what Watkins described as a cult of “Enron blondes”—the anonymous 
but gorgeous women who seemed constantly to adorn the company’s offices and staff events.19 
The running joke, when nobody could say what division employed them, was that nobody cared. 
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 Alternatively, since Enron had the best of everything, perhaps these women represented their 
own division. Describing this sexual climate, Watkins depicted Enron’s corporate culture as 
tainted by more than one kind of sleaze. And by suggesting that she herself felt pressure to be an 
“Enron blonde”—specifically in Skilling’s assessment, for whatever reason—she again appeared 
vulnerable and submissive. Thus in recollections ranging from accounting methods to her beauty 
routine, Watkins evoked a company rotting from the inside out, and presented herself as its 
trembling but noble voice of reason.  
Former Enron trader Brian Cruver offered a much different narrative in his own memoir, 
Anatomy of Greed: The Unshredded Truth from an Enron Insider (2002). Notwithstanding his title, 
Cruver was far less dramatic than Watkins, and explicitly rejected the notions of good and evil 
that had seemed to prevail at the height of the scandal. Though he acknowledged and applauded 
Watkins’ efforts, almost none of her most basic premises, beginning with her congressional 
testimony, had corollaries in Cruver’s memory. He dismissed the hearings as “great theater,” and 
said the Enron story had “No heroes. No whistle-blowers. No happy ending.” “Hollywood will need 
its best screenwriters,” Cruver speculated, “to spin heroes out of a game that had no winners. 
There are dozens of ‘I told you so’ analysts, journalists, and whateverists, each of whom knew 
something but none of whom knew everything.” He stated that Watkins, and he himself, had 
voiced feeble objections to the misbehavior around them, but ultimately “decided to sit back and 
go along for the ride.” 20 
Such a blunt tone was perhaps not surprising coming from a veteran of Enron’s infamous 
trading operations. Cruver experienced Enron, day-to-day, with a distinct set of colleagues, and in 
an environment starkly different from Watkins’ staid accounting offices. Here traders—mostly 
young and mostly male—made contracts and instantaneous deals all day, always on the phone 
and facing several computer screens apiece that reflected constantly changing valuations, 
worldwide, in various energy forms. The mood was tense but also excited, even giddy. Money 
could be made by the keystroke, and most traders thrived on their job’s split-second demands in 
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 dealing and negotiation strategy. Cruver’s particular trading division dealt in credit risk as a 
commodity21—at the time an edgy startup idea, but all too familiar a concept today. Like so many 
other Enronians, he worked for an energy company but did not work with energy. 
Enron’s trading business was highly lucrative but frequently problematic, with the 
California energy crisis of 2000 a prime example in both respects. In that instance as in many 
others, the bold and ambitious trading division brought Enron enormous profits and also intense 
scrutiny. (Cruver defended Enron’s dealings in California, both at the time and in his memoir).22 
Within the company, the traders were often disparaged as crass and out of control—and yet they 
brought in so much revenue that no one would take action to quash their rule-bending, much less 
to sanitize their dirty language and boorish habits.  
Cruver did little to position himself, in his memoir, as a “good guy”—but neither did he 
admit to having done anything that he shouldn’t have. To begin, like Watkins, Cruver found ways 
to place himself at a distance from those around him. He related raunchy conversations in which 
he nibbled a cookie rather than participate, and uncomfortable meetings in which he cut the 
tension with a well-timed joke. Cruver made clear that he considered getting a job at Enron to be 
a tremendous professional boost, and that he had always genuflected in its imposing corporate 
presence. Yet in a careful move, seemingly self-deprecating but actually self-absolving, he 
established in his memoir’s first ten pages that he was only hired due to “a slight mix-up.” Cruver 
recalls supervisor Greg McLainey saying “I just wanted you to know because some people aren’t 
real happy you’re here…I wanted to hire you. It’s just that the group really hadn’t agreed to hire 
you…Just think of it like you’re adopted” (emphasis in original).23 Cruver said McLainey’s words 
were “the sound of my bubble bursting,” but in retrospect this revelation could reassure readers of 
his memoir. He had been “adopted” by, rather than ever truly belonging to, Enron’s disgraced 
family—particularly that branch of black sheep who worked in the trading division. Indeed, the 
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 “real” Enronians were loath to accept him. At the time, not being Enron material might have come 
as a blow to his ego, but when he wrote his story, it was Cruver’s salvation as a credible narrator.  
Cruver offered memories similar to Watkins’ on the basic point that Enron was a wily 
work environment. He described intrigue and mistrust even among close co-workers, and a 
widespread, tacit acknowledgment that “the Crooked E,” as employees affectionately called it, 
was “crooked” in its practices as well as its logo. He recalled his earliest impressions of his new 
co-workers at Enron: “They didn’t really mind being the bad guy, as long as it meant they were 
all-powerful and dominant.” Invoking the common Star Wars analogy—which equated Enron with 
the Death Star—he added, “I didn’t mind joining the Dark Side either—after all, the Empire 
offered great pay and excellent benefits.”24 In these nonchalant terms the former trader 
established that Enronians, as a group, took a cavalier attitude toward right and wrong. By 
including himself in such statements, Cruver hardly flattered his own morality, but he appears to 
have been striving for something else instead. For every compromise that he related from his 
time at Enron, he highlighted its cynical rationale. He was well paid; he couldn’t piss off the wrong 
people; if he had protested nobody would have heeded him anyway. Spoken like a true trader, 
Cruver did not mind if he came off looking opportunistic, but he maintained he knew what he was 
doing all along. 
Cruver had even more to say than Watkins about Enron’s sexual politics. He emphasized 
(and perpetuated) the objectification of the “Women of Enron” pinup calendar, referring to one 
colleague simply as “Miss August.”25 He recalled a female work friend of his confirming “‘some of 
the execs had their own harems.’”26 As to the credentials of “Enron blondes,” Cruver suggested 
that certain employees were recruited from the staffing ranks of Houston’s many topless bars.27 
Cruver, like Watkins, also focused specifically on Jeff Skilling’s office flirtations, which culminated 
when he “upgraded his marriage after a messy divorce” and “shacked up” with corporate 
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 secretary Rebecca Carter. To specify in what manner this represented an “upgrade,” Cruver 
disclosed that Carter was referred to (behind her back) as “Va-voom.”28  
Cruver never primped for Skilling, as Watkins admitted that she had, but in remarks like 
this one—on a subject that was after all none of his business—Cruver demonstrated that he 
shared her particular fascination with Skilling and everything about him. Neither Ken Lay, nor the 
egregious Andy Fastow, nor any other Enron executive received nearly so much attention or 
analysis—in these two insider memoirs, as in other expository narratives after the company 
bankrupted. Watkins highlighted as a turning point the incident in which Skilling called a stock 
analyst an asshole during a conference call; Cruver emphasized instead the time he angrily 
flashed his middle finger to a row of employees in Enron’s parking garage.29 But both were 
preoccupied with this man’s personal downfall as a kind of mirror to the company he had made. 
Skilling’s notorious drinking, skirt-chasing, and bursts of rage provoked endless psychoanalysis, 
even from someone like Cruver who never dealt with him personally. Such speculation may be 
entirely misguided. For that matter, Skilling may not even be an especially interesting person. But 
fixating on his bad habits—the tragic antidote to his celebrated brilliance and ambition—helped 
personify Enron as crumbling under poverty of character. 
All told, neither Watkins nor Cruver wrote much at all, in their memoirs, about what they 
actually did in a day’s work at Enron. Perhaps they judged that such details would have been too 
tedious or too arcane for a general audience; and indeed this was probably true. Both of these 
books, instead, were primarily about Enron’s corporate culture. The authors seemed to assume 
their readers were more interested in what Enron was like, than in how it worked—and again, 
they were most likely right. We can infer, however—comparing Watkins’ job description with 
Cruver’s—that their professional Enron experiences overlapped very little. There would have 
been no reason for them to have any contact while employed there, and indeed they probably 
never even heard of each other until their books stood side by side as the two major, published 
Enron testimonials. In other words, Watkins and Cruver have almost nothing in common except 
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 for their shared, elective status as “insider” memoirists. This suggests that on the one point on 
which they appeared to concur—Enron’s seediness, with Skilling the exemplar thereof—they 
were pandering, as confessors, to the same audience, and by the same calculations. The other 
possibility is that Watkins and Cruver agreed because this was, genuinely, how they as former 
employees remembered Enron. 
Though she had never worked for Enron herself, a certain business journalist could also 
publish a book with a claim to special, exclusive authority. Bethany McLean was the Fortune 
magazine reporter whose bold March 2001 article, “Is Enron Overvalued?” had raised questions 
about the company’s practices for the first time on the national stage. In her research she had 
attempted a phone interview with Jeff Skilling, who was then CEO, but he directed her questions 
elsewhere and ultimately, she claims, called her journalistically “unethical” before hanging up on 
her. Obviously, in the grand scheme McLean was to have the last word when her skepticism 
received vindication, and then some. Along with Fortune colleague Peter Elkind, McLean went on 
to publish the only Enron book to date that makes a compelling read without being 
sensationalistic or reductive. Though not short, the book was a narrative achievement in both 
accessibility and scope, for it examined the personal and moral dimensions of Enron’s 
dysfunction alongside thorough analysis of its business models, management practices, and, of 
course, unscrupulous trading and fraudulent accounting. It refused to anoint heroes, though it did 
focus on a few of Enron’s dark personalities. The book’s title referred forebodingly to the 
reverence that Lay and Skilling had enjoyed as business celebrities: The Smartest Guys in the 
Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron (2003).  
Two years later the book became a movie titled Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room 
(2005).30 In classic documentary style it features “talking heads;” people who witnessed the 
Enron disaster from a variety of angles, from the executive suites, to the community church, to 
the power lines, to the trading floor, to the courtroom. It discusses the political parameters of the 
Enron scandal, giving due attention to the longstanding Lay-Bush relationship and the broader 
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 context of energy deregulation in the 1990s. The film identifies many outside parties that were 
complicit in the company’s ongoing fraud, including investment banks, stock analysts, and 
regulatory agencies. It does justice to Enron’s glory days, conveying the critical but embarrassing 
fact that this company, whose name now serves as shorthand for immoral business dealings, was 
for no brief time a Wall Street darling.  
In contrast to the presumptive happy endings that were promised in Congress, the 
documentary concludes with Sherron Watkins stating to the camera that this scandal “was not an 
aberration.” In case her meaning is not clear, she adds with an uneasy laugh, “It can happen 
again.” Thus the Enron bankruptcy not only represented broader problems; The Smartest Guys in 
the Room further makes clear that these problems have not gone away. Barbie Zelizer has 
argued for the unique ability of popular cultural forms to influence collective memory: particularly 
since the assassination of John F. Kennedy, she claims, Americans in their love of mass media 
entertainment have consistently shown willingness to draw upon sources such as popular films to 
inform their conceptions of history, even on highly contentious topics. If Zelizer is right, then The 
Smartest Guys in the Room as film may represent one of the most important contributions, to 
date, to the project of committing the Enron scandal to history in a way that will prove 
instructive.31 
Still, the documentary as expository Enron memory has significant flaws. First, it shares a 
certain pitfall with Watkins’ and Cruver’s memoirs: like any “true story” told by people who lived it, 
The Smartest Guys in the Room shows personal partiality. Modestly, Bethany McLean all but 
wrote herself out of the film’s story. It mentions her groundbreaking article and Skilling’s hostility 
to “the Fortune reporter,” but although she is one of the talking heads it is never specified that 
McLean was the writer who first called attention to the unanswered questions surrounding 
Enron’s success.  
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 McLean’s prudence, however, in declining to gloat, did not resolve other conflicts of 
interest among the film’s interviewees. Amanda Martin, former in-house Enron attorney, tells of 
how she once tried to warn Skilling about the Enron Energy traders. They were becoming an 
almost tribal brotherhood, she felt, and exercised a growing, corruptive influence over the 
company. Sure enough, the traders in their unscrupulous quest for ever higher profits appear to 
have machinated unethical dealings in California energy markets. Martin describes Skilling gazing 
out of his office window as he contemplated her wise words. “‘Yeah, Amanda,’” she recalls him 
replying, “‘you’re probably right.’” According to Martin, Skilling heeded her but declined to address 
the problem; thus indirectly she suggests he might have averted the California energy crisis if he 
had acted on her counsel. Whether or not this account is accurate, Martin’s primary role during 
her time at Enron was certainly not that of sage advisor to an attentive Skilling—he was her far 
superior. Likewise the film never mentions Martin’s extramarital affair with Skilling’s cohort Ken 
Rice (CEO of Enron Broadband). That may not be centrally relevant in explaining the bankruptcy, 
but then, neither are the film’s staged close-ups of gyrating strippers.  
The most important journalistic compromise made by The Smartest Guys in the Room, 
involving personal sensitivities, related to Sherron Watkins. Watkins, again, probably had more 
than one reason for writing her now-famous memo to Ken Lay. The important point here is that 
The Smartest Guys in the Room does not acknowledge any nuance in this critical chapter of the 
Enron story. Thus here, as on other matters, the documentary forces its subject matter into “black 
and white.” The most straightforward explanation is that Watkins’ contributions were so valuable 
to the film that its makers would not risk alienating her. She may even have stipulated, when she 
agreed to appear in the documentary, what she would and would not allow to be included as to 
the details surrounding her actions. McLean’s book had taken a much less generous view of 
Watkins, so upon hearing of its translation into a film for popular consumption, the latter might 
have calculated that cooperating with the project would be the wisest way to control her image. 
Indeed, as publicity for her new career as an expert corporate ethicist, Watkins likely knew that 
appearing in this film could do even more than her own memoir had.  
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 If the documentary showed signs of personal bias, it also demonstrated a bias toward the 
personal. Here The Smartest Guys in the Room, as a whole, succumbed to one dangerous 
oversimplification. McLean pronounces close to the beginning that the company’s story was a 
“human tragedy;” fundamentally “about people;” and the film corroborates that premise through 
intensive psychoanalysis of executives such as Lay, Fastow and Skilling. Lay is the messianic 
“son of a preacher man” and Fastow the cackling crook; rotten to the core. Several shots of the 
Enron headquarters are shown as an anonymous voiceover asks, in an exaggeratedly mysterious 
tone, “What’s he building in there? What the hell is he building in there?”  
Such mockery of the corporation’s opacity is amusing, but it also reinforces the equation 
of Enron’s many frauds with the deeply psychological, and even subconscious, motivations of just 
a few “guys.” Particularly, in the documentary as in the book, the primary human fixation of The 
Smartest Guys in the Room is Jeff Skilling. The documentary relates at length how Skilling was 
awkward and unpopular as a teenager and, even after his rise to staggering wealth and business 
stardom, still harbored a complex about his masculinity that inclined him toward daredevil sports. 
His unscrupulous professional style, his adrenaline habit, and, ultimately, his fraud, were all 
connected to the same core issue: that Jeff Skilling always felt he had something to prove. Again, 
this executive appears to have been specially targeted. Either he was a character of extraordinary 
intrigue, or he was somehow supposed to embody Enron. 
Expounding on the theme of individual psychology, the documentary also makes much of 
the personal indiscretions of lesser-known Enronians—including foibles that had nothing to do 
with their work, especially Enron Energy traders’ penchant for gentleman’s clubs and their 
(married) boss Lou Pai’s impregnation of his “stripper girlfriend.” Because the filmmakers did not 
seek Pai’s cooperation, they were free to dish dirt at his expense—though not Amanda Martin’s 
or Sherron Watkins’. (The one trader interviewed in the film confessed, as to Enron’s 
crookedness, that he “should have asked why;” but like Brian Cruver never mentioned whether he 
joined in the strip club outings. Presumably both had a standing invitation.) Even Lou Pai’s 
custom of deliberately spilling gas on himself before going home, so as to prevent his wife from 
smelling unfamiliar perfume on him, was deemed a relevant detail. Enron, as presented by the 
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 film, had a fundamentally immoral culture. The company was founded, led, and served by 
compromised characters—the ones who did not appear on camera to speak for themselves.  
Thus perversely, The Smartest Guys in the Room in one sense actually echoed one of 
the first arguments that political conservatives offered in attempts to play down the scandal: that 
Enron was a case of “a few bad apples”—a handful of latter-day robber barons—rather than an 
indicator of any underlying systemic problems in politics or business. In the overarching assertion 
that the Enron story was “about people,” the essential message of The Smartest Guys in the 
Room was that it was not primarily about energy policy, corporate governance, or the alliance 
between big business and public officials. The documentary said very little about laws and 
regulations that enabled Enron’s fraud, and nothing about the ones enacted afterward in 
response. In Why?, his analysis of various forms of explanation, Charles Tilly wrote that people 
prefer to focus on “psyche” rather than political processes.32 Whether this is due to audiences’ 
voyeurism toward “human interest” stories, intellectual laziness, or simple incomprehension (or 
boredom) toward more systemic explanations, it appears that these documentary filmmakers 
understood and delivered on this prizing of the personal. 
It would be unfair, however, to dismiss the documentary for its overemphasis on 
psychology and personality. This bent is probably due in part to Bethany McLean’s obvious 
fascination with Enron executives, particularly Skilling; but it also represents an effort to construct 
an Enron story—a story needs characters—as well as to make it accessible. A documentary that 
only mentioned the executives in passing, focusing in stead on the particulars of special purpose 
entities, mark-to-market accounting, and energy deregulation, would be hard pressed to appeal to 
a general audience. Here we are reminded once again that the Enron bankruptcy really did not 
lend itself readily to any kind of narrative representation, much less to a visual form such as film. 
Indeed, if one had to state fundamentally what this “story” was “about,” the answer would have to 
be numbers, perhaps alongside the laws of corporate financial statements. Needless to say, 
neither of these is apt to make a good show. Thus the disproportionate attention to certain Enron 
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 figures and their innermost thoughts is one strategy by which The Smartest Guys in the Room 
strove, against the odds, to create an Enron narrative with entertainment value.  
As Wulf Kansteiner noted, representations of collective memory often hinge on “’the 
primacy of the visual.’”33 Enron, as an event that would be memorialized, faces a distinct 
disadvantage in this regard. In an effort to make account fraud, for example, into something that 
can literally be “seen,” The Smartest Guys in the Room features incoherent montages of 
computer-generated digits that scroll across the screen in red and black, changing several times 
every second as if in response to the keystrokes of an unseen hand. Eerie music often completes 
the effect, apparently in hopes of conveying the intrigue in Enron’s accounting. The extreme (and 
extremely dangerous) sporting adventures of Skilling and his circle of invitees, are depicted from 
the perspective of a participant. The camera hurtles through desert dunes to show the viewer 
what she might see if leaping across canyons on a motorized mountain bike.  
More blatantly still, the filmmakers found another visual perk in the lascivious behavior of 
some Enron employees. The strip clubs frequented by Lou Pai and some traders apparently 
needed to be depicted in live action. The documentary leaves little to the imagination as to that 
anecdote even though it is largely irrelevant. The Smartest Guys in the Room, after all, to achieve 
broad success could not be a straightforward analysis or commentary. It needed ferment, 
exhilaration, and female flesh; it needed to be a movie.  
Apparently it achieved the right admixture of explanation and titillation. The film made an 
impressive showing at the box office, won numerous awards, and even received an Oscar 
nomination for Best Documentary of 2005. In its personal partiality, its psychologizing, and its 
attempts to make Enron visual, The Smartest Guys in the Room had to some extent 
compromised its journalistic and historiographical integrity when it translated from book to movie. 
Perhaps more than any other form of collective Enron memory, however, the film illustrates that 
such compromises are inevitable. Indeed they may even be necessary if a retrospective narrative 
is to gain traction in the moment, and to survive over the years.  
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 Objects and Placelessness: Where was Enron? 
The efforts toward visual appeal in The Smartest Guys in the Room merely hinted at a 
much broader challenge in making collective Enron memory: that of substantiation. While most 
historic events leave behind some kind of artifacts or documentation, this bankruptcy and scandal 
consisted in very little that could be seen or touched. One might blame the massive shredding 
and deletion that went on at Arthur Andersen, but even had that data been preserved it would 
have held little aesthetic accessibility. Thus making Enron “real” to laypeople had posed unique 
challenges in representation from the beginning. As time passed, even less would be left of the 
company. What did remain possessed questionable meaning—if “crooked E” golf counters or sun 
visors were meaningful at all.  
In a phenomenon that Marita Sturken calls the “tourism of history,” Americans tend to 
visit places, and to purchase kitsch, as a means of remembering. The remembered events of her 
case study were the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 and the attacks on the World Trade Center 
in 2001, both of which inspired formal and impromptu memorials, monuments, and souvenirs.34 
While the meanings of all could be contested or ambiguous, they carried emotional resonance 
because of the solemnity in that which they commemorated. But if these two episodes of violence 
and death gave a certain dignity to their grounds and artifacts, the same cannot be said for 
Enron.  
To remember this disaster it was not clear where one would go, nor what one would buy. 
Sturken is critical of, for example, the “FDNY” t-shirts ubiquitous after September 11, but there 
was at least some consensus as to what they signified: support, gratitude, mourning. The Enron 
shirts available on tlknet, by contrast, could be baffling as to the intended message in buying or in 
wearing one. This is one difference between commemorating a tragedy and commemorating a 
scandal (or trying to). Some narratives of Enron, in 2001-02, had indeed “borrowed” the somber 
imagery of death—even specifically from the events of 9/11—though often to unconvincing effect. 
It may be that amid all the political tug of war in narrativizing historical events, only bereavement 
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 unites people long and closely enough for collective memorialization to take place.35 By this 
reasoning, in the absence of deaths to grieve, it is no wonder people never agreed on the 
significance or even the relevance of Enron; much less embraced any associated monument or 
memento.  
It also proved difficult to create a historical site where there was none; to posit Enron as 
something that happened somewhere, just like a famous battle, a fateful meeting, or a great 
performance. As we have seen, in 2001 and 2002 the struggle to locate Enron occurred amidst 
another narrative with a highly stable sense of place. Yet while “Ground Zero” was immediately 
and permanently defined by that which used to stand there, no such conception, in narrative or in 
memory, would occur for Enron. Ground Zero became an instant tourist destination, and an 
elaborate memorial has been long in the works. The former Enron headquarters, on the other 
hand, evidently retained no innate significance.   
The main Enron building, though stripped of what was officially called the “tilted E” sign, 
remains essentially unchanged. Initially it was renamed Four Allen Center, but today it is known 
simply by its address, 1400 Smith Street. Houston realtor Brookfield Properties leases it out like 
any other office space, with Chevron currently occupying the entire building. Brookfield’s 
promotional web page for the Smith Street property makes no reference to its infamous former 
tenant, but dubs the building “an icon of the Houston skyline” that has “a high level of visibility 
from all points of the central business district.”36 This description accompanies a photo that most 
documentary viewers would immediately associate with foreboding music and “What the hell is he 
building in there?” For Houston-area business professionals, most likely to be browsing this realty 
website, the rate of recognition is probably one hundred percent. Brookfield’s obliqueness, as in 
calling the building an “icon” without stating outright why, is therefore almost funny. Here Enron is 
so deliberately forgotten that it becomes all too obvious how acutely it is, in fact, remembered. 
The reference goes without saying.  
                                                 
35 Edward T. Linenthal, “The Predicament of Aftermath: Oklahoma City and September 11,” in Lawrence J. 
Vale and Thomas J. Campanella, ed., The Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005): 55-74. 65. 
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 This looming building, even more than other famous corporate headquarters, symbolizes 
the staggering heights possible in business success, and at the same time the sheer, vertical 
plummet possible in business failure. Also apt in remembering the Enron building, from the time 
when it was so-called, is the astute observation of financial historians Charles Kindleberger and 
Robert Aliber. They argued that skyscrapers and urban cultural centers may seem to signify 
booming business because of their glamorous and imposing edifices, but that their real 
association is with asset-price bubbles, which often provide the financing for ambitious 
construction projects.37 Overall, Brookfield is probably correct if it assumes that potential 
corporate tenants neither need nor want to be reminded of the ghosts that may haunt this house. 
For its part, the “E” sign sold for $44,000 at an Enron auction. Brian Cruver also showed up there 
to bid on his ex-office chair because, as he told the Cincinnati News, it was the most comfortable 
seat he had ever known.38 
Thus for someone trying to “tour” Enron as history, there is very little to see. Some 
narratives’ treatment of Enron as distinctly Texan suggested that reckless businessmen were 
heirs to the mythic Wild West. And especially considering the company’s inception in the oil and 
gas industries, its Houston location was no coincidence. For the sake of lasting coherence, 
however, the Enron collapse would better have occurred in New York City. Here the association 
with September 11, and the business failures and financial busts that both preceded and followed 
Enron, might have provided the bankruptcy, in narrative and memory, a more logical home. Wall 
Street in particular is an iconic location, with its name more often evoking a realm of activity and 
opinion rather than actual sidewalks and storefronts. Given its typical connotation of despicable 
money-grubbing, Enron would have fit in nicely. As for physical representation, New York’s 
financial district at least offers statues of a bull and a bear, who appear evenly matched in their 
eternal face-off. This might be as close as the US has ever come to physically memorializing—
both bemoaning and celebrating, it seems—market volatility and all that it entails. Specific 
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 corporate failures, even when spectacular and historic like that of Enron, can never be revisited in 
person. 
Humorous Memory and Slapstick Revisionism 
What could not be commemorated could still be laughed at. Indeed, as if to acknowledge 
that Enron could not be memorialized in traditional terms, retrospective satirists embraced the 
very attributes of this historical event—embarrassment and incomprehensibility—that seemed to 
disqualify it from more dignified forms of memory. Like expository recollections of Enron, 
humorous ones emerged both in books and in films. These less serious renderings of Enron 
memory were never framed as “the truth” or “the facts,” but instead tended to recall the 
bankruptcy with irreverence and sarcasm. Such narratives looked back on the Enron story as 
how it “might as well” have happened, or indeed sometimes how it “should” have turned out. 
In 2005 director Dean Parisot undertook a remake of the 1977 comedy Fun with Dick and 
Jane.39 The original film had featured a professional couple who resorted to a life of crime after 
the husband, Dick, lost his job. The twenty-first century rendition, which takes place “a long time 
ago” in 2000, modified this premise somewhat by making the layoff itself, and the action leading 
up to it, more integral to the story. Here Dick (Jim Carrey) is an executive at “Globodyne,” a new 
economy corporation whose business is never specified. Globodyne folds, Dick is out of a job, 
and he and his wife Jane (Tea Leoni) stoop to indignity and then to robbery in attempt to make 
ends meet. The movie reviews ranged from ambivalent to abysmal, but all seemed to agree on 
one point: what originality and satirical merit the film did have was due to its depiction of the 
arrogant, flashy and doomed Globodyne. Fun with Dick and Jane was recognized (most 
generously) as a commentary on corporate scandal in the twenty-first century, and particularly on 
Enron.   
The opening action establishes that Dick and Jane enjoy a luxurious lifestyle, and also 
how they are the worse for it. Their home, cars and clothing are beyond enviable, but they cannot 
communicate with their young child because he has learned to speak only Spanish—cared for 
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 exclusively by the Mexican nanny. Then in one of the first scenes, corporate go-getter Dick 
receives a promotion too good to be true: to “Vice President of Communication.” Globodyne’s 
senior executives inform him that his first task in this new, lofty position is to represent the 
company on the TV program “MoneyLife.” It turns out that the company is on the verge of 
collapse, and Dick has been duped into the position of “fall guy”—mistaking it for an honor. On 
the air, Dick falters when bombarded with questions about all the Globodyne intrigues now 
coming to light: accounting shenanigans that his superiors had used to siphon money from the 
company but about which Dick himself knew nothing. MoneyLife’s real time ticker tape shows 
Globodyne’s stock value plummeting and then leveling at zero by the end of Dick’s interview. The 
bankruptcy happens over the course of just a few minutes.  
Globodyne recalled, though with some exaggeration, several corporate collapses that 
had occurred three or four years prior to the movie’s release, including those of WorldCom, 
Qwest and Tyco. The screenwriters, however, clearly used Enron as their primary model, and 
included many details and subtleties that identified Globodyne with “the Crooked E” to anyone 
who had paid close attention to the latter’s meltdown. Early scenes make this point intimately, 
with reference to the people most affected. After Globodyne folds, Dick begins lolling about the 
house, sending out résumés (in vain) and voraciously reading and watching all coverage of his 
own company’s scandal. Jeff Skilling could never resist any press on Enron, and Brian Cruver 
wrote that he too followed it, for better or worse—between restlessly applying for jobs and playing 
Black Jack online. 
Globodyne’s fallen Chief Executive is a bootstraps case with an affected folksy 
demeanor. Several times he begins a remark, “Like my granddaddy used to say…”, but never 
finishes. This character (played by Alec Baldwin, always a natural CEO) easily references Ken 
Lay, who was born into poverty in Missouri, paid for his own education, and even at his richest 
claimed a personal connection with less fortunate people around him. It is said that Lay 
sometimes emulated his Baptist preacher father when debating energy policy or, most 
notoriously, when exhorting his employees to keep the faith in Enron—even when all evidence 
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 advised otherwise.40 Eerily, Lay’s death was also anticipated, symbolically, in Fun with Dick and 
Jane. Globodyne’s greedy and guiltless CEO has a way of lifting off in his personal helicopter 
whenever he hears questions that he doesn’t want to answer. Hair blowing in the wind, Baldwin’s 
character takes to the sky with a beneficent farewell even when surrounded by a plaintive crowd 
to whom he owes an explanation, and more. Many people felt Lay had effectively done the same 
thing when he ascended into the heavens, permanently, shortly after his criminal conviction in 
2006. 
When Globodyne’s Chief Financial Officer receives subpoenas for accounting 
documents, massive shredding ensues. Enron is the only corporation in the 2001-2003 Hall of 
Shame whose bankruptcy scandal involved such blatant document destruction, so again the 
reference is apparent. After the bankruptcy, the Globodyne CFO habitually appears drunk in 
public, indulging in pathetic monologues about his company’s fall from grace. Enron CFO Andy 
Fastow, for all his misdeeds, was not known for embarrassing himself in the bars of Houston, but 
his colleague Jeff Skilling was. (Unfortunately, Skilling’s incidents were the occasional subject of 
news reports through the time of his trial, and even after his conviction, in 2006)41. In one scene 
Globodyne’s stumbling CFO slurs through a highly technical explanation of one particular factor in 
his company’s downfall. He describes, exactly, the role of the Raptor hedge funds in Enron’s 
collapse: intended as risk management, they were actually a liability in themselves, and 
Globodyne (Enron) had been losing money through them for years—without reporting it—by the 
time someone recognized the problem. To make this scene comprehensive as a recollection of 
Enron, the drunken CFO would have had to enumerate several more main factors in his 
company’s bankruptcy. But to invoke the Raptors, and with such precision, was remarkable in 
itself.  
Fun with Dick and Jane also features one “Grand Cayman Bank,” whose slogan is 
“Where rich people go to evade taxes.” Partnerships chartered in the Cayman Islands are 
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 extremely common among American corporations, for exactly the reason this promotional phrase 
suggests. But one of Enron’s most fateful partnership plans, through which real CFO Fastow 
brazenly stole millions from his employer, was known as LJM Cayman. Thus from the antics of 
shamed executives to the intricacies of corporate accounting, the Globodyne story resembles 
Enron’s to an extent that cannot be coincidental. If screenwriters Judd Apatow and Nicholas 
Stoller did not themselves conduct research on Enron, it appears they at least commissioned 
others to do it. 
By leaving Globodyne’s corporate function unspecified, the film gestures toward the 
opacity of big business in the new economy, even with all trickery aside. After Dick and Jane 
have exhausted all other money-making schemes, one of Dick’s former colleagues proposes a 
new Globodyne-style swindle in which they themselves would make off with the loot, rather than 
playing the victims again. Like a moustache-twirling villain he lays out the plan in all its 
mischievous glory—but the jumble of acronyms, statutes, numbers, and account or partnership 
epithets, sounds like gibberish. Dick can only pretend to understand. Thus the film posits 
incoherence as the overarching theme in financial dealings, from the honest and ordinary to the 
illicit and nefarious. Indeed, the incomprehensibility of both legal and illegal business begs the 
question of how people are to know the difference, especially if so many of those with expertise 
on the subject would probably prefer that they not.  
By positing 2000 as “a long time ago” the film gestures at several key events beyond 
business scandals, including the attacks of September 11, 2001, that might for some have made 
four or five years indeed feel much longer. Moreover, though no character ever acknowledges 
them, gigantic Gore-Lieberman campaign posters are ubiquitous in the film. Indeed they appear 
in virtually every scene that takes place outdoors. They may remind viewers that the Bush 
administration and its policies, foreign and domestic, were not inevitable. They could also suggest 
that a different president would have dealt with corporate scandal more effectively (or at least 
have been less intimate with the likes of Ken Lay). Most subversively, the posters might represent 
a last gasp of protest that the presidential election of 2000 was “stolen.” When the Supreme 
Court, rather than the electorate, ultimately designated George W. Bush the winner that year, 
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 much of the resulting anger targeted not only him and his party, but also cronyism and corruption. 
Like Gore supporters who insisted on leaving their yard signs up five years later, the filmmakers 
might have been suggesting that Enron manifested the same societal ills as had Gore’s false 
defeat. There are no Bush-Cheney posters to be found. 
On the other hand, if Fun with Dick and Jane takes place prior to the election of 2000, as 
we know it, then presumably the Globodyne scandal happens on Bill Clinton’s watch. The 
campaign posters, then, could equally be interpreted to mean that officials from both major 
political parties have allowed big business too much prerogative at the expense of the American 
people. Indeed, though Clinton may not have been on a nickname basis with Ken Lay, the former 
Democratic president did express interest in symbiosis with Lay and Enron over a round of golf in 
Houston.42 His administration also defended Enron when its energy plant in Dabhol, India, 
created a public relations crisis involving allegations ranging from bribery to human rights 
violations.43 A corporation as successful as Enron in its heyday had the financial means to make 
many friends in high places, regardless of their professed political affiliations. That aspect of the 
Enron scandal—that the president and many legislators were implicated by association—in one 
sense does not need to be “remembered” because the business-government alliance is so clearly 
still with us.44  
In the movie, Dick and Jane ultimately wreak revenge and deliver justice in an elegant 
(and completely implausible) Robin Hood-style denouement. They dupe Globodyne’s dodgy CEO 
into signing away $40 million, which goes to the relief fund for former employees who lost their 
jobs, savings and pensions in the company’s collapse. (Enron employees did have such a fund, 
but no one ever managed to trick Ken Lay into bankrolling it.) This caper is, in a sense, a tamed 
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 and sanctioned version of what Dick and Jane first did to stay afloat: robbery with moral 
justification. To begin with, all Globodyne underlings had been vilely “robbed” by bosses who 
thought they could get away with it. By effectively robbing them in return, Dick and Jane are 
serving justice and completing this morality play. Furthermore, while cheating a CEO out of ill-
gotten gains was fantastical, its appeal spoke to unresolved conflicts arising from the corporate 
form.  Corporations are legally defined by, and practically advantageous in, their eschewing of 
personal liability.45 Accordingly no CEO can be forced to compensate, out of his own pocket, for 
anything his company has done.46 This comedy nonetheless imagines otherwise—and it does 
make a satisfying conclusion. 
This formalized robbery also gestures to Americans’ persistent admiration for people 
alienated from the harsh worlds of business and markets, who take matters into their own hands. 
Such rebels and outlaws are legendary; the most quintessential being bank robbers of the Great 
Depression era such as John Dillinger and Bonnie [Parker] and Clyde [Barrow]. These icons were 
and remain widely revered for boldly flouting not only government authority, but also an economic 
order that so many people found unjust. The timing was not coincidental, and neither were their 
crimes. In the 1930s, few among the public had much sympathy for bankers. Not only were bank 
failures generally associated with the compounding Depression, but bank managers specifically 
appeared to be evading taxes, rigging stocks, making insider transactions, and paying 
themselves far too well.47 Someone who bypassed the breadline to rob a bank at gunpoint could 
become a folk hero, therefore, because doing so seemed fair—even righteous. It would not be 
surprising if Fun with Dick and Jane exploited a similar impulse around an era of corporate 
accounting scandals. The impoverished couple in this film is always sympathetic, whether 
attempting robbery with masks and weapons, or with fraudulent paperwork. 
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 In sum, Fun with Dick and Jane revises the Enron story by giving it a coherent, and even 
a happy ending: justice is served and order restored. Significantly, however, justice and order do 
not come courtesy of the judiciary or the government—neither of which figure into the plot at all—
but by the machinations of one individual. This contrived storyline is reminiscent of the 
melodramatic form in that it blames rotten characters for all problems, and applauds noble 
characters for all solutions. Neither is allowed to play out on a systemic or even collective level.  
By the end Dick has gone from conspicuous consumption to total poverty, and emerges a 
champion for the common people. He and Jane have been guaranteed their material well-being, 
but returning to their luxurious former lifestyle is no longer the point. Dick’s newfound integrity, 
earned through struggle, and the story’s endorsement of individual enterprise over institutional 
convention, both reflect American narrative traditions: those of individualism, the “self-made 
man,” and rebellion against corrupted authorities. Dick also, perhaps ironically, earns his virtue 
through ignorance. Had he never been tricked into accepting his “promotion” and publicly taking 
the fall for Globodyne, he would never have had his transformative experience. When Dick does 
learn the truth, he is empowered to strike back. But only the bad guys knew all along what was 
going on. Here the story seems to acknowledge and even to celebrate how much is not known 
about the workings of big business. It implies that the “good” people among us are those who, 
generally speaking, do not understand.  
Thus Fun With Dick and Jane “remembers” Enron exactly as the bankruptcy and its 
consequences did not happen: in a way that would have made sense in cognitive terms, and a 
satisfying story in moral and cultural terms. Yet even were it not for the film’s romantic resolution, 
the fact that it provides any ending at all makes it a revisionist memory. At the time of its release, 
Enron’s big-name executives were all still living free and comfortable lives; Lay, Skilling and most 
others would not even face trial until the following year. Most of the company’s employees and 
shareholders who had suffered in the bankruptcy had not recovered lost money. And the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Corporate Accountability, enacted in 2002, had failed to usher in any 
ethical renaissance in American business.  
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 In its final scene the movie concedes somewhat to the reality that corporate crime is still 
a problem far from resolved. Cruising along in his convertible in sunny southern California, Dick’s 
old friend boasts over the phone that he’s landed a promising new job with a prestigious company 
called Enron. Dick gives the appropriate congratulations. In the end, then, Globodyne is 
apparently not Enron, for Enron qua Enron exists in the world of the movie, and is still flying high 
(as indeed it was in 2000). Yet ironically, this revelation represented the most holistic accuracy of 
the Enron memory in Fun with Dick and Jane, for it admitted two important truths. First, the 
bankruptcy could have been foreseen, because despite all claims to the contrary, it was not 
unprecedented. Enron simply went the way of Globodyne. Second, corporate scandal would 
strike again, even where least expected. Indeed, the film’s last scene suggests the worst may be 
yet to come. Before the final credits roll, the screen displays text giving “special thanks” to a 
number of (real) disgraced executives, including Enron’s notables. If the film is ever re-made a 
third time, there should be at least a few additions to this list. 
Fantasies of revenge formed a common theme between Fun with Dick and Jane and 
other humorous expressions of Enron memory. The movie envisioned cheating the cheaters—as 
in bilking Globodyne’s CEO—and the stolen funds made for restitution, if not punishment per se. 
However, a farcical book proposed that justice should ultimately be served on terms having 
nothing to do with money. This vision was no more realistic than that of Fun with Dick and Jane, 
but it was more baldly vengeful. In 2003, humor writer Andy Borowitz published Who Moved My 
Soap?: The CEO’s Guide to Surviving in Prison.  
The title mocked Spencer Johnson’s 1998 bestseller Who Moved My Cheese?: An 
Amazing Way to Deal with Change in Your Work and in Your Life. Johnson’s book was a parable 
analogizing professional employees to mice. It advised readers to anticipate, adapt to, and make 
the best of workplace change (movements of cheese); as opposed to complaining, fixating on 
why the changes had occurred, or simply wishing they had not. Many companies distributed this 
book to employees, often to the latter’s resentment. Their message was usually interpreted as 
grossly patronizing: that good workers never raise objections to decisions made over their heads, 
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 and furthermore that even mass layoffs—often the occasion for giving out this book in the first 
place—represented “amazing” opportunities rather than bad luck or irresponsible management.  
The first instrument of revenge in Who Moved My Soap was its title, then, for it was 
addressed “back” to corporate leadership at the highest levels. It suggested that going to prison 
offered an exciting opening for career development—to those smart and mature enough to 
recognize it. Borowitz adopts the authorial persona of one of Forbes Magazine’s “Top 100 
Convicted CEOs,” and claims to be writing from a penitentiary in Lomax, Alabama. Most of his 
book simply makes fun of prison life by describing it from the point of view of a pampered 
executive. He uses business jargon and market concepts to guide his reader, in a friendly and 
reassuring tone, through preparation for and survival of a jail sentence—not at a comfortable, 
minimum-security facility, but in a tiny, filthy cell shared with a violent criminal. Borowitz’s 
snickering hardly needs to be discerned between the lines. 
The author assumes, expressing great sympathy, that his reader was caught up in a 
high-profile accounting scandal just like the one that has landed him behind bars. To this elite and 
talented pool he presents imprisonment is a fantastic business opportunity, encouraging his 
counterparts to follow his lead by launching creative startup ventures from jail. As a memory of 
Enron and other contemporaneous bankruptcies, however, this book is most relevant in its 
backward-looking passages: the first-person business biography that Borowitz provides. In his 
narrative explanation of who he is and why he is in prison, the author crudely sketches recent 
business history, using sarcasm similar to that of the Billionaires for Bush. By pretending to speak 
as the privileged billionaire, he is actually speaking—quite bitterly—as an “ordinary American” 
disgusted by the antics of large corporations. 
The narrator’s company, Shamco International, was an “energy-telecom-pharmaceutical 
giant” founded in the late 1990s after a merger between smaller firms KleptoCom, Larcenex, and 
Fungible Data.48 By declining to identify Shamco with a single industry, Borowitz modifies the 
approach of business spoofs like Fun with Dick and Jane and the “Dilbert” cartoon strip, neither of 
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 which ever reveals its central company’s function. Such vagueness suggests that one never 
knows, or that at any rate it doesn’t matter, what a company in this era actually does. By contrast, 
Shamco’s stated involvement in three basically unrelated industries more closely refers to Enron 
and its ilk, for by 2001 the company seemed to be in virtually every business, stretched far 
beyond its means in terms of finance and expertise. Furthermore, one question leading to Enron’s 
abrupt stock devaluation was, simply, what the company did. When its leaders failed to provide 
an answer directly or promptly enough to maintain investor confidence, sharp doubt arose: 
perhaps Enron, despite its constant boasts of entering and creating new markets, had not been 
doing anything! Trading, which was Enron’s de facto core business, was neither reliable, nor easy 
to explain or quantify. And as was discovered, the company’s data were, surely enough, fungible. 
Borowitz describes the market euphoria of the late 1990s that benefited him richly. 
“Before you could say ‘Dow 30,000,’” he writes, “…Shamco became one of the high-flying 
momentum stocks…even dwarfing such then-hot Wall Street darlings as tubesocksbymail.com 
and 1-800-CATFOOD.” These “dwarfed” competitors were barely veiled references to some of 
the dotcom bubble’s most notorious failures. He continues, “Shamco eventually came to acquire 
twenty more companies and six US senators. Suddenly, Viktor [his business partner] and I 
became feared, envied, and sexually attractive.” Here Borowitz makes fun of this period’s trend of 
acquisition sprees, the alliance between big business and legislators, and the cult of the celebrity 
executive. The latter two issues had been highlighted by the Enron scandal. As to the first, Enron 
was not known for purchasing smaller companies with abandon, but the almost equally infamous 
WorldCom (bankrupt in 2003) was.  
Borowitz’s character recalls his own dramatic downfall. He was celebrating the twenty-
sixth birthday of his third wife, a retired waitress named Conspicuosa, with a lavish party. (This 
scene was probably modeled on the infamous birthday bash of Tyco’s Dennis Kozlowski, which 
was illegally funded with company money. The elaborate ice sculpture gives it away.) Then, out of 
nowhere, a rather un-festive voice on the CEO’s cell phone says “This is the SEC.” The author 
fails to mention what he or his colleagues were actually investigated for. Instead, just like Enron’s 
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 real executives, he dismisses all allegations—along with “Little Miss Whistleblower.” The next 
scene is of feverish document-shredding.  
When he recalls the humiliation of his public shaming, the author again gestures to the 
sudden reversal of market euphoria and business celebrity. But this time, it seems Borowitz’s own 
cynicism actually aligns with the posturing of his adopted CEO persona: 
I’d be surprised if you didn’t see my so-called “perp walk,” since it was carried live by 
every major cable network in the country…the Department of Justice threw 1,702 
separate indictments at me, a new high-water mark for politically motivated prosecutorial 
overkill. Just twelve months earlier, Business Week had hailed me as a capitalist 
visionary who was reinventing the American corporate landscape; now I had mutated 
monstrously into a convenient scapegoat for a suddenly souring economy. Yes, I was an 
easy mark, someone to take the heat off the true culprits: Mr. Alan Greenspan and his 
cadre of economic do-nothings in Washington, D.C., empty suits who fiddled while the 
Dow and the NASDAQ burned.49 
 
The last line’s description of stock indices “burning,” around this time, was a bit sloppy. The 
NASDAQ was in much worse condition than any other, and had been since 2000—but even it 
was trending up rather than down. Otherwise, however, this paragraph is a not unreasonable 
summary of what happened to the disgraced high-profile CEOs at the center of this era’s 
business scandals. Once adored by the media, they were suddenly demonized; and long 
condoned by the government, they were suddenly scapegoats. The only difference between 
Borowitz’s real narrative, here, and that of his character, is that the latter would claim he had 
done nothing wrong. The author, in subtext, was vilifying both this condemned CEO and the 
institutions that condemned him with such self-serving zeal.  
Through his jailed executive persona, Borowitz also articulated the problem of knowledge 
and understanding in corporate scandals and their legal and regulatory context. He points to the 
intimidation and hypocrisy so often at play when executives either claim exclusive expertise, or 
conversely, insist that they don’t know things that the public might well expect them to. First, 
Borowitz wrote, many a CEO is “probably used to having a staff of professionals around him at all 
times to help explain things he does not understand, such as arcane legal terms, intentionally 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 11-12. 
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 misleading SEC regulations, and some of the Ten Commandments.”50 Here he gibed at 
executives who claimed not to have known the rules they broke. But by including “some of the 
Ten Commandments,” Borowitz also struck a blow for the perennial school of anti-big business 
thought positing corporate crime as ultimately a moral, rather than a legal or technical matter. The 
most important knowledge deficit for executives, these critics would say, is of right and wrong.  
The author advises other jailed CEOs to speak to their fellow prisoners with deliberate 
obfuscation. He assures readers that this should come easily, as they employed exactly the same 
strategy to shore up status and power in their former jobs “on the outside.” They are encouraged 
to use Enron congressional testimony to develop “an exotic tongue almost no one on the planet 
could ever hope to comprehend” and then “watch [their] fellow inmates crumble under an 
avalanche of perplexity.” Under these conditions, the CEO can convince them to work for, and 
invest in, his cell-block startup businesses—some of which are illegal. The triumphant effect: 
Thanks to your use of incomprehensible Enron-speak, your fellow convicts now strain to 
understand you—but they pretend to nonetheless, for two reasons. First, because they 
work for you, and people always pretend to understand their boss; and second, because 
they are your shareholders, and shareholders always want to believe that the CEO of the 
company they hold shares in is making sense, even when he is spewing utter gibberish. 
Their livelihood depends on you now, so they’ll be the last people on Earth to say that 
“the emperor has no clothes”—especially now that you, the emperor, take your showers 
with all of your clothes on.51 
 
This last line reminds us that, notwithstanding all of its business advice and nostalgia for 
the good life, Borowitz’s book is indeed, above all, a “Guide to Surviving in Prison.” 
Overwhelmingly it emphasizes the drudgery and danger of being in jail, even if described in 
language mockingly borrowed from the business world. Showering while fully clothed is one of 
Borowitz’s pleasantest images. Ultimately, then, his book is yet another revenge fantasy, with 
punishment—envisioned in graphic and grisly terms—serving as the false but satisfying 
conclusion to another revisionist narrative of the Enron bankruptcy. 
Punishment—real or imagined—may itself be a vehicle of memory. Not only does it 
perform the narrative pairing of action with just consequence. Punishment also purports to ensure 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 34. 
51 Ibid., 57, 58. 
 195 
 that a wrongdoer will “remember” his trespass and its impact, or, at the very least, remember the 
fact that he has misbehaved. Moreover, formalized punishment, such as incarceration, 
demonstrates to the public that this misdeed is collectively and institutionally remembered. 
Conviction and sentencing, then, might be considered an extension of Michael Schudson’s theory 
of legislation as memory, for state-sanctioned punishment too produces a permanent record and 
testimony of events. Each can affirm, or even shape particular memories—for the punished, for 
the state, for spectators, and for posterity.  
Who Moved My Soap? was hardly the first instance, in business history, when people 
fantasized about taking brutal revenge in the punishment of executives. For example, in the 
1720s, when the South Sea joint-stock company turned out to be a speculative bubble, and burst, 
a member of Britain’s House of Commons called for classical-era retribution. The company’s 
directors, he proposed, should be sewn into sacks, each with a monkey and a snake, and 
drowned.52 If this government official appeared ready to bypass the law, many lay citizens have 
been willing to do the same when they have seen justice denied. Sometimes the vigilantism has 
been mainly for show, as when Jeff Skilling was hit in the face with a (generously frosted) pie 
during the California energy controversy. Still, Skilling understandably feared for his safety after 
that incident. And while Skilling stayed out of danger, not all of his historical counterparts have. In 
1932 somebody attempted to kill Samuel Insull, perpetrator of a huge utility company pyramid 
scheme, by shooting into the window of his limousine.53 As if to affirm suspicions that the law 
cannot be trusted to punish fairly, when the surviving Insull went to court he was acquitted on all 
counts—partly due to the opacity of his case. It seems he had “muddled up the books so much 
that no ordinary juror could be free from reasonable doubts.”54 If Insull’s primary crime was his 
Ponzi scheme, it appears a secondary crime in accounting, which anticipated Enron, kept him 
safe from formal punishment. 
                                                 
52 Kindleberger, Manias, Panics and Crashes, 174-75. 
53 Michelman, Business at Bay, 186-87. 
54 Ibid., 188. 
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 In proposing how executives should be punished, and envisioning revenge by 
imprisonment, people often scoff at the special treatment of white collar offenses. Suppose, they 
say, that some CEO has deprived thousands of their incomes, and even more of their pensions 
and savings—not to mention his company’s millions of investors. Why should he be allowed to 
reside comfortably at some “Club Fed;” a leafy, minimum security federal penitentiary? A “blue 
collar” criminal faces much harsher punishment for an offense against just one victim.55 He is 
treated as more of a threat, the argument goes, because he lacks an MBA, a golf resort 
membership, and a designer suit. Who Moved My Soap? belabors the point that a criminal CEO 
should be thrown into exactly the same prison conditions as the typical hoodlum.  
In sentencing and punishment, however, the real line relevant is between violent and 
non-violent crime. In other words, even if this CEO has inflicted great harm on millions of victims, 
it is reasonable to assume that he is not dangerous. He has no record of hurting anyone, 
physically, and therefore the resources of a maximum security jail are better spent on someone 
who does. The fact that protestors against big business seem so easily to dismiss this distinction 
might indicate how trampled they feel by big business, including by its influence over the 
government and legal process. It might also suggest that they are simply too furious to consider 
such logics. In fact, however, while white collar crime may be unique in that its sentences tend to 
be fairly comfortable, it is also exceptionally easy to prosecute. In such cases, due to a complex 
set of modifications to criminal law tailored to white collar offenses, the government bears a lower 
burden of proof, and can demand a much higher standard of compliance from a defendant, than 
in any other type of criminal proceeding.56  
Moving back from the realm of fantasy to the realm of reality, regarding punishment for 
corporate scandals, news reports around this time showed nothing so much as inconsistency. 
Bernie Ebbers of WorldCom was sentenced to 25 years. Richard Scrushy of HealthSouth was 
                                                 
55 Set aside, here, are so-called “victimless crimes” like drug dealing and prostitution. The fairness of 
sentences for these kinds of offenses, as compared with white collar punishment, is more questionable. I will 
compare executive crime instead with violent crime because both types of offenses harm people in obvious 
and direct ways. 
56 John Hasnas, Trapped: When Acting Ethically is Against the Law (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 
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 fully acquitted with pomp and circumstance. Martha Stewart did a brief stint in jail but laughed it 
off, and her persona and brand name (literally synonymous) still represent a strong and growing 
conglomerate. There appeared to be little logic, and no predictability, in the ultimate results of 
high-profile white collar crime. If these executives’ stories do at least have “endings,” and even if 
they are just, none is quite as elegant as that of Fun with Dick and Jane, or as triumphant as the 
scenario in Who Moved My Soap?. And at any rate, none applied to the case of Enron. Most of 
the criminal trials associated with that case were still to come; likewise the shareholder civil 
proceedings by which employees and investors would try to win back at least some of their 
money. They had no guarantee of restitution—much less of any vengeful punishment.  
Memory as Forgetting 
As time passed after the Enron bankruptcy, most invocations of it became increasingly 
vague. Insider memoirs, documentary accounts, and well-researched spoofs had had their factual 
weaknesses, but all did at least recognizably refer to Enron. This was not always the case, 
however, as the company’s name drifted into shorthand, deployed in news stories and other less 
formal analogies. Here what seemed to be memories of Enron actually represented the erosion of 
knowledge; a process of collective forgetting. Hollow references to the bankruptcy—that is, ones 
that demonstrated no substantive recollection of it—nonetheless pointed up what people 
understood and failed to understand, as well as what about the scandal remained salient, and 
what did not. 
Obviously, corporate scandals continued to occur even after the spate, in the early 
2000s, that Enron had seemed to kick off. Two in particular that occasioned references to Enron 
illustrated a great range in memories of the scandal. When the Italian dairy company Parmalat 
filed for bankruptcy in 2003, it was compared to Enron, and here the analogy was useful. Indeed, 
it was probably the most appropriate comparison available to mainstream media. Parmalat had 
been moving money around via off-balance sheet partnerships, and doing business with itself 
using special purpose entities, in what amounted to accounting trickery familiar to anyone who 
knew Enron. On the other end of the spectrum of fittingness, however, was Hewlett-Packard’s run 
of bad publicity in 2006. The company was caught essentially spying on some of its board 
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 members, as well as a few journalists. It had hired private investigators to obtain and peruse 
personal phone records in order to determine the source of an “information leak” judged harmful 
to HP. Here there was absolutely no likeness to anything that occurred at Enron, and yet 
analogies and comparisons between the two were common. It seemed “corporations doing bad 
things” was a sort of blanket storyline; a category in narrative that could encompass even totally 
unrelated events. In this case, to mention Enron was arguably to degrade public understanding of 
it, because the reference was so general as to be almost meaningless. 
Some satire, too, flagrantly forgot the Enron scandal even while pretending to recall it. 
For example, 2004 saw the release of a semi-improvised “mockumentary” film called Memron. 57 
Its title phonetically fused the words “memory” and “Enron,” but in fact the movie did very little to 
memorialize the bankruptcy as it really happened. The action begins on the grounds of a federal 
prison, where fat CEO “Ken Clay” and all of his upper-level Memron Corp. colleagues (now fellow 
inmates) are playing golf on asphalt. This opening scene thus combines the revisionism and 
revenge of jailing the executive, with the cynical assumption that Club Fed is somewhat too 
comfortable. This was neither too optimistic nor too pessimistic as to executives’ punishment; it 
simply had no referent, yet, in reality. 
Memron’s collapse, opening exposition reveals to viewers, left “60,000 employees fired,” 
and “86 per cent” of them now live below the poverty line. This is a great rhetorical exaggeration, 
as Enron only ever employed 30,000 people worldwide, and few of them, after being laid off, ever 
ended up in legal poverty. Executives in the film speak often in unintelligible jargon, but Ken Clay 
himself is not particularly bright, mostly acting on the nefarious counsel of men who worked for 
him. In this characterization alone, Clay’s character may be based in reality, for many people did 
describe Lay as a fairly “hands-off” CEO, ultimately “duped” by underlings such as Skilling and 
Fastow. (He could only be considered fat, however, in some metaphorical sense.) Like Borowitz’s 
fictional jailed CEO, Clay has a much younger trophy wife, and is completely oblivious to her 
brazen infidelity. Clay’s wife is Italian, and free to arrange trysts even as her husband stands by 
smiling, because he does not understand her language. As in Who Moved My Soap?, clichés and 
                                                 
57 Memron, dir. Nancy Hower, 79 min., Magnolia Home Entertainment, 2009, DVD. 
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 stereotypes reign even on matters of executives’ personal lives. Linda Lay was neither foreign-
born, nor wild, nor scandalously young for her husband (though they did first meet when she was 
Ken Lay’s secretary, and he was married to someone else). 
The main story arc in Memron is about the efforts of former employees to regain their 
confidence and professional security after being laid off. One proposes a lawsuit, but a lawyer 
advises “you can’t sue a bankrupt company.” In fact, under some corporate bankruptcy statuses 
you can. In Enron’s case, people already were. Indeed the only reason that Enron still legally 
exists is to be the defendant in civil cases brought by former workers and shareholders. What is 
left of a bankrupt company’s funds, the reasoning goes, is a fair target for damages claims. Here 
Memron’s narrative forced closure on a story that was actually still unfolding.  
Ken Clay, as it turns out, has a “plant” among his former employees—the one Memron 
worker who was not laid off. This man is now paid to spy on his ex-colleagues and report back to 
Clay on their activities. As he discovers, they are banding together to start an “air company.” Here 
is another clear reference to new economy corporations that seemed willing to puff even the most 
inane business concepts, or, again, to the possibility that some of them might not do or make 
anything at all. Still, this plot development has no basis in the Enron story. Ultimately, Clay’s 
minion takes over Memron—with the bumbling former CEO easily kicked aside—and buys the 
new air startup to achieve spectacular success. All of its employees, former Memronians, are laid 
off a second time. The film ends with the consolation that at least they can, in this case, sue.  
Overall, Memron suggests how faulty collective memory can be, for in virtually everything 
but name(s) the film departed completely from that which it claimed to “remember.” It further 
demonstrates the slipperiness and triviality of Enron, as a referent, compared to other historical 
events. If a movie was made with such loose a basis on, for example, the battle of Wounded 
Knee, then its near-total abandonment of fact would be much more obvious and much more 
controversial. By contrast, there was nothing at stake, evidently, in falsely memorializing this 
business scandal. At the same time, Memron can be read as an abstract impression of what 
mattered and what lingered in perceptions of the Enron bankruptcy. The filmmakers remembered, 
evidently, injustice and impoverishment, silly business models, and a cast of executives 
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 composed of half idiots and half crooks. They seemed to expect that their audiences would as 
well. The result was a document now committed to collective Enron memory—however 
inaccurate. 
History has shown that Americans tend to remember business and economic events in 
terms of their human interest components, as opposed to banal financial factors. Thus the panics 
of the nineteenth century appear, in hindsight, as a series of bank runs. The ultimate 
worthlessness of Confederate currency is represented by the scene in Gone With the Wind in 
which southern dollar bills are used to cover a hole in the wall. The Great Depression is a 
montage of bread lines, the Dust Bowl, and vagrants desperate for work. Surely this tendency 
toward such images in memory is understandable. The effect of, for example, a recession or 
business failure, on people’s lives, is no doubt more salient, and for longer, than its technical 
causes. These effects also make more sense to more people—with “making sense,” in some 
cases, meaning a real-life experience all too personally felt.  
Enron, however, did not signify any great economic downturn—even if we take its effects 
combined with other corporate collapses around the same time. Neither the stock markets nor the 
economy as a whole suffered any cumulative damage that can be linked to Enron, Tyco, 
WorldCom, or such others. Moreover, even if we do take the Enron bankruptcy as a sobering 
moment in American business history, it was different from past panics, recessions, and 
depressions, in that it was a scandal. In this instance, specific people and a specific company, 
widely identifiable, were blamed and vilified. They had caused the problem, or so people 
perceived, by knowingly acting against the greater good (of employees and shareholders, if not 
the public), and also against the law. 
Even while a scandal is unfolding, as we saw, it can be difficult to grasp and to narrativize 
if it hinges on business practices, finance structures, or regulations and laws unfamiliar to most 
people. Teapot Dome is instructive as precedent for Enron in the attendant lack of public 
engagement. Business historian Irving Michelman characterized the general attitude toward 
Teapot Dome as “apathetic,” and observed that the press largely turned it into a story, like The 
Smartest Guys in the Room, “about people.” Part of the problem, with this business scandal as 
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 with many others, was that the relevant facts were difficult to understand, and also that details 
were revealed to the public in an investigative process that simply took too long.58 
Over time, obstacles to narrative become obstacles to memory. Even the most egregious 
business scandals, it seems, have proved easy to forget and difficult to memorialize at the 
collective level. Teapot Dome, for example, probably has little name recognition among the 
general public. At any rate, very few people would be able to summarize it even as a 1920s 
incident of business-legislative collusion. The same is true of Samuel Insull’s infamous frauds of 
the 1930s. Watergate, although not categorically a business scandal, is considered a defining 
moment in recent American history, and even left behind the spurious suffix “-gate” to be attached 
to subsequent events, denoting shame or gaffe. Yet even Watergate is already a vague and 
confused “memory” among many of those Americans too young to remember it personally.  
If the early 1970s are too long ago for people to be expected to remember, the Iran-
Contra affair, the so-called Keating Five scandal, the disgrace of the Savings and Loan crisis, and 
Bill Clinton’s “Whitewater” have all occurred more recently. Nevertheless, in each case, memory 
among “ordinary people” is already fading. That is to say, compared to the Civil War, the 
Holocaust, or racial segregation, Americans are far less likely to be able to say of these events, 
even in the most general terms, what happened and who was involved. Again, there are 
straightforward explanations for this. But the fact remains, regardless, that scandals seem 
especially forgettable.  
Perhaps the one notable exception is in those relating to sex, betrayal, and marital 
infidelity. This category of scandal is one of the most familiar, and arguably it produces far more 
lucid collective memories than disgraces in business and politics. Bill Clinton’s affair with White 
House intern Monica Lewinsky, for example, seems according to the popular media one of the 
most significant events of his presidency. Likewise John F. Kennedy is remembered, in part, for 
sexual adventures that included Marilyn Monroe. From ancient to modern, even world history is 
colored—whether accurately or not—with lascivious imagery: Cleopatra’s two-timing of Marc 
Antony and Julius Caesar; Mata Hari’s bedroom espionage during World War I.  
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 Even if we do not assume a prurient public, or some kind of Pavlovian effect on memory 
whenever it involves sex, there is a plausible explanation for this tendency. Sex scandals are 
immediately understandable. One needs no technical knowledge or legalistic mind to grasp, at 
least generally, what has happened and why it is problematic. Indeed, unlike mismanagement of 
finances or abuses of executive power, sexual misbehavior is a familiar concept from ordinary 
people’s daily lives. It has analogies—though they need not be first-hand—in their own personal 
experiences. Thus it is not only comprehensible, but also even relatable.  
The unique accessibility of sex scandals, for purposes of formulating a coherent 
narrative, probably explains an otherwise puzzling tendency in documentation of the Enron 
bankruptcy. From the most serious “insider” memoirs and exposés, to the most ridiculous spoofs, 
nearly every single retrospective narrative about Enron attempted to identify the company with 
sexual aberrations. The “Women of Enron” calendar, the strip club excursions, and Jeff Skilling’s 
dating life were highlighted nearly every time this story was told. On the whole, there was 
probably nothing particularly exceptional about the sex, or even the flirtation, that went on at 
Enron. And even if there was, none of it had anything directly to do with the bankruptcy. The 
reason that sex was so emphasized in Enron memory was that it helped to establish, more than 
any explanation of accounting tricks or trading rule-bending, that something wrong was afoot. Sex 
was invoked, in memories of the Enron scandal, because people “get it.” This ploy may have 
been misleading, but evidently it works. 
The emphasis on people and personalities, like the emphasis on sex, was 
disproportionate but probably useful in expressions of Enron memory. These accounts’ depictions 
of executives—including but not limited to their supposed sexual exploits—was another means of 
making Enron memory more accessible, and also of fitting it into an existing canon of scandal 
narratives. For in addition to portraying Jeff Skilling as a ladies’ man, Ken Lay’s marriage as a 
sham, and Enron’s offices as a meat market, these retrospective narratives also drew on 
collective memories of the con man. Here was another iteration of the deceptive charmer; and 
one that was actually somewhat more appropriate. The trope of the con man, at least, actually 
related to the Enron story’s fundamental issue: money.  
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 The con man as a literary, historical and cultural archetype was a ready analogy for 
Enron as a swindle. The term “confidence man” was coined to describe dapper criminals in 
nineteenth century American cities, who would charm an unsuspecting victim into handing over 
his watch or some other valuable item, and then make off with it. It may be that few people could 
correctly identify the origins of the epithet “con man” (just as most, likely, could not identify the 
namesake of the “Ponzi scheme”). Nonetheless, the term is understood. To call Enron a con, or 
its executives con men, thus simplified and humanized a vast and complex corporate operation. 
The scandal was thereby likened to an interaction between two individuals: smooth-talking 
deceiver (Enron) and gullible innocent (investors).  
Jeff Skilling, for all his faults, would be hard to describe as a con man because he 
showed no ability to charm or ingratiate. If he had taken off with stolen loot, then, a better 
historical analogy might have been the highwayman. Andy Fastow, likewise, was rarely called a 
con man, and in his case this might be due to a lack of contact with the public. The only people 
he had personally conned were SEC officials, and perhaps some of his colleagues. Ken Lay, on 
the other hand, was dubbed a con man early and often. He was the face of Enron, for investors, 
the media, and in Washington, and his demeanor was always cheerful and friendly; even 
“grandfatherly.” Some who had berated him, particularly in Congress, did elaborate as to why 
they thought the epithet appropriate. He was an affable deceiver, they said; someone who 
consciously made false representations in order to gain confidence, and then exploited it to his 
own gain. 
As John F. Kasson has pointed out, as soon as the concept of the con man gained 
currency in the Victorian era, people were already recognizing “the ironic parallels between this 
brazen swindle and the manipulations of the most stupendously successful capitalists.”59 Thus to 
call Ken Lay a con man actually did not warp the term’s original meaning, aside from its equation 
of one interpersonal exchange with a web of corporate transactions. On the contrary, Ken Lay as 
con man was very much in keeping with a longstanding suspicion of wealthy businessmen. 
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 Literary analysis of the con man as a character type also illuminates his function in a narrative—
including how he sometimes reveals victims as guilty parties. John G. Blair argues that the con 
man actually “[exacts] moral complicity” from those he deceives. In other words, they cooperate 
with the con, in part, because they see a potential gain in doing so. This means the con man 
brings victims’ integrity, not just their powers of discernment, into question.60 Given the number of 
people complicit in the “con” that was Enron, including many employees who were fully and 
uncritically along for the ride, such an idea may also be appropriate as applied to Lay and his 
company.   
Conclusion: The Wrong Memory at the Wrong Time 
There is little in the way of theoretical framework from which to draw in analyzing Enron’s 
collective memory. The examples most often invoked in memory studies are historic events that 
satisfy some or all of the round hole criteria mentioned before, such as battles, massacres, 
genocides, enslavements, or social or political upheavals. However, I do not believe that Enron 
has been lost to a collective “amnesia,”61 for although some very powerful people would likely 
prefer that this event be forgotten, the company name still echoes from one arena of discourse to 
another. Those who invoke it do at least claim to remember Enron, and in effect they are urging 
others to do so as well. Nor do I believe that Enron, at least at this point, represents the 
“unknowable” in history. Allan Megill states that such an epistemological void appears when an 
event is either a) “too traumatic to put into language;” b) “too foreign to be understood in the 
present;” or c) lacking in evidence.62 The Enron collapse falls into none of Megill’s categories. It is 
“knowable” though arguably it is not known. 
Michael Schudson’s treatment of the collective memory of Watergate is useful because in 
this scandal as well as that of Enron, conventional memorialization was out of the question.63 
Even a catastrophic defeat can inspire proud identities and affirming collective memories, as, for 
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 example, W. Fitzhugh Brundage points out regarding the Confederacy in The Southern Past. 
Narratives of bravery and martyrdom, along perhaps with a conception of a despicable enemy, 
can validate or even glorify a “cause” long after it is “lost.” But simple embarrassment, especially 
regarding the behavior of a society’s supposed leaders, offers no similar consolation. Thus there 
will no more be a monument to Enron in Houston, than there is a national day of observance for 
Watergate. It is possible that, as Jay Winter might put it, the memory of the Enron collapse has 
been “hidden behind” a (more dignified) memory of another event: the September 11 attacks, 
which occurred just a few months prior.64 Yet even in a bitter and irreverent narrative, Enron’s 
memory could be glossed over. Oliver Stone’s 2008 film W, about George W. Bush, scrutinized 
his anti-terror initiatives and foreign policy, and even insinuated that he had a weak mind and 
character. But the film never so much as mentioned the series of corporate scandals that 
occurred during Bush’s first term. 
 As memory studies has shown, collective memory is instructive as to identity and 
political controversy among those who do the remembering. In this respect, Enron is no exception 
to the rule; thus an analysis of the inchoate collective memory of Enron will hopefully have value 
in itself. More broadly, however, this study attempts to identify, define and theorize a type of 
collective memory as yet overlooked. Holocaust scholar Lawrence Langer recognized from the 
testimonials of survivors that their memories did not always conform to interviewers’ expectations. 
There were assumptions, and sometimes very real pressure, attempting to mold the survivors’ 
stories into narratives about the triumph of good over evil, the resilience of the human spirit, and 
the ultimate invincibility of a moral soul. In an effort to best honor the true content of the 
testimonials, Langer proposed new concepts of memory that could accommodate 
embarrassment, guilt, shame, and despair; such as “humiliated memory,” “tainted memory,” and 
“unheroic memory.”65 
                                                 
64 Winter, “The Memory Boom,” 63.  
65 Lawrence Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1991).  
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 Langer attempted to advance new modes of understanding individual memory; my 
theoretical suggestions relate to the interpretation of collective memory. Based on case studies of 
Enron, I propose that we need theories that acknowledge vagueness, ambiguity, confusion, 
apathy, and tedium as factors that, far from precluding the formation of a collective memory, can 
in fact command it. The new theoretical concepts I might suggest sound odd or even facetious: 
“vague memory;” “confused memory;” “indifferent memory;” “annoyed memory;” “bored 
memory”—or even “barely memory”—? Yet I maintain that developing some such line of theory is 
important. It may lack the drama and pathos of the kinds of devastating events that most typically 
figure into memory studies. But if our society can be so deeply affected by the peaks and valleys 
of the stock market and the vicissitudes of large corporations, then it needs to remember events 
like the Enron scandal, for many of the same reasons that it needs to remember massacres, wars 
and genocides. In turn, then, as people create and maintain collective memories of events such 
as corporate bankruptcies and financial crises, parties to Jay Winter’s “boom” need a vocabulary 
with which to identify and interpret these memories. 
Edward Linenthal writes, “Events are memorialized before they are assimilated into 
historical consciousness.” The ambivalence, bizarreness, and wild inaccuracy of some 
expressions of Enron memory reviewed here can thus be taken as evidence that they appeared 
too soon; that people did not yet know, or had not yet decided, how to remember Enron. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the richest years for commemorating Enron were roughly 2002 
through 2005. In other words, most Enron remembering, however scant or sloppy, has already 
been done.  
This is why a discussion of Enron memory belongs not at the end of my story, but in the 
middle. The Lay-Skilling trial was yet to come, but for most of the public it would be an 
afterthought. The financial crisis of 2008, likewise, was approaching shortly thereafter, but by that 
time it seemed even more obvious: Enron had been largely forgotten. It may be that the 
bankruptcy will never be memorialized, recognizably—much less clearly or accurately. This void 
can be attributed to the ill fit between an event like the Enron scandal, and the ritual and concept 
of collective memory. But it is also probably because the bankruptcy, after just a few years, was 
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already fading into history; “remembered” too soon. No collective memory that could endure by 
mass appeal, or by solemn dignity, stood in the way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: A Trial, a Death, and a Class Action Lawsuit 
  
In January 2006, more than four years after the fact, Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling finally went 
on trial, together, for allegedly precipitating and in turn profiting from Enron’s disastrous collapse.1 
Lay faced six counts of conspiracy and fraud; Skilling was accused of twenty-eight crimes, which 
also included insider trading and making false statements. In the intervening years several other 
business scandals, including those of WorldCom, HealthSouth, and Martha Stewart, had made 
criminal defendants of high-powered executives, but all along the white collar world awaited Lay 
and Skilling’s day in court. Enron above any other company symbolized the rash of corporate 
fraud discovered in 2001-2003, the ever-richer and ever-greedier caste of celebrity executives, 
and even the dashed promises of the “new economy.” Thus the verdict on Skilling and Lay would 
indicate how strongly public outrage and political vengeance had endured.2 Pundits billed this 
“the business trial of the century”3—though perhaps they assumed an overly sunny forecast for 
the next ninety-four years on Wall Street.  
 Narrative would be integral, operating at several levels and coming from all sides. The 
Enron bankruptcy had to be re-narrativized, in retrospect, while a new set of narratives—of the 
trial underway—would also emerge; connected to but distinct from original stories of the scandal. 
First and most obviously, the prosecution and the defense would craft opposing accounts. Both 
strove for coherence, but to distinctly different ends. Other parties with a stake in the 
proceedings, such as concerned Houstonians and former Enron employees, in turn offered their 
                                                 
1 Despite numerous trials of other Enron executives, the case of Lay and Skilling was known in mainstream 
journalism as “the Enron trial,” as if it were the only one. Because I am not writing in detail about any other 
Enron trials I will follow suit, using this term interchangeably with “Lay-Skilling trial” specifically to refer to 
these proceedings.  
2 Kurt Eichenwald, “Big Test Looms for Prosecutors at Enron Trial,” The New York Times 26 January 2006, 
Business/Financial Desk, 1.  
3 E.g. see Greg Farrell, “Skilling and Lay to Take Stand,” USA Today 31 March 2006, Money, 1B. 
 own stories. While the legal teams actually had more, materially, to lose here, their narratives 
tended more toward abstract psychology and ethics, where locals and ex-Enronians tended to 
emphasize money and other practical matters instead. Meanwhile journalists and outside 
observers, as always, made narratives of the trial’s events, both performing and justifying their 
perennial role in the bankruptcy and its fallout. Thus this trial, and indeed any trial, may be read 
as a struggle over narrative.4 Everything that narrative does—designate relevant facts; establish 
sequences of events; link causes to effects; and point to a logical, usually moral resolution—trials 
are designed to do as well, with the verdict signifying victory of one narrative over another.5 The 
Enron trial would decide the bankruptcy’s official story once and for all.  
Further, because the trial was supposed to be the final episode in the Enron narrative, 
various interested parties brought to it an expectation of closure. Here the concept carried 
meanings ranging from logistical to philosophical. At its most concrete, the closure that the trial 
promised was legal: a final pronouncement as to who had done what, and a judgment of 
appropriate consequences. The trial also suggested the possibility of financial “closure” in the 
form of settlements to pending lawsuits (against Lay and Skilling), for which a criminal verdict 
would be crucial precedent. At the same time, some people who still felt anger or vengeance 
toward the Enron executives sought more symbolic forms of closure from the trial. 
Psychologically, they needed to see Lay and Skilling judged guilty. Finally, the dramatic exigency 
of narratives’ moral meaning also required resolution along these lines, preferably involving 
punishment as just deserts.  
Historically, however, white collar criminal trials have often been indecisive—when they 
even happened at all. Samuel Insull’s trial, for example, ended in acquittal by default at the hands 
of a befuddled jury. Yet even such a lackluster finale was more than some corporate scandals 
ever saw. No trials occurred, for example, connected with the electrical price-fixing conspiracy 
                                                 
4 See Edward J. Larson, Summer for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America’s Continuing Debate Over 
Science and Religion (New York: Basic Books, 1997). 
5 Robert Ferguson observes that even judicial opinions, the final rendering in any legal proceeding, often 
engage in narrative manipulation, sacrificing factual complexity and comprehensiveness in favor of 
bolstering the story’s (and their findings’) integrity. (The Trial in American Life [Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007], 14). 
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 uncovered in the early 1960s, because involved people and companies pleaded guilty or no 
contest. What legal drama this scandal did offer—grand jury indictments of Westinghouse and 
GE executives—garnered little public attention, especially compared to the TV quiz show rigging 
scandals of 1959. 6 (It seemed price-fixing carried scant intrigue to compete with a story “behind 
the scenes” of popular entertainment.) One thread of the Enron saga had followed a similar 
course: Andy Fastow pleaded guilty in 2004 proceedings that were neither climactic nor 
particularly captivating. 
 In the “court of public opinion,” it was said, Lay and Skilling had been convicted years 
ago. This might explain the comparative lack of national interest, among the public, in the trial’s 
details. But while few professional observers had particularly high hopes for the defendants, most 
approached the trial with a genuine curiosity as to what it might reveal. Given how diverse the 
criminal charges were, and also how many of Enron’s activities had been legal or at least 
arguably so, those who were less incensed acknowledged persistent questions—and apparently 
had faith that trial would resolve them. Even Bethany McLean, whose celebrated expose  had 
raised the first warning about Enron and who had since made her name as an expert on the 
scandal, believed the defendants might legitimately be proven innocent. 7  Indeed, her 
testimonies of trial-watching suggest that she initially hoped they would be, and she was not the 
only seasoned Enron skeptic who held that perverse sentiment.  
 Houston officials coolly prepared for the media swarm, offering maps, guides, and 
parking permits to visiting journalists, but no special treatment or discounts.8 Such conservation 
of resources needs no explanation, but the city may have had reason for doing so apart from the 
obvious (fiscal) rationale. Houston was weary of being equated with Enron, and of dramatized 
reports that the bankruptcy had devastated its community. Of the company’s 30,000 employees, 
                                                 
6 Irving S. Michelman, Business At Bay: Critics and Heretics of American Business (New York: A. M. Kelley, 
1969), 169.  
7 Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind, “No More Mr. Nice Guy,” Fortune 153, Iss. 9, 15 May 2006, 72-75. 
8 Carrie Johnson, “Jury Chosen for Lay, Skilling; Former Executives Face Fraud and Conspiracy Charges in 
Enron’s Home Town of Houston,” The Washington Post Financial, 31 January 2006, D1.  
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 only 4,600 had been local9—and while many of these men and women expressed interest and 
opinions in the Lay-Skilling trial, they had recovered from their layoffs and coped with their 
financial losses.  
Moreover, Houstonians argued that the impact of Enron’s bankruptcy on the city’s 
economy had been greatly overstated: Doug Miller, publisher of a purchaser’s index of business 
activity in the area, said the company’s collapse made “not even a blip on the screen.” If the 
layoffs had not all occurred at the same place and time—nationally televised—they would have 
gone largely unnoticed.10 “Enron and the trial, at this point, have nothing to do with Houston,” said 
Barton Smith, an economist at the University of Houston. “In fact, Enron was never very 
important. When you look at the (economic) data you can’t see an effect [of the bankruptcy]. In 
2002, if you looked really closely, you could [only] see…a temporary effect on the downtown 
office market.”11  
Houstonians may have been protesting too much when they claimed that Enron, in which 
they had once taken pride, ultimately brought them no harm or shame. But regardless, the Lay-
Skilling trial certainly would have made an ugly centerpiece, even temporarily, for Houston life, 
and so civic leaders did their best to counteract its ignominy. The Visitors Bureau prepared 
information packets for out-of-towners, available at the courthouse, emphasizing “positive” and 
forward-looking elements in the city’s business and culture. The Greater Houston Partnership had 
considered barraging reporters with “positive economic information” about the city,12 but the plan 
was scaled back—again, perhaps not only to save money and time, but also as a PR play to 
                                                 
9 Gary McWilliams, “The Buzz: Houston, We Have the Enron; Plenty of Seats Go Unfilled for Heralded 
Proceedings; ‘Chapter 37 of a Long Book,’” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), 29 April 2006, B3.  
10 Bruce Nichols, “This Enron The Big One: City, Scandal’s Victims Have Vested Interest as Lay-Skilling 
Date Arrives,” Knight Ridder Tribune Business News, 28 January 2006, 1. 
11 Mike Tolson and Tony Freemantle, “Houston After Enron,” Houston Chronicle 28 May 2006, A1.  
12 Johnson, “Jury Chosen for Lay, Skilling.” 
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 appear unconcerned. Representatives from the Bureau were simply “available to answer 
questions” throughout the trial.13  
For the most part it did appear Houston had turned a corner, both in economics and in 
esteem, since the dark days of the Enron scandal—whether its impact had been exaggerated or 
not. Oil prices were climbing, and a “boom mentality” seemed to be on the rise once again in “a 
city that always looks forward.” Since Enron’s demise the city had hosted one Super Bowl and 
two professional All-Star Games, drawing attention and visitors from around and even outside the 
country.14 Houston was proud to be prospering not only as an end in itself, but also for the 
benevolence that it made possible. When Hurricane Katrina had struck the Gulf Coast a few 
months before, the city gave shelter to a staggering number of refugees, and was still harboring 
an estimated 120,000 as the trial began. 15 For this occasion, Houston stories in the national 
news were more flattering.  
A few enterprising Texans did seek to exploit the attention and crowds that the Enron trial 
promised. A children’s book about a pack of rats, entitled The Kingdom of Norne (2006), offered a 
bedtime parable of corporate scandal. Norne—which is Enron spelled backward—was a worthy 
nation of diligent and supremely smart Nornians. They had the misfortune, however, to live under 
the incompetent King Yal (again, the name of his analog in reverse),16 whose pyramid (scheme) 
of cheese proved as illusive as the Emperor’s exquisite robe from a different bedtime story. When 
their kingdom collapsed the Nornians found themselves destitute.  
This book’s reviews were few but positive: parents and teachers expressed faith that it 
was comprehensible to its target audience, who might grow up to create a new world in which 
figurative “rats” did not rule. Perhaps the story, as translated for children, achieved the narrative 
simplification and moral that had thus far proven so difficult for adults—by abandoning systemic 
                                                 
13 Mark Babineck, “Houston Isn’t On Trial This Time, Groups Say: Unlike Some Big Media Events in the 
Past, It’s a Tale of Two Men, and Not The City Itself,” Knight Ridder Tribune Business News, 28 January 
2008, 1; Tolson and Freemantle, “Houston After Enron;” Johnson, “Jury Chosen for Lay, Skilling.  
14 Tolson and Freemantle, “Houston After Enron.”  
15 McWilliams, “Houston, We Have the Enron.”  
16 Here is a rare account of the Enron collapse that implicates Lay more than anyone else. King Yal has 
unnamed “advisors,” but there is no Duke “Gnilliks” or “Wotsaf” to even take a small part of the blame. 
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 conditions, legal nuances, and ethical ambiguity. One reader commented online that the story 
“might provide the most concise memento of one of the biggest corporate scandals in American 
history.” Hopefully “concise” does not ultimately have to mean juvenile, but at any rate, Norne’s 
creator did know of which he wrote. Publishing under the nom de plume Busta Scam, the author 
was electrical engineer Brian Durbin. He had lost a substantial amount of money as Enron’s stock 
lost value, but the loyalty that his wife—a former Enron accountant—felt for the company had 
compelled them to hang on to these shares even as they did more and more damage to the 
family finances.17 
Durbin was not the only Houstonian to greet the trial with a sales pitch and an assumed 
name. David Tonsall, a 42-year-old former employee who adopted the artistic alias EnRun, 
released his first rap album for the occasion, titled “Corporate America.” Tonsall had been an 
Enron pipeline worker and lost $200,000 in retirement savings and other investments when the 
company bankrupted. His album seemed a mixture of derision, catharsis, and the cute. Among its 
songs was one called “Drop the S off Skilling,” and the rest generally followed the same theme 
and tone. Tonsall distributed free CDs outside the courthouse on the first day of the Lay-Skilling 
proceedings and boasted that 2,500 copies had already sold online. Like the children’s book, the 
rap album offered a reductive narrative of the bankruptcy, but in experience if not empirics its 
integrity could not be denied. “I hope they’re convicted,” Tonsall told a reporter, before the trial 
began, “and I hope [Lay and Skilling] get to sit next to some guy who is going to knock their 
heads around for a couple of years.” 18  
Tonsall had reason to remain angry even now. But even if he was not, his comments and 
lyrics suggested he believed fantasies of punishment and retribution toward Enron’s leaders were 
still marketable. Sneering and smugness, at least, were well precedented. For example, when 
seven managers were imprisoned for the electrical price-fixing conspiracy, industry union 
                                                 
17 Busta Scam (Brian Durbin), The Kingdom of Norne (James A. Rock, 2006); summary and description at 
http://www.senseofwonderpress.com/KON.htm. Accessed 19 August 2009; customer reviews at 
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18 “Four Former Enron Workers Weigh In On Trial,” Knight Ridder Tribune Business News, 22 January 2006, 
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 representatives sent each a “Monopoly” board game to help pass their time.19 The game’s 
simulation of ruthless capitalism, its constant threat of “Jail,” and of course its name and theme, 
apparently made it an appropriate incarceration gift for the occasion. Like Tonsall, these workers 
felt wronged by powerful executives, but now were ready to gloat.  
The third and most widely noted Enron entrepreneur, at the time of the trial, was local 
historian Sandra Lord. Beginning in 2006 Lord offered a four-hour guided tour of Houston that she 
called “Lifestyles of the Rich and Infamous,” pointing out the former offices, homes and haunts of 
the disgraced Enron corps for $30 a head. “Enron is a piece of history,” Lord said. “Enron is part 
of our language. It has become so ubiquitous I could do this tour ten years from now and still 
have a lot of interest I am sure.”  Lord’s assessment of Enron in “history” and “language” was 
well-founded, but her confidence in the public’s interest—at least in her tour—was not. Her buses 
seemed never to fill even at the height of the Lay-Skilling trial.  
Lord’s narrative attempted a delicate compromise: perpetuating and trying to capitalize 
on Enron’s disgrace of Houston while still insisting that the company never defined the 
community. Her tour traded upon the literally concrete—the locations of the scandal’s events—
affirming the importance and material reality of their setting in this particular city. Yet in her 
emphasis on Enron as “history,” Lord joined the hometown chorus that Houston had not been 
nearly so “devastated” by the bankruptcy as media “hype” would have it. “Life has moved on,” she 
rebutted. “Nobody is sitting around Houston wringing their hands about Enron today.”20  
Such renderings of the Enron bankruptcy and its fallout; the children’s book, the rap 
album, and the guided tour; in the end won far fewer patrons than press coverage—and even that 
was scant. They are more significant for their colorful and democratic narrative offerings than for 
their actual impact on perceptions of Enron in the national media or even in Houston. Most of the 
attention paid to the trial, and indeed most of its attendees, were more serious than sensational. 
Here was yet another change of scene since the time of the bankruptcy. Official Houston wanted 
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 no hubbub and, Busta Scam, EnRun, and Lifestyles of the Rich and Infamous notwithstanding, 
essentially it got none.  
 Had the defense gotten its way, the trial would not have been held there at all. Convinced 
that embittered locals were prejudiced against them and their company, Lay and Skilling had 
argued no Houston jury could be fair. Judge Simeon “Sim” Lake III denied the defendants’ petition 
to be tried elsewhere, but at any rate they may have overestimated the persistent hostility of their 
hometown. Few people who were not directly connected to trial participants ever attended the 
proceedings.21 The Houston Chronicle covered the trial assiduously, and its online reporting in 
particular was highly popular22, but very few readers wrote in about the case. When they did, it 
was just as frequently to defend Lay and Skilling as it was to condemn them.23 Most Houstonians, 
including former Enron employees, professed simply to have “moved on.”24 Many looked forward 
with greater interest to civil litigation against Lay and Skilling, for only then could those who 
suffered from Enron’s collapse hope to recover any money.25 Granted, this was not the sort of 
attitude that the defense would have sought in a juror—but neither was there much evidence of 
the consummate, unanimous rage by which Lay and Skilling felt already condemned. 
 The jury that did take the booth would of course remain anonymous and nondescript 
during the proceedings, but the little information that was available about its members also 
pointed to an orderly, businesslike trial rather than any drama of vengeance. Observing reporters, 
as well as Judge Lake, praised them throughout the 54-day trial for their punctuality, 
attentiveness and patience. They maintained focus on the evidence and testimony being 
presented, sometimes taking notes on legal pads, even when others in the courtroom nodded off 
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 or began to fidget.26 Their attention was most likely to stray, in fact, when lawyers and witnesses 
delivered vitriol27—even though it had been scripted, cynically, to appeal to them. Eight women 
and four men, the jurors did not appear obvious allies to either side. Along with Judge Lake 
himself, corroborating his reputation for running court efficiently and by the book, all arbiters in 
this case took it quite seriously. It was to be a trial in earnest. 
For The Prosecution 
 The Justice Department’s Enron Task Force had been preparing to prosecute Lay and 
Skilling for four years. Perhaps even more important, here, the fundamental requirements of 
evidence, was the comprehensibility of this courtroom narrative. Having learned from previous 
white collar trials that technical details of accounting or securities trades could confuse a jury—to 
the point of reasonable doubt—the government adopted an overall strategy of streamlining and 
simplification.28 Its core argument was that Lay and Skilling had lied to employees and investors 
about Enron’s straits in the months leading up to its bankruptcy, in order to protect and enrich 
themselves. The government stressed that jurors need not determine the causes of the 
company’s collapse; they needed only to judge whether Lay and Skilling had handled the disaster 
honestly.29 “This is a simple case,” attorney John Heuston said in an opening statement. “It’s not 
about accounting. It’s about lies and choices.”30 Here was one way to deal with complexity: deny 
it. 
 Anecdotes and intricacies were welcome, however, if they might help the government to 
establish Enron as a suspicious company, or its leaders as suspicious men. The prosecution had 
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 wanted to introduce evidence about the 1987 Valhalla incident, in which Lay seemed to have 
condoned accounting tricks among his oil traders, and about the California energy crisis of 2000, 
in which Enron Energy traders had recklessly manipulated the state’s newly deregulated market. 
Judge Lake designated both matters irrelevant to the case at hand, which legally they were. 31 
The government was permitted, however, to present evidence about the defendants’ “characters,” 
and it did so even at the expense of argument’s momentum. Thus, for example, Skilling’s 
decision to invest a fairly small amount of Enron money in an ex-girlfriend’s company was worth a 
substantial digression, even though this minor transaction had no connection to Enron’s collapse. 
Skilling admitted he was supposed to have it specially approved, but did not. The jury was to infer 
more generally that he tended to disregard inconvenient rules.32 
 This narrative detour, and others like it, was ultimately personal rather than technical. As 
noted previously, the prosecution calculated that too much time and attention dedicated to 
business arcana would work in the defendants’ favor—and the other side had made the same 
judgment. Once more the issue of technical expertise, and loaded questions as to who could or 
could not “understand” relevant facts, were pivotal in narratives of the Enron collapse. While the 
defense would try to establish Enron as a highly complex accounting case in which sophisticated 
observers saw no evil, the prosecution built a straight story of right and wrong; of “Truth” and 
“Lies” according to the double-sided cardboard poster that lead government attorney Sean 
Berkowitz flashed during his closing statement.  
Yet the government did not really abandon or ignore the issue of technical expertise. 
Instead, it attempted to exploit it uniquely by turning it back on the defense. The prosecution 
sought to tie such nuances, in jurors’ perception, to an arrogant and decadent business culture 
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 that by opacity and luxury discredited itself. “Don’t let the defendants, with their high-paid [expert 
witnesses] and their lawyers, buy their way out of this,” Berkowitz told the jury. “You can’t buy 
justice; you have to earn it.” 33 The link, in such a statement, between abundant money and 
expertise, is significant, for both are things that “ordinary” Americans—as exemplified by the 
jury—do not have. And if it seemed the former could often purchase the latter, Lay and Skilling’s 
legal effort was indeed an apt case in point: estimated at $50 million, combined, theirs was said to 
be the most expensive defense in US history.34 Moreover, particularly in the booming business 
era of the previous decade, money and expertise had been conceived as part and parcel. The 
“new economy” was one of knowledge and information, and the new means of making an 
astronomical fortune now often had nothing to do with traditional industry, but instead with the 
mystical maneuvering of new financial instruments that made little sense to most of the public.  
Thus the government gambled that any amount of expert knowledge that Lay and Skilling 
tried to deploy would backfire by alienating the jury. Anybody with a sense of values could 
understand what had happened at Enron, the prosecution insisted. Like any criminals, Lay and 
Skilling had acted recklessly and caused tremendous suffering. Refusing to admit it or repent, 
they deserved to go to jail—even if, or perhaps especially because, they were highly-educated, 
sharply calculating multimillionaires who had done everything in their formidable power to avoid it.   
For the Defense 
 Narrative form pervades the legal trial. Yet another synergy between the two is in their 
shared, intrinsic focus on individuals.35 The more personal Enron narratives became, the more 
dangerous for the Enron defendants. For in the context of trial, even more than before, it was 
clear who the relevant characters were—and thus implicitly where blame, if there was any, should 
land. Neither Lay nor Skilling had ever wanted to appear at all in narratives of Enron’s collapse, 
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 much less to be personally audited for competence or integrity. Yet this was exactly what these 
proceedings were for. A story about people is not a story about numbers, and the former is much 
more accessible and, for someone in a position to judge, morally intuitive. Thus Lay and Skilling 
faced an uphill climb as they attempted to make this case technical rather than moral or personal. 
On the vital issue of comprehensibility, they had to make the unappealing argument, rebutting the 
prosecution, that Enron was less simple than it appeared. 
 The defense did call expert witnesses and presented a surfeit of testimony and evidence 
about Enron’s dealings and why they were legal (if not always wise). The defendants seemed 
most comfortable when the court’s attention was on Enron’s trading and finance strategies, to 
which, after all, the company owed its wild success and of which Lay and Skilling were clearly still 
proud. Yet the defense could not adopt an entirely opposite strategy to that of the prosecution—
that is, a relentless emphasis on esoteric accounting practices or securities trading rules at the 
expense of ethical and personal factors. It has been proposed that complex white collar trials like 
this one should be assigned expert judges and juries; individuals familiar with relevant 
technicalities;36 but for the time being both sides still have to convince a non-specialized 
audience. Therefore, whether the defense liked it or not, it had to depart from arcana at least 
some of the time. Defense lawyers, too, had to build an accessible narrative about Enron’s 
collapse; but unlike that if the prosecution, this story was to portray Lay and Skilling as 
sympathetic characters.37   
                                                 
36 The argument is that individuals with relevant background make more efficient and competent jurors. 
Meanwhile, however, others seek to summarily exclude experts from juries or to prohibit them from drawing 
upon any specialized knowledge or skills, during deliberations, lest they be biased or unduly influential upon 
fellow jurors. (It is certainly more common that lawyers favor lesser educated and thus, supposedly, more 
gullible juries.) For the time being it is probably both by default and by caution that American courts have no 
absolute policy as to the issue of juror expertise. For examples of various stances in this discussion, see 
Daniel Solove, “Should We Have Professional Juries?” 20 March 2009, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/03/should_we_have.html. Accessed 21 July 2009; 
Michael B. Mushlin, “Bound and Gagged: The Peculiar Predicament of Professional Jurors,” Yale Law & 
Policy Review 25 (2007): 240-287; Beth Z. Shaw, “Judging Juries: Evaluating Renewed Proposals for 
Specialized Juries from a Public Choice Perspective,” UCLA Journal of Law and Technology (Nov. 2006): 1-
37. 
37 Robert Ferguson states “the defense tells no story until it has to,” and relates law school dicta that 
defendants may create reasonable doubt with miscellaneous contradictions, even ones that are logically 
inconsistent with one another (Ferguson, Trial in American Life, 14-15). In other words, defendants don’t 
need narrative. Principle aside, I believe that these defendants, at least, did—perhaps because they were 
already so widely known and reviled, because previous public excuses and alibis had been unconvincing, or 
because juries may be more willing to sentence minimum security jail time than harsher forms of 
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  Enron, the defense argued, had been a great company. Its pioneering business models 
not only transformed how energy business was done, but also brought technologies and 
resources to people who had previously gone without. While its corporate structure and financial 
transactions were complicated to the unschooled observer, they left nothing illicit to be found. 
Indeed, the only wrongdoing that had occurred at Enron was Andy Fastow’s admitted stealing 
from Enron via the LJM hedge funds—and neither Lay nor Skilling had even known about, let 
alone condoned or benefited from, those thefts. Eventually Fastow aroused suspicion and was 
fired. As rumors began to swirl that Enron was in trouble, the media seized an opportunity to 
tarnish its golden image, and investors poised to profit when a company’s stock falls (known as 
“short sellers”) completed the self-fulfilling prophecy. Lay and Skilling, both committed and 
competent managers who cared deeply about the company, had no criminal liability, but had 
nonetheless already suffered severely from Enron’s collapse. Far from being punishable, the 
defense asserted, they deserved to be vindicated in this trial, and to get on with their professional 
and personal lives just like everyone else. 
 If this story was harder to follow than that of the prosecution, it was no coincidence. By 
definition, a defensive narrative at trial is a series of rebuttals. The government’s accusations had 
made a simple narrative of greed and deceit. But when one by one the charges had to be 
answered with alternate explanations, the sum was no graceful ensemble. Indeed, the defense 
left a number of holes in its corresponding narrative, woven piecemeal.  
For one, Fastow had been enabled to steal by express permission to manage the LJM 
funds by himself, which was a waiver of Enron’s own conflict of interest rules. Then as 
speculations arose about Fastow and Enron’s well-being more generally, the company’s leaders 
had been equivocal, ham-handed, and even hostile. Finally, it was unclear why media outfits like 
the Wall Street Journal would have sought aggressively to bring Enron down. (At one point 
Skilling even suggested the Journal had stockpiled negative articles about his company and 
                                                                                                                                                 
punishment. The first two of my speculative reasons why these defendants needed narrative relate to the 
exceptional passage of time between their alleged offenses and their trial; the third, to the exceptional nature 
of white collar crime. Perhaps none of these is correct, but at any rate, I believe Lay and Skilling’s defense 
teams knew they needed to create a successful narrative, and furthermore that their failure to do so was a 
primary reason for the convictions.  
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 released them with strategic timing, perhaps in cooperation with the short-sellers, who Lay said 
were “organized” and even “conspiring”.)38 Overall, the same two business geniuses who had 
taken credit for Enron’s groundbreaking successes seemed in this narrative to be pleading 
ignorance of their own company’s inner workings, and the logical consequences thereof. If the 
defense was tasked with constructing a sort of mirror narrative—one that would answer questions 
raised by the prosecution and yet absolve Lay and Skilling of wrongdoing—it never quite made up 
for this disadvantage.  
 Lay and Skilling, however, also had indirect means of pleading their cases. They had 
worked assiduously with their legal teams to prepare for the trial in its narrative contest, but 
“optics” were crucial as well. There is a playbook—figurative and in more than one instance literal 
as well39—for white-collar criminal defendants, and Lay and Skilling followed it fairly consistently. 
Both men tried to appear confident and genial throughout the proceedings. In remarks to 
reporters at the end of a session Lay frequently referred to his religious values, and God’s will, 
while Skilling took a more secular but also standard tack, steadfastly reiterating his innocence. 
Lay’s family came to court every day, with Skilling’s wife, ex-wife and additional relatives also 
usually present. Hand patting, muted tears and occasional (dignified) expressions of 
disagreement with the prosecution were advisable for these defendants’ supporters.40  
Even clothing was a subject of advice and scrutiny, with the first edict that neither the 
defendants nor their families should dress ostentatiously.41 A blue shirt and red tie, as Lay 
customarily wore,42 were to achieve an approachable yet professional look. Always the more 
                                                 
38 McLean and Elkind, “No More Mr. Nice Guy.”  
39 Ferguson, Trial in American Life, 72-3. 
40 Jayne O’Donnell and Mindy Fetterman, “Wives, Ex-Wives Faced Trials of Their Own; Spouses Were 
Under a Lot of Pressure, Analysts Say,” USA Today 26 May 2006, Money, 3B. Skilling’s current marriage, it 
seemed, was less camera-ready than Lay’s. For one, its very foundation was somewhat questionable: 
Rebecca Carter had been Enron’s corporate secretary, and Skilling had broken off their engagement before 
he was indicted. He may ultimately have married her to obtain spousal privilege, which released Carter from 
testifying against him. She was not in the courtroom for his sentencing, and afterwards Skilling thanked his 
whole family, emphasizing his three children, but made no mention of his wife. However, I find no evidence 
that the couple has separated or divorced since Skilling entered prison. 
41 O’Donnell and Fetterman, “Wives, Ex-Wives Face Trials of Their Own.” 
42 Mary Flood, “Lay Proclaims His Innocence: He Blames Fastow, Bad Publicity, and a ‘Classic Run on the 
Bank,’” Houston Chronicle 25 April 2006, A1.  
 222 
 daring, Skilling wore crisp white shirts although experts warn they can accentuate a flushed face. 
Skilling also varied his ties, with green apparently being a particularly audacious choice—one 
juror would later say that one evoked “crumpled dollar bills.”43 While both Lay’s and Skilling’s 
attorneys denied dressing their clients, they did throughout the trial manage commentary and 
speculation as to the defendants’ appearances and behavior. When a court officer indicated that 
Skilling had made threatening gestures and profane murmurings to a former colleague, who was 
testifying against him, lawyer Dan Petrocelli called the report “absurd” and “an attempt to 
prejudice Jeff.”44 Likewise, although Lay was reportedly “groaning and growling” while the 
government presented its case—and would stoop even lower later on—his lawyers constantly 
defended him as “a strong man” who had “the truth on his side.”45  
 In the substance of trial strategy, one of the most significant and most highly anticipated 
decisions that the defense faced was whether to call Lay and Skilling themselves to the witness 
stand. Since at least the nineteenth century, big business leaders have often been considered 
inarticulate and unreflective, especially when pressed to explain and justify their own activities. 
Thus far neither Lay nor Skilling seemed to have proven any exception to this rule. A talent for 
manipulating markets and making money, it has often appeared, does not necessarily come with 
an aptitude for charming a general audience46—and historically, criminal trials have born out this 
pattern. “Ordinary” observers typically do not respond well to executives in white collar 
proceedings, and so most executive defendants look silently on.47 Everyone knew that if the 
Enron defendants did testify it would mean their attorneys felt particular pressure,48 and sure 
                                                 
43 Cheryl Lu-Lien Tan, “Pursuits; Style—What They’re Wearing: The White Collar Blues,” The Wall Street 
Journal (Eastern Edition), 27 May 2006, 5.  
44 Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind, “Fightin’ Words,” Fortune 153, Iss. 4 (6 March 2006): 41-42.  
45 Susan J. Douglas, “If Ken Lay Was Black…,” In These Times 30, Iss. 6 (June 2006), 14; Peter Elkind and 
Bethany McLean, “Judgment Day,” Fortune 153, Iss. 1 (23 January 2006), 58-64.  
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47 Alexei Barrionuevo and Kurt Eichenwald, “At Enron Trial, A Calculated Risk,” The New York Times 4 April 
2006, Business/Financial Desk, 1.  
48 Greg Farrell, “For Lay and Skilling, Day of Judgment Near; After 55 Witnesses, Closing Arguments Begin 
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 enough, after the prosecution rested an undeniably well-made case, Lay’s and Skilling’s lawyers 
determined it was worth the risk. As soon as they made the announcement, nearly all observers 
agreed that the defendants’ fates most likely depended on their own credibility as witnesses. 
 One factor in this assessment was how Lay and Skilling would speak, on the stand, about 
each other. Each had the opportunity to discredit his counterpart, but also, in attempting to do so, 
risked discrediting himself—and this relationship was not simple to begin with. Though often 
portrayed as a duo, Lay and Skilling had actually never been friends or even, especially in later 
years, closely connected colleagues. Indeed, while each man always acknowledged and 
appreciated the other’s strengths, Lay and Skilling had often found themselves at odds due to 
disparate habits in work and communication. After the bankruptcy, not surprisingly, they blamed 
each other—though only in private remarks.49 This was likely because both knew (or at least 
feared) that from then on they were in it together. Legally speaking, they were right, for when Lay 
and Skilling sought to be tried separately Judge Lake again had denied them. To make the best 
of the situation the two defendants worked as tenuous allies. Aside from a few less than 
complimentary remarks about each others’ personalities in the workplace, they vouched for one 
another throughout the trial.  
Lay, in the mainstream media, had been the more iconic of the two for having founded 
and long led Enron, and also for his now-reviled connections to the Bush family. Most of the 
evidence and testimony in the trial, however, targeted Skilling instead,50 and thus the lower-
profile former COO faced his own disadvantage. In their respective testimonies Lay and Skilling 
distinguished themselves from one another, in part deliberately—as on matters of their separate 
roles at Enron—but also stylistically, in the way each man featured in and also crafted his own 
narrative of the bankruptcy.  
 Skilling went first. Long known for his brashness, foul mouth and quick temper, he was on 
his best behavior—with the offensive gestures and cursing under his breath being glaring, and 
                                                 
49 Elkind and McLean, “Judgment Day.” 
50 George Flynn, “Enron Trial Moves Into Key Phase with Ex-CFO Fastow to Take Stand,” Platts Oilgram 
News 84, No. 44 (7 March 2006), 1; Carrie Johnson, “Lay Faces a Second Trial, Alone; Judge Will Weigh 
Separate Federal Charges of Bank Fraud,” The Washington Post 28 March 2006, Financial, D1.  
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 telling, exceptions. He remained for the most part cool and confident, even trying at times to 
make the jury laugh, but a complete transformation from his former self was neither plausible nor, 
as we saw, possible. Even if he did not, in fact, harass an opposing witness in the courtroom as 
was reported, previous antics along the same lines were fair game for prosecutors as evidence 
about Skilling’s “character.” With discomfort he had to admit to calling a hedge fund manager an 
“asshole,” on a public conference call, when his queries got too probing for Skilling’s taste.51 
Likewise he had famously hung up on Fortune magazine’s Bethany McLean, after calling her 
investigation into Enron “unethical,” rather than answer any further questions from her. 
Acknowledging Skilling’s reputation for “bluntness,” his defense team actually tried to exploit it. 
They claimed that such an artless communicator could never have managed to lie so elaborately 
and for so long. He may have been a bit rough around the edges, the argument went, but Skilling 
was not the sort of man who would or even could deceive on a criminal scale.52 
Far from being random unflattering anecdotes, these incidents were important to the 
case, and Skilling’s lawyers knew it. Both had occurred during his brief tenure as CEO, and 
indicated he was unprepared to defend or even discuss Enron’s business and finances with 
people who had legitimate reasons for asking. Skilling still maintained that Enron’s collapse was 
due to a “classic run on the bank” rather than any error or wrongdoing, and as to his August 14 
resignation, Skilling had always insisted it was for purely personal reasons; that such outbursts 
were due to stress unrelated to the company. Given how quickly Enron collapsed after Skilling’s 
exit, however, this question was a point of major controversy. He also sold most of his Enron 
stocks shortly after this departure, which looked highly suspicious in context of the massive 
losses he left to employees and outside shareholders. While the prosecution had attempted to 
show that Skilling made a mess and then fled, this defendant argued instead that he had 
discharged his job responsibly and left it honorably, with his personal hardship only compounded 
by what came next. 
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 It was demands from his children, emotional exhaustion, and even possible mental health 
problems, according to Skilling, that had prompted him to leave Enron and his CEO post. Time 
spent with the families of employees who had died in an explosion at an Enron power plant had 
disturbed him emotionally and reordered his priorities.53 He also lost a close friend, former 
executive vice president Cliff Baxter, to suicide shortly after the company bankrupted, and more 
than once Skilling professed having “wanted to die” himself.54 He also had a drinking problem 
which had led to more than one embarrassing run-in with police, and subsequent court-ordered 
rehabilitation and community service.55  
The purpose in this narrative examination of Skilling’s testimony is not to deny his 
personal exigencies and emotional traumas. Rather, it is to show how he presented these as 
alternative, rather than additional, explanations for his abrupt abandonment of Enron, and his 
apparent misrepresentations of the company’s condition. Here Skilling rehearsed the tragic 
narrative from his congressional testimony. He suggested that he deserved pity rather than 
punishment. 
Again, such personal revelations were a pragmatic sacrifice rather than an ideal strategy 
for the defense, and Skilling in particular was obviously more comfortable when technical details 
were at issue instead. He had pored over company documents, account records and prior 
testimony and stated that the trial was his chance to “get the story out” about Enron; to prove that 
nothing he had done was illegal, or even in most cases unusual.56 Defense lawyers questioned 
the competence of some of the prosecution’s witnesses,57 reiterating the familiar but now risky 
line that only certain people with technical expertise were qualified to have opinions about Enron. 
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 Only proper understanding of business and accounting practices, Skilling insisted, would enable 
the court fairly to judge. 
When it was discovered—and decried—that Skilling had hired a jury consultant, he 
claimed it was to make his testimony more accessible.58 “I tend to get technical,” Skilling 
explained, 59 pretending to concede as a pesky habit what he actually seemed to feel was his 
best hope for acquittal. In truth the consultant, Reiko Hasuike, probably also advised Skilling 
about juror perceptions and how to communicate persuasively. The defendant’s choice to 
describe her as a sort of aid in translation—from business jargon to plain language—
demonstrates simultaneously an avowed commitment to facts and details, and an understanding 
that those, raw, would never win Skilling’s case.60  
Opacity is a matter of course for business people who, even if entirely legally, have made 
their fortunes in contemporary trading and finance. Their job is to capitalize on information, and 
that rarely involves sharing it. They take pride as instantaneous innovators and problem-solvers, 
and anyone unable to keep up is left behind. This is why constructing a narrative did not come 
easily to Skilling: the typical communicative mode of the world in which he had flourished was 
clipped, utilitarian, and exclusive by design. Even without the profanities, it is easy to see why 
such a style of meaning-making does not usually play well to a general audience—and why 
Skilling failed even with the best narrative help his money could buy. 
This tension, between technical expertise and accessibility, connects more broadly to lay 
juries’ tendency to view white collar defendants with disdain. If, in such trials, the executives are 
proxies for the modern business world, and jurors represent “ordinary” Americans, then this 
confrontation exemplifies a widespread suspicion and resentment that long predated Enron. One 
of the defense’s most common complaints, in the trial, was that the government was trying to 
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 “criminalize normal business practices,”61 and it was a legitimate point. But given the mystique 
and moral doubt that had always surrounded those practices, prosecutors’ work of demonization 
was for the most part already done for them.62  
Unlike Skilling, Ken Lay proactively took up matters of morality and personal character 
throughout the trial. Lay’s statements to reporters almost always referred to values, family, or 
God. His defense highlighted his modest beginnings and self-made success, and called 
numerous Houston community leaders—including a ConocoPhillips ex-chairman, a former US 
commerce secretary, and two Baptist ministers—to testify he was an upstanding man and a 
valuable citizen.63 (No witness had come forward to praise Jeff Skilling’s character). The 
beleaguered Lay said he had lived the “American nightmare:” having won, with nothing but his 
own perseverance, fortune and fame, and then lost both, and then some, to a malicious media 
and traitorous former colleagues.64 Still, Lay maintained, he deserved credit for “going down with 
his ship.” Without drawing any explicit contrast to Skilling’s drastic unloading of Enron stocks in 
September 2001, Lay emphasized that he had held on to $.5 billion in shares—and lost “ninety 
percent of his net worth” when the company failed.65 As Enron’s “captain” that was the only 
honorable thing he could have done.66  
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 In an intriguing twist in Lay’s presentation of character, he was posed as a champion and 
ally not only to his employees and ordinary Houstonians,67 but also specifically to local African-
Americans. Black leaders such as Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) and Rev. William A. Lawson, 
who founded the prominent Wheeler Avenue Baptist Church, both in court and in media 
statements defended him as an honest and magnanimous person, who far from being a thief was 
a formidable benefactor with real respect and care for them.68 Big businessmen have a long 
history of donating money to churches, in part to “secure immunity from criticism.”69 Andrew 
Carnegie, self-appointed “trustee and agent for his poor brethren,” was particularly notable for his 
paternalistic philosophy of philanthropy. Carnegie felt that using “surplus wealth” for the “common 
good” was the best answer to attacks on concentrations in capital.70 Without denying that Lay 
could have been genuinely pious and generous, he appears to have followed in this tradition and 
also brought to it a racial dimension. 
Lay had indeed donated to the NAACP,71 the United Negro College Fund, and the Urban 
League,72 but the trial-time emphasis on such connections may have been on cue from 
HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy’s surprising acquittal with support from black pastors in 
Birmingham, Alabama.73 In any event, it would seem that Lay, his attorneys, and his black 
supporters all calculated that endorsements of character from African-Americans would lend him 
a unique authenticity. When Lay claimed to have lived a spiritual and virtuous life, and to have 
succeeded purely of his own determination, apparently black people were deemed the most 
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 credible in vouching for him. Perhaps this was due to a common historic portrayal of slaves and 
their descendants as morally righteous but materially deprived; people who had to work doggedly, 
and to pray, for everything they achieved.  
Before Lay’s testimony, many knowledgeable observers—including some who thought 
Jeff Skilling’s fate had been sealed long ago—believed Lay was more likely to be acquitted. Even 
if some of his conduct at Enron was questionable, some reasoned, Lay was despite the disgrace 
of the scandal still too revered and well-connected ever to go to jail. 74 But if Lay did take the 
stand with such factors in his favor, he risked squandering whatever goodwill he had left. Having 
staked so much on a presentation of largesse and moral virtue, he, even more than Skilling, had 
to deliver an affable and obliging testimony. His odds seem to hang in the balance. 
Lay had declined to testify before Congress or the SEC during the time between 
bankruptcy and trial. Thus although he had given a few interviews and public statements, this was 
his first occasion to present a narrative under oath. The pressure did appear to make a 
difference. Lay never contradicted Skilling’s story—indeed the two men testified largely about 
different matters given how rarely their jobs intersected during the relevant time period—but he 
did strike a dramatically different tone, and went against his usual demeanor. Known for 
politeness, charm, and generosity, Lay appeared irritable and sometimes downright defiant on the 
witness stand, even under questioning by his own attorneys. He interrupted them frequently and 
even asked defense lawyer George “Mac” Secrest, in response to more than one question, 
“Where are you going with this?”75 There was no angle from which these could appear wise 
moves on Lay’s part. He was off-script and apparently out of control.  
For all the strategic and stylistic differences between the defendants’ testimonies, they 
shared two arguments that, if not ultimately convincing, were still significant in their narrative 
implications and in their connections to larger, ongoing issues at the time of the trial. The first will 
be familiar from the immediate post-bankruptcy period of congressional hearings: the association 
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 of Enron’s collapse with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Both Lay and Skilling tried to 
quell suspicion by citing the impact of that day. Lay blamed it for a stock market nosedive that 
spurred short-selling and the subsequent “run on the bank” that supposedly killed Enron.76 
Skilling claimed that he sold 500,000 shares on September 17, the first day the stock market re-
opened after the attacks, out of his own concerns about their economic effect.77  
“I had no knowledge of accounting improprieties, no knowledge of write-offs,” Skilling said 
of these stock sales. “I had a tremendous investment in Enron I was worried about.”78 The 
defense, it seemed, was attempting to win empathy by re-conjuring the shock and uncertainty 
that attended the events of September 11. These executives, just like everyone else, they 
argued, were devastated and simply trying to weather the panic. Prosecutors, however, 
recognized the emotional pitch in this argument and found it shameful. “Mr. Skilling used our 
nation’s tragedy to cover his tracks,” said lead prosecutor Sean Berkowitz. “That’s offensive, and 
he shouldn’t get away with it.”79  
Whether or not jurors found Lay and Skilling’s September 11th explanations credible, the 
attacks were still entangled with Enron narratives. And just as before, in the immediate aftermath 
of the scandal, Enron executives were trying to align themselves with ordinary Americans when 
they evoked terror and tragedy. Their detractors—now prosecutors—once again suggested that 
these men were not allies of the public, but indeed were part of a persistent threat.  If not 
“economic terrorists,” the government lawyers averred Lay and Skilling at least sought to benefit 
from the events of September 11th by hiding behind them; disguising their crimes like looters who 
moved among clouds of smoke and debris. 
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 The second defense that both Lay and Skilling mounted was informally dubbed “blame 
the media.” Both defendants claimed that reckless business journalists had brought down their 
company with unfounded suggestions that Enron was a house of cards. More interested in 
attention and sales than in diligent reporting, the defense claimed, the culpable media enriched 
not only themselves but also scores of short-selling “vultures” by dragging the once-lauded Enron 
through the mud. This argument can actually be traced back to the Gilded Age, for even then 
disgraced executives impugned the motives of any critics, including journalists, who soiled their 
reputations. Such claims, in that era, even anticipated Lay and Skilling by alleging conspiracies 
between newspapers, government, and stock speculators.80 Of course, according to the Enron 
defendants injustice had only compounded since the bankruptcy: both Lay and Skilling feared 
they had already been convicted on the public stage by a sensational media that loved to vilify. 
Unlike the invocation of September 11th, this narrative strand contained much ambiguity 
for its lack of obvious heroes or villains. While mainstream perceptions all agreed that terrorism 
was evil, and everyone could remember and sympathize with dramatic reactions to the attacks, 
“the media” and its strategies of reporting news and making money were more controversial. In a 
contemporary poll American respondents ranked sixteen US institutions by confidence, and the 
media wound up near the bottom. These findings might have been encouraging to the Enron 
defense in its “blame the media” argument—were it not for the other ratings that the poll also 
showed. The other lowest-ranked institutions included “big corporations,” “Wall Street,” and 
lawyers.81 In other words, “ordinary people” began with a low opinion of everyone who had 
played a role in the Enron story, or who now held a stake in the Enron trial. Judgment, then, 
would more likely favor the lesser of evils than any party that had truly done right. 
Lay and Skilling might actually have been able to use this moral ambiguity to their 
advantage. For while appearing to have been “good guys” in the Enron story was clearly a stretch 
for these defendants, a jury that refused to anoint any good guys was not necessarily sympathetic 
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 to their accusers either. The government, once again, was posing as protector of the people 
against corrupt businessmen. But as we saw in the post-bankruptcy hearings and in debates on 
reform legislation after Enron, Americans had very little faith in their self-designated federal 
champions. And not only was the government ethically questionable to begin with; it appeared 
that the Enron Task Force itself did engage, while prosecuting this case, in a number of specific 
activities that at least deserved scrutiny. One argument that Lay and Skilling could not make in 
court—at least not explicitly—was that they were the victims of prosecutorial misconduct. But 
expert observers suggested not only that this argument, if allowed, could have worked, but 
indeed that it might actually have been fair.82 
Justice Unbound 
 Skilling lead lawyer Dan Petrocelli declared that “right from the inception,” the 
government’s pursuit of the Enron case had been “reckless” and “overzealous.”83 Ken Lay posted 
online that “only those who have seen its teeth truly grasp the arbitrary power of the Enron Task 
Force,”84 and claimed that Enron prosecutors were perpetuating a “wave of terror.”85 Although 
Judge Lake ruled, by the opening of the trial, that the Task Force had never overstepped the law 
in its preparation,86 many observers—besides the defendants themselves—thought otherwise. 
The prosecution, they believed, had badgered and intimidated scores of Enron managers, 
threatening exorbitant legal expenses and decades in jail if they did not testify against Lay and 
Skilling. Once they agreed, the suspicion went, these witnesses were pressured to reinterpret or 
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 even fabricate their memories. The defense also complained that the government was deflecting 
attention from documents showing that some of Enron’s now-controversial transactions had been 
properly and thoroughly approved at the time87—by lawyers, accountants, or supervisors.  
The prosecution’s choice of key witnesses was also a liability. Having reached plea 
bargains with eight former Enron executives, most notably former CFO Andy Fastow, the 
government’s strength was in turncoat testimony from professed criminals. These individuals, 
with “insider” perspective, could portray Lay and Skilling as collaborators if not masterminds, but 
they also prompted obvious questions of credibility. Fastow, for example, got a drastically lighter 
sentence than Lay and Skilling faced in exchange for his cooperation. By testifying, he stood not 
only to win more lenient punishment for himself, but also for his wife, who was also implicated in 
the LJM thefts and in fact had already served one year in jail.88 If Fastow and other witnesses like 
him had lied before, to serve their own interests at the expense of others, why wouldn’t they do so 
again? For them the ends had changed—from dizzying wealth to shortened jail time—but the 
means might easily be the same.  
Though the government denied that it had any single “star witness,”89 Fastow’s testimony 
was clearly intended to be damning. He proclaimed that Skilling himself had proposed the LJM 
hedge fund maneuvering that put Fastow on both sides of the bargaining table—an arrangement 
that, as everyone knew, left supervision to Fastow’s conscience alone. Skilling, supposedly, 
welcomed the revenues resulting from this conflict of interest and urged Fastow to set up more 
funds along the same lines. (In one of the trial’s several colorful quotations, Skilling allegedly had 
said “get me as much of that juice as you can.”)90 Moreover, Fastow said Skilling knew he was 
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 stealing from the company, and that Skilling condoned the theft. Yet Fastow had no proof that his 
stealing was ever approved, or even known. In other words, regarding the only obvious crime 
here, it was his word against the defendants.’ Fastow was supposed to be the more trustworthy 
party for having admitted years of criminal deceit. 
Even those former Enron employees who testified for the government without plea deals 
might be suspect. When Sherron Watkins, celebrated whistleblower, took the witness stand, she 
could not remain the “folk hero” who had appeared in congressional hearings, the Smartest Guys 
in the Room documentary, or her own memoirs. Now her motives and credibility, though perhaps 
not as seriously as Fastow’s, were also subject to questioning. Watkins told of how she urged 
Ken Lay to avert the “wave of accounting scandals” that she saw coming in August 2001—but 
said the complacent or even clueless CEO took no action, perhaps in deference to Skilling and 
other corrupt underlings. Watkins had plenty of self-serving reasons to have written that famous 
memo, and when read in full it seems to recommend covering up accounting problems rather 
than fixing them. Years later, her relationship to Enron’s illicit activities was no less ambiguous. 
But this time, in the context of trial, doubts as to Watkins’ integrity would be pointed up by an 
“other side” seeking to discredit her testimony.  
Granted immunity from prosecution, Watkins had nothing to lose by testifying, but 
evidently something to gain: as the defense did point out, her new career as a speaker and 
consultant on corporate ethics and leadership would not be well-served if the so-styled crooks 
who had made her famous were judged to have done nothing wrong. Moreover, it was clearer 
than ever that Watkins herself was not without blame in her own activities at Enron. During her 
testimony, Lay attorney Chip Lewis asked her why, given her $47,000 in Enron stock sales amid 
the company’s meltdown, she had never been indicted for insider trading. Apparently with total 
candor, she replied that she didn’t know—and even admitted that she was “wrong” to unload 
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 these shares because she had nonpublic information, at the time, about the company’s 
difficulties.91 This is precisely the definition of insider trading, and it had landed Skilling, along 
with many other executives, in court. Thus Watkins’ remark might be taken as refreshingly 
honest, or as gallingly strident. For the baldness of her admission proved she was not beyond 
reproach, but it also proved she had absolutely no fear of punishment. Otherwise she would have 
equivocated more in her answer, or even offered a rehearsed defense. Perhaps even a witness 
like Watkins did have a “deal” with the government—albeit informal and unspoken.   
The Enron Task Force, for all its time, money, and manpower, did not have a single 
“smoking gun” document to incriminate either Lay or Skilling on any of their charges. Otherwise, it 
might not have resorted to questionable tactics and compromised witnesses, of which Fastow 
and Watkins are only two examples. Here, then, was a missed opportunity for Lay and Skilling; a 
narrative—probably the only viable one—that the defendants could have originated and 
controlled. For the chronology that they had assembled in response to the prosecution, really an 
awkward set of excuses and denials, was unconvincing. As mentioned before, Lay and Skilling 
could not formally allege prosecutorial misconduct. But a proactive story that showed the Enron 
Task Force to be flawed or even unethical might have won them a mistrial, and thus a second 
chance, if not acquittal outright. 
The defense, however, never attempted an offense. On one level, this is curious: Lay and 
Skilling obviously felt scapegoated, and as we have seen there were both attitudinal and factual 
reasons why jurors might have bought an argument that the government was out of line. 
Moreover, even a mistrial would, to the Enron Task Force, have been searing and likely crippling. 
The loss of momentum and erosion of public support—both already running low at this late 
date—would have severely dampened the next attempt to prosecute, even leaving aside all the 
additional time, effort, and replacement staff that a take-two trial would require. 
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 Moreover, for the government, symbolism was even more important than anything legal 
or logistical. When Skilling’s lead attorney, Dan Petrocelli, said this was “the most important, most 
high-profile, most must-win case the United States has ever prosecuted,”92 his drama was 
exaggerated but not outlandish. Indeed the case’s political significance was probably the primary 
reason for such a long lapse in time between Lay and Skilling’s alleged crimes and their trial date. 
The government, though it had brought the Enron case, actually had quite a bit to lose here. As 
discussed previously, public officials had not come through the Enron scandal with as righteous 
an image as they would have liked. The trial was the government’s last chance to appear 
authoritative and disciplinarian toward crooked tycoons, as epitomized by Lay and Skilling, rather 
than cooperative or even deferent. The prosecution was vulnerable because its client of sorts, the 
federal government, risked being judged guilty in its own right. For them a routine legal draw 
would have amounted to a grave political defeat. 
Though advocates for the defense, such as Petrocelli, were comfortable articulating this 
dynamic—“they’ll do anything, and they have,”93—they were ultimately unwilling to trace the idea 
out to its broadest implications. Here may be the reason why Lay and Skilling never “put the 
government on trial.” Robert Ferguson, in a study of high-profile trials in American history, writes 
that certain arguments that are never made—certain issues that are never raised—can be just as 
helpful in understanding the fundaments of a trial, as can those points that see hours of hot 
debate.94 In other words, what is avoided speaks volumes, particularly when one speculates as to 
why neither of the opposing parties opted to bring it up. In this case, the topic carefully 
sidestepped was the historical relationship between Enron and the government. Specifically, in 
the company’s dealings with regulatory agencies, Congress, and the Bush and even the Clinton 
administrations, there was a great deal of relevant, well-documented background information for 
this trial. Yet almost none of it would appear as evidence. 
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 Why the reticence, here, of the defense team? If Lay’s and Skilling’s lawyers had 
concertedly tried to portray them as victims of a collusive government setup, then they would 
have confronted a “before and after” comparison—the pivotal event being Enron’s bankruptcy. 
There was abundant proof that Enron in its heyday had garnered all manner of official approval 
and enjoyed many high connections. The defendants would maintain those governmental entities 
and figures had been fully justified in their faith and admiration for the company, and that Enron 
never did anything to purchase it. Certainly Enron executives did not abuse their clout by calling 
in policy favors or regulatory winks of any kind. Then post-scandal, the defense would have to 
argue, the very same people and parties had suddenly turned against their company, inventing 
copious allegations and complaints with no basis but a collective urge to blame someone. 
Essentially, this story would have claimed that officials and institutions that had shown 
nothing but integrity and good judgment in their dealings with Enron before the bankruptcy, had 
instantly and simultaneously lost all scruples in the rush to implicate Lay and Skilling. At their 
vindictive will they appointed and directed the Enron Task Force, which likewise stopped at 
nothing. Like Fastow’s supposed reverse transformation; swindler to revelator; this story would 
have been a hard sell. Politicians certainly have been known to abruptly denounce erstwhile 
friends when the latter are tainted by scandal. But people like Lay and Skilling would not draw 
natural empathy as suffering from such abandonment—because any loyalty they might have 
claimed appeared more likely due to campaign donations than to personal merit. 
Why, for its part, did the prosecution avoid the topic of Enron’s relationship to 
government? The most likely truth, on this neglected issue, was that federal agencies and public 
officials were too credulous and complacent both before and after Enron folded. They had 
bestowed too much favor on the company as long as it was convenient for them, enjoying 
campaign contributions and perks in exchange. (As discussions about campaign finance reform 
had shown, many legislators even acknowledged this “conflict of interest,” if reluctantly and 
equivocally.) Then, indeed, when Enron became a household name and the icon for 2001 and 
2002’s mess of corporate scandals, the wind changed direction abruptly, and almost everyone 
moved their sails. Lay and Skilling did not want to provoke questions about the “before” scenario, 
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 and the prosecution just as urgently needed to gloss over the “after.” Thus although the defense 
did have the option of crying foul on the government, this silence was by mutual consent, and to 
mutual benefit.  
Trials do not always serve, holistically, the communities in which they take place, nor 
resolve the deeper issues that give them their real meaning. Because it lacked any discussion of 
business-government relations, the Enron trial failed to do anything more than produce a verdict. 
Of course, this was its only purpose, and the American adversarial model of litigation hardly 
encourages, or even allows parties to present themselves in shades of gray. Still, this narrowness 
of debate speaks to why the Enron story that was significant in public discourse was already 
effectively over, and why this trial probably deserved even less attention than it got.  
We saw in narratives of the Enron bankruptcy from 2001 and 2002 that Americans were 
deeply concerned about the connections between business fraud and politics. In order to be 
relevant, then, to the concerns that laypeople most frequently voiced about Enron, this trial would 
have had to illuminate the characters, motives and actions not only of Lay and Skilling, but also of 
legions of government leaders and civil servants. Thus for all the talk of how complicated the 
Enron trial was, the questions that most people actually wanted answered were far more complex 
still.  
The public’s ideal trial would have had scores more defendants, hundreds more charges, 
thousands more witnesses. It would exceed the definition and parameters of a trial—and this is 
no coincidence. For connected to mistrust of the government is mistrust of its legal mechanisms. 
If some people feared Enron had been allowed to break the law, others pointed out, with no 
particular radicalism, that some of the company’s most widely denounced activities were legal. 
Thus perhaps both law and lawmakers had facilitated this devastating bankruptcy. If so, there 
was little reason to believe a trial would rectify anything. But of course, this possibility too was 
resolutely off the table in courtroom proceedings. It was no wonder everyone else had “moved 
on.”   
The Verdict 
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  Thus it was a qualified climax to which these proceedings built: a plain pronouncement 
on the criminal statuses and immediate futures of two individuals. After bombastic closing 
statements from both sides, Judge Lake delivered the jury instructions, noteworthy for including a 
dictum that no “ostrich” or “idiot” defense was grounds for acquittal. This legal defense has a 
name because it is familiar: numerous executives have used it in court, as did Standard Oil’s 
president in his 1942 congressional testimony (like Jeff Skilling in his).95 Not all claims of 
ignorance are necessarily false; for even in early forms of big business, and all the more so now, 
diversified and decentralized corporations are simply too large for their top executives to know all, 
or even most, of what goes on beneath them.  
Yet Judge Lake, in the Enron case, rejected this line. His instructions stated, essentially, 
that even if convinced that either defendant had been unaware of wrongdoing at Enron, the jury 
could still convict for negligence and incompetence. Thus in a move that might be passed off as 
purely procedural, Lake in his official capacity rejected one of the defense’s most important 
arguments: that Lay and Skilling had been unaware of fraud at their own company. The judge 
decreed that these self-styled expert-geniuses could not be acquitted based on claims of what 
they did not know.96 Here was one more argument both defendants had tried, at times, that would 
be disallowed from the official narrative.  
 The jury retired to deliberate. Its members were allowed no public comment, but opinion 
still held that they were taking their task quite seriously. Lay’s lead lawyer, Mike Ramsey, said he 
was “encouraged” when he heard the jury was reviewing audio and videotape.97 This comment 
reflected once again the defense’s assumption that all technicalities were on their side, and that a 
jury interested in detail would eschew matters of moral fault. Most observers and commentators, 
however, weighed the defendants’ chances in a bigger picture—in which the prosecution’s airtight 
presentation and Lay’s botched testimony appeared much more prominent—and were all but 
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 certain of overwhelming conviction. In an indicator that would have been familiar, if hardly 
welcome, to Lay and Skilling themselves, futures trading markets also reflected this widespread 
prediction. “Lay-Skilling contracts” almost unanimously favored the odds that the two men would 
be found guilty, with the only real speculation pertaining to how many counts each would be 
convicted on.98 
On May 25, after six days’ deliberation, the jury announced its decision: Lay was guilty on 
all six of his counts, and Skilling convicted of nineteen out of his own twenty-eight. Those 
Houstonians and former Enron employees who commented appeared satisfied: “If [the guilty 
verdict] hadn’t happened it would have been an open wound,” said Chris Jones, who had worked 
for Enron. “This brings closure for some people.”99  (If speaking for himself, Jones might have 
been referring to psychological closure, but in a broader sense the trial offered narrative closure 
as well.) Letters to the editor in local newspapers had locals affirming Lay and Skilling’s guilt and 
suggesting unconventional punishments, while others condemned the impulse toward “jubilant 
‘public lynching.’”100 Although many people who had lost money in the Enron collapse were more 
interested in Lay and Skilling’s civil rather than criminal liability, the verdict was good news even 
for them. The dozens of lawsuits pending against the two men could now go forward, 
strengthened by this conviction, and attempt to win back some of the so-called “stolen” money.  
For their part, onlookers in the business and white collar legal worlds seemed regretful—
not so much that Lay and Skilling had been found guilty, but rather, that they were guilty. That is 
to say, it seemed some business leaders and defense lawyers, like Bethany McLean, had hoped 
for a revelation that these Enron executives had not actually done anything unethical or illegal. 
This signified, again, a faith in the legal process that may or may not have been warranted. At any 
rate, people generally agreed that prosecutors had simply presented the better case. A few 
murmured that the projected sentences—up to twenty-five years for men who were not young—
were too harsh, designed to make an example of Lay and Skilling. This complaint was familiar 
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 from previous high-profile business cases, such as that of 1980s junk bond financier Mike Milken. 
As a “symbol of greed,” Milken was sentenced to ten years after pleading guilty to offenses 
usually punished by a maximum of eighteen months.101  
Overall, however, the consensus held that Enron and its top executives had been fairly 
judged. Not only did Lay and Skilling seem to have in fact done what they had been charged with 
doing; it also appeared that the trial had duly proven it. Joe Lauria of The Business, for example, 
emphasized Judge Lake’s impeccable reputation, and in a legal prognosis on the defendants’ 
prospects for appeal rebutted, one by one, potential arguments that the trial had been 
procedurally flawed.102 
The defendants’ responses to the bad news were fairly predictable in light of their 
previous public statements. Lay led a prayer circle, assuring his family and supporters that all 
would “come through this stronger and more reliant on God,” who had “another plan,” and said he 
still considered his life “blessed.”103 Skilling simply reasserted his innocence and vowed to 
appeal. “Obviously, I’m disappointed,” he said of the verdict, to reporters outside the courtroom 
“but that’s the way the system works.”104 Both would continue on the themes of scapegoating and 
conspiracy, insisting that the passage of time and the cooling of tempers would ultimately show 
they had been honest and diligent managers.  
The Enron Task Force, meanwhile, gloried in victory. “The jury has spoken,” said director 
Sean Berkowitz, “and they have sent an unmistakable message to boardrooms across the 
country that you can’t lie to shareholders, you can’t put yourself in front of your employees’ 
interests, and no matter how rich and powerful you are you have to play by the rules.”105 Such 
panorama demonstrates once more the crucial symbolism of this trial, for the government, over 
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 others of its kind. No doubt, the Enron case was hard-fought, but it stood for something greater: 
an assurance that in the end, the federal government could have the final word in this 
embarrassing scandal.  
Perhaps most telling was the Enron Task Force’s tacit indication that its work was done. 
After the Lay-Skilling trial, government lawyers refused to say whether they were pursuing any 
more Enron-related indictments, whereas leading up to the trial they had seemed to warn that 
anyone affiliated with the company—especially if he did not cooperate with the government—had 
reason to fear. Some former prosecutors speculated that from now on, Enron would be the SEC’s 
affair. One veteran, Jacob Frenkl, said more decisively: “Enron beach is closed, and not just for 
the summer.” Yet it was widely known that dozens more former Enron executives, dwelling 
obscurely in vacation getaways or compounding their wealth in new jobs, were also great 
candidates for indictment.106 Some of them were so seriously implicated that even under Judge 
Lake’s stringent standards of evidentiary relevance, they became important characters in the 
trial’s proceedings—in coveted absentia. At any rate, the government seemed to have decided 
that if Lay and Skilling were put away, Enron as a whole had been adequately prosecuted. This 
trial likely would have been but a part of a much longer-term investigation and federal court 
offensive had the Task Force’s mandate been earnest, and purely legal. 
The most illuminating comments at trial’s end, however, came from the jury. Finally, after 
months of speculation, all parties involved in and outside of the trial could hear directly how these 
twelve locals interpreted the proceedings and reached their judgment. First, the panel showed it 
had embraced rather than balked at the technical components in the case. (Upsetting lawyers’ 
and PR consultants’ assumptions as to who focuses more on “facts,” the majority of these jurors 
were female.) Yet if information and expertise clearly had been important to the panel, it was not 
for the reasons that defense lawyers would have liked. Jurors acknowledged the scope of 
business language and rules that the trial had required them to master.107 Wendy Vaughan, a 
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 local business owner, said such a complex case “was like having a 2,500-piece puzzle dumped 
on the table.” Another juror added that “not all the pieces were there.”108 But the jurors never 
suggested that their attention to such arcana automatically favored the defense. Learning it was 
simply prerequisite to making their decision—which, as it happened, did quite the opposite. 
The technical knowledge and business mastery of the defendants themselves actually 
worked against them—though here the government’s hopes were not fulfilled either. Jurors never 
expressed resentment or alienation toward Lay or Skilling simply for their sophistication or their 
elite training. Rather, it was the defendants’ obvious expertise as combined with claims of 
ignorance that the panel could not reconcile. Often purported, by himself and others, as a genius, 
Skilling appeared too adept to have been fooled or blind-sided: “When he got on the stand and 
knew what a [technically complicated] chart was and how it worked, we knew he was involved,” 
said elementary school principal Freddy Delgado. Likewise Lay’s authoritative essence was not 
easily scuttled once it became inconvenient. Just as jurors observed that he attempted, 
disastrously, to “command the courtroom” during proceedings and “take control” of his 
questioning,109 so it seemed he had always held the helm at Enron despite all claims to the 
contrary. It was simply impossible for the jury to imagine Lay deferring to anyone—at least, not 
without calculation and purpose. His rudeness and obvious frustration, even in dealing with his 
own attorneys, hardly helped in this regard. 
For all this skepticism and exaction, however, jurors also attended seriously to the ethical 
and philosophical parameters of the Enron case. Delgado took Andy Fastow’s testimony with a 
grain of salt because, he said, anyone willing to funnel stolen money through his children was not 
credible. Moreover, this juror said he identified as “CEO” of his school, and could not fathom 
being as unaccountable or as opaque as Lay and Skilling appeared.110 Members of the jury said 
the defendants’ stock sales spoke volumes; that “cash[ing] out at the expense of employees” 
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 demonstrated poor character.111 More than one juror remarked on the sadness of the situation, 
regardless of the defendants’ guilt or innocence, and expressed deep disappointment in their 
conclusion that some of the region’s most dazzling and inspiring successes had been ill-won. 
Hardly vengeful, administrative manager Doug Baggett regretfully pronounced that in Enron’s 
aftermath “everyone was a loser.”112 
Fusing the trial’s demands on both their technical and their moral sensibilities was the 
sheer weight of jurors’ commitment. They spoke proudly of the sacrifices they made to perform 
their assignment—which had strained their intellects, their analytic faculties, and also their 
schedules—thoroughly and effectively. Through sixteen weeks of testimony, jurors worked nights 
and weekends to stay abreast of their job responsibilities. “We went home so tired we hardly 
knew who we were,” said payroll manager Carolyn Kuchera. It was a complex kind of exhaustion, 
due to more than scant sleep and intense concentration. They accepted that Lay and Skilling’s 
fates were in their hands, and insisted that they get the verdict “right the first time.”113 Such a 
serious charge, in the words of retiree Nancy Thomas, had “taken a whole lot out of…our hearts 
and our minds.” 114 Jurors announced not only that they had become an emotionally bonded, 
interdependent “family,” intimately aware of events in each other’s lives, but also that they had 
begun every single day of the Enron proceedings by praying as a group. Being from different 
religious backgrounds, they took turns leading prayer, but invariably they asked for “guidance” as 
they sought the case’s “truth.”115   
The service of the panel was clearly a point of pride, both for observers of the trial and 
also for its members themselves. “The Enron jury is the walking definition of ‘grace under 
pressure,’” Houstonian Sylvia Villareal wrote to the Houston Chronicle. “In this often cynical and 
weary world, they gave us a close-up look at the dignity, wisdom and courage of ordinary 
                                                 
111 Rust, “Defendants Sunk by Their Testimony.” 
112 Babineck and Kaplan, ““Enron Jurors: We Prayed, Too.” 
113 Rust, “Defendants Sunk by Their Testimony.” 
114 Bajaj and Whitmire, “‘I Didn’t Know’ Did Not Sway Houston Jury.”  
115 Babineck and Kaplan, ““Enron Jurors: We Prayed, Too.” 
 245 
 citizens.”116 Such a pronouncement might have been particularly assuring given that these jurors 
were the only people to land in the public eye, as associated with Enron, essentially through no 
choice of their own. Thus even if someone like putative whistleblower-heroine Sherron Watkins 
had in fact been out for herself all along, the truly “ordinary” Americans who had been forced into 
the Enron story could at least remain sympathetic characters. With accolades for the jury’s 
dedication and precision came credit to the individuals, the city of Houston, and even the country 
as a whole that were welcome—and perhaps even, in context of the embarrassment of the Enron 
scandal, needed.  
Yet in a final testament to the sagacity of the panel, jurors showed that they did not take 
themselves too seriously. For even aside from the few jokes they made to reporters after 
delivering the verdict, they had shown levity by coordinating their outfits on every secular holiday 
that fell within the trial’s period: pink and red for Valentine’s Day, and the signature bright plastic 
beads for Mardi Gras. On March 2 they appeared to have agreed on a Western theme: spotted in 
the jury booth were “a distinctive color-blocked Western shirt,” a number of vests and bolo ties, 
and a “Western cut suede skirt.” Most observers from out of state hadn’t a clue what occasion the 
jurors were celebrating—and part of the amusement was in the fact that no one was allowed to 
ask. Those in the know confirmed it was Texas Independence Day, for which Texan children are 
encouraged to wear “country and Western attire” to school.117  
Later, jurors explained that the theme dressing celebrated their friendship but also 
affirmed, for their audience and for themselves, that Enron must be kept in perspective. Alternate 
juror Gary Creakbaum revealed he had brought in a king cake on Mardi Gras, and fellow panelist 
Doug Baggett said that although he was initially wary of “cutesy displays” he ultimately endorsed 
them as “a subtle way of saying ‘we still have lives.’”118 This jury was absorbing information and 
considering arguments at a level of tedium that would probably be trying to anybody, yet 
simultaneously they brought whimsy into an extremely tense situation. Such a gift was 
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 necessarily unique to the panel, because such levity would have been inappropriate coming from 
any other party in the courtroom. Here we revisit a critical theme in democratic engagement with 
business scandals: the intersection of critical thinking and humor. The jury proved that “ordinary” 
American citizens could be all at once technically proficient, morally astute, and judiciously 
jovial—all while embracing a civic responsibility to determine both what had happened and what 
should happen next.  
In sum jurors’ comments, after delivering the verdict, reflected the same dedication and 
proficiency that people had long attributed to them even as they sat silent. Such remarks also 
showed that courtroom theatrics had been performed essentially in vain; that the trial’s moralizing 
speeches, fury, and pleading had all been deemed simplistic and irrelevant. This did not mean, 
however, that jurors viewed the Enron case as strictly technical either. In other words, both the 
prosecution and the defense, in the Enron trial, had underestimated the jury—even though they 
knew it was better-educated than most. (Six jurors had college degrees, and of these two also 
had master’s.)119 The government had thought it could win in a morality play, while the 
defendants believed that straight “facts” would always tilt the jury in their favor—or at least 
confuse them enough that they wouldn’t dare to convict.  
Instead, this jury actually appeared to function more or less exactly as the trial system, 
ideally, envisions: as wise arbiter and proxy for the common people. Like anyone else who did not 
have a personal stake in this case, jurors could see plainly that Enron was neither “simple,” 
merely about “truth and lies,” nor was it prohibitively complicated. Lay and Skilling did not deserve 
snap moral judgment, but neither did it take multiple advanced degrees to understand what they 
had been doing. Daily prayer was strengthening and inspiring. Meanwhile, cake and costumes 
were still occasionally in order. The jury defied both the posturing government and the shrill 
defense by tacitly insisting that life goes on. This verdict was, impressively, a synthesis of 
technicality, morality, and perspective that the jury had been left to do entirely on its own.    
In this sense the Enron trial succeeded in spite of itself. While it was no particular 
surprise that Lay and Skilling were convicted overall, the jurors’ explanations as to how and why 
                                                 
119 Barrionuevo, “Enron Jury Chosen in First Day.”  
 247 
 they found these defendants guilty bode well for the ongoing dialogue about big business and 
fraud. Even though crucial issues of corporate-government relations were excluded from these 
proceedings, “the people” (via the jury) demonstrated that they accepted platitudes neither from 
executives nor from public officials. The jury as representative of the population, or their post-
verdict comments as representative of their true feelings, might be more tenuous if not for the 
ample evidence from before, during and after the Enron scandal. Most Americans, this evidence 
suggested, had taken this approach toward corporate crime all along. 
 Robert Ferguson writes that a trial becomes an “enduring event” if it articulates an urgent 
broader conflict, if it promises an element of surprise, and if its issues and parties are 
iconographic. The Lay-Skilling trial fulfilled none of these criteria. The public rage it ostensibly 
sought to address—over the Enron bankruptcy specifically—had peaked years ago. To be sure, 
Enron stood for a broader conflict as well, but this trial featured neither the appropriate parties nor 
the appropriate means to play it out. While there were a few surprises during these proceedings, 
most notably Lay’s testimony, the arguments and even the trial’s outcome were more or less as 
predicted. At any rate, as we saw, many people did not stake much on either of these anyway. 
Finally, what icons there were here—the two defendants and perhaps Fastow and Watkins—had 
been iconized already. The trial made no new stars. Thus the Enron trial will not be historically 
significant. Indeed most people have already forgotten about it, to the extent they were ever 
aware of it to begin with.  
One reason is Enron’s relative impact compared to the much more sweeping financial 
disasters that followed later in the same decade. Yet even before most Americans could 
anticipate something much worse still to come, the Enron trial—though not the Enron 
bankruptcy—vanished from consciousness almost immediately, almost completely. This was 
because, unlike the monumental trials in Ferguson’s study, this one did not represent a climax for 
the story that engendered it. The decisive moments in the Enron story had come in 2001, and this 
trial, especially because it was so long in coming, was a narrative afterthought. For this reason, 
the government could never redeem itself as thoroughly as it would have liked. For despite the 
satisfying repetition of the word “guilty” twenty-one times, the fact is that very few people were 
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 listening by that point. Coverage of the Enron trial was neither as thorough, nor as prominent, nor 
as dramatic as coverage of the Enron bankruptcy. 
Once again, we see the supremacy of narrative over basic sequences of events. Here 
the two held a sort of standoff as to whether the Enron trial would be historically important or not. 
If everything that occurred that was pertinent to this corporate scandal fell on a simple timeline, 
with each event given some objective weight, then it might have mattered much more that Lay 
and Skilling were convicted and sentenced to jail. But in ordinary public perception, the narrative 
arc of Enron was already complete before the trial even began. Judgments had already been 
made not only on these two defendants, but also on their company, big business in general, and 
public officials in their relation thereto. In one sense, American citizens were ill-served by the 
Enron Task Force’s decision not to pursue any other prosecutions—but in practical terms, they 
had not cared much even about these ones. This is not to discount the outrage that so many had 
felt over the Enron scandal. Instead, it is simply to acknowledge that what “closure” they got from 
the criminal proceedings was superficial and clumsily timed. The Lay-Skilling trial, for narrative 
purposes, was both too little and too late.  
Kenneth L. Lay, 1942-2006: The Con Man Makes His Great Escape 
It was only due to a surprise punctuation, roughly two months after the trial, that there 
was much reflection at all on the Enron story in total. Here was one dramatic plot twist that even 
the closest followers of the Enron saga could never have anticipated. On July 5 in Snowmass, 
Colorado, Ken Lay was reported dead of heart disease. Just 64, Lay had been thought relatively 
healthy, and his heart problem was previously unknown. In yet another illustration of the power of 
narrative, people were much more interested in this death than they had been in the trial. Thus to 
the extent that the lay public revisited Enron in 2006, it was due not to the government’s 
meticulously planned prosecution, but instead to the former CEO’s sudden, unceremonious exit. 
Almost instantaneously, conspiracy theories hit the internet: the body that was 
pronounced dead at the hospital was not Lay’s. He had snuck out of town, bound maybe for 
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 South America, that haven of Nazis and other public enemies of the West.120 Perhaps like Juliet 
he had feigned death, to be carried from his bed in a storm of shock and grief, and then made his 
escape from the morgue by paying off the night staff. President George W. Bush, actually a loyal 
friend all along, could have arranged for the CIA to put “Kenny Boy” in the Witness Protection 
Program, supplying him with a new identity and a new life. Someone even suspected that Lay 
had undergone plastic surgery to resemble and to replace Cuban president Fidel Castro, who had 
either already died or was expected to do so soon. 121  And in a final, ludicrous nod to the notion 
of Enron executives as “economic terrorists,” Lay’s face appeared imposed on Osama bin 
Laden’s head. The former CEO would elude authorities by growing a beard, wearing a turban, 
and hiding in some remote cave.  
The most plausible explanation, if we are to demand one, for Lay’s abrupt death, is that 
that emotional and psychological trauma had seeped from his mind into his body. Even his most 
bitter detractor would have to admit that the experience of losing, all at once, his company, his 
career, his reputation, and many of his friends, must have been deeply upsetting for Lay. As 
Enron’s founder, he had always taken great pride in the firm, and so, although its disgrace did not 
hurt him financially nearly as much as it did others, it probably did affect him emotionally to a far 
greater extent. He certainly said as much, as did other chief executives, particularly Skilling.  
Then came the Enron trial, a protracted experience of humiliation in the very same 
community in which he was once a pillar. Lay also underwent a separate, individual trial 
immediately afterwards, and was convicted on four additional bank fraud charges.122 Some 
unsympathetic commentators after Lay’s death protested that he could not possibly have had a 
heart attack, because he had no heart. If such poetic license may be borrowed in his (qualified) 
defense, it is possible that Lay did have a heart, but that it had been broken. There is medical 
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 research to the effect that emotional trauma can bring on cardiac problems; this is increasingly 
likely as people age. Experts also said that depression and even the high altitude of the Aspen 
area might have put intolerable strain on Lay’s heart.123  
The one “conspiracy theory” worth taking seriously is that of discreet, premeditated 
suicide. Much was made of the (relatively) favorable timing of Lay’s death: after he became sure 
that he was bound for jail but before beginning his sentence. Also noted, his autopsy was 
performed inordinately quickly, and by a coroner brought in from another county who promptly 
pronounced that Lay had died of a heart attack, with no sign of foreign chemicals in his body. 
Autopsies showed, however, that Lay had had two prior heart attacks.124 It was never publicized 
that he had been on heart medication, but if so, he could simply have stopped taking it. Lay may 
have decided, perhaps in consultation with his wife or his whole family, that he would rather die 
prematurely as a free man than suffer decades of imprisonment. When he reported to jail he 
would have left his family bereaved and disgraced, bound to handling indefinite litigation. It is 
harrowing, but one might imagine making such a choice given the circumstances. Though least 
dramatic as a “conspiracy theory,” this one is actually the grimmest. 
Lay had two memorial services: one in Aspen, near where he died (and where he and his 
wife had long maintained a home away from home), and one in Houston. The latter attracted 
several well-known figures in politics and business, including former Secretary of State James 
Baker, Reliant Energy CEO Joel Staff, and Houston Astros owner Drayton McLane. The most 
high-profile attendees were former president George H. W. Bush and his wife Barbara.125 Jeff 
Skilling did not attend, although his wife, who had also worked with Lay for years, did.126 
(Skilling’s absence may or may not have been meaningful, but at any rate it garnered no 
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 comment.) The officiating minister, Rev. Dr. Bill Lawson, compared Lay to Martin Luther King, Jr., 
and to Jesus. His premise was that Lay, like King and the Messiah, was wrongly persecuted, and 
that like theirs, his untimely death was a profound loss to the world. Lawson averred that future 
generations will recognize Lay as a righteous man.127  
Again much was made of Lay’s empathy and generosity toward the less fortunate, and 
African-Americans in particular. “Most people will give to the museum. Most people will give to the 
opera. Most people will give to the ballet,” said Rev. Lawson. 128 Lay, however, was a “unique 
philanthropist” who “was willing to reach down and touch people like me.”129 As a well-known 
pastor and community leader, there was no obvious reason for Lawson to position himself as 
beneath Lay, but he may have been invoking the persistent hierarchies of race. Lawson 
described Lay as “rich and powerful”—not as white—but it is worth noting that the three 
institutions he cited as opposed to those of “people like [him]” are historically some of the nation’s 
most exclusive and culturally homogenous.  
Sheila Jackson Lee also praised Lay once again. “Kenneth Lay loved the community of 
Houston and America,” she said, “and we thank him for it.”130 A black Democrat, Rep. Lee was 
the only lawmaker to issue any official condolence statement. Finally, a personal anecdote 
rendered Lay’s sanctity in the most human terms. Rev. Steve Wende of First Methodist Church 
recalled for mourners what one Houston courthouse maintenance worker said to him about Lay. 
‘“When this…trial started,”’ this woman supposedly remarked, ‘“one of the first things he did is 
walk over…, tell me I was doing a great job and thank me for the way I was cleaning the floors. 
I’ve been working here for years [and] he is the first man in a suit ever to look me in the eye and 
say anything kind.”’131 
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 Lay’s obituaries were less partial. Most of them simply performed the typical function of 
the form: announcing his death, summarizing his life, and discussing the significance of his 
career. Obituaries usually refrained from moralizing tirade, which though probably justified might 
have been in bad taste. Neither, however, did they pretend that Lay died a prosperous and 
upstanding self-made businessman. They frankly rehashed his descent from dazzling success to 
consummate shame. Further, they usually related him more broadly to the spate of corporate 
scandals of 2001-2003 and, occasionally, to their impact on public policy.132 To the historian, it is 
noteworthy that only here, in obituaries and other articles about Ken Lay’s death, did any 
expressions of collective Enron memory refer to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. (None mentioned 
McCain-Feingold.) The fact that legislative reform went unmentioned in all other forums, including 
the analytically sophisticated Smartest Guys in the Room, suggests how little relevance and 
salience it had, as a legacy of Lay or Enron, for most “ordinary” Americans.  
Informal treatments of Lay’s death gave voice to more impulsive, less informed reactions 
to the news. Some who were still furious about Enron said stiffly that he had gotten what he 
deserved. But more commentators, in internet posts or letters to the editor, expressed anger at 
what they perceived as the ultimate guile.133 Unlike the conspiracy theorists mentioned earlier, 
these protestors accepted that Lay was indeed dead. However, the sentiment behind their 
remarks was similar: that the convicted and disgraced Lay had still found a way to avoid any real 
accountability.  
Lay made the cover of the New York Post on the day after his death. The report inside 
was titled, “LAY HIM LOW: ENRON’S CHIEF CROOK DUCKS BIG HOUSE BY DROPPING 
DEAD.”134  A few editorial cartoons added dark humor to this general idea. One featured Lay as 
an angel; wings, halo, and all; flying out of a birdcage. Recalling the bitter practical joke played on 
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 electrical price-fixing convicts in the ‘60s, this image appears on a Monopoly game “GET OUT OF 
JAIL, FREE” card, which reads “THIS CARD MAY BE KEPT UNTIL NEEDED OR DEAD.”135 
Another cartoon depicts an “Enron retiree” attempting to purchase flowers in honor of the late 
executive; she asks the vendor what she might buy with a quarter.136 Whether this is the most 
she can afford or whether this sum represents her esteem for Lay is not clear, but the two 
readings are not mutually exclusive. Such statements are intriguing because they are actually 
even colder, toward Lay, than saying he deserved to die. In effect, when expressing anger that 
Lay had been able to “escape,” these writers and artists suggested he deserved something 
worse. Death represented a rest and a reward that Lay had not earned.  
Another cartoon shows a mortician announcing to a crowd, in bafflement, “Apparently he 
took it with him.”137 One man in the disgruntled assembly is clutching a newspaper whose 
headline reads, “CHANCE OF $ SETTLEMENT FOR ENRON VICTIMS?” Here was where the 
sense of being duped went beyond the mere frustration of vengeful fantasies. For indeed, 
because Lay died before exercising his right to appeal the conviction, his criminal record was 
wiped clean per standard legal procedure. This meant that the government’s avowed plan to 
seize $43.5 million from Lay’s estate, as forfeiture for his crimes, was moot. To the extent that 
those appropriated moneys would have been used for relief of former Enron employees and 
shareholders, Lay did take that possible consolation with him. The aggrieved still pursued civil 
remedies privately, of which more will be said later. 
Whether rightly or not, Lay had always been the figurehead for Enron; once basking in its 
glory, then cowering in its disgrace. There is an impulse to anthropomorphize the corporation, for 
it is so vast and diffuse that it is difficult for many to conceptualize. Thus the equation of Enron 
with its founder was cognitively convenient. Also, to interpret the scandal with a focus on its 
characters deflects attention away from the underlying systemic factors that were involved, which 
are more complicated and more disturbing. But if the Enron story was “about people,” then what 
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 did it mean that the one person who most commonly stood for the company had died? For those 
who had been seeking narrative closure on the Enron scandal, on the surface level, it had been 
granted. To the extent that Lay was Enron, Enron was gone. On a deeper level, however, Lay’s 
death represented a permanent denial of closure. He had been convicted, but he had never 
confessed, never repented, and never returned money to those from whom he had “stolen.” 
Justice can hardly be served on a criminal who has escaped. Lay’s sentence was forever 
suspended. The verdict of “the people” would never be carried out. 
Thus Skilling was the lone convict at the sentencing hearing on May 25. In the audience 
were not only his family and legal team, but also several former Enron employees, members of 
the Lay family and, remarkably, more than half of the jury that had convicted him.138 In what has 
become a fairly common feature of such hearings,139 “victims” of the offender’s crimes—in this 
case, Enron workers and investors—were permitted to make statements. In a particularly potent 
example, Dawn Powers Martin, a veteran of Enron’s credit union, said Skilling was a “liar, a thief 
and a drunk” who had cheated her and her daughter out of retirement funds. Ann Beliveaux, who 
had worked eighteen years for Enron, told Skilling “The worst mistake Ken Lay ever made was to 
hire you…and let you run the company. When things got bad, you just shoved off, because you 
knew what was coming.”140  
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 Skilling got twenty-four years.141 The sentence was on the high end of initial estimates, 
but experts doubted it would have been any lower had Lay survived. Judge Lake also ordered 
Skilling to forfeit all of his assets—valued at $43 million—to a restitution fund for former Enron 
employees and shareholders.142 Still maintaining his innocence and planning his appeal—for 
which prospects were considered dim—Skilling reported to a low-security prison in Waseca, 
Minnesota on December 13, 2006. He was transferred in 2008 to a facility near Littleton, 
Colorado, where he remains today.  
It will be interesting to see what kind of public voice Skilling asserts in the future, both in 
the continued legal process and outside of it; both during his jail time and after his release. He 
has vowed to fight his charges until “the day [he dies],”143 but whatever the result, Skilling 
insists—as did Lay—that history will exonerate him. Even if it does, however, he stands to win 
very little. He might find some relief from the slew of lawsuits he faces, but in this case it seems 
safe to say that money would be little consolation—even for someone like Skilling. The fallout 
from the Enron bankruptcy, he has said, ruined his life. It permanently ruptured his career, his 
family, and his fundamental well-being. Skilling has more than once expressed a wish to die—and 
at this point two of his close associates, Cliff Baxter and Ken Lay, have done so, although only 
the former was a clear suicide. 
It may never be appropriate for a scholar to speculate on the psychologies of her 
subjects. If, however, there is any place where these men’s true self-concepts and criminal status 
deserve my final evaluation, it is here. After his verdict was announced, one reporter asked 
Skilling if he would ever admit to himself that he had done something wrong, and Skilling gave a 
definitive no—“because I didn’t.” Lay, though less strident in tone, had always taken the same 
attitude. Obviously, any defendant who has pled innocent will deny his alleged crimes, lying and 
perjuring himself as necessary. But for what it is worth, I think the Enron executives in this context 
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 were telling the truth. They had committed criminal offenses, but they genuinely believed they had 
not. In their writings and statements both before and after the bankruptcy, both men appear to 
have been remarkably out of touch not only with the specifics of energy, securities, and 
accounting regulation, but indeed with the very conceptual meaning of rules, at least as applied to 
themselves and to Enron. True business visionaries, Lay and Skilling made their reputations and 
fortunes in defying norms and questioning arbitrary boundaries. It seems they ultimately failed to 
recognize which lines were there for a reason, or at least which lines could not be crossed without 
consequences.  
Here is what makes the Enron case more textured, and more interesting, than almost 
anyone—on either side—would acknowledge. It is both a story of crooks who tried to cover their 
tracks and of successful businessmen who were scapegoated. What “really happened”—if such a 
statement is allowed in a study of narrative—is that Enron went down in disgrace due to a long 
legacy of bad decisions, some deceptive and some merely dumb. It did become a “poster child” 
for corporate corruption, and while the ramifications of this designation may have been unfair, the 
designation itself was not. The same could be said of the short-selling and “run on the bank” that 
Lay and Skilling so often cited. People were feverish in the rush to sell Enron stocks, or to profit 
from their devaluation, and though the net effect was damaging one cannot argue that the instinct 
behind it was wrong.  
Executives like Lay and Skilling had misbehaved, and committed crimes, but they could 
not see it. In the end their incomprehension, not that of the public who came to hate them, was 
the problem. The fact that these men could be guilty, and unanimously judged guilty, all the while 
proclaiming innocence with complete honesty, illuminates conflict and confusion in the society of 
which defendants, prosecutors and jurors were all representatives. It speaks to Americans’ 
simultaneous reverence and revulsion toward technical expertise and money. It shows the 
underside of the phenomenon of the celebrity executive. Finally, it illustrates a business culture 
that spurs innovation faster and faster, until it outpaces rules, even outpaces understanding. The 
public, and even legislators and regulators, struggle to understand what businesspeople are 
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 doing. Yet it also appears that businesspeople themselves lack crucial knowledge as to the 
meanings of their own actions, and also about the activities of people they supposedly manage. 
Conclusion 
Lerached: Justice Denied and Delayed, Again 
 
The last year Enron made major news was 2006. And even at that time narratives of the 
Enron story as a whole—from its founding, to its heyday, to its collapse, through the trial and its 
aftermath—found only tenuous resolution. Whether he deserved to or not, Ken Lay had died, and 
Jeff Skilling was behind bars but still denying everything. Yet there was still one more surprise 
episode to this story that would cement most decisively Enron’s moral ambiguity and 
incoherence, and foreclose any simple narrative of right and wrong in the world of business and 
law. Fittingly, it was a scandal, both deplorable and darkly amusing, and it involved millions of 
dollars and large-scale deception.   
As they stated repeatedly during the trial, many aggrieved former Enron employees and 
shareholders were more interested in litigation against Lay and Skilling than in criminal 
proceedings. While sending the men to jail might have brought some satisfaction, only a 
successful lawsuit could actually bring hope for financial compensation. Accordingly, there were 
dozens of civil complaints against these and other Enron executives, as well as the company as a 
whole. Lead plaintiffs’ counsel in the single largest class action suit, the $40 billion Newby vs. 
Kenneth Lay et al., was Bill Lerach of Milberg Weiss LLP.144 He was the nation’s best-known 
litigator in cases of this kind, having made his name suing companies like AT&T, Microsoft, and 
Prudential, with settlements in the tens of millions.  
Having railed his whole career against “corporate scam artists,” Lerach was a natural for 
the Enron lawsuits. Because the company had become iconic for executive exploitation of 
investors, it would indeed have been more remarkable if Lerach, iconic himself, had not 
represented the plaintiffs. Yet as the lawsuits proceeded, it turned out that the Department of 
Justice, striking gold in a years-long investigation unrelated to the Enron bankruptcy, found 
                                                 
144 “Lay’s Meteoric Rise, Fall and Death Leave Complicated Legacy and Legal Uncertainties,” Platts Power 
Markets Week 10 July 2006, 1; Nathan Koppel, “Lerach May Recover $50 Million in Fees; Trial Lawyer Who 
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 evidence that Lerach’s own methods of doing business were illegal. In 2006, he was indicted for 
his firm’s payment of secret kickbacks—estimated at a total of $11.3 million—to individuals who 
agreed to be lead plaintiffs.145   
Lerach did not lack for clients. Even absent a headline news corporate collapse or 
executives convicted of lying, he would represent any investors who had lost money from a 
particular stock’s decline in value. As one might imagine, he had quite a large customer pool, 
particularly around this time. Why, then, had Lerach needed to pay people to put their names on 
his cases? It was a matter of expediency, which translated to money—estimated in this case at 
$250 million.146 Whomever the court recognizes as lead counsel in a class-action suit of this kind 
stands to win a far greater share of any settlement than other firms and attorneys who join the 
legal push afterward. Being named lead counsel is largely a matter of getting there first, but one 
needs a lead plaintiff to put on even the most hastily filed complaint. Apparently, money 
encouraged people to commit quickly. 
The individuals who suffered, as a result of Lerach’s illegal payments, were certainly not 
the lead plaintiffs who received them. Nor did the kickbacks particularly affect other parties to the 
lawsuits—or, they wouldn’t have, had Lerach never been caught. The issue here, according to 
the government’s allegations, was abuse of the legal system. In other words, while Lerach’s 
clients might not have been bothered by his misconduct, the citizenry as a whole deserved a 
model of litigation based on the merits of claims rather than a money-greased race to the best 
promise of profit.  
If this premise sounds familiar, it is no surprise, for it is largely the same logic by which 
the Enron scandal indicated a systemic problem. The stock market is based on a necessary 
assumption that companies compete, with transparency, on the sole basis of real business 
success. Strategic misrepresentation and movements of money should not be allowed to give or 
maintain a favorable standing that a firm has not earned, just as they must not be permitted to 
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 buy a designation as lead counsel or a disproportionate share of legal winnings. Lerach had 
manipulated the system in which he worked in a manner analogous to that of Lay and Skilling.  
This was only one in a series of fascinating corollaries between the hapless story of Bill 
Lerach and those of his favorite Enron lawsuit targets. For throughout the process of his 
indictment, it was widely acknowledged that, just like Lay and Skilling, Lerach was for the 
government a coveted big name. This “superlawyer” held special symbolic significance, and his 
punishment was primarily intended as an example and a deterrent to others in his line of work.147 
As with Enron executives, Lerach’s errant practices were probably widespread, perhaps even de 
rigueur. But if this particular man and his closest associates were caught and punished, that 
would serve the investigation’s real purposes, which were both more and less than prosecution 
for kickbacks. 
Lerach’s public disgrace also mirrored those of Lay and Skilling in that he came to 
epitomize the corruption of the very ideas he held most dear. Just as Enron’s smartest guys had 
made their lives’ work in energy deregulation, trading models, and innovative management, 
Lerach had based his entire career on a conviction that ordinary shareholders must be able to 
hold even the largest and richest corporations accountable for flawed information and bad 
decisions. Yet in the end Lay, Skilling and Lerach all seriously discredited their long-cherished 
causes, and moreover defeated themselves, by engaging in lies and exploitation. 
Once Lerach was in the spotlight for these charges, broader complaints about his trade, 
though they were hardly new, enjoyed fresh consideration. The allegation, in the cases Lerach 
filed, was always fraud—that shareholders had been deliberately misled as to a company’s 
condition or earnings—but business leaders had argued for years that such lawsuits usually have 
no grounds but resentment and regret. To be “Lerached,” as it was known, was to be sued by 
one’s shareholders if only for having a bad quarter. Investing always entails risk, but lawsuits like 
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 these—according to corporate defendants—sought to neutralize it by winning “back” in 
settlements money that had been lost fair and square on the market. 
Enron, of course, was not a good example in this pro-business argument, for here the 
stock devaluation had been a massive, scandalous bankruptcy, and the executives in question 
had formally been pronounced liars. But even if Lerach and others like him did ply most of their 
business suing companies that didn’t deserve it, Enron proved that some investor lawsuits have 
legitimate grounds. Indeed, if one of the causes of the Enron collapse was lax regulation and a 
condoning federal system, then evidently shareholders could not rely on the government to 
protect or, much less, to recover their money in real instances of fraud. How else than by threat of 
lawsuits would companies be kept honest? And how else than by suing could cheated 
shareholders hope for any recompense? Although nobody lost livelihood or savings directly from 
Lerach’s illegalities, they were dangerous in their implications, just like those of Lay and Skilling.  
In one crucial move, however, Lerach departed from the unsavory company of Enron’s 
two top executives: he pled guilty. Admitting to obstruction of justice and making false statements 
under oath, Lerach agreed to two years’ imprisonment, 1,000 hours of community service, and a 
$250,000 fine.148 At his sentencing, he apologized to his family and former colleagues, and he 
publicly admitted to acting unethically and illegally.  
Still, like Enron’s leaders Lerach was clearly uncomfortable in taking any real blame, and 
so he too indulged in some almost laughable deflections. First, he questioned the motivations of 
the federal prosecutors who had been investigating him for years.149 Second, he claimed his 
punishment was far too harsh given the impunity of “Wall Street CEOs who line their pockets 
while making stupid decisions that rob shareholders and pensioners of billions of dollars.”150 
Third, the very language he used to announce his wrongdoing still managed to sound almost self-
righteous. “In my zeal to stand up against this kind of corporate greed over the years,” Lerach 
wrote, “I stepped over the line.”  
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Finally, like a child scowling under a wagging finger, Lerach had much to say about 
everyone else’s misbehavior even though he was the one in trouble. In an op-ed column that ran 
in The Washington Post Lerach railed against executives of Citigroup, Merrill Lynch and Enron—
and made only a passing nod to his own crimes.151 The only connection he forged between 
corporate fraud and paying kickbacks to plaintiffs was, essentially, that the former was 
immeasurably worse, and that punishments should reflect that. In a more useful op-ed Lerach 
might have admitted that a corrupt system of “standing up to corporate greed” could leave 
shareholders doubly victimized: first cheated by a fraudulent company, then exploited by a self-
interested lawyer. It even appeared that Lerach and his colleagues were part of a kind of 
ecosystem that had grown up around large corporate fraud. His livelihood had depended on 
executives who acted unethically, or at least who could be made to appear dishonest. 
Bill Lerach’s admitted crime was the last gasp of Enron narratives in the mainstream 
media—and not every report even linked him to Enron litigation at all. This was not a major story, 
and surprisingly few commentators reflected on the disturbing parallels between Lerach’s illicit 
practices and the frauds of the executives he so vilified. Perhaps pundits and journalists did not 
see these connections, or perhaps they deliberately left the job of picking them apart to some 
future historian. At any rate, this case in point about the inherent messiness, entanglement and 
contestability of narrative—that is, the Enron “case”—ends in a perverse neatness. The Lerach 
bust as the Enron scandal’s final episode is so morally symmetrical that only a boldly romantic 
storyteller would ever have dared make it up. 
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Epilogue: The Financial Crisis of 2008 
 
 
When future generations write about American business and economics in the early 
twenty-first century, Enron will all but certainly be overshadowed by the financial crisis of 2007-
2009. The mortgage and credit crash that occurred later in the decade, which led to numerous 
bankruptcies and controversial government bailouts, had further-reaching effects by far, both 
economically and politically, than did Enron. For one, it caused a severe recession, which made 
the vagaries of globalized finance all too tangible to millions of Americans in the form of 
foreclosures, layoffs, devalued retirement funds and stock portfolios, and a constriction in public 
services—to name only some effects. The crisis, most convulsive in 2008, also took longer to 
play out, since the scope and the implications of numerous, interconnected news items—ranging 
from bad to worse— seemed unclear, for quite some time, to even the most trusted intellectual 
authorities. As we have seen, any event that, in the moment, registers as historic—especially if it 
has some quality of disaster—needs a narrative. The financial crisis presented even more an 
acute demand than that of Enron, and so, of course, the storytelling began. Accounts yielded thus 
far alternately echo, abandon, or seem entirely to ignore the still-recent bankruptcies of Enron 
and its ilk.  
Telling the Financial Crisis 
First came the explanations from on high, which proved contentious from the start. 
Federal officials and pundits of the national economy shrilly disagreed with each other on what 
had happened and what should be done. That dynamic was hardly new, although it was probably 
more intense, and more consequential, than prior to the recession. More distressing, these same 
experts had also begun contradicting themselves; negating their own previous statements—
whether willing to admit it or not—on, for example, interest rates, lending standards, and 
 securities ratings. The primary storytellers of the national economy, to whom everyone was 
looking urgently at this time, appeared to be fumbling.  
By October 2008, in the throes of what was by then known generally as “the financial 
crisis,” America’s most reliable and most convincing economist may have been Kenan Thompson 
of Saturday Night Live’s “Weekend Update.” Appearing in suit and tie as an expert talking head 
on this fake news show, “The Fix-It Guy” never altered his story. Indeed, he did not even have 
one; simply screaming two syllables—“Fix it!”—in response to every question about the desperate 
state of the US economy. Thompson was hysteria embodied, with his head appearing ready to 
snap off his shoulders and his wild eyes close to popping out of their sockets. Imagine his 
deafening primal shriek in this representative exchange: 
ANCHOR: So how do we go about fixing it specifically? 
FIX-IT GUY: Take it one step at a time. Identify the problem. Fix it! Identify another 
problem. Fix it! Repeat as necessary, until it’s all fixed!1  
 
Prescriptions like this demonstrated roughly the level of certainty to which American audiences 
were by now accustomed. It was perhaps even relieving to hear one prognosticator who did not 
pretend to know what he was talking about. Articulating not only terror but also rage and a total 
lack of comprehension, the Fix-It Guy offered more catharsis than satire. And as Thompson 
reprised his role numerous times in late 2008 the laughter grew fainter and fainter. 
 Amid the turmoil and chaos of this time, cultural memory was everywhere. The busts and 
panics that have pockmarked the US economy for as long as there has been one were perfect 
prologue to the upheaval of 2008, in which every newscast seemed to convey the American 
Dream turning to nightmare: people losing their homes, making less money or no money, and 
watching one by one all elements of their professional and material security falling into question. 
Many adults could easily remember, as recently as the early 1990s, seeing lines of people waiting 
outside commercial banks or Savings & Loan offices, anxiously waiting to take out their money 
(and hoping that it was still there). The quip “is that a breadline or a bank?” was grimly applicable 
to this episode while also referring to the nation’s most infamous, in which homelessness and 
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 hunger, for many more people, had been no metaphor.2 Although the 2008 recession had not, 
and would not, even approach the dire situation of the 1930s, comparisons to the Great 
Depression in particular ran rampant. Many superlative statements about the dismal state of 
affairs were qualified only with “…since the Great Depression.” The fear, which hardly needed to 
be made explicit, was that current trends, particularly in banking, the stock market and the job 
market, if uncurbed might lead the crisis to rival or even surpass those dubious 1930s records.   
 As in the case of Enron and the spate of corporate scandals that had accompanied it 
several years prior, this crisis could have been foreseen. In some exceptional instances, and for 
some specific factors, it was—but foreboding economic prophecies had been unpopular, as 
usual. Leaders both in business and government were inclined now to portray the mortgage and 
credit collapses as externally motivated and utterly disarming—not unlike a terrorist attack, 
although the 9/11 analogy was no longer so timely. Likewise, as more and more high-risk modes 
of finance, and seemingly predatory (or at least careless) lending practices came to light, a set of 
reformed sinners—bankers, mortgage brokers, securities traders and the like—came forward for 
confessional interviews and book deals, just as some former Enron employees had done. Yet 
overall, it seemed that by 2008 nobody consciously “remembered” Enron. It did not make a ready 
analogy, apparently, nor did people see it as a prelude to this far worse disaster. We have seen 
how low the standards are, in politics and media, for making associations between fairly 
incomparable phenomena. Thus it seems odd that Enron was almost never mentioned in 
discussions of this financial disaster, which included high-profile corporate bankruptcies. In two 
syllables: why not?  
 First, the blame and the fury for the 2008 crisis found no single corporate target—or at 
least no consistent one. Names like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, 
and AIG paraded through the news, and while each did arouse a flurry of indignation, none had to 
suffer very long before being upstaged by the next in the public theater of ignominy. Enron, by 
contrast, probably remains the most disgraced name in American business, even though 
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 WorldCom’s bankruptcy, which followed just a few months after Enron’s, was larger—later to be 
outstripped, in turn, by Lehman. It seems Enron was just isolated enough, and just compelling 
enough, to appear in a class by itself even though that was far from the case. 
 Enron also stood out, as we have seen, by virtue of its colorful cast of characters and 
their intriguing back-stories and interrelations. “Kenny Boy,” the villainous Skilling, and folk 
hero(ine) Sherron Watkins spent far more time under individual spotlights than did any single 
person in the 2008 crisis (with the possible exception, though unwarranted, of Bernie Madoff). 
Just as the mortgage and credit disasters, and the attendant recession, lacked an obvious 
corporate scapegoat, so too did they seem to lack a human face. Both of these notable absences 
might be attributed, at least in part, to lessons learned in 2000-2003, when so many companies 
and executives went from celebrity to shame. It seemed some kind of savvy had developed as to 
how to minimize the prominence of one’s company or oneself—thus, how to stay on the margins 
of a narrative—even when caught in a widely publicized bankruptcy or a cycle of significant 
failures. Given the abundance of literature and professional advice on corporate and personal 
image, and specifically on how to manage it while under fire from business journalists, protestors, 
regulators, and politicians, this is entirely possible.  
 Yet whether coincidental or not, it was in some ways appropriate that the 2008 financial 
crisis was never pinned on any one, or even any three or four, corporations or individuals. The 
Enron scandal, and the others that closely followed, surely were symptomatic of certain systemic 
failures and of flawed paradigms of thought and valuation. But the overarching problem there; 
namely, inaccurate reporting of finances and assets, and condoning thereof; was fairly discrete 
and identifiable compared to what caused the 2008 crisis. It was also more plausibly attributable 
to specific firms and people who had misbehaved, and who had done so on purpose. Six years 
after Enron, it was not so much that crucial values were inflated, as that crucial values were 
indeterminate.3 To name the two fundamental, mass misconceptions that turned US financial 
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 markets into the proverbial house of cards by 2007: first, mortgage-backed securities and 
mortgage-backed financing were considered safe because home property was ostensibly a solid 
asset; and second, debt began to be evaluated on the basis of its salability (in the form of 
securities and derivatives) rather than on the traditional basis of whether the borrower would 
actually be able to pay it back.4  
Granted, a certain amount of genuine uncertainty had always been part of Enron’s 
deceptive accounting. Conversely, a certain amount of deliberate puffing, for the purpose of 
continued faith and continued investment, had always contributed to the mystique of those arcane 
financial instruments whose worth was finally impugned beginning around 2007. Overall, 
however, the financial crisis and recession resulted from a seemingly sudden vacuum of 
information, even with all potential lying aside. Into that vacuum rushed doubt, which quickly 
became anxiety, and then panic. Thus localized blame—politically expedient and emotionally 
relieving though it may be—was not only less practical, but also less possible. Perhaps this is 
why the financial crisis and recession of 2007-2009 cannot in sum be called a scandal, nor is it 
easy even to locate a central scandal or scandals within them.5 It was not only insufficiently clear 
who had transgressed. It was also even more ambiguous than in the case of Enron what the 
relevant rules and norms were, and therefore how to tell when and where they had been broken. 
In any event, it would be difficult even to conceive of, much less to prosecute, a “scandal” in 
which nearly everyone who worked in the huge US financial sector was implicated. 
Nevertheless, anger and blame were inevitable, and as manifested in recognizable 
patterns both were about as generalized as in the above “scandal” formulation—and just as 
unwieldy. “Banks” or despicably rich “bankers,” as well as “the media” or perhaps “the business 
media,” were as specific targets as any mass backlash ever adopted in the long term. Essentially, 
the allegations ran, reckless financiers had played fast and loose with ordinary Americans’ 
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 investments, and the cheering section at CNBC, along with other breathless business reporters, 
had continued to forecast an ever-growing market with ever-rising returns. Both groups—who 
were purported to have expert knowledge—must have known, or should have known, that the 
“bubbles” in mortgage and derivatives eventually had to burst. 
The 2008 Crisis in History 
Suspicion and blame toward both banks and the media had historical precedent long pre-
dating the trauma of the Great Depression. Business historian Stephen Mihm has shown that 
during the nineteenth century—which witnessed intense controversy over currency coinage as 
well as a flourishing industry in counterfeit bills—Americans who mistrusted the banks often 
likened them to counterfeiters for the arbitrariness and spontaneity with which they seemed to 
open and fail, and to provide or deny. This analogy obviously denigrated bankers, but it also in 
some way elevated counterfeiters. Indeed, Mihm found abundant evidence that many in the US 
used counterfeiting, effectively, as a means of banking, insofar as it ensured liquidity in amounts 
small and large. Many who manufactured fake money or attempted to buy things with it had been 
dealt out of the formal market of real currency, perhaps because they were disabled, 
unemployed, or widowed. Writ large, this sometimes meant mass amounts of counterfeit 
functioned as “loans” to people who otherwise could not have secured them. (This practice was 
particularly common, and important, in the developing but highly disorganized economy of the 
American West). In any of these cases, counterfeiting provided where banks refused or failed, 
and accordingly, many counterfeiters were well-known and appreciated within their communities, 
and received help as needed in hiding from authorities.  
By equating these two sources of capital, Americans suggested in effect that they held 
certain fraudsters in higher esteem than bankers, because they were more reliable both 
logistically and ethically.6 Rejecting the sanctioned institutions in favor of an informal, unregulated 
alternative, they judged purveyors of money (or “money”) by the practical effects of their activities, 
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 not by legal status. It appeared in the late 2000s that bankers still had to prove they brought more 
contributions than risks to the American economy and society—and once again, they had failed.  
Likewise sources of news and information have long been suspected—often with good 
reason—of compromised reporting on markets and finance. Many of the first journalists of early 
modern Europe were partial to certain business interests: companies would reward newspapers 
for positive stories by purchasing advertising space or by financing writers’ travel. Sometimes 
firms even supplied their own news coverage, planting in newspapers stories that they 
themselves generated, to pass them off as the work of independent journalists. In the nineteenth 
century United States, investor columns were often used to manipulate markets. For generations, 
some American financial reporters got away with using inside information, collected on the job, to 
their own investing advantage.  
Though such alliances and tricks are more easily detected today, it appears that in some 
form they persist. Enron had a number of external advisory committees, including journalists, who 
gave counsel on the company’s media image for a $50,000 annual honorarium. One might well 
question those reporters’ inclination, in that context, to write critically about the company. In the 
2008 crisis, business commentators came under fire for capitalizing on the rash mood of the 
preceding few years. Some had been promoting stocks that they themselves owned.7 If not an 
obvious offense in itself—given appropriate disclosures—these optimistic analyses certainly 
looked more suspicious in hindsight. 
Both banks and the media were and are implicated in any mass crisis of valuation. At the 
peak of American counterfeiting it was barely relevant, says Stephen Mihm, whether a bank note 
was real, as long as it was accepted, as currency, in exchange for something else.8 The same 
pragmatic principle might be applied to the highly complex financial instruments of the early 
twenty-first century: collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), for example, functioned perfectly well 
in capital exchanges as long as the people who handled them—usually bankers—agreed, 
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 collectively, that they held value. Likewise analysts and journalists of finance were only able to 
understand and report on what they saw if they shared in this estimation. (The emperor’s robe 
was on display again.) Under such circumstances it was not important, in practical terms, to 
establish any objective valuation of CDOs—and this was convenient, as such calculations proved 
incredibly difficult.  
Americans, evidently, have always understood this concept of value-by-consensus—from 
the willingness of so many to deal in counterfeit bills in the nineteenth century to the explosion of 
consumer debt via credit buying when an ever-expanding group could never realistically commit 
to paying their bills. Yet while people are always aware of this flexibility in valuation, they do not 
always welcome it. Just as shopkeepers of the nineteenth century cursed their luck upon realizing 
they had accepted counterfeit money, so investors felt wronged when they saw their investments 
shrivel during the recent mortgage and credit crises. As long as someone benefits from a 
misconception of value, it seems, he finds nothing objectionable. But when suffering himself from 
such a misconception, then a swindle has taken place. Moreover, he feels, others (often, experts 
or “the media”) should have detected fraud and sounded an alarm. The 2008 crisis amounted to a 
mass re-valuation of financial assets; an unpleasant process of scrutiny like the one a clerk might 
apply to a suspicious-looking bill. In both cases, the scrutiny came too late. 
Mihm suggested that amid the panics of the 1830s, so many banks were insolvent that it 
made little sense for officials and regulators to spend time investigating counterfeit operations. 
Their efforts, he argued, would have been better spent bolstering those institutions that were 
supposed to be—and needed to be—legitimate and reliable.9 It does make sense, however, to 
focus on the illicit, even when the licit is in shambles, if one of your main objectives is to publicly 
reaffirm which is which. The 2008 analog is latter-day con man Bernie Madoff, an investment 
broker who was firmly ensconced in the financial community of New York City. Madoff ran a fairly 
classic Ponzi scheme, using money from new clients to pay dividends to existing ones rather than 
actually investing any funds in an outside market, as he purported to do. This pyramid strategy 
only works as long as new contributions grow exponentially—being either simply higher amounts 
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 of money, or coming from an expanding pool of unsuspecting “investors.” If Madoff’s fraud was 
predictable, so was its outcome.  
In some circles Madoff was accepted as the financial crisis personified. Indeed at least 
one scholarly analyst of contemporary political economy, Andrew Gamble, endorsed him as “the 
face of the financial collapse.”10 Yet it appears Madoff had been carrying on this fraud for over 
twenty years. Theoretically, he could have been discovered at any point—including during the 
boom times of the late 1990s, for example, when he probably would have seemed a random 
outlier rather than “the face” of anything in particular. (Indeed, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission [SEC] staff had tried to call attention to Madoff more than once, beginning as early 
as 1992, but those investigations were mis-handled).11  
Madoff’s self-promotion on his professional website read in part: 
In an era of faceless organizations owned by other equally faceless organizations, 
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC harks back to an earlier era in the financial 
world. The owner’s name is on the door. Clients know that Bernard Madoff has a 
personal interest in maintaining the unblemished record of value, fair-dealing, and high 
ethical standards that has always been the firm’s hallmark.12   
 
Though obviously not in the quaint sense suggested here, Madoff’s practice was indeed 
reminiscent of an earlier era. Cheating people in the manner he did was far more in keeping with 
centuries-old traditions in the confidence ruse, than with the kinds of market disruptions that 
happened to be going on at the same time Madoff was caught. Indeed, the 2008 crisis was very 
much connected to “faceless organizations owned by other equally faceless organizations.” 
Madoff had evidently sought to exploit the common alienation from huge and impersonal 
corporations—in this case, most likely banks and market exchanges. In this sense he was a 
throwback even pre-dating 1920’s Ponzi. Madoff in his “personal” approach recalled the well-
dressed gentleman who greeted someone in a nineteenth century city street, which was crowded 
with strangers, claiming to be an old friend in order to borrow (permanently, as it turned out) his 
                                                 
10 Andrew Gamble, The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the Politics of Recession (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 100-01. 
11 Madrick, “They Didn’t Regulate Enough,” 57. 
12 “Madoff Securities: Quality Executions and Service Through Innovative Technology,” “The Owner’s Name 
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 watch or wallet.13 In distancing himself from the current experience of anonymity, corporate 
“facelessness,” again Madoff was right in how he described his service, though for the wrong 
reasons. 
Madoff’s scam was arguably far less important a priority for financial regulators and even, 
perhaps, the Justice Department, than were the mortgage and credit disasters that seemed to be 
worsening every day around this time. Yet his investigation and prosecution edged out these 
broader crises in terms of both manpower and headlines. His case was infinitely simpler, his 
narrative infinitely more accessible. In context of a crisis that was hopelessly complex and 
involved an unmanageable number of industries, transactions, and people, Madoff was a perfect 
swindler in profile, complete with a pun-ready surname. Like Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling, Bernie 
Madoff was prosecuted with great show, in part, to reaffirm the power of the federal government 
over business and the financial markets at a time when such authority was subject to heightened 
questioning. His punishment was, politically speaking, an attempt to solve a much larger problem. 
It is widely accepted that markets expand and contract in a cyclical pattern. Any kind of 
crisis or crash can be interpreted as a mechanism of economic self-correction—an adjustment (if 
drastic and painful) of valuations in, for example, the most popular securities of the moment, 
which brings their prices back in line with actual worth in terms of real productivity. Particularly in 
good times, yea-sayers tend to describe current market conditions and workings as 
unprecedented, and to declare that new technologies or methods have overcome whatever 
inefficiencies and instabilities that led to failures in the past.14 Such analyses simultaneously 
explain prices and yields that only ever seem to go up, and also assure investors that they need 
not fear any significant change in the other direction. The housing-driven boom of the mid-2000s 
was no exception. In 2002 then-Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, known to prioritize 
liquidity in financial markets especially through low interest rates, was knighted by Queen 
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 Elizabeth II for ensuring global “economic stability.”15 In 2004 and even again in 2006—with 
housing speculation and financial leverage staggering higher than ever before—Ben Bernanke 
(Bush’s chief economic advisor turned Federal Reserve Chairman) announced there had been a 
“great moderation.” The economy had achieved unprecedented stability, which could continue as 
long as inflation was contained.16  
Thus far, such triumphal announcements of a new economic order have been wrong 
every time: some kind of downturn is always possible, even inevitable. Indeed, whenever 
someone makes a statement along those lines, he is participating in exactly the mentality that 
brought on the last bust, which he claims cannot happen again. Near-mythical stories of bubbles 
and busts date virtually as far back as formalized investment, beginning with the South Sea joint-
stock disaster of 1720. It would be tempting to surmise that, rather than defying all precedent, 
markets and economies are doomed to play out precisely the same pattern of peaking and 
crashing over and over again. Amid crises like 2008’s, many commentators have indeed arrived 
at this conclusion.  
Some people proposed, as remedies, policies and regulations that actually had been on 
the books previously. Such suggestions only deepened the sense that history was repeating 
itself. For example, some suggested re-implementing the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which had 
separated commercial and investment banking activities. (Glass-Steagall was repealed in 1999). 
Others claimed that short-selling in stocks was at least in part to blame, and indeed this practice 
was temporarily banned in the United States and in some foreign countries during 2008, as 
applied to the stocks of certain large financial companies. The first major American controversy in 
short-selling had occurred in 1866, and, after the stock market crash in 1929, the practice was 
prohibited during “downtick” conditions—until 2007, when that rule was abandoned.  
Yet it is too easy to pretend that financial markets and the global economy are the same 
as they have been since the eighteenth century. The perennial axiom, in economic analysis, that 
nothing has changed, is just as deceptively appealing in its simplicity as the obverse: the conceit 
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 that everything has changed. A narrative of utter stasis is just as facile as a narrative of linear 
progress. Even to attempt to understand recent events, some kind of reconciliation between 
continuity and transformation is imperative, if difficult.  
Charles Morris argues that systems of finance in the nineteenth century United States 
were no less complex than the ones most common today, emphasizing that railroad financing 
was both highly abstract and daringly speculative.17 He also contends that Jay Gould, “master of 
the leveraged buy-out,” anticipated the finance schemes behind the wave of corporate 
restructuring in the 1980s.18 Most philosophically, Morris suggests that even the concept of 
money as a means of storing value, facilitating exchanges by proxy, was “but a step away from 
the notion of money as capital;” anticipating finance and all its elaborations.19 Derivatives, for 
example, being financial instruments whose value is “derived” from other securities or contracts, 
might represent a far removal of actual value from that which represents it.20 But by this 
reasoning perhaps derivatives are less remarkable than we might presume—with money itself 
having laid the necessary conceptual groundwork many centuries ago.  
Still, Morris asserts that the financial cycle, which in his terms proceeds from “innovation,” 
to “crisis,” to “consolidation,” now moves “breathtakingly faster” than ever before.21 We might 
attribute this acceleration both to the mechanisms of trading themselves, whereby contemporary 
technology can facilitate in real time nearly any transaction worldwide. One degree removed from 
the markets, however, digital media—both in broadcast and interactive capacities—may be 
equally important. Insofar as any crisis manifests a shift in collective psychology, communication 
in the dispensing of information and analysis (however hurried or informal) is crucial. Both of 
these conditions, which could make any meltdown faster and more disastrous, were at play in 
Enron’s bankruptcy as well as in the 2008 financial crisis. 
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 Thus many narratives were imbued with perceptions of the past—whether that past was 
familiar, foreign, or even a repository of prudent rules and safeguards which had been unwisely 
scrapped. At the same time, narratives of the 2008 crisis also frequently invoked the future. Some 
American news commentators expressed a fear that this downturn would unseat the United 
States as global economic hegemon—or, if that process had already begun on other fronts, that it 
would hasten a descent in the world’s political hierarchy. Less invested in the answer, British 
political scientist Andrew Gamble similarly wondered in print whether the crisis will in retrospect 
appear to mark “the beginning of the end” of US dominance of global markets.22 Some 
progressive academics, meanwhile, welcomed it as the death knell of neoliberalism.23 Even here, 
narratives that everything had changed—or would change—were at work, apparently without self-
consciousness, even among the most erudite. On one hand lay the assertion that absolutely 
nothing new or newsworthy had occurred, and on the other hand, a variety of narratives about 
change: from speculation that financial markets were fundamentally different than ever before—if 
only because they were more volatile—to the proposition that entire paradigms of hegemony and 
ideology might be on the verge of upset.  
Publicized recollections of past economic failures, as well as constant comparisons to the 
Great Depression, highlighted the challenges that recession poses for the grand narratives of 
capitalism and even democracy, in their treatments of the past and the future. Both capitalism 
and democracy rely on “optimism and progress, the sense that things can get better, and will get 
better.”24 If time now appeared to have doubled back on itself, it may have been because the 
equation of passing years with progress had been freshly exposed as imaginary. Instead of the 
bright destiny that had been promised, generations of innovation and renewal had brought about 
a crisis for which the best apparent options for meaning-making lay either in dismal comparison 
with the 1930s, or in frantic pronouncement that current conditions were worse than ever—or 
soon might be.  
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 The 2008 Crisis in Imagery 
Unlike Enron, the financial crisis seemed not to have any single image to serve, by mass 
consensus, as its symbol. Some people did conjure “collapse” and “re-building,”25 though without 
specific reference to the World Trade Center. The construction and demolition of buildings, 
indeed, has always made a convenient and accessible metaphor for establishments and failures 
in business. But a wide array of alternative images was also on offer, showing little uniformity in 
how people “saw” the blighted economy. Some favorite terms appeared to trade merely on 
alliteration, such as “credit crunch” and “mortgage meltdown.” Temperature also held appeal, 
along with some promise of springtime in finance: credit markets were said to be “frozen” and 
then hopefully “thawing” thanks to official efforts to “heat up” the economy. Meanwhile imagery of 
water flowed everywhere, its meaning constantly changing shape. “Bubbles” and “flooded” 
conditions were bad, and might even necessitate a “bailout,” which when not applied to a person 
thrown in jail, applies to a sinking boat. At the same time, “liquidity” was good—the desirable 
product of a thaw—and “TARP” (the acronymic shorthand for the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief 
program) might offer shelter from an economic torrent. 
Imagery of natural disasters also proliferated, recalling earlier generations that seemed to 
consider business and markets beyond human control—and thus subject to “storms” or 
“earthquakes.”26 James Cayne, former CEO of Bear Stearns, said his company “ran into a 
hurricane.” Even if he was not specifically invoking Katrina, Cayne here mimicked claims, 
common to many executives in his unenviable position, that they were victims of an “act of God,” 
a “hundred-year flood,” or some other cataclysm that fell arbitrarily from the sky.27 More gravely, 
business columnist and commentator Daniel Gross offered a comparison with death and grief, 
writing in 2009 that “dozens of institutions, thousands of careers, millions of dreams, and billions 
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 in value” had “died,” leaving the American public to begin five discernible “stages of grief”—
beginning with denial and then anger.28  
Evocations of suicide made an even more grim, if unsurprising, analogy. At the individual 
level, mythologies of businessmen jumping to their deaths from Wall Street skyscrapers were 
resurrected, recalling a long legacy of failed entrepreneurs and other economic upstarts—and 
perhaps Enron’s Cliff Baxter and even Ken Lay—who decided that life was not worth living 
humiliated, with dashed hopes and finances.29 The concept of suicide applied also to companies, 
as if they were people weighing the advantages of death. While taking a “poison pill” has long 
denoted a company’s self-destructive action to ward off hostile buyers, a firm “holding a gun to its 
head” appeared to have been newly coined in the late 2000s (if it is still uncommon). This was a 
metaphor for a huge company, probably a bank or investment functionary of some kind, 
persisting in financial gambles that were more and more obviously going to lead it to bankruptcy. 
Due to its inestimable interdependence with other financial institutions, and its significance in 
overall market health, such a threat of suicide was cause for widespread concern. Appearing 
prepared to pull the trigger on itself, the company could then manipulatively demand an 
emergency infusion of capital—if the government wanted it to live another day.30 
In late 2008, the mainstream media apparently began a conscious effort to moderate its 
language on the financial crisis. The Wall Street Journal stopped using terms such as “crash” and 
“pandemonium,” and Ali Velshi, CNN’s chief business correspondent, told the New York Times, 
“We’re very careful not to throw words around like ‘meltdown’ and ‘free fall.’”31 Such backpedaling 
may have been, in part, the news media’s effort to mitigate its embarrassment for failing to 
forecast the crisis. But a cynical observer might infer it was the ultimate sign that “pandemonium” 
or a “free fall” definitely now applied—one knows disaster must have struck when sensationalists 
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 start hesitating to say so. And indeed if, for example, the Wall Street Journal had decided that 
using evocative language to describe the crisis might actually contribute to the problem—perhaps 
by affecting investor decisions or even behavior among finance professionals—that was hardly 
reassuring as to the integrity or stability of the markets or the economy as a whole. 
Yet as Communication Studies scholar Lawrence Grossberg has pointed out, dramatic 
imagery for the 2008 crisis could be useful, politically, even for opposing constituencies. Anti-
capitalists could use extreme metaphors to portray the marketplace as uncontrollable and 
inhumane. At the same time, capitalists—especially the most gluttonous ones—might conjure an 
unprecedented emergency as an excuse to channel more money, including public funds, toward 
corporations.32 It seems both strategies were employed, although critics on the left were more 
willing to emphasize human actions and motives over the hurricanes, floods, and so on, to which 
business apologists frequently alluded. 
As in the case of Enron, people launched numerous attacks on the characters of 
executives—in 2008, usually bankers. But more noticeable than the usual allegations of “evil,” 
“greed,” and “corruption,” were references to benign human failings. Insofar as people were to 
blame for this financial crisis, it was more likely because they were “stupid,” “crazy,” or 
“delusional.” Such derogations applied both to the world of business and to the journalists who 
covered it. Daniel Gross, for example, boldly titled his book on the subject Dumb Money. His 
attribution of “dumb”-ness countered the era, just ended, of Greenspan’s “cheap money,” but 
more obviously the business network CNBC’s program “Mad Money,” where host Jim Cramer 
plugged all manner of mad investments, typically with flailing arms and strained throat.  
As to the bankers, Barry Ritholtz offered the explanation of “dot-com penis envy.” He 
claimed that old, East Coast bank executives had witnessed the instantaneous wealth and 
renown of young, California internet-based startups in the 1990s and become jealous. According 
to Ritholtz, aging men out to prove that they could still perform devised the convoluted 
instruments of finance that gained most traction during the 2000s: metaphorical “Viagra.”33 This 
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 analogy is elaborate enough to become tiresome, but, sexual imagery aside, it may hold some 
merit. Ritholtz’s choice to embarrass bankers in such a way, when he did not have to, speaks to 
the popular view of those businessmen responsible for the 2008 crisis as bumbling rather than 
inherently bad.  
Of course, to describe the financial crisis as a byproduct of a contest in manhood is also 
to make much of gender, even without admitting it. Ritholtz’s theory of “dot-com penis envy” is 
only one recent example in a long line of narratives about brash machismo in business failures, 
with Enron being no exception. Such notions not only erase the culpability of certain women; also, 
as we have seen, they can serve to place absurd expectations on women—sometimes even the 
same ones—as ad hoc moral authorities in a culture from which they are traditionally considered 
outsiders. The 2008 crisis did not bring with it any prominent female whistleblowers, nor, for that 
matter, any infamous female finance executives. Thus for the most part, unlike with Enron, the 
gendered language establishing credit—and more commonly, blame—was specific only to men, 
remaining abstract as to the other (implicitly absent) sex. 
Ready or Not: The Role of the Feds  
 Also subject to blame and derision for the 2008 financial crisis were regulators and the 
federal government. Recessions almost always imperil the seats of incumbent officeholders,34 
signifying a belief that those in charge could and should have prevented an economic downturn—
or at least a generalized irritation with the status quo. Such frustration and backlash are not 
necessarily unjustified. As in the case of the Enron bankruptcy, regulatory agencies, Congress, 
and even the President did deserve scrutiny as to how their actions and inactions may have 
facilitated or exacerbated the financial crisis. Here we will begin with the crisis’ possible regulatory 
antecedents, less visible and less interesting to lay Americans because they occurred behind the 
(media) scenes during generally good economic times. Next we will examine the government 
response to the “meltdown” of 2008, which if anything was all too compelling to its public 
audience. 
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 Through certain identifiable actions, the government and some regulators appear in 
retrospect to have courted disaster in the name of continued economic growth—or at least an 
appearance thereof. Historically low interest rates from 2001-2004 made borrowing cheaper than 
ever, enabling more and more people considered “subprime” borrowers (based on their lower 
likelihood of fully repaying) to secure loans anyway, including mortgages. Then-Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan has been blamed for keeping interest rates so low during this time, 
with allegations sometimes to the effect that he did so to win a popularity contest.35 (If so, his ploy 
largely worked). Meanwhile the SEC moved in 2004 to allow major investment banks to leverage 
at heightened degrees of risk.36 In a related action—done on request and problematic for similar 
reasons—it also waived rules for these banks’ holding reserves, meaning they were no longer 
required to keep as much cash on hand.37 Overall, banks may have been allowed to grow too 
large, too complex, and too involved in too many different activities to be effectively managed.38  
At least as important as such activities, which might be considered foolhardy if not 
malicious, were arguable sins of omission.39 The Federal Reserve had the authority to scrutinize 
various forms of mortgage risk, but declined, even after one of its governors urged that it do so 
during the early 2000s. Likewise the SEC could have researched securities firms’ investments—
investments of unprecedented levels of borrowed money—and yet did not do so.40 As with the 
embarrassing mismanagement of warnings about Bernie Madoff, here the problem might not be 
incompetence, laziness, or corruption at the SEC, so much as its chronic understaffing and lack 
of money. (Pay and prestige at federal regulatory agencies overall have been eroding since the 
1980s, though the root problem here—chronic under-funding—is probably not an accident.)  
Finally, calls to regulate derivatives trading, beginning in the late 1990s, fell on deaf ears. The 
classically free-market justification for such permissiveness, notably propounded by then-deputy 
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 Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, was that derivatives reduced risk within markets and 
that regulating them would limit investors’ strategic options.41 
 In yet another illustration of the ambiguous relationship between economic past and 
present, the accounting system known as “mark-to-market” has made a series of ironic 
appearances in the financial dramas of the last several decades. It is like a character in some 
epic soap opera, which might first appear peripheral to the plot, and then once established as 
significant shows up in some episodes to intervene for the good, and in other episodes to provoke 
unexpected conflicts. Enron and the financial crisis of 2008 provide the best contrast along these 
lines.  
The feature of mark-to-market most salient in the Enron bankruptcy was that it allows the 
projected revenues from a given contract to be reported immediately upon its signing, even when 
no money has yet come in the door. Having received permission from the SEC to use mark-to-
market in more and more of its lines of business, Enron grossly abused the system by booking 
unrealistically high “predicted” profits, and even by altering those predictions—always in the 
upward direction—whenever the company needed to report higher earnings in a pinch. After the 
Enron bankruptcy, many observers outside the finance and regulatory communities concluded 
that mark-to-market was a key enabler of the company’s fraud, and that the SEC should be much 
stricter about this practice, if not ban it entirely. 
Yet the other most important component of mark-to-market, which Enron invoked to 
justify using the system but then abrogated in practice, is that it requires a company or bank to 
update the valuation of its assets daily according to their “market” values. The advantage here—
not necessarily to the company’s balance sheets, but for the transparency of its financial 
statements and thereby the reliability of its own market valuation—is that marked-to-market books 
should more accurately reflect assets’ actual worth. Those figures fluctuate, sometimes widely. 
Therefore the more information available to everyone outside the company, as to how such 
fluctuations affect its financial position, the better. “Everyone,” here, includes investors, lenders, 
and the government. 
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 Mark-to-market might well have mitigated or even pre-empted the Savings and Loan 
crisis. Because the S&Ls were not required to report the market values of the mortgages that they 
owned, they were able to hide their insolvency (tens of billions of dollars in debt) for many years, 
during which the problem only worsened.42 None other than Jeff Skilling lauded this wisdom in 
the system, citing the S&Ls. These firms were collapsing right and left at exactly the time he 
called mark-to-market accounting at Enron a “lay-my-body-across-the-tracks” priority.43 Indeed he 
was probably right that if used honestly and correctly, mark-to-market would also have been 
prudent for Enron—in revealing its dire financial straits much earlier, that is, and thereby keeping 
its stock price down.  
Likewise it appears that mark-to-market accounting, more diligently and more 
consistently applied, might have helped to avoid such a drastic financial crisis in 2008. Because 
so many banks find ways around marking their assets to market, including moving more and 
more of their transactions off balance sheets, they can pretend—or even believe—that their 
finances are much sturdier than they are.44 Not surprisingly, this can include assets like 
collateralized debt obligations and other forms of derivatives. All of this is to say that even an 
obscure (to the general public) regulatory parameter, such as a method of accounting, can 
instantiate the zigzagging and doubling back of “progress” in capitalism. 
 Charles Morris has pointed out that governments and regulators usually respond to a 
financial crisis only after it peaks, and compares such efforts to “sweeping up broken glass.”45 
This observation neither accounts for, nor rules out, the possibility that regulatory reaction—even 
if belated and imperfect—might actually help to define the crisis’ worst point. That is to say, 
perhaps intervention seems always to have come at the most desperate possible time precisely 
because that very intervention helped ensure the situation would not decline even further. Even if 
this premise is impossible to prove, perceptions of what is, or was, the peak of a crisis, are crucial 
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 and can be self-realizing. If the state tends to intervene when collective panic compels it to, then 
by consensus the “worst time” has thereby been designated. For historical purposes it may not 
even matter much whether this consensus was right. 
But even assuming that regulatory intervention does occur only at the most desperate 
eleventh hour, and furthermore that public officials deserve blame for this bad habit, it is far from 
clear what good options they have in addressing economic crisis and recession. As finance 
historians observe, whenever self-appointed canaries sing warnings during times of market 
euphoria, they are ignored. Numerous examples of such failed admonitions begin in eighteenth 
century England and continue through the statement of a Federal Reserve founder in February 
1929 that US stock prices were inflated, and then Greenspan’s testimony to “irrational 
exuberance” in the securities market in 1996.46 Meanwhile there are no readily apparent 
instances in which warnings against speculation or inflated values have actually worked. Some 
economists did raise concerns about mortgage finance and derivatives in the mid-2000s. But in 
this case, as in those that came before, people who were making staggering sums at great speed 
simply did not want to hear of any “bubble”—not even the minority who got off of it early and 
quietly, signifying they may have anticipated what was to come.   
When it did come, in 2008, government and regulators became much more visible, 
though not necessarily in a way that either would have wished. Suddenly, and even more 
pronouncedly than after the Enron bankruptcy, business and finance rules and laws were in 
mainstream news reports, whether in stories about what had gone wrong, or in proposals as to 
what should be done next. Likewise once the crisis had hit, state intervention, for better or worse, 
necessarily shifted from a proactive to a reactive pattern. The most prominent and most 
controversial element in this reaction was the multi-faceted effort to relieve markets by way of 
government-granted liquidity. In other words, in many instances and in various forms, the public 
sector gave money—in great amounts—to the private sector.  
 Bailouts of all kinds were intensely unpopular with the public in 2008, as they almost 
always are. The concept of bailing out stands in square opposition to the prized American myth of 
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 pure meritocracy. In a culture so steeped in the ethic that one earns success and its spoils 
through hard work, arbitrary relief for people or companies who have made bad decisions and 
failed is predictably anathema. “None of us,” the rationale goes, “can expect to be rescued from 
the consequences of our own mistakes—so why should they?”47 Yet this sentiment does not 
necessarily rely on any generalized disdain for the coddled executive. Many Americans who 
themselves worked in finance were also offended by the government’s gifts of “relief.” The classic 
Wall Street adage, “eat what you kill,” exemplifies the pride that most of these people take in their 
brutal competition in intelligence and initiative. That contest alone is supposed to govern who 
among them rises and who falls.  
 The government itself also appears tarnished after bailing out a floundering bank or 
corporation. To begin with, politicians who like to position themselves against greedy 
businessmen find it hard to justify giving those people money. Moreover, official decisions as to 
who receives government capital, and how much, are often suspect, and indeed some legislators 
had business connections that made their support of 2008 bailout measures questionable in 
motive. This is not even to mention the staggering cost, to the public, of granting such aid. 
Bailouts from the 2008 crisis, by February of the following year, had cost over $14 trillion, making 
this the largest single federal expenditure in United States history. 48   
In September 2008 House Speaker Nancy Pelosi attempted to re-christen the “Wall 
Street bailout” as a “buy-in.” Apparently she hoped that cheerier phrasing could gloss over the 
glaring fact that taxpayers had by no means consented to what they were buying in to. Here 
Pelosi’s equivocation echoed previous generations’ justification for corporate bailouts. Though 
“subsidy” has long represented a primary component of state intervention in business, it has 
proven more palatable than “giveaway.” The latter “denotes a fundamentally passive role;”49 
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 despised probably for the same reasons as any form of government dole, including citizens’ 
welfare programs. “Bailout” may be an even more perturbing term because it is not passive, but 
unflatteringly active. In this image the government takes immediate and drastic measures to keep 
afloat a corporate ship which, if left to the pitiless seas of the market, probably would have gone 
under.   
President George W. Bush’s awkward attempts to defend TARP led him to one faltering 
explanation of the mortgage crisis: “All this—everybody got kind of interwoven” (emphasis 
mine).50 Particularly in the market of unbridled competition that Bush and his political forbears 
typically advocated, self-interested participants are supposed to gain or lose based solely on the 
merits of their own individual decisions. Bush here not only admitted how “interwoven” financial 
firms were with mortgage markets, but even more dubiously, he tried to use that to justify 
interweaving taxpayers ever more tightly with these companies—at a time when they were less 
attractive partners than ever. In this sense, it is ironic whenever bailouts happen under free 
market proponents like Bush.  
But attributing such instances, which are actually quite common,51 to emergency 
necessity, or some kind of “groupthink,” ignores the longstanding amity and mutual support 
between politicians—especially Republicans—and business. It should come as no surprise that 
just as a large corporate donor might bail out a legislator in danger of losing his seat, so federal 
leaders appear inclined to help out their partners in the business world when they risk being dealt 
out of a lucrative market. It is by this reasoning that Enron requested and may even have 
expected a federal bailout in 2001. There was no widespread economic “meltdown” in progress at 
that time, nor did the company’s bankruptcy bring on or even likely contribute to much of a 
recession. Thus Enron could not assume that any “groupthink” or serious concern of widespread 
economic havoc would work in its favor. The company’s leaders did argue that Enron was so 
financially interconnected with other firms and larger markets than allowing it to go bankrupt 
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 would be foolish—this is more or less the same “too big to fail” rationale that proved so crucial in 
2008. But it is more likely, if and when Enron executives were honest with themselves, that they 
believed the government, headed by their longtime friend Bush, might bail them out simply 
because in political terms the company deserved it. Cynically speaking, they were probably right. 
By the time they asked the Bush administration for aid, however, it was already too dangerous in 
terms of public perception for the government to be seen helping Enron. 
American business history has witnessed numerous corporate bailouts, including some 
fairly large ones, that happened relatively quietly and without much public objection (or public 
notice) although the funds came from taxpayers. This includes much of the Savings and Loan 
industry, and major financial institutions such as Continental Illinois bank in 1984. There was also 
a long pattern of financial assistance from the Federal Reserve to the banking sector during the 
early 1990s, which helped the latter recover from losses in real estate markets, and debt from 
foreign loans and leveraged buyouts.52 In Bailout Nation (2009), Barry Ritholtz pronounced with 
resignation that “the present system has lost its auto-correcting mechanism,” insisting that 
heretofore (the turning point is unspecified) companies were left to reap the harvests of their own 
stupidity.53 Yet even if financial markets have no ability to self-correct today, it is difficult to say 
with certainty that they ever did in the past. The problem is that this hypothetical experiment—
measuring what happens when the government intervenes in a financial crisis, as opposed to 
letting it either “auto-correct,” or not—has no control group. That is to say, crises have almost 
never been allowed to take their natural course. Panic and public outcry have in nearly every 
instance moved public officials to action, whether their efforts ultimately proved helpful or not.54 
At any rate, some bankruptcies and market failures really are more damaging than 
others, even to the point where the costs of bailout are outweighed, at least in economic terms, 
by the benefits.55 When Lehman Brothers—unlike Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Bear Stearns—
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 was denied government aid and allowed to fail, the consequences were not trivial. Although the 
company evidently was not too big to fail, it was too big to fail without extensive collateral impact. 
The stock market took a nosedive the following day, and credit markets came to a near total halt. 
Lenders worldwide who had made loans to Lehman were unable to recover those funds, or even 
to ascertain they would ever be repaid. Mortgage-backed assets no longer qualified as good 
collateral for lending. Money markets stopped loaning to investment banks. Financial journalist 
Jeff Madrick called it a “modern bank run.”56 
Why didn’t Lehman Brothers receive a bailout? The technical explanation was that 
private investors had by this time adequately protected themselves from the worst possible 
outcome of a Lehman bankruptcy.57 The political explanation, however, was “bailout fatigue”—
that the American public simply would not tolerate another huge infusion of taxpayer money to a 
company that appeared to have erred. Here we revisit the reason that government aid to 
corporations was so distasteful in a society that prized self-reliance and personal ownership. 
More generally speaking, however, the vehement resistance to bailouts—not only among the 
public but also evident in the discomfort of politicians—reveals a dissonance not only in culture 
but also in narrative.  
In a satisfying story, characters act in certain ways and then experience logical 
consequences for those actions. Effects are coherently related to causes. Events are organized 
in patterns of progression that make sense. Sudden interference from above is certainly not 
unheard of in the canon of familiar narratives—and it may be comforting when a deity, fairy 
godmother, or long-lost rich uncle appears out of nowhere to rescue a hapless and deserving 
protagonist. Here a moral is still possible, to the effect that virtue is rewarded. But suppose the 
story begins with a generally unsympathetic character or ensemble (in 2008, the financial 
industry) making a series of foolish decisions in the name of greed and bravado. Imagine the 
rescuer as another unpopular, if familiar, entity (the federal government), who saves the day not 
out of pure benevolence, but partly out of calculated self-interest. Here the narrative loses its 
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 symmetry. The magical intervention is unjustified, and no moral applies. Back in the concrete 
world of policymaking, the most common practical argument against bailouts is in fact called 
“moral hazard”—the risk that people and companies will take excessive risk if they have reason to 
believe the government will protect them. This term simultaneously seems to refer to market 
imbalance and to narrative injustice. 
Even the narratives coming directly from parties involved in a bailout are compromised at 
best. First, the recipients of aid hardly want to acknowledge how desperate a plight they have 
brought upon themselves—hence the “act of God” analogy so often invoked when executives 
face bankruptcy. Bailers-out are equally reluctant to emphasize the dire situation that compelled 
them to act—although paradoxically, to defend their intervention they have to do exactly that. 
Here they find themselves expounding upon the stupidity or negligence of the very people they 
decided to help. 
Even a narrative of redemption rings hollow in context of a bailout, no matter how familiar 
and how popular the notion of betterment through adversity. Some politicians attempted to take 
this line, but it was especially popular with bailout beneficiaries. General Motors most notably 
pushed the claim that after receiving federal assistance the company would emerge stronger than 
ever. Yet it seems incongruous that a person or corporation would learn much of anything, to its 
own improvement, by receiving a sudden and arbitrary boon. Here was the era’s most thorough 
bastardization of the American “bootstraps” narrative: a corporation promising to remake itself, 
with great discipline and inspiration, through receiving entirely unearned money from the federal 
government. Even if the lesson supposedly learned was “how not to end up a candidate for 
bailout again,” that was hardly flattering to the company as character. 
 Bailout narratives’ awkward portrayal of personal actions and their consequences often 
pivoted on the issue of executive compensation. If liberty and independence go hand in hand in 
the grandest American narratives, so too did they seem inextricable in political logics of how 
corporations should proceed after taking government money. Having proven their dependency, it 
seemed, the companies had forfeited their liberty—the most tangible case in point being the 
salaries of those same people whose leadership necessitated bailout in the first place. Americans 
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 have consistently expressed some distaste, if not disgust, at the dazzling incomes of many in the 
business world, with scandals like Enron’s typically making complaints even louder. In the 2008 
crisis, irate taxpayers saw generous pay within bailed out firms—especially retention bonuses as 
in the most infamous case of AIG—as especially egregious. They seemed to be rewards for a job 
ill done. But even the companies themselves appeared to recognize that taking bailout funds 
meant sacrificing some of their autonomy. Most recipients of TARP money and other government 
aid began paying it back as soon as (perhaps even sooner than) they were able, partly in order to 
regain absolute authority over compensation policies.  
Legislators and both Presidents Bush and Obama demonstrated with enthusiasm that 
they agreed: bailed out corporations should not be able to maintain lavish pay packages. Yet 
even as they promised not to funnel public money into the personal accounts of “failed 
executives” (this was always the favorite term, perhaps because it showed disapproval without 
being too accusatory), officials waffled when it came to actually mandating salary caps. 
Predictably, the major argument against such limits was that they would interfere with market 
competition—in this case, between firms over financial talent. Yet as much as bailouts had 
undermined businessmen’s image as strong, savvy, and independent, the reticence to cap 
executive compensation, at the rescued firms, may have curbed that damage. To allow generous 
salaries to flow unabated was to begin resuscitating an important fiction: that the people who 
move money around American markets are an extraordinary elite, living and working in their own 
insulated, mystical world.  
To Grasp the Crisis  
 Once again, the challenge of understanding the problem at hand was paramount, in 
narrative and in politics. Even more than in the case of Enron, the layers of complexity seemed 
only to multiply the further one investigated the 2008 crisis, with deciphering highly convoluted 
systems of finance and trading bring only the first of many challenges. The market euphoria 
leading in to 2007 may actually have required a sort of collective reverence for that which defied 
straightforward explanation. Part of the wonder of the bubble was that most people did not 
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 understand how money was being made and exchanged.58 As we have seen in many cases, 
including Enron’s, the business people involved rarely mind this dynamic until called upon by 
skeptics to do the explaining themselves.  
 Yet because finance is so complex, “simplicity…amounts to concealment.”59 In other 
words, to give a pat rundown of how financial trading worked by the mid-2000s would almost 
necessarily have been evasive, if not deliberately dishonest. Yet the opposite approach—the so-
called “data dump” in which those in the know simply deposit on the public unmanageable 
amounts of raw information—is equally vague even in all its precision. When people demand “just 
the facts” or “all the facts” they don’t actually want either option: that is, neither the reductive 
platitude nor the technical, comprehensive report. What they really seek is a narrative.60 That 
narrative must balance accessibility with whatever level of specificity its audience will find 
convincing, but not overwhelming. All of these standards are variable according to whom the 
narrative is for. Particularly in an event like the financial crisis of 2008 the task of meaning-
making, for the purpose of understanding, was as difficult as it was urgent. 
 Several key features of the “before” scenario—that is, the landscape of the market prior 
to crisis—posed special challenges in politicized arcana and opacity. Some accounts of how the 
bubble had come to be effectively blamed the same public who couldn’t understand the crisis 
now, for not understanding its antecedents before. Laypeople’s “financial illiteracy” was 
sometimes cited to explain why so many had committed to mortgages that, as now seemed 
obvious, they would never be able to pay.61 The Savings and Loan crisis had previously been 
analyzed along similar lines:62 essentially, uninformed consumers had gotten in over their heads 
and, implicitly, should have known better. Yet this explanation largely glossed over the 
responsibility of lenders—in 2008, mortgage brokers were the group most relevant—despite 
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 abundant evidence that they had consciously lowered their standards for borrowers (even 
courting particularly vulnerable ones), structured payback schedules with deliberate obfuscation, 
and generally misled people into signing who clearly should not have. Most likely the mortgage 
crisis arose out of both borrowers’ ignorance and lenders’ unscrupulousness.   
Hovering over both sides of these ill-advised deals, however, was a larger broken 
promise. American business people and consumers perennially re-tell this promise, and even 
seem to believe it: that in the land of opportunity, an honest worker and his or her family can own 
their home. It need not be lavish or located anywhere glamorous, but the stability, autonomy and 
pride associated with homeownership has become part of even a modest conception of an adult’s 
social entitlement. This does not necessarily seem unreasonable—particularly in light of the 
government’s consistent promotion of home-buying, including initiatives to make it financially 
easier, which date back to the New Deal era. Indeed the very term “subprime,” as used to 
describe borrowers who likely could not pay back their loans, may have continued this campaign 
via euphemism. It was an “egalitarian and inclusive” label that welcomed a new population into 
mortgaging; one that very much wanted in.  
For the financial industry, the term “subprime” was a means of perpetuating the housing 
boom.63 Thereafter it appeared careless mortgage lenders had knowingly peddled a fantasy to 
those who could least afford it—and it mattered little what these people were called as more and 
more lost their homes to foreclosure. The genuine sadness of the mortgage crisis was that it 
exposed the traditional dream (or, the common goal) of homeownership, as categorically out of 
reach for many Americans. When crisis gave way to recession, analogous promises of 
opportunity and security for many more people—including most notably the promise of work—
likewise fell into the realm of vain hopes. The realm of guarantees, meanwhile, looked sparser 
than ever. Overall, any lack of understanding in the “mortgage meltdown” and its consequences 
might be blamed at least as much on trends in business and policy that had encouraged false 
expectations, as on the inexpert public that had all too readily adopted them. 
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 Meanwhile the financial markets had securitized debts and begun trading derivatives 
from these mortgages and other consumer transactions. And beyond the sheer complexity of 
contemporary financial instruments were the mechanisms of decision-making among those who 
dealt with them. Today most securities are owned and traded not directly by lay individuals, but 
instead by institutional investors, including mutual, hedge, and pension funds; money markets; 
and of course financial firms. This means “ordinary people” never do or even see most 
calculations underlying the buying and selling of, for example, stocks; professionals primarily now 
make such decisions. Yet the professionals appeared, in 2008, to have had no specialized 
knowledge (or at least, not enough) to protect the rest of us from the market’s worst.64 If finance 
experts evidently did not know what they were doing, then who could assure the public they 
understood market functions—let alone knew how to guard against risk? As the Fix-It Guy 
demonstrated, the same questioning applied at this time to economists and pundits. It was a 
crisis in the concept of expertise.  
Any proposed solution, during this financial tumult, would have to make sense to 
everyone lest it prove a political nonstarter—not to mention a logistical nightmare.65 Though a  
certain degree of opacity is often desirable for leaders in business and government, the financial 
emergency of 2008, at least for purposes of securing relief, was not one of those times. Yet if the 
problem had boggled the popular mind, so, it seemed, did the solution. Occurring under both 
Bush and Obama, government relief initiatives and corporate bailouts occasioned by the 2008 
crisis, as represented in numbers, seemed unfathomable and therefore alienating. The Federal 
Reserve spent $5.255 trillion; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), $1.788 trillion; 
the Treasury Department, $1.15 trillion; and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), $300 
billion.66 Viewed from the receiving end—to name just a few prominent beneficiaries—Citigroup 
got over $300 billion; AIG, at least $173 billion; and the nation’s nine largest banks received $125 
                                                 
64 Morris, Money, Greed, and Risk, 138, 140. 
65 Ritholtz and Task, Bailout Nation, 296. 
66 Ibid., 181-82. 
 292 
 billion as a group. A set of smaller banks shared the same amount in government funds.67 Like 
the incomprehensible vastness of the corporation—highlighted during the Enron scandal as an 
obstacle to accountability—the sums of money that major American companies processed, and 
now supposedly required to stay afloat, lay beyond most people’s ability to meaningfully 
conceive. The only straightforward interpretation of these dollar amounts was that they were 
large. 
Some people—from lay commentators to pundits—wondered aloud whether the total 
figure for the Troubled Asset Relief Program ($700 billion) had been chosen arbitrarily, or at least, 
determined by a rather non-technical calculation: what was the greatest sum possible that would 
not provoke voters’ rage to an unmanageable level? Essentially, what was a huge number that 
did not sound too huge? Speculations like this one, as to how financial policy was formulated at 
this time, indicate very little faith either in the specialized knowledge of politicians and regulators, 
or in the integrity of their motives. Furthermore, they accused leaders of condescending to the 
public by assuming Americans were innumerate. The accusation was probably well-founded—but 
so too was the assumption that most voters do not cognitively process figures in the billions and 
trillions; that more likely they react to such numbers intuitively. Still, this mutual mistrust further 
illustrates the complex dynamics of understanding as power, and how they shaped the political 
fallout of the 2008 crisis.  
As Lawrence Grossberg has put it, the problem with most existing accounts of the 
financial crisis is not that they are untrue, but rather that they are “not true enough.”68 Here the 
hallowed but slippery concept of truth, which proved so pivotal in narratives of the Enron 
bankruptcy, returns. And once again it offers more questions than answers as to how 
technicalities should be weighed against comprehensibility, and even against moral values, when 
the job of politicized storytelling reaches its practical purpose: convincing a particular audience to 
support a particular course of action. Yet even this kind of re-composition of “truth” appears not to 
be working thus far.  
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 If 2008’s financial turmoil truly deserves the title of “crisis,” then perhaps it warrants a 
departure from the familiar parameters of narrative competition, particularly as applied to 
business and economics. Rather than continue to struggle over who does or does not “know” or 
“understand” the “facts” or the “truth,” it might not only be more honest, but also more productive, 
for expert meaning-makers to admit to their own incomprehension. Grossberg seems to suggest 
that “we” (presumably not finance professionals, regulators, or federal officials) should confess 
that we do not understand the crisis,69 but I would take the proposal further to include these 
groups—indeed, ideally, to begin with them. Such a mass act of self-humbling is inconceivable. If 
nothing else, however, it would certainly settle the question of whether the financial crisis of 2008 
included any unprecedented, unforeseeable, or paradigmatically transformative events. 
To Make Fun of the Crisis 
 Even amid the worst of the crisis, most finance executives, regulatory officials, and 
government leaders would remain unwilling or unable to acknowledge their confusions and 
shortcomings. Not surprisingly, satire emerged almost immediately to begin making these 
acknowledgments for them. Mockery and joking about the financial meltdown of 2008 followed 
the strong American tradition of criticizing business and business policy by way of humanizing its 
most important actors and laughing at their faults, mistakes, and dissimulations. Also, as it did 
after the Enron bankruptcy, satire in its many forms offered humor as an alternative to—or at 
least a temporary reprieve from—anxiety, anger, or despair. All of these sentiments, which can be 
quite depleting, were more acute and more widespread amid the 2008 crisis as compared with 
the Enron scandal. As urgently as people now needed narratives, then, they also needed some of 
them to be funny. 
 The terrifying magnitude of the crisis was perhaps the most important component of 
which people tried to make light. A cartoon showed a businessman with a briefcase who stood on 
a sidewalk (marked “Wall Street”) that overlooked a ninety degree cliff. The sign warning him of 
the drop-off read “DIP,” perhaps referring to the stuffy understatements many people feared were 
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 belying the crisis’ severity.70 Finance workers themselves also made fun of the industry’s plight, if 
perhaps from a different angle. One joke popular across Wall Street trading desks: “I went to a 
Citibank ATM this morning, and it said ‘insufficient funds.’ I left wondering if it was them or me.” 
Both personal and corporate bankruptcy, apparently, were possible and amusing. One trader’s 
anonymous email—which went on to circulate widely—read “This has been even worse than my 
first divorce. I’ve lost half my net worth but I still have my wife.”71 Without knowing how many 
subsequent divorces this trader had gone through (or perhaps anticipated?) this seems a fairly 
standard joke formulation: money as asset, woman as liability. However, for the writer of this e-
mail and for his colleagues, who forwarded it so freely, it was actually a rare, if tongue-in-cheek, 
admission. These professionals were suffering along with everyone else from market 
disturbances that they were supposed to know how to sidestep, or even how to exploit.  
The recession that followed was even more sobering—and so came the dark humor 
about living through an economic downturn. For example, one cartoon showed a manager 
handing his employee a layoff notice. “I’m sorry I have to let you go,” he tells the unfortunate, “but 
since this is a global economy, you may rotate back here someday.”72 A caption like this 
sarcastically exposes erstwhile catch phrases such as “global economy,” suggesting that they 
hardly deserved any technocratic mystique. Perhaps they had been meaningless all along. In any 
event, the problems that they purported to solve were now as severe as ever, at least as they 
affected ordinary people’s daily lives.  
 The people to blame for the 2008 crisis, jokes suggested, were at best careless and 
irresponsible. Many quips about Wall Street and the finance industry made telling comparisons to 
casinos, suggesting that the “players” involved were amusing themselves by risking (and, lately, 
losing) huge sums of the rest of the nation’s money. American International Group, widely vilified 
for its bonus payments after taking bailout funds, was nicknamed by more than one satirist “The 
Notorious A.I.G.” This was a reference to the late rapper Biggie Smalls, who had been known as 
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 The Notorious B.I.G., and was one of many comparisons between high-flying executives and 
mogul rappers. The Notorious B.I.G. perhaps made a particularly apt analogy for this insurance 
firm, however, due to his immense girth and his signature understated, almost lazy cadence. AIG, 
the “notorious” epithet implied, was a lavishly wealthy, bloated, and sluggish company that 
showed nothing but pride where it should have shown shame. Like Biggie Smalls, who had 
successfully marketed his own notoriety, AIG was exploiting a record of wrongdoing: taking 
bailout money and continuing to pay fat bonuses. Similarly, some of the Billionaires for Bush 
became “Billionaires for the Bailout,” highlighting the luxury that executives seemed still to enjoy 
even during the worst times of the crisis.73 
 Resentment and anger at the lush finance industry, and those government coddlers who 
were willing to bail it out, often lay at the core of such satire. Yet “populist rage” itself also proved 
a fair target. Late night news humorist Stephen Colbert mocked the bandwagon by pretending to 
jump on, furiously exhorting his audience to reach for their pitchforks and initiate mob violence 
against AIG bonus recipients (as well as any babies they might have).74 Colbert’s colleague Jon 
Stewart declared “our streets are boiling over in anger” about these same bonus payments—and 
dispatched reporter John Oliver to cover what was clearly the New York City Saint Patrick’s Day 
street celebration, teeming with drunken youth wearing green. Oliver stood among the masses, 
whom he called protestors, and shouted frantically about their fierce determination to make their 
objections heard.  
The correspondent also prompted revelers, with his questions, to make comments about 
the banking crisis that were utterly unintelligible. One particularly inebriated man in a leprechaun-
style hat jumped before the camera and bellowed “too big to fail!”—presumably in reference to 
himself. “In the hour and a half that I’ve been here, Jon,” Oliver summarized, “I have seen people 
passing out in anger! Throwing up in anger! Pissing up against the sides of buildings in anger!”75 
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 The comment of such humor was that “populist rage” is easily overstated, and that the public as a 
whole is not necessarily as involved or even as aware as minor uproars like the AIG bonus 
backlash might suggest. Yet lay Americans—even as represented by these St. Patrick’s Day 
partiers—were not necessarily the butt of this joke. It affirmed, essentially, that everyone was fine 
and that life, including raucous festivities, would go on. If anything, then, “ordinary people” had 
more reason to take comfort than did disgraced executives. 
Yet the party was not continuing quite so smoothly for most people, and some forms of 
crisis satire mounted much more serious complaints about the national economy and the 
government’s response. Warren Buffet in 2003 had called derivatives “financial Weapons of Mass 
Destruction”—likening them to the “WMDs” that, according to President Bush’s rationale for 
launching a war in Iraq that same year, Saddam Hussein was developing. Where Buffet had used 
the analogy in an attempt to warn, however, Daniel Gross used it to make a bitter gibe at not one, 
but two dubious legacies of the Bush administration. Writing about derivatives in 2009, Gross 
quipped, “No, American soldiers did not find any of those in Iraq either, just cash.”76 
Referring to the war in past tense, during the 2008 crisis, may have represented wishful 
thinking—even for all Gross’ sarcasm. The nation’s military commitments in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan often took lower priority, in the news, than the most dramatic events in the financial 
markets. But the nagging reality that those commitments were ongoing, even (perhaps in 
Afghanistan) deepening, pointed out another cause for confusion and complaint in terms of the 
American economy and how citizens think about its constituent parts. Many respectable 
observers still maintain that the US recovered from the Great Depression primarily thanks to 
World War II. Yet from even before that time, war has generally been associated, both empirically 
and mentally, with economic growth and prosperity. Furthermore, in wartime Americans usually 
tend to hold more favorable opinions toward large corporations, and to trust that in collaboration 
with the federal government, these companies are allies on the home front, deserving less than 
their usual level of suspicion.  
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 Amid the 2008 financial crisis, however, people in a variety of roles and of a variety of 
political persuasions started talking about war as a drag on the national economy. The mounting 
federal expenses of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts were invoked again and again, with people 
who advocated military scaling-back arguing that the nation could not afford them. “Afford,” here, 
took on its most concrete meaning: the government had many domestic bills to pay, toward the 
goal of economic recovery, and the huge budget item of foreign war should be slashed in order to 
compensate. An analysis of the economic effects of contemporary warfare is beyond the scope of 
this study, but it is worth noting that nobody on the other side of these debates attempted an 
economic argument. More likely, statements in favor of heightened military efforts made 
geopolitical or moral issues their focus. Many even acknowledged the great cost of the wars, and 
that those funds could be put to use elsewhere. They simply insisted that these foreign missions 
were worth it.  
As for the rule that wartime brings large corporations into the public’s good graces, it 
already had at least one glaring exception: Vietnam. Indeed in that case, opposition to the war 
often went hand in hand with opposition to business’ involvement in military mobilization and 
defense supplies. One might modify the rule, then, by concluding that as long as the public 
generally approves of a war effort, then it tends to approve of large companies that contribute. 
Yet the crisis of 2008 poses a challenge to this proposition as well. Despite widespread 
opposition, at this time, to two wars that seemed to be going on and on, almost none of the 
“populist” complaints about greedy executives, “fat cat” bankers, or bumbling financial companies 
made any conceptual connections to these unpopular military operations.  
Of course, one ready explanation is simply that no such connections existed. Yet even if 
this were true (which seems unlikely), that would not nullify the potential rhetorical power of 
associating hated companies with hated wars—especially since the government seemed 
committed to supporting both. In fact, in early 2003, when the Bush administration was preparing 
to begin bombing Iraq and anti-war protest was at its height, many dissenters did condemn 
defense contractors as immoral, arguing that the government would wage “war for profit” or 
sacrifice “blood for oil.” In turn, heated controversy arose over the reconstruction of areas 
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 decimated by American bombs, with no-bid contracts allegedly awarded to corporate favorites. 
Perhaps these kinds of arguments had largely quieted, by the time of the 2008 crisis, simply 
because people were too overwhelmed by the domestic effects of irresponsible business. 
President Bush’s lame duck status and subsequent exit also may have quelled the fury of his 
most committed critics. These Americans were the ones most willing to equate his administration 
with business pandering and war-mongering—though not all necessarily expected his Democratic 
successor to be a great improvement. 
During the 2008 crisis, Bush was widely perceived to have abdicated his responsibilities. 
Instead of setting about to solve the multiplying economic problems at hand, he seemed at best 
to be attempting damage control—with the “damage” he cared about most, perhaps, being to his 
reputation and presidential legacy rather than the markets’ or citizens’ well-being. After his 
election in November 2008, President-elect Barack Obama immediately began getting urgent 
questions about how he would deal with the financial crisis. His responses often included the 
caveat, “we only have one president at a time”—by which he tactfully deferred to Bush’s 
continued authority. Yet back in the project of grim, agitated humor, Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA), 
chair of the House Committee on Financial Services, improbably entered the ring. On 60 Minutes 
during the period between election and inauguration, Frank said of Obama’s mantra, “That 
overstates the number of presidents that we have at this time.”77 
Frank’s dry delivery, along with his distinctive husky voice, enhanced what was 
simultaneously a joke and an indictment. Yet his choice of words here did more than opt for 
humor over polemic. Indeed this quip concisely fused the crisis’ parameters of delinquent leaders, 
missing information, and failed expertise. Frank was suggesting obliquely that the United States 
had zero presidents—or perhaps some portion of a president that might be expressed as a 
decimal. Maybe there was even a negative amount of presidents, such that having none at all 
would have been preferable. In effect, he was equivocating with numbers. He was willing to 
commit to a statement on record that one was too high a figure. At least “at this time,” however, 
                                                 
77 “Barney Frank on Bailouts, Welfare,” 60 Minutes, CBS, 14 December 2008, 
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 Frank declined to specify the actual sum even though it held grave import for his audience. Such 
detachment and evasive technicality were all too familiar in pronouncements about the economic 
and political state of the nation, coming from suits in both business and government. Frank, at 
least, did not expect to be taken seriously.  
All The Presidents’ Narratives 
Whether George W. Bush was president, null entity, or some indeterminate fraction, he 
remained in office throughout the worst year of the financial crisis. For many Americans who felt 
he was not wholly doing his job, the ascendant Barack Obama offered a promise of something 
better. During the time leading up to his inauguration, when Obama was not being compared to 
Abraham Lincoln or Martin Luther King, Jr.—both analogies gesturing more to racial politics—he 
was associated with Franklin Delano Roosevelt in a statement of faith about economic recovery. 
Like FDR, Obama was to sweep into office with noble determination and a decisive popular 
mandate. He would transform economic policy, as only he knew how, and reverse the nation’s 
downward spiral. Such “hope” for “change”—two of the Obama campaign’s most common 
buzzwords—may have been born more out of desperation than actual expectation, at least as 
applied to economic issues. 
At the opening of his term in office, however, the overwhelming faith in and approval of 
Obama included a firm belief that he was not a friend to big business. In sharp contrast to Bush, 
and Republicans in general, the new president was perceived ready to whip the financial industry 
into shape, performing no favors and heeding no pleas. This image actually held currency in the 
form of a fear as well: some conservatives suspected that Obama (sometimes called a “socialist”) 
would use the financial crisis to undermine American capitalism. He might exploit the political 
temper of the moment, they worried, to implement scores of onerous regulations that would hurt 
competition, innovation, and duly earned profits. The phrase “reverse Reagan” referred to Obama 
as an economic statist who might roll back decades’ worth of privatization and deregulation—
opposite to the “revolution” launched in 1980.  
Obama’s staunchest supporters, in broader political terms, might have hoped for a 
“reverse Bush.” If the outgoing president had used the emergency and disaster of the September 
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 11 attacks to implement policies that might otherwise never have passed, many progressives now 
argued, pragmatically, that Obama had a mandate to do the same thing. Here, however, the 
threat at issue was not terrorism, but volatile markets and irresponsible executives. Some of the 
more radical elements on the political left embraced the very same prospect conservatives feared 
in Obama, hoping he would drastically overhaul how business was done in the United States. 
They freely admitted that, like Bush and his fellow neoconservatives, these were changes they 
had wanted all along, simply waiting for a moment of political opportunity. In its extreme form, this 
was the “real-life” application of academic speculations, seen earlier, that the financial crisis 
signaled the end of neoliberalism. It seemed a moment of great potential as well for various 
strains of anti-capitalism.78 Encouraging both progressive hopes and free-marketer fears, in 
November 2008 Obama’s chief of staff Rahm Emmanuel said, “You never want to let a serious 
crisis go to waste.” Lest his point be unclear, he continued, “What I mean by that—it’s an 
opportunity to do things you think you could not do before.”79 
While campaigning, Obama had emphasized repeatedly that he took no contributions 
from corporations or from Political Action Committees (PACs). Instead, he had played up his 
grassroots network of support and the role of small contributions from people of modest means. 
He would assume the presidency, he promised, without any debts to big business—only gratitude 
and humility toward the ordinary people who had helped him to victory. In addition to his personal 
background as the son of a single woman, raised by his grandmother; a scholarship student; and 
an African-American; Obama presented as a stark exception to the norm of privileged politicians. 
Despite his unfailingly professional veneer and scholarly diction, he seemed—in who he was and 
in what he was doing—to be no more familiar with big money than the great majority of voters.  
Obama’s campaign and victory have been called “historic” for numerous reasons, and 
rightly so. However, in addition to overcoming formidable hurdles, beginning with race and 
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 socioeconomic status, the Illinois senator also made another kind of history when he won the 
nation’s highest office—and this claim to fame brings less honor. Setting aside (temporarily) the 
matter of where Obama’s campaign funding came from, the fact was that his presidential 
candidacy was the most expensive in US history. By the end of October 2008 he had raised 
almost twice as much money as his general election opponent, John McCain, and out-spent him 
on television advertising by a ratio of four to one.80 Even without any suggestion that Obama 
“bought” the oval office—that is to say, that he deserved to lose, or would have, given less 
money—there was nothing particularly inspiring in the acknowledgment that Obama ran a 
fabulously well-funded campaign, and won. Yet this is no less true, and certainly no less 
important, than any of the more celebrated stories about this man and how he became president.  
For most spectators, campaign funding was hardly the most compelling feature of the 
2008 presidential contest. It had to compete with race, gender, generational dynamics, 
interpersonal harmonies and clashes, family back-stories, rumored skeletons in various closets, 
and occasionally—when all these subjects were exhausted—policy debates. Yet the amounts of 
money, and even more significantly, the kinds of money involved, made for a little drama of their 
own; one that resumed from prior episodes in 2002 and 2004, and even included some of the 
same characters. Most obviously, John McCain, namesake of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act, won the Republican nomination. He had made a somewhat surprising comeback from a 
primary campaign “grave” of obscurity—and from the scant funding that is both its cause and its 
effect. That he, rather than someone else, was the Republican to run against Obama made for a 
much more complex dialogue—both between and within the two parties—about how campaigns 
should be paid for.  
After securing the Democratic nomination, Obama announced in June 2008 he would opt 
out of the public campaign finance program for his run in the general election. This meant passing 
up the public money to which, as a major party candidate, he was entitled—but also that he was 
free to raise and to spend unlimited amounts of private money. Obama was the first presidential 
bidder ever to forego public funding in a general election since the system was implemented after 
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 Watergate.81 The only reason, practically speaking, why any candidate would make this decision, 
is that he can raise more money from private donors than the public funding rules would allow 
had he opted in. In other words, Obama recognized the wild success of his campaign fundraising 
up to that point, and sought to take full advantage. During the Democratic primary campaign he 
had committed to participating in the public funding system, but evidently he was pleasantly 
surprised by the $265 million he raised against Hillary Clinton.82 
Given Obama’s self-positioning against money’s influence in Washington—and his 
endorsement of the public finance program while a primary candidate—the choice to fund his 
general campaign exclusively with private money required some explanation. The GOP camp 
immediately criticized it, reminding voters that McCain bore the righteous mantle of the public 
finance system, and stating that Obama had revealed himself as “just another typical politician 
who will do and say whatever is most expedient.”83 Many liberals as well were disappointed by 
what they saw as a hypocritical decision. In his rebuttal, Obama attempted to reconcile his anti-
big money stance with what was, in effect, an admission that he now had big money. He 
reiterated his support for the public campaign funding program, but said it was best not to 
participate because of all its “loopholes,” including the largely unregulated 527 organizations. Not 
only was the system “broken,” he stated, he had “opponents” who were “masters at gaming” it.  
This rationale appeared a stretch: Obama was opting out of a public system that he 
himself had praised as a bulwark against privately bankrolled elections, because it was somehow 
(suddenly?) corrupt. The candidate was probably lucky that relatively few voters were paying 
close attention to this sub-plot in the campaign storyline. As the general contest went on, the 
Obama campaign would go on sidestepping regulations intended to keep elections clean. 
Fundraising training workshops offered specific instructions for soliciting contributions from 
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 “business colleagues” without running afoul of campaign finance law,84 and despite his constant 
promises of transparency Obama’s donor lists were the least clear or accessible in a generation 
of presidential contests.85  
Given his widely publicized decision not to take contributions from corporations or PACs, 
how could Obama afford to decline public funding? It was certainly no lie that he made an 
impressive haul in individual donations—but not all came from middle-class Americans moved to 
give what little they could spare, as the Obama campaign liked to suggest. Many more of these 
gifts came, as in any campaign, from affluent people corralled by professional fundraisers or 
courted at glamorous private campaign events, who gave the maximum amount legally allowed 
under BCRA: $2,300. Typically their spouses would do the same, with the second sum officially 
coming from another “individual” though perhaps taken out of the same bank account. One 
couple who gave in this manner—also, in this campaign like most others—was the candidate and 
his wife.  
Even so, however, these kinds of contributions to Obama’s campaign would never have 
been able to compensate for the vast private sector donations that he said he would forego. As it 
turns out, perhaps not surprisingly, the simple statement that Obama took no funding from 
corporations was not entirely true. First, because all individual contributions over $200 are tallied 
according to donor’s occupation and employer, strong patterns often emerge linking industries 
and even specific companies, to particular candidates. This is not to suggest that firms direct their 
employees to make campaign contributions, or to whom—indeed, such mandates are illegal. 
Nonetheless, it requires no great leap in logic to surmise that corporate employees—particularly 
higher-ranked ones, who probably have both more money and more of a sense of their 
company’s stake in politics—might make common and predictable choices in contributing to 
campaigns. That is to say, corporate executives appear to give in discrete groups, and for 
reasons that are not impossible to guess.  
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 The top six contributors to Obama’s primary campaign hailed from Goldman Sachs, UBS, 
Lehman Brothers, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Citigroup.86 In the general election two of Obama’s 
five largest donor groups were associated with Goldman Sachs and Microsoft.87 Most of these 
companies also gave, if in smaller amounts, to Obama’s opponents. Some of their counterparts 
within the same industry contributed to other candidates even more. And there is no evidence 
that Obama made any special quid pro quo with these firms. However, this overview of 
contributions does establish that large corporations did not necessarily see an adversary in 
Obama—nor, practically speaking, did Obama find any united front of opposition among them.  
Second, Obama did receive help from trade associations, advocacy groups, and 527 
organizations. These entities can, and sometimes do, fill their coffers partially or even entirely 
with corporate money. Thus to accept a gift, or benefit from advertising, paid for by any such 
group, is to accept funds from private companies—only with an intermediary and perhaps some 
anonymity to gloss over the money’s real origin. Favoring Obama were numerous single-issue 
interest groups, as well as professional organizations in the fields of education, law, real estate, 
insurance, and securities.  
One group worth mentioning in particular that managed to contribute richly, though 
indirectly, to Obama’s campaign, was hedge funds.88 Such a generous flow through the loophole 
is amusing given the candidate’s purported stance against big money, for hedge funds have 
been, since the time of Enron, among the most suspicious shadows on the economic scene. 
They rely on high-risk finance tactics, they command vast sums of money from incredibly wealthy 
investors, and they face the most lenient regulations of any trading firms. Yet even people who 
know none of this can parrot the argument of some experts that hedge funds are dangerous to 
financial markets,89 and it is not out of the question, given how much capital they control and how 
much influence their transactions exert, that hedge funds helped precipitate the 2008 crisis. They 
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 are neither illegal nor even necessarily problematic in any inherent way. The irony here is simply 
that the hedge fund sector, which so thoroughly epitomized the era’s business bogeymen, helped 
bring into office the very man who many hoped would tame this wild world. 
It is hardly surprising that Obama never volunteered a more frank and thorough account 
of how, or even just how well, his campaign was funded. Not only would such an announcement 
have marred the “hope” and “change” tableau of November 2008; it also would have posed a 
major challenge to his image as antagonist to big business and antidote to Bush. This omission 
only presaged further inconstancy from Obama on matters of business regulation, for as his 
supporters averred—sometimes with disappointment—being the president required even defter 
maneuvering than being a candidate.  
In the statements he made directly to business leaders at the outset of his term, Obama’s 
philosophy on government’s role in the markets sounded very similar to those of recent 
predecessors Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. The context of financial crisis, if anything, 
enhanced rather than impeded Obama’s courting of corporate executives. In a speech to the 
Business Council in February 2009 he said, “I’m here to enlist your help,” and praised the group’s 
history of benevolent “corporate citizens” who had helped the national economy through its worst 
times theretofore.90 Likewise he told the Business Roundtable that during past crises and 
recessions, “Government has stepped in not to supplant private enterprise, but to catalyze it.”91  
To address the possibility that business leaders might actually carry blame for the 
financial crisis, Obama expressed solidarity with those under fire—by comforting the executives 
and speaking somewhat patronizingly of “ordinary” Americans.  
We live in such a rapid-fire, information-rich environment that people’s attention spans go 
like this. [Note: presumably some gesture here indicating brevity.] And that makes for 
volatility in confidence. A smidgen of good news and suddenly everything is doing great. 
A little bit of bad news, oh, we’re down in the dumps. And I am obviously an object of this 
constantly varying assessment. [Laughter.] I’m the object-in-chief of this varying 
assessment. [Laughter.]92 
                                                 
90 President, Address, “Remarks to the Business Council,” 13 February 2009. Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents (GPO Access: frwais.access.gpo.gov). 
91 President, Address, “Remarks and a Discussion with the Business Roundtable,” 12 March 2009. Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents (GPO Access: frwais.access.gpo.gov). 
92 Ibid. 
 306 
  
By comparing his own position to theirs—and getting a laugh in doing so—Obama was affirming 
that he and the Business Roundtable were in it together. Indeed they were. Rightly or not, the 
public’s “assessment” of anyone even associated with the financial markets had by this time 
“varied” quite far in the negative direction. But Obama here suggested that volatility in 
confidence—which is always crucial in beginning and ending economic crises—played both to his 
and his audience’s advantage as often, or perhaps even more often, than not. This statement, 
probably more than the President intended, also illuminates the similarities between the political 
and financial spheres. In both, fortunes can rise and fall almost instantaneously, and favorable or 
unfavorable “assessments” may carry great impact even when they lack solid reasoning. Obama 
himself, both in his meteoric rise before this statement and his sagging approval ratings since, is 
a strong case in point. Not only, of course, is he a politician; he is one of the politicians who have 
been most strongly associated with the 2008 financial crisis—sometimes as part of the solution 
and sometimes as part of the problem. 
The sense of a shared perspective would also apply to Obama’s actual work of making 
policy. During a question and answer session, Harold McGraw III, chairman of the Roundtable 
and CEO of McGraw-Hill, rejected the popular notion that Obama’s administration and the 
business community would be “like, well, oil and vinegar.” “We have the same common goals 
right now,” McGraw told the President, speaking for his group, and he then asked Obama “to set 
up a regular schedule such that the expertise of the chief executives here could work with 
whoever you designate to be a sounding board, pushing back and helping to form those kinds of 
opinions.” Obama replied, “Absolutely. Well, look, that’s exactly the kind of partnership that we 
seek…there are actually a lot of people in this room who our team has consulted with on a 
regular basis, and we hope to do more of that in the future.”93 
The Obama supporters who had dreamed of some new, take-no-prisoners approach to 
business regulation would have seethed to hear this exchange. Here McGraw, speaking on 
behalf of the nation’s most prominent CEOs, explicitly requested an ongoing forum for special 
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 input on the President’s policies. Obama, for his part, obsequiously assured him they already had 
his ear. The style, as well as the content, of this dialogue, would also have irked those wary of 
business and its apparent dominance not only in politics, but even in everyday life. From 
“sounding board” and “pushing back” to “partnership” and “our team,” McGraw and Obama were 
sharing office-speak so clichéd that they might have been standing by a water cooler in a sit-com. 
Granted, any representative of any trade or interest group would probably make a request like 
McGraw’s. Likewise, any wise politician would publicly welcome input from a constituent group; 
and the friendlier the terms, the better. And of course, our nation’s leaders are notorious for 
adopting the local vernacular wherever they go. In this instance, however, exceptional money and 
influence are difficult factors to ignore. In other words, notwithstanding Obama’s background in 
community organizing on Chicago’s South Side, he knew who he was dealing with now. Both 
President and CEO understood: the stakes were higher, here, than in just any agreement to 
“touch base” or “circle back”.   
To someone familiar with business-government collaborations, there is nothing 
particularly startling about these kinds of statements from Obama. They do clearly demonstrate, 
however, that he was no less welcoming than his presidential predecessors to the priorities of 
large corporations—and also no less comfortable, or collegial, with their executives. And indeed, 
Obama’s continuation of TARP, his economic stimulus initiative of February 2009, and his 
approval of the auto industry bailout aroused more suspicion that he was all too willing to cater to 
business leaders—even by giving them taxpayer money outright. Early in his term complaints 
also began that his economic advisors, including Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and 
National Economic Council Director Larry Summers, were too cozy with bank executives and 
even beholden to Wall Street; liable to confuse the interests of the public with the interests of their 
friends.  
An awkward anecdote from a past press conference is strangely apropos: 
Q: Sir, what about the hedge funds and banks that are overexposed on the subprime 
market? That’s a bigger problem. Have you got a plan? 
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 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. (End session).94 
 
This response—which was none at all—might have come from a presidential impersonator on 
Saturday Night Live’s “Weekend Update,” simply walking away from the podium rather than even 
acknowledging this most serious question, which was on many people’s minds. In fact, however, 
this was the real president: Obama’s predecessor, speaking (or rather, ceasing to speak) in 
August 2007.  
At this time, as the unnamed reporter suggested, upheaval on the mortgage markets was 
beginning to portend worse things to come, and Bush’s audience sought much more from him 
than this polite dismissal. The mention of hedge funds would have made this question unpleasant 
for leaders of either major political party, due to connections demonstrated in the 2008 campaign 
and before. As for the banks “overexposed to the subprime market,” they would become Bush’s 
problem soon enough—and then, in turn, Obama’s. Aside from being both funny and darkly 
foreboding, however, this dialogue also serves as exceptionally raw testimony to that which did 
not change when Obama replaced Bush in the White House. At the time of this writing—more 
than a year into Obama’s term—few Americans would say that the request for a “plan” has 
satisfactorily been answered. Last-minute, ad hoc, vehemently resented emergency bailouts do 
not qualify.  
Each of the “crisis presidents”—if Bush and Obama can be so-called—were both 
subjects in, and creators of, important narratives. First, there were narratives about the men 
themselves. From the first time Obama gained wide national recognition, addressing the 
Democratic National Convention in 2004, he began telling his own story, emphasizing his humble 
beginnings as testimony to the American promises of equality and opportunity. His purported 
alienation from the affluent elite, special interests, and big business, followed logically in this 
narrative. When the origins of most of his campaign funding posed a challenge to the story, he 
chose to play that down.  
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 Part of the risk, there, was related to narratives about Bush—that this fortunate son, 
coddled from birth, had essentially inherited the presidency despite ample evidence he was not 
up to the job. Infamously backed by the “haves” and the “have mores”—and Enron, for good 
measure—Bush embodied the corporate-political alliance that Obama railed against, and he 
made a particularly handy whipping boy toward the end of his term, with his approval ratings 
lower than ever. While Bush had also been adept in his down-home personal profile and his 
folksy manner of speaking, and while his own narrative of humility and salvation had won him 
much affection, most of his political goodwill had dried up by 2008.  
Then came the narratives that each of these presidents used to turn the financial crisis 
into a story. Like it or not, such meaning-making is part of the job—and Bush, for one, had little 
luxury of preparation for his executive summary. From the beginnings of the “mortgage meltdown” 
in 2007, Bush reminded Americans over and over again of the resilience of their economy and 
society, and reprised the promise of redemption and betterment familiar from September 11 (and 
awkwardly applied to Enron as well). He also maintained that the federal government remained 
firmly committed to free markets, and that “democratic capitalism” was unquestionably the best 
system of political economy in the world. These are the kinds of statements that, from an 
American president, do not bear repeating under normal circumstances.95 
Struggling to justify TARP and the 2008 bailouts, Bush insisted that allowing financial 
firms and, for example, the Big Three automakers, to fail, would have seriously harmed the 
families and small businesses of “Main Street.”96 Here was an uncomfortable, though 
counterfactual narrative, again conjuring the “interwoven-ness” that was hard to reconcile with 
Bush’s ethic of independence, ownership, and personal responsibility. He was suggesting that 
ordinary Americans were so bound up with the fates of large corporations that they should 
consent to taxpayer bailouts (though not to the pockets of “failed executives) because in the end, 
it was for their own good.  
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 In one brave attempt to maintain distance between the perpetrators of the crisis on one 
hand, and himself and his country brethren on the other, Bush said: 
I mean, I had a lot of people—when I went out to Midland [Texas] that time—say, “What 
the heck are you doing, boy? Those people up East caused the problem.” I said, “I know, 
but if we hadn’t worked to fix the problem, your situation would be worse.”97 
 
This mini-narrative is notable for its positioning both in time and place. First, Bush insinuated that 
his “work” (already completed) to “fix the problem,” had pre-empted something “worse.” In fact the 
only thing definitely coming to an end by mid-January 2009, when he made this remark, was 
Bush’s presidential term. In that sense alone was the “work” finished. Furthermore, the 
denigration of “those people up East,”—which Bush attributed to some fellow Texan, but which he 
also accepted—stood out as a return to the traditional scorn of New York City after a fairly long 
hiatus in the wake of September 11. Earlier in his term Bush had praised the city and its 
denizens, and vouched for their exemplary American-ness. But now they had brought a crisis 
upon themselves and also all their innocent countrymen. 
 In his farewell address Bush launched immediately into recollections of September 11 
and reviewed his administration’s efforts against terrorism. Though it was not a short speech, and 
though it reviewed numerous events of the preceding eight years, it made absolutely no reference 
to any business developments or to economic issues of any kind.98 For a presidential term book-
ended by Enron at the outset and the financial crisis at its close, this was obviously a deliberate 
omission. Insofar as Bush was attempting, here, an early and laudatory narrative of his own 
presidency, he apparently wanted no corporations or markets to appear. He could, and on other 
occasions did, find ways to portray his own time in office as one of business growth and 
economic progress. But evidently by January 2009, Bush (or at least his speechwriters) did not 
have the stomach to force that story.   
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 The problem of narrative, for the 2008 financial crisis, persisted. In what was probably a 
backhanded compliment, Bush had called Obama “a better speechmaker than me,”99 and indeed 
whether people liked or resented the President-Elect, most agreed that he had a way with words. 
Here was another reason why so many of Obama’s supporters had faith that the crisis would 
abate when he came to the rescue. It seemed Obama could clarify concepts and appeal to 
skeptics on a variety of policy issues. As the financial crisis had worsened, during 2008, and 
neither the current president nor the Republican presidential candidate had offered a coherent 
response, the professorial Obama inherited progressives’ hopes that somebody could explain the 
disaster and then lead the way out of it. A crucial part of the hope for change hinged on a new 
narrative. 
Evidently, in this regard Obama was convincing enough as a candidate, and he enjoyed 
high popularity and confidence when he was inaugurated in January 2009. By the end of his first 
year in office, however, he had already received much criticism relating to his job as the nation’s 
highest-ranked explainer. Naturally, many Republicans and conservatives simply objected to his 
policies, including his strategies in addressing the financial crisis. Within his own party, however, 
complaints often focused instead on the challenge of accessibility and understanding. Nobody 
questioned Obama’s intelligence; indeed during his campaign some supporters had worried that 
he might appear “too smart” to gain the public trust. Rather, on bailouts and financial policies—as 
well as others, particularly health care reform—the Democratic camp was beginning to argue that 
though Obama had the right ideas, he was not adequately explaining them. The President was 
hemorrhaging much-needed political capital by failing to make himself clear.100 Many 
commentators even said that what he needed was a coherent “narrative.”  
Polling data did reflect widespread incomprehension, particularly on financial 
developments of that time. Large percentages of voters—in about the same proportions across 
the political spectrum—admitted they understood the crisis on Wall Street “somewhat well,” “not 
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 too well” or “not well at all.”101 Meanwhile, the most accessible images and the simplest narrative 
concepts that Obama did use were strikingly similar to those of Bush. Obama promised that the 
nation would emerge from the financial crisis “stronger and more prosperous” than before, and 
that intervention (particularly bailout) was justified lest the havoc spread “from Wall Street to Main 
Street.”102 Such assurances may not have worked any better for Obama than they had for his 
predecessor, but apparently he had no better ideas. 
Conclusion: “And Then…” 
The story—insofar as there was one—was far from over by the end of Obama’s first year 
as president. Debate raged as to whether the recession had definitively ended; and if so, whether 
it was permanently over, or bound to return, perhaps even worse, as the second low point in a 
linear chart line that might look like the letter W. The impact of the financial crisis on markets or 
even on regulation, in the long term, remained unclear. And just as Bush had claimed that the 
seeds of the crisis had been sown before his term,103 so Obama had said he “inherited” the crisis 
from Bush. (As his term progressed, that premise convinced fewer and fewer people that Obama 
held no blame.) Industries, companies, and a few well-known individuals all still held concerns, 
and rightly so, about how they might feature in historical accounts of the 2008 financial crisis. 
The story of Enron, as it turned out, was not over either—largely because a few of its 
obdurate characters did not want it to be. Though to far less media coverage, the scandal and the 
questions it raised continued to echo in three Supreme Court cases entered in 2009. One 
challenged the constitutionality of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, on grounds that the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board that it had created violated the separation of government powers. 
Another, recalling Mitch McConnell’s lawsuit of 2002, contested the McCain-Feingold Act as an 
abrogation of companies’ and unions’ first amendment rights—and a 2010 decision in favor of the 
                                                 
101 Fox News/ Opinion Dynamics Poll, Fox Broadcasting Company, 2 April 2009, Field Date 31 March – 1 
April 2009; Pew Hispanic Center Poll, Pew Hispanic Center, 8 January 2009, Field Date 11-30 November 
2008.  
102 President, Address, “Weekly Address,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (GPO Access: 
frwais.access.gpo.gov), 24 January 2009; President, News Conference, Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents (GPO Access: frwais.access.gpo.gov), 9 February 2009.  
103 President, News Conference, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (GPO Access: 
frwais.access.gpo.gov) (week ending 16 January 2009), 12 January 2009.  
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 plaintiffs did strike down BCRA’s limitations on the funding of campaign ads. Finally, fulfilling his 
vow, Jeff Skilling appealed his criminal sentence to the highest court in the land. Three years in to 
his prison term, he argued—again through lawyer Dan Petrocelli—that his trial had been unfair, 
based in part on location (a complaint Judge Lake had dismissed), and in part on the legal 
standard of “honest services,” which the jury had found Skilling did not provide. The verdict, still to 
come at the time of this writing, depending on its scope may bear broad implications for white 
collar prosecutions and sentencing, including those related to other accounting scandals that 
occurred in the early 2000s.   
As 2009 came to a close, pundits and the news media reflected on the foregoing decade. 
Just as they lacked consensus as to what to call it, in pop parlance—the oughts? the ‘00s?—
there seemed an uncomfortable ambivalence in their attempts to summarize its events. 
Particularly on matters of business and economics, the decade’s narrative might have been much 
more encouraging had it been cut off a few years early. Instead, commentators had to confront a 
ten-year stretch that began with the dotcom bust and Enron, WorldCom and their counterparts; 
proceeded through what in retrospect was clearly just another bubble, even in brick and mortar; 
and then concluded with a much broader and deeper crisis, spreading from mortgage to credit 
and then seemingly everything else.  
More sobering still, not only had 2000-2009 witnessed its own economic fits and starts; it 
seemed that much of the decade’s bad news, in business and finance, really represented delayed 
damages from what had appeared to be positive developments in the past. Where the 1990s had 
been the best calendar decade for stock performances, with an average annual gain of 17.6 
percent, the 2000s had followed as the worst. Such a drop-off strongly suggested that the ‘90s 
had been an economic aberration rather than any real burst of growth, and that that decade’s 
bustle in trading and entrepreneurship left securities dangerously overvalued. Since the end of 
1999 stocks had lost an average .5 percent per year—a lower performance than any calendar 
decade in recorded stock market history. Here was one grim indicator to which the qualifier “since 
the Great Depression” did not apply, for the previous record of .2 percent annual average 
 314 
 losses—set in the 1930s—had been broken.104 Yet even all of this aside, a similar narrative, 
stripped of statistics, resonated with people who did not read the Wall Street Journal. It was hard 
for anyone to characterize 2000-2009 as an era of economic growth given that effects of both the 
market downturn and the recession were still undeniably with us at the end. 
In the December 20, 2009 issue of the New York Times, columnist Frank Rich offered a 
blunt assessment of the 2000s that blended business, the media, and popular culture. Though 
Ben Bernanke had been named Time Magazine “Person of the Year,” Rich called him a 
“schnook,” like everybody else in the world of finance, and said Bernanke hardly deserved such 
an honor for “putting his finger in the dike” far too late. In Bernanke’s place the columnist wryly 
anointed golf star Tiger Woods. Woods had been a worldwide brand name with an impeccable 
public profile until late that year, when news broke that he had strayed from his marriage. The 
scandal began with one mistress coming forward, but it turned out that Wood’s indiscretions 
spanned many years and at least two continents. Although ultimately busted, Rich concluded, 
Woods had pulled off quite the “con,”—less on his wife than on his global fan base and on the 
numerous companies with whom he had promotional contracts. “What’s striking,” Rich wrote, “is 
the exceptional, Enron-sized gap between this golfer’s public image as a paragon of businesslike 
discipline and focus[,] and the maniacally reckless life we now know he led…. People wanted to 
believe what they wanted to believe.” 
Accordingly, the womanizing golfer well represented not just 2009, but indeed the whole 
preceding decade. Rich characterized the 2000s as an era of massive-scale deception, with 
Enron as opening act and the subprime mortgage crisis as finale. Other “successful ruses” during 
the intervening years included the rationale for the Iraq war. According to the columnist, it was all 
part of the same collective delusion that the September 11 attacks, rather than the Enron 
bankruptcy, had provided a compass in 2001 showing Americans where they stood in the world, 
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 315 
 and what direction pointed to safety and progress.105 Terrorism was a real threat, of course—but 
the nation’s legions of domestic “hucksters” were in a sense more dangerous because they were 
so subtle and so adept in their dissembling. Indeed, “schnooks” like Bernanke were among the 
people who were supposed to make expert judgments on the nation’s behalf—and yet they were 
at best oblivious to, and at worst complicit in, the largest and most ominous cons. 
Rich probably could not be blamed for taking such a sarcastic tone given the context of 
this writing. His narrative of the 2000s was part satire, in that it embraced the feel-good 
designation “Person of the Year” (Sherron Watkins, emeritus) but re-purposed it as a badge of 
infamy, or at least ambiguity. Conflating heroes with villains, Rich essentially argued that the 
United States’ most prominent personages should be those who truly represent its cultural 
climate, with money always at the fore. For this era, he judged that a multimillionaire-golden boy-
adulterer was about right.  
Yet if anything, Rich’s narrative of the 2000s was too bounded in its events, its 
characters, and its cause-and-effect pairings. Like any storyteller, the columnist had to choose 
somewhere to start, and for his purposes Enron was as good a point as any—especially because 
so many people had already forgotten about it. But Rich’s depiction of this particular decade as 
the era of the con ignored an American history of deception and false promises at every turn. 
Thus this story also, gloomy as it was, actually took too optimistic a view of what had preceded 
the 2000s and, implicitly, of what will come next. To assume that this decade will be remembered 
for its business blunders and its financial collapses is to suggest that nothing similar, let alone 
worse, has happened before or will happen in the future. Finally, we see here once again how 
even those narratives that seem most irreverent often adhere to traditional principles of the form. 
Rich inadvertently endorsed two popular axioms: that his story was unprecedented, and also that 
it would ultimately have a happy ending.  
The only thing certain about the future of American business and finance is that humor 
must remain in abundant supply. Luckily, there is no evidence of its drying up. Even people who 
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 make no claim to understand economic news have shown themselves willing and able to make 
fun of it, and they continued in this yeoman’s task even through the darkest days of 2008. In this 
regard, however—just as on issues of business regulation and state intervention in financial 
markets—that year’s presidential election raised questions as to what kind of “change” Obama 
might bring. Just as some supporters, during his campaign, had worried that he might be “too 
smart” or even “too cool” to be widely relatable, some commentators suggested for similar 
reasons that Obama as president might make a difficult target for satire. Perhaps the shift that he 
represented—from cynicism to “hope”—would have a downside. 
And yet, as all should have known, jokes would find a way. “Saturday Night Live” came 
up with an impersonator as soon as Obama achieved prominence on the political scene. In his 
debut as “Fauxbama,” Fred Armison warmly but firmly assured armies of swooning (female) 
journalists that it was “okay” that all of their questions to him were easy, and all of their reports on 
him adoring. Already an impressive study in majestic head motions and sonorous baritone, 
Armison’s technique sharpened over the course of the 2008 campaign at about the same rate as 
Obama’s. Likewise print caricatures came easily, exaggerating the President’s angular facial 
features and his lanky build until he appeared a very narrow pillar of (somewhat less) dignity. 
Especially as his term and the recession continued, Obama began speaking from both corners of 
his mouth, in cartoons, just like any of his presidential predecessors.  
One editorial cartoon published early in Obama’s term shows the President as a doctor—
complete with clipboard, lab coat and stethoscope—standing by the bed of a deathly ill man 
designated “ECONOMY.” The patient is hooked up to six monitored support systems, each of 
them bearing the dollar sign, and yet still appears to be gasping for breath. “I’ll feel better about 
his chances for recovery,” Doctor Obama says to some Everyman hospital visitor, who is 
standing with him bedside, “after he’s able to be taken off life support.”106 Such a scene highlights 
all the most salient themes in narratives about business and government, both amid the Enron 
scandal and through the financial crisis. The numerous high-tech IVs and monitors on which the 
economy depends are indecipherable to the reader. Moreover, the “$,” all presumably coming 
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from the government, though administered with haste and in great quantity appear not to be 
working—or if they are, then just barely. Finally, the “presiding” expert doctor seems no better a 
judge of the situation than anyone else. His expert prognosis manages simultaneously to be both 
contingent and completely obvious. At the end of the 2000s, even as the economic patient’s vital 
signs appeared somewhat more encouraging, his fate and the role of politics in it was still 
anyone’s story to tell.  
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